Viscount Eccles
Main Page: Viscount Eccles (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
Viscount Eccles Excerpts
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Ullswater)
My Lords, if there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for 10 minutes.
Viscount Eccles
I would like to detain the Committee briefly on a point of clarification that arose out of last week’s proceedings. Grand Committee Hansard for last week states:
“The creation of the CMA has also been welcomed by business groups and practitioners, including the CBI, the Federation of Small Businesses, the Institute of Directors, the Forum of Private Business and the City of London Law Society”.—[Official Report, 12/12/12; col. GC 335.]
The Committee will remember that we were debating the creation of the CMA under Clause 20. In col. 338, my noble friend Lord Razzall said that,
“all the major business organisations and the Law Society are in favour of this recommendation”.—[Official Report, 12/12/12; col. GC 338.]
That did not tally with my memory of the Government's response to the consultation on this matter.
Paragraph 317 of the consultation, which was admittedly published some time ago, states:
“A number of respondents expressed stronger concerns about the creation of the CMA and did not support it. Notably, the City of London Law Society and the Joint Working Party of the Bars and Law Societies of the UK on Competition Law (‘Joint Working Party’), echoed by many individual law firms in their responses, considered the proposed CMA to involve some real disadvantages that outweigh the potential efficiency benefits”.
So the government document published in March said in terms that neither the City of London Law Society nor the Law Society, which are two completely different organisations, supported the creation of the CMA.
Now I recognise that they may have changed their minds. When three Front Benches agree something it seems to become inevitable and in true British style they decided to make the best of it. But at that time it is quite clear that they did not agree.
I have gone over the ground with the Law Society. I confess that my impression is that it has not changed its mind. It repeats that,
“the merger is not expected to achieve any material cost savings; and, although there is potential for a single CMA to deliver efficiencies of the kind mentioned in the Consultation Paper, the [Joint Working Party] is very doubtful about the scale of such benefits. More importantly, the [Joint Working Party] sees a real risk that the benefits of the merger will in practice be more than outweighed by the loss of the benefits of independent decision-making by separate organisations”.
The Law Society ends by saying:
“The scale of these risks is such that the [Joint Working Party] is not persuaded of the case for a single CMA”.
As the whole burden of my own argument was that we were running into trouble with the legal profession if we created the CMA on a single-institution basis, it was quite important to clarify where these two important organisations now stand.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Lord Marland)
My Lords, as my noble friend said, we did not actually mention the Law Society, but he has responded with a statement from the Law Society. We mentioned the City of London Law Society, which, as he said, is a totally separate body. I quote from a statement made by Mr Robert Bell, the chairman, on 21 June 2012. The CMA,
“will help competition policy be more cohesive, and it will help streamline the regulatory process, which, in turn, will provide efficiencies and boost business confidence in the rigour of the competition system in this country”.
He also said:
“There are benefits to be gained. On the merger of the CC and the OFT, we do not really have a very strong position, but we are pleased to see in the Bill that the checks and balances between first-stage and second-stage merger investigations and market investigations have been retained. There is potential to streamline the regulatory process and make it faster”.
I am very content with that statement. It is unequivocal, and it is just one example, which was used by my noble friend on a previous day in Committee, of a number of institutions that supported it. I hope that that clarifies the position.
The Deputy Chairman
My Lords, there is no question before the Committee so we cannot have a debate. I call Amendment 24C.
Schedule 5 : Amendments related to Part 3
Amendment 24C
Viscount Eccles
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I want to probe the Government’s attitude towards penalties in this part of the Bill. My amendment would take out an order-making power which is there by virtue of an amendment to Section 94 of the 2002 Act. There is already, of course, a power to settle turnover and to levy damages. That power comes from Section 28(2) of the 2002 Act. Indeed a statutory instrument was laid in 2003—the Enterprise Act 2002 (Merger Fees and Determination of Turnover) Order 2003.
Why do we need a new power and why do we need the new power to run in parallel with the old power? The Government state in their submission to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee:
“This new penalty will run in parallel with the existing civil enforcement mechanism for failure to comply with interim measures under section 94 such that a person could potentially be liable to damages under Section 94 and a financial penalty under clause 25.”
Some explanation is needed of the Government’s approach to penalties in this part of the Bill. In following a policy of simplifying and deregulating things, and creating more certainty for business, it could be argued that this overlap between two penalty regimes is going in the opposite direction. In thinking about that, I would be interested to know from my noble friend, what has been the experience under Section 28(2) and the statutory instrument which flowed from it. Are we absolutely sure that we need both? I beg to move.
Lord Marland
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this complex issue. In terms of the methodology, I undertake to look at it in some detail. This will come along in secondary legislation, once we have had a chance to look at it, because it is not a straightforward matter. We are applying rules in terms of financial turnover and in terms of percentage of the market. We then need to know how to enforce the penalties. Clause 25 provides the CMA with the power to impose a fine of up to 5% of the worldwide turnover. That is the effect of the clause that we have created. It is complex and my noble friend has drawn our attention to it. We will look at it in secondary legislation rather than having something in the Bill. I hope that that will encourage my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Eccles
I am grateful to my noble friend for that reply. It probably needs to be looked at because it seems to me that here we have some sort of tightening of the screw. If you believe in tightening the screws—frankly, I do not—and you believe in civil sanctions and administrative fining, which I find a difficult subject, one has to justify why one is hardening up the regime. I do not have up-to-date information so I do not know whether any damages have been levied under the existing statutory instrument. If there have not been any, which seems quite likely, it is even more important that this hardening of the position be justified. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, these amendments have been tabled simply to raise the issue. The Government may well have a different solution. They all relate to the incredibly detailed provisions in Schedule 8 for the procedures and time limits of how the CMA should carry out its business. We have nine pages of procedures set down in the schedule. I think it is a lawyer’s paradise and a regulator’s nightmare. These amendments suggest different ways in which we can simplify them, while at the same time remaining bomb-proofed to judicial review and so on.
Some of the problem stems simply from the amalgamation of the two bodies and having to preserve two stages of the investigation. Consequently, there will have to be ring-fences, Chinese walls and, for all I know, barbed wire and high hedges, but it does not need to be as complicated as this. Is setting it out in statute, in a complex and incomprehensible schedule, the best way to deal with it? My noble friend Lady Hayter mentioned the other day that it might be better to leave the board of the CMA to sort out in detail what the procedures should be, like most regulators and most organisations. The role of the board could be separated from the role of the investigators, as other regulators, such as the pensions’ regulator, do.
These amendments are tabled to give us a brief debate on the issue. They offer a number of alternatives. Amendment 24Q would make it clear that the board can set its own procedures, subject to the time limits. Amendments 25ZA, 25ZB and 25ZC would delete those paragraphs of Schedule 8 that relate to procedures and just leave the time limits. The Question that Schedule 8 stand part could delete the whole of that schedule and leave everything to the board. There are probably other options.
The Minister’s amendment was a tiny snip. We need wholesale pruning of this schedule, but it does not appear to be on offer. I seriously suggest that, if we leave it like this, the CMA will get caught up in procedural challenges and threats of judicial review. Every corporate lawyer in the land will be looking at this and ensuring that they follow every dot and comma of it. I think that the Government would be wiser to prune it and leave much more to the CMA board to sort out for itself. I beg to move.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, because his contribution means I do not really have to say much about Clause 26 stand part. The real effect of knocking out Clause 26 would be to knock out Schedule 8, so perhaps we can elide the two.
This is a very tricky area and I am sure that it should be thought about again. There is already a time-limit regime—lots of it from 1998 and 2002—and there is a clear general duty of expedition, which is referred to in Clause 26:
“duty of expedition in relation to references”.
It is clear in the current legislation that everyone is supposed to do things in as timely manner as possible. The question then arises of why the Secretary of State thinks that his or her intervention is helpful in this matter, which was very much the line along which the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, was going. I cannot see that it is helpful, nor that it is consistent with the coalition’s policy towards these matters. I thought that we believed in decentralisation, deregulation and trusting the professionals. It seems quite strange to introduce this regime, and of course it has to be hedged about with all sorts of escape clauses. If something gets as far as Brussels, all time limits are off the table; it says so in the schedule. The 40 days can be extended by 20 days, you can stop the clock in certain circumstances and—again I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Whitty—the lawyers will have great fun, as they always do, with this kind of overcomplicated and apparently statutorily enforceable system because they find ways around it. I am very much in support of the noble Lord’s amendment—if it is not to be accepted as it is, I very much support the way in which he put it across.
Lord Marland
We have had two excellent points of view, but the reality is as follows. Britain is seventh worst out of eight regimes in the world in terms of speed, in a review carried out by KPMG. That is a terrible place to be. We are seeking here to give some real clout to the process. Yes, the OFT exists on a 40-day rule but it is not statutory, and as a result 15 out of 76 cases have exceeded that time limit. We want to enforce that limit because it is absolutely no good being seventh out of eight in the world. We are enforcing the 40 days and we have put a period of undertaking in lieu of 50 days, as opposed to nil, and a period of implementation of 12 weeks, as opposed to nil. That is a very big step forward.
Often you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t, but one thing is for certain: we have to get our speed and efficiency up in getting these deals sorted, because that sends a clear message to industries that are merging. As we know, businesses want one thing, and that is clear messages. I therefore feel that this is the right approach for this Government. I do not totally disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, as on many occasions—I have rarely disagreed with him—we could perhaps have taken a more aggressive stance. This is a very good start, though; we will of course keep these things under review, but this is progress. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and, when we come to it, that my noble friend Lord Eccles will do the same.
Viscount Eccles
Very briefly, my Lords, my noble friend’s answer is an abdication of management. If you believe that public bodies should be of a certain strength and have a certain independence but then you say, “Of course, they cannot be trusted to do the job unless we can visit them and beat them over the head every now and again”, if we keep on going down that road, we will not only be turning more and more people out there in the country off the political system but completely missing the right target, which is not the legislation but the behaviour under it. That is what Ministers need to concentrate on. I am very disappointed that my noble friend cannot say whether, since May 2010, there has been any improvement in the performance of managing the way that time is spent in the OFT. If that is so, it is a kind of double abdication.
Lord Berkeley
My Lords, I have a few worries about this amendment. It sounds fine for the companies. They will merge, grow and make more money. That is wonderful. What if you are a consumer at the other end of these events? I see something of this in the West Country where I live. There are a number of quite small companies there and occasionally they play around at trying to take each other over or merge, and you end up with monopoly situations. I do not know what the solution is.
A monopoly with a turnover of under £5 million is just as dangerous to the consumer as a monopoly with one of £100 million. Competition is key. I do not know whether there is a simple way for the new authority to look at this and possibly not get involved but suggest another route. It is wrong to put a figure on this and just allow companies to merge, because they are small, without looking at the consequence of the merger on the customer and whether there is still competition for whatever services that are provided rather than turning the company into a monopoly.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I very much support my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral’s amendment. Key to this is the definition of “market”. You can dance on the head of a pin and end up with a single supermarket in the Scilly Isles or somewhere and say that that is a market. First, this is a very good amendment and I hope that the Government will take it up. Secondly, the key is to be clear in the publications that are put out what a market is. I can remember occasions when we sat down and argued extensively over whether something that was said to be a market really was one. That is key to coming to the right judgment about whether something should be referred.
I doubt that there will ever be a market where a company has less than £5 million turnover and the anti-competitive effects are such that it should be referred. It comes back to one thing only. Are the public paying higher prices than they should reasonably expect to pay? The rest is fluff and twitter. It is the prices that the public are paying that matter. If there were examples, maybe there would have to be a review of a figure of £5 million, but £5 million is pretty safe on the basis of an accurate definition of “market”.
Lord Mitchell
My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, and the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles. We, too, are always looking for reasonable ways to ensure that SMEs—or SEs, small companies, in this respect—are not subject to too much regulation.
Perhaps I am confused on this, but currently in the 2002 Act there are two criteria as to whether competition authorities should take an interest in a merger. The first, which we have spoken about today, is whether the turnover of the business is in excess of £70 million. This is a considerably higher level than what is being proposed today, so it is unlikely that any company with a turnover of £5 million being taken over would be investigated.
The second criterion, though, the one that we are paying most attention to today, stipulates that where two merging businesses have an effective market share of over 25%, that becomes a relevant merger situation for the competition bodies to consider. That 25% is an important threshold as to whether some form of monopoly is taking place and therefore, as the noble Viscount said, the value to the consumer is affected prejudicially.
At present, it appears that the only effect of Amendment 25 is to exclude the possibility of the CMA looking into a merger if the turnover of the business being taken over was above the £5 million threshold, even if the combined market share were to be more than 25%. Those are scenarios in which we might not wish to tie the CMA’s hands in this fashion. A tech company, for example, could have a low turnover but a high market share, particularly in a locality, and as a result the CMA might want to take a look at a merger between it and a dominant company in that market, or there could be some form of geographical dominance.
I find myself sympathetic with the thinking behind this because, as far as I am concerned, the more competition the better at all times, and I am also sympathetic with keeping red tape away from small businesses. However, it appears that when it comes to mergers, such protections are already offered, and this amendment could damage something even more important to SMEs—a strong competition environment. We definitely want to think about what has been said today; some important points have been raised. We will wait for the next round at Report.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I have tabled my intention to oppose Clause 29. It is not that the clause does not bring in some useful stuff, but I find myself in some bemusement over quite what the Government ultimately intend in relation to the public interest and the kind of interventions in that regard. I am hoping for some clarification of the strategy here. I do not yet know whether or not I agree with the Government because it is not clear in the clause, or in anything that anyone has so far said, what lies behind Clause 29. I hope that I will be a bit wiser at the end of this debate.
At present, as I understand it, the criteria under which the OFT and the CMA operate are clearly related to market structures or competition, and only the Secretary of State can intervene to require them to look at wider issues of public interest or himself deal with issues of public interest. A narrow definition of what the public interest is operates at present, principally, as I understand it, relating to national security. We all know, though, that when high-profile mergers come up, the public, by which I mean both interested parties, consumers, suppliers, workers, the financial press and so on, are often concerned about much wider issues than competition as such—the issues of employment or the potential loss of employment, the loss of UK control, technology, intellectual property or international competitiveness as well as the long-term effect on consumers, workers, communities, the environment, and so on.
Almost all these issues get raised when we are faced with a big merger. For example, in the Kraft takeover of that old and respected English company, Cadbury, all these things were gone over with a fine-toothed comb, but none of them was particularly relevant to the final agreement to the merger. Perhaps I can make one little gripe: despite assurances, the Bristol factory in fact closed. There was no issue of national security and no other issue on which the Secretary of State felt able directly to intervene, although there was a requirement frequently to explain the position to Parliament and to committees of another place.
There are two arguments. One is what constitutes the public interest beyond the stipulations of the competition regime. The other is who invokes the public interest and how. As I read Clause 29, it seems to attempt to transfer some of the responsibility of the Secretary of State on to the CMA; it does not at all attempt to define the public interest. One could take different positions on this. Some would say that the Secretary of State should retain some responsibility, as is largely the case now. Some would say that he or she should retain that control but have a wider range of criteria on which to define the public interest.
You could also say that the CMA should be able to invoke the wider public interest, such as competitiveness or employment issues, but that the Secretary of State should still retain powers to intervene as an alternative. Others say that the Secretary of State should be the judge of national security issues but that the CMA should have other aspects of the public interest in mind in its investigations and decisions. At the other extreme, some say that the CMA should have the sole role and that politicians should keep out of it. I think that the Government are veering towards that position but are not quite getting there. The cleanest position, which some of my colleagues have taken, is that the Secretary of State should have the sole initiative in issues of wider public interest and that the public interest definition should be narrow.
I take a wider view; I tend to think that the CMA should be able to initiate consideration of what the wider issues are if it considers that those could outweigh the competition issues. I do not think that, on this front, the Government’s position was clearly spelt out in the House of Commons or elsewhere. This clause stand part debate gives the Minister the ability to spell out clearly and precisely where the Government are going with this. Once we are clear on that, we can decide whether we take it any further at a later stage, but at the moment I am essentially unclear, so I hope that it can be clarified now.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, in supporting the thesis of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, I just wonder whether this is meant to be unclear. It is very long and there are lots of tos and fros. You get caught up in considerations of exactly how independent the CMA is when something called public interest comes on the horizon. My suspicion is that it is not very independent at all. Schedule 4 makes certain that you had better do what you are told when the chips are down. It also seems to me that the weakening of the operations of phase 2 by the creation of a panel that floats freely without being rooted into the ground in any way that I can see also makes it all a bit unclear. Surely the sort of panels that there have been on the Competition Commission have been pretty good at public interest considerations, which vary widely. I entirely agree that there needs to be some clarity as to what this is all for.
Lord Marland
My Lords, I will break with tradition and, much to my officials’ relief, read from a prepared script on this one, because it is way above my unpaid grade.
Public interest cases are particularly important to the UK, so it is right that the Secretary of State receives the best possible expert advice on these cases. This clause gives the Secretary of State the option to ask the CMA to look at public interest issues in the round with competition issues. I hope that that clarifies one of the points the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made. This will enable the CMA to provide comprehensive recommendations on both issues. The Competition Commission can already do this in merger cases.
This clause does not give the Secretary of State additional powers to intervene in market investigations—he already has the power to intervene on certain public interest grounds, and these are not changing. Currently the Secretary of State can only intervene where there are issues of national security.
It will not be the CMA’s decision on where the balance is between competition issues and public interest issues. This will remain, as it should, a decision for Ministers who are accountable to Parliament. The CMA will be the UK’s primary competition authority and will therefore overwhelmingly be focused on competition enforcement.
The CMA, like the Competition Commission, will have expert staff and panel members with a wide range of experience. If the CMA does not have enough in-depth expertise on the specific public interest matter in question, the clause allows for a public interest expert, or experts, to be appointed, who would work alongside CMA teams.
To my way of thinking that gives a very clear understanding of the position on a quite complicated issue. I think the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, has initiated a very good debate. On that basis I commend this clause to the Committee.
Viscount Eccles
The trouble is that it does not tell us why it is there. It tells us something about what could happen under it, but not why it is there. I would enjoy a freedom of information application to find out where this started and what it really means.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, this amendment and the others in this group are pretty straightforward and deal with the level of fines in relation to Schedule 11, which relates to non-disclosure or falsification of information in the course of an investigation. It is about the maximum level of fines.
The maximum level of £15,000 or £30,000 would be significant fines to the kind of small businesses to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, referred earlier. For many in large markets, though, these would be a flea bite. For the investigatory powers to work, they need to be able to ensure that the procedures are honestly met by those companies that they are investigating.
It is unlikely in any case that small businesses would be caught under these provisions; it is middle-sized and larger companies that are likely to be caught. You need a deterrent to dishonesty, which is effectively what this is. We are suggesting that up to 10% of turnover would be an appropriate deterrent whereas, frankly, £15,000 would not. That runs through all these amendments. The Government would be wise to look at this again. I beg to move.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I part company a little from the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, here and I shall illustrate why. I think that the Competition Commission has had the power to exercise civil sanction or administer fines—I am not too sure exactly what it can and cannot do. On the information that it has sent me, it has not ever done so, yet I have not heard any complaints that people have not given it the information that it has asked for.
A fundamental point needs to be remembered. We live under the law by consent. If the assumption is that people will live under the law only if they are threatened with fines and that the fines are big enough, and you go on down that road, in the end, people will not obey the law by consent.
Lord Borrie
Surely the noble Viscount would agree that these things sometimes have a deterrent value. People know about them; there is no need for them to be served with a writ.
Viscount Eccles
I quite agree about deterrents: a nuclear bomb is a deterrent. You have to provide a deterrent. Everyone will say, “Well we expected that, so now we’ll only go to 70 and not 90”. I am sorry, but I do not agree with the philosophy behind such a system. The minimum number of sanctions and penalties that you can achieve is the best, and the greatest degree of things working properly by consent is the best way to go.
Lord Marland
I have to disagree with my noble friend Lord Eccles because I believe that you should have deterrents. I think that the general public would want us to impose deterrents for those who do not comply with statutory rules, so I am afraid that he and I do not converge on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is right to talk about deterrents. First, I point out that this is not just £30,000, it is £30,000 or 10% of turnover, so that deals with some of those companies that did not fall into the net that he was talking about. For very large companies, the Competition Commission can fine a daily rate of £15,000 per day with no limits, which is a serious deterrent.
The other point that I emphasise is that the Competition Commission has never had to impose a fine for non-compliance with a request, which shows that the system is working and has worked. I hope that on that basis the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Eccles
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I am probing to see whether there is some way in which some of these arrangements could be drafted to simplify their implementation. I worry about the amount of work that we are giving the legal profession by some of these arrangements. This is a very complicated piece of paper chase. New Section 40A amends the 1998 Act. We have been talking mostly about the 2002 Act. It relates to powers when conducting investigations, to failure to produce documents, destroying or falsifying documents, and providing false or misleading information. The 1998 Act contains in Section 27 powers to enter premises without a warrant and with a warrant. In a statutory instrument in 2004—which, incidentally, is not included in the latest printed edition of the 1998 Act, you have to find it some other way, but it is an amendment to the 1998 Act, statutory instrument 1261 —there is a power to enter domestic premises with a warrant. That is the 1998 Act. However, new Clause 26A to that Act, which we have just been looking at, is in Clause 33 of this Bill. That leads me to ask one or two questions.
I should say to the Bill team: thank you for your assistance with my eventually finding Amendment 28A and that statutory instrument because it was a very interesting chase. No wonder I could not find it in the 1998 Act; it was not there.
New Clause 26A(6) says,
“For the purposes of this section … an individual has a connection with an undertaking if he or she is or was … concerned in the management or control of the undertaking”.
I started to get into a terrible panic and wondered what sort of information I might be required to provide about when I was laying graphite cores in nuclear power stations or something. Is there any limitation on that subsection, such as a statute of limitations?
I have many questions in my mind, but I shall limit myself. With regard to new Clause 40A in Clause 34, BIS’s presentation to the Delegated Powers Committee says that the Bill,
“removes … criminal sanctions attached to failure to comply … and replaces them with a new civil sanction”.
However, when I read the amendments in Clause 34, particularly the ones near the end about omitting subsections (1) to (4) and so on, I could see where we were omitting certain of the criminal sanctions, but there followed two or three other clauses in the 1998 Act that seemed still to apply and still to envisage criminal proceedings. All that I am asking is that some real effort is made to clarify some of these matters in a way that means that businesses, their secretarial departments and legal departments will understand them, and they will not have to go to outside lawyers too much. We keep on talking about making things certain so that people know that they can get on and do the things that they want to but, believe you me, it is some endeavour to find out what this means. I beg to move.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I am in danger of re-establishing my alliance with the noble Viscount. There are aspects of this clause that could do with clarification. It had not struck me until he spoke that the wording,
“is or was … employed by”,
might refer to when they were an employee, a subcontractor or a director 20 years ago, and that would still be covered by this clause. Clearly the noble Viscount’s previous career flashed past him. Mine did so a little earlier this afternoon when watching the interplay between the Minister and his team; I recall that many decades ago my Civil Service career was clearly doomed when I passed the Secretary of State an illegible note during the course of one bit of legislation. There must be equivalent things that people have seen, and have had in their hands; they may not have realised their importance at the time but they still have vague knowledge of them. The criminal sanctions that are implied by the interplay of the various pieces of past legislation here could raise anxieties that the Government do not really intend. The noble Viscount is essentially right that perhaps once again the draftsman could have another look at this. Clearly the noble Viscount and I will quietly let any amendments on this front through at later stages.
Lord Marland
Perhaps I could explain to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and to my noble friend Lord Eccles that all that the clause does is to allow the CMA to conduct a more effective and timely anti-trust investigation. We are imposing civil fines, to be quicker and more effective, which will have some bite to them. The reason for this is that not one criminal prosecution for non-compliance has been pursued. That shows either that the CMA does not want to pursue it because it is too complicated, or that it is in the margin.
We are retaining criminal sanctions for obstructing an officer exercising powers to enter premises, destroying or falsifying documents, or giving false or misleading information—they will remain. The imposition of civil fines rather than criminal sanctions to speed up the action on anti-trust is also in line with the European law that features that. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend might withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Eccles
I thank my noble friend. Can he deal, if not now then later, with this point about an individual having had a connection with an undertaking? As a provision in Section 26A, which is one of the new clauses covered by this enforcement power, it seems pretty wide-ranging. I am pleased to be told that the criminal sanctions are staying for certain parts of the 1998 Act regime. On that, the presentation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was rather ambiguous, but we have cleared that up.
In the argument that says that if people know that there are all sorts of horrendous and complicated penalties, with extensive legal costs attached to them—even if you go down the route of new Section 40A, costs will still be attached—we are basically, steadily saying that nobody can be trusted. We are losing touch with the idea that people do things by consent and because they trust each other. That is very regrettable. Meanwhile I beg to withdraw.