Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd September 2026 Grand Committee

Regarding Amendment 172 and calls for a single reporting portal, industry does not need another 12-month review. The answer was already on the amendment paper under Amendment 88 from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, which we discussed on Tuesday, establishing an office for cyber resilience as the single national threat-reporting hub, which sadly did not receive the approval of the Conservative Front Bench or, indeed, the government Front Bench.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I start by thanking my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones for introducing this group and setting out her stall so clearly and compellingly. I apologise that some of the amendments that have been looked at here I had in my record as being part of the next group. So, if I do not cover them all now, they will be covered by my noble friend Lord Markham as we get into the next group.

Let me begin by outlining the amendments in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Markham and Lord Holmes of Richmond. The need for action on ransomware has never been higher. The NCSC handled 204 nationally significant ransomware attacks in the year to September 2025 that we know about—up by 130% on the year prior, leading the NCSC to name ransomware as the most pressing threat to the country in its annual report. Of course, one of the challenges we face with ransomware attacks is not knowing when they happen, to whom and how often. The victims too often have strong reasons, generally associated with legal liability, not to report them. This makes it challenging, if not impossible, for any government agency seeking to identify commonalities across attacks to pursue repeat offenders and warn vulnerable organisations.

We could seek to make reporting of such attacks mandatory, but at the risk of placing hacked organisations in an impossible position where public reporting creates a legal bind that worsens the damage already done by the attack. I take on board the cogent concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but the moral hazard occurs today where companies do not report ransomware attacks, thereby damaging our collective ability to defend others yet to be attacked.

Our amendment therefore seeks to find a channel that reports the facts of the hack and the metadata around it in a way that is not disclosed beyond the agency charged with cyber protection and does not become public knowledge. I do not pretend that this will be straightforward. For instance, we would have to understand how to deal with FoI requests and so on. That is why we propose a consultation. But if we were able to achieve something on this basis, we would greatly enhance our ability to protect UK PLCs from these hugely damaging attacks.

Amendment 172 seeks to require a review on the impact of the new reporting requirements introduced by the Bill. Again, this is fairly straightforward. The strengthened incident reporting requirements are being introduced to allow the regulators and the Government to help with providers and suppliers who have been attacked. Whether these requirements actually serve that purpose, and whether they do so at the expense of providers, cannot yet be known, but we must be able to form an assessment and adjust if necessary. Everyone in this Room would accept that we need statutory agility in the face of fast-moving technology, and a review on these lines could and would enable just that.

For a similar reason, I support the desire for transparency in Amendment 165 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This may even overlap with our own amendment; we could probably think about merging the two in some way. It seems clear that both Houses of Parliament should be informed as to what the reporting regime is being used for and whether it is fulfilling its function. I hope that the Minister agrees.

I very much support Amendment 17 in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones. We are going from an incident constituting an actual adverse event on the security of network and information systems to it being capable of having such an effect. Arguably—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made this point very well—almost any incident would meet this condition. We need language that expresses genuine risk to avoid all incidents being caught in the net. This seems wholly pragmatic to me and I commend it to the Minister, to whose response I look forward.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Baroness Lloyd of Effra) (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group; in fact, subsequent groups also speak to this question of the nature, scope and timeliness of incident reporting. What we are all trying to do, I think, is to get the right balance in reporting actionable information that can be used by regulators and the NCSC to improve the security of the United Kingdom and the entities that operate essential services within it. That is obviously what the Government have put forward. I have heard clearly the arguments made by noble Lords, some of which probe the intention and the detail, and I will attempt to clarify those as I speak.

First, I shall speak to Amendments 19, 36 and 44 in my name. Improving incident reporting under the NIS framework is a key pillar of the Bill. Without an understanding of incidents, our regulators and the NCSC cannot assist in recovery, assess risk and bolster resilience. The amendments that I have tabled will ensure that the incident reporting measures for regulated entities reflect what we are trying to achieve.

The Bill already requires relevant regulated entities to consider a list of factors when determining whether an incident is likely to have a significant impact and be reportable. This includes whether data relating to users is, or is likely to be, compromised. Government Amendments 19, 36 and 44 remove the reference to “users”, meaning that all data compromises relating to the relevant network and information system are in scope of incident reporting. This will enable key incidents to be reported, including the compromise of commercially sensitive information or the exposure of access details or usernames of the regulated service.

These incidents will need to be reported to the NCSC and the relevant regulator. I say in response to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that that is the motivation behind the change to that categorisation. This will ensure that the regulators have full oversight of significant security compromises, supporting them to keep the UK safe and secure. We will shortly consult on what constitutes a significant impact and put further detail in secondary legislation and guidance.

I turn now to the amendments tabled by—

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, support these customer notification amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Harding of Winscombe. As I have said, the noble Baroness brings vital lived experience, in more ways than I thought, from the front line of corporate crisis response. When a major cyber breach occurs, vague statutory requirements to notify customers

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

lead to corporate delay. Amendment 58 would replace this with a strict statutory 24-hour notification clock, while Amendment 65 would establish explicit harm triggers and require providers to provide actionable remediation advice to affected customers. Look at what Amendments 60 and 65, in particular, would achieve across Clause 16.

Under Amendment 65, notification would be explicitly triggered whenever an incident causes or threatens severe operational disruption, substantial financial loss or material harm to downstream users. Furthermore, Amendment 71 would place a positive duty on the provider to advise customers on immediate remediation steps that they can take. In the cyber realm, time is the attacker’s greatest ally. If a hospital, bank or small supplier is informed within 24 hours that their cloud or managed service provider has been breached and given technical instructions on how to isolate their systems, they can prevent contagion before it paralyses their operations. We must ensure that customer notification is prompt and meaningful, empowering downstream businesses to isolate compromised systems before contagion spreads, so we very strongly support these amendments.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe for tabling this important set of amendments, which we welcome, and for clarifying the refinements of the grouping process, which had slightly eluded me up to that point. As with the previous group, this would amend four key areas of, on this occasion, customer reporting. It would tighten the timing to notify customers; widen the incidents expected to be reported by removing the adverse impact criterion; add extra reporting triggers; and add an “advice on remedies” duty.

Of course, businesses should be supported in the case of cyber attacks and our priority must be preventing, containing and controlling such incidents, but this cannot come at the expense of the customers that businesses serve and depend on. Customers deserve to know when a firm they depend on is targeted, even if such an attack does not necessarily directly adversely affect them. They deserve to be informed promptly and they deserve to be informed of potential remedies.

It is worth saying that there is a welcome side effect to doing so, based on the premise that behaviours are the best guard against cyber attack. Constantly being aware that cyber attacks are going on will improve behaviours. As was said earlier, the goal is not to create panic but, on a continuum between insouciance and panic, we must imbue a point closer to concern more widely in the population to keep people aware that we are constantly at risk of being hacked. On these Benches we feel these are wise, pragmatic and helpful changes. I certainly hope the Minister agrees.

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for raising important points around customer communication. As set out in the Bill, it takes forward the current duties to notify customers that the Bill places on data centres, OESs, RDSPs and RMSPs. That duty was designed to ensure that providers of key digital and data infrastructure services consider whether their customers are likely to have been adversely affected by a reported incident—whether through disruption of service, compromise of their data or exposure of their systems to cyber threats—and to notify them.

I will explain the logic in response to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the importance of meaningful communication with customers. The reason we have drafted the Bill so that customer notification follows the 72-hour incident report is to ensure that regulated entities can focus on understanding the nature of the incident and contact customers when they are more likely to understand its potential impacts.

We have discussed the question of what an organisation might reasonably be expected to know within 24 hours of identifying an incident. The point is that customers should be communicated with in a timely manner, with sufficient information, so that they can take the necessary action. On that point, the rationale for 72 hours was to time it, for simplicity, with the 72-hour report. I am happy to consult further with the noble Baroness to explain the logic of the 72-hour and 42-hour requirement to communicate with customers, because the motivation is exactly the same: to have actionable and meaningful communication with customers.

I turn to the degree of depth of communication, the advice that can reasonably be put on regulated entities on technical measures, and what technical mitigations customers should take on their own. It is reasonable that the regulated entity should share what they know about the nature of the incident. The question about whether the regulated entity is in the right position to provide advice to customers on what mitigations they should take is both practical and technical. Would they have enough insight to have an effective understanding of the situation of the customers and a detailed understanding of the customers and their businesses in order to give effective meaningful advice in that way—or would that just be a requirement on the entities that would not have the intended impact? On that point, I am not quite persuaded that the line is drawn in the right position.

On keeping in touch, mentioned by the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, I am happy to come back to that on Report to make sure that we have the right balance between the initial notification and the right type of customer communication.

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I think we have had an extremely comprehensive and useful debate today, drawing on the considerable experience of all of us on boards. These two amendments are entirely practical and desirable, and I very much hope that the Minister will accept both of them.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for opening this debate on behalf of my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes. I will come to her amendment in a moment, after I touch on Amendment 167, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. Her comments, particularly about board ownership of cyber risk, were well founded and an extremely important foundation for the debate—as indeed were those of the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, who pointed out the difficulty of accelerating from zero cyber knowledge to sufficient. That is a non-trivial undertaking.

Amendment 167 is absolutely in line with the principle that we raised on the first day of this Committee in the form of Amendment 92B. It is the idea that executives should be held accountable for cyber security and resilience plans by their board and their shareholders, by reporting consistently on protections. This amendment, perhaps a little more explicitly, would require the same thing and I am very happy to support it.

I think Amendment 74 largely follows the same sentiment: that companies should and must be held accountable for their own cyber security. On this one, however, I need a little more persuasion. I am going to tread a little tentatively here, because I very much take on board the comments of my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot that we have not solved this problem yet and that carrying on as we are is probably not that sensible.

However, I do have some inner alarm bells ringing about this one. So, while we support the goal of making companies self-sufficient and accountable to their shareholders, this amendment would give the Information Commissioner powers to enforce compliance and sanction individual negligence. The concern here is that, as a matter of principle, the inner working of companies—who is accountable internally, to whom and for what—should be placed in a different category from the requirements placed upon them.

We should encourage companies to figure out internal issues themselves. By all means require board oversight of cybersecurity plans, as we have attempted to do, but my understanding is that this amendment would make it the Information Commissioner’s job to decide which individual is responsible when cyber attacks take place and are not adequately defended. I find this quite a tricky path forward, but I am clearly willing to keep talking and to be persuaded.

I am also concerned about the disincentives to become a director that this might put in place, because of what feels to me like the inherent uncertainties of the liabilities that may hang over board directors as they undertake these responsibilities. That being said, I, of course, completely agree with the underlying principle and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses who introduced their amendments, including the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who did so on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for raising the incredibly important topic of board accountability and senior management oversight. It is absolutely right that organisations, especially those delivering our essential services, are held properly accountable for their activities. That is why the Bill creates a more meaningful enforcement regime in terms of the maximum fines that can be levied—up to £17 million or 4% of turnover, whichever is higher—alongside a simpler process for taking that forward.

I also agree with the points made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Neville-Jones, and by my noble friend Lady Berger, on the extent of this being within the regulatory perimeter as well as the non-regulatory perimeter. Boards upskilling themselves and taking training seriously is absolutely imperative. That is why we have our Cyber Governance Code of Practice, which is at the heart of our approach to board and executive accountability. I personally feel that I am an extremely active proponent of this. For those who feel that we are not doing enough, I request their support in continuing to highlight that important code of practice in their own organisations, and on all the numerous boards they sit on, to make sure that we are governing cyber risk appropriately—and that many of the board directors they sit alongside are aware of it.

That is obviously not the limit of the approach that we are taking. We are going to introduce new security and resilience requirements in our secondary legislation. Our proposals will include a dedicated requirement on board-level governance, which will be consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework. It will cover issues such as organisational capability, senior responsibility, accountability for security and resilience, and effective risk escalation. In that way, we will connect the clarity on what is expected of boards with accountability through the enforcement regime.

I will touch on the point alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the EU’s regime. Individual liability for board-level members is not mandatory under NIS2. Different EU member states have taken different approaches to implementing the directive in this respect, so there is not a single model of implementation that the EU is following.

To conclude, I would also concur with the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, made on the importance of attracting those with cyber expertise to take on board-level roles and be able to contribute as part of the board accountable to shareholders in that way. We do not want to introduce anything that might disincentivise either senior executives with cyber expertise or those at board level from taking these very important roles.

I believe that, together with the enforcement regime and the security and resilience requirements, those two things will cement the importance of board and executive accountability firmly into the regime, in the way that noble Lords have highlighted today. That is the right approach.

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[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

It is not the same. I wish to stress that the importance of strengthening cyber resilience can happen outside of legislation being put in place. There are many efforts that can go on to improve cyber resilience.

Moving on to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and her question about the scope, as well as the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, about CRMs and so on, I do not know the specifics of this CRM. I am very happy to write after hearing of the attributes that were enumerated for its characteristics. Businesses that offer software as a service are in scope of the NIS regulations as cloud computing services, under the RDSP definition, if they meet the definitions in the Bill. In the case of the particular company that was mentioned, I do not know whether that would meet any definitions in the Bill.

Data protection legislation is obviously in place already, and processors are meant to have the systems in place for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of their measures for ensuring the security of that processing. That legislation is already in place.

Moving on to the public sector, I will respond to the questions from the noble Lords, Lord Birt and Lord Clement-Jones. The Government are already taking equivalent steps to secure their own essential activities through the Government Cyber Action Plan, published in January this year. That plan applies to government departments, arm’s-length bodies and wider public sector organisations. It sets out clear expectations, targets and milestones at all levels to transform cyber security and resilience in the public sector. The outcomes of the plan are aligned with those of the Bill; there will be a consistent approach to strengthening cyber resilience across the public sector. Government departments are accountable for setting expectations and overseeing resilience across the sectors and organisations within their purview, while individual organisations remain responsible for managing their own cyber security and resilience.

This brings me on to Amendment 81A—

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her point about the Government Cyber Action Plan, but do the strength of her arguments there not completely reinforce the urgent need to have the national cyber action plan, so that we can assess overall the cyber strategy of the nation and the role of the Bill within that strategy?

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

The cyber action plan is a very thorough document. It sets out a plan over many years to improve the cyber resilience of the Government and the public sector, which I think we all agree is absolutely needed. The fact that incidents are still occurring in the public sector reinforces the need to act. We will publish the cyber action plan and, as I mentioned two days ago, I will keep the Committee and the House updated on progress on that.

Education is an incredibly important sector, and the Department for Education takes an active approach to supporting the sector. This includes the Cyber Security Hub, providing schools in England with guidance, while the standards for schools and colleges help institutions to understand their cyber security requirements. Colleges have been required to meet cyber essentials since 2024, with more than 80% of colleges now meeting this requirement.

I come to the question of MHCLG and local government. The department is also taking meaningful steps and working with local authorities to increase their cyber defences. This includes the rollout of the cyber assessment framework for local government, which would be the equivalent to what is required in the cyber Bill, and the recently proposed revisions to the best value statutory guidance to set new expectations for local authorities on cyber resilience. That best-value duty provides an immediate and proportionate route to improving through existing governance and accountability mechanisms. In addition, MHCLG is supporting councils directly.

The question of electoral infrastructure and political parties, raised in Amendments 79 and 81D, is also incredibly important, as noble Lords have set out. The Government work with the NCSC to mitigate risks there. MHCLG specifically works with local authorities to strengthen their electoral cyber resilience and ensure electoral data is adequately protected. The Joint Election Security and Preparedness Unit has responsibility for co-ordinating election security. The MHCLG digital electoral services team maintains robust incident response arrangements to protect electoral systems and citizen data. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned, the NCSC also has a broad package of support for political parties, candidates and elected representatives. This includes regular engagement with parties, which can access the NCSC’s active cyber defence services, as well as NCSC providing tailored advice to parties and candidates.

I have set all that out because the motivation behind bringing these matters into scope is to engender further action. I want to emphasise that further action is happening, whether or not it is within the scope of the regulatory perimeter.