Digital ID

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

To conclude, we will launch a full consultation on our plans by the end of this year, including with parliamentarians, the devolved Administrations and members of the public. Legislation informed by that process will follow shortly afterwards. I know that honourable Members will have many questions and I look forward to taking them, but let me just say this. Some 92% of people over 16 already have a smartphone. Many of us already use digital credentials held in our phone wallets, from tickets to events and online banking to storing boarding passes. People should expect the same service from the Government. Indeed, we should be criticised if we are not modernising our services to make them easier and more convenient for the public. Years from now, when we look back, I believe that having your ID on your phone will feel like second nature, putting more power directly into people’s hands and giving them more control over how they interact with government and the whole range of services. That is something worth striving for. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, we unequivocally oppose the Government’s dangerous mandatory digital ID policy, both in principle and in practice. If it is allowed to become legislation, the electorate risks being subjected to an extraordinary expansion of state power, one that comes not only at the expense of personal freedom but at great cost to the taxpayer.

Before I outline our objections to this proposal, it is important to understand the wider context in which this policy has been announced. Over this Government’s year in power, an estimated 50,000 people have entered the country on small boats, the largest recorded number to date, but the Secretary of State has claimed that digital IDs will deter these illegal migrants. Where is the evidence for this claim? Criminal gangs and illegal workers already operate outside formal employment and taxation systems. They do not care about paperwork or credentials. They work illegally, beyond the reach of existing regulation. They subvert existing national insurance requirements. Why would we expect digital ID to be different? To suggest that digital ID would somehow deter these operations is untested, unfounded and too optimistic to be convincing.

We are concerned, too, about the vast scope of this programme. The Government have claimed that digital IDs will result in “more joined-up” public services, saving people time from having to restate personal details to multiple departments. Here the Government seem to me to conflate separate issues: more effective public services and curbing illegal migration. They promise an end to bureaucracy while simultaneously constructing one of the most intrusive systems of state surveillance in our nation’s history. This is vast in its objectives, slight in its detail and, frankly, creepy in its reach into our privacy. Better online services do not require a centralised identity regime. We already have mechanisms such as right-to-work checks and DBS verification. These have all been designed with consent and privacy in mind, with nobody forced to pursue the digital route. The Government’s policy would herald an end to that freedom.

This policy was not even in the Government’s manifesto. There is no democratic mandate for digital ID, nor is there any appetite for it. In fact, over 2.8 million people have already signed a petition opposing it.

If, all of that said, the Government go ahead with this policy, we urge them to mitigate the risks and the costs in three ways. First, can they please ensure that the system is designed as a decentralised tool, using the blockchain to give citizens privacy and security? Secondly, to ensure some adherence to their stated goals, we urge the Government to adopt an agile approach of test and iterate rather than a build-once model. Thirdly, can the Government clarify and limit the stated goals? The current scope is simply too broad to be realistic.

Digital IDs fundamentally shift the burden of proof from government to citizens. In a free democracy, it is the state, not citizens, that must justify its actions. Under this scheme, one’s ability to rent, open a bank account or even order a drink would be conditional on the possession of government-issued digital ID. When the ability to work is conditioned on digital, state-approved credentials, meaningful consent ceases to exist. The choice between non-participation and never being able to work again is no choice at all. Last week, the Foreign Secretary proposed issuing digital IDs for those as young as 13. Once implemented, this policy will further infringe on people’s lives. Today, it is to determine the right to work; tomorrow, it could be to determine the right to vote or to travel.

Digital IDs are accompanied by a litany of practical problems and challenges, not least the enormous and real cybersecurity risk. The UK’s own sign-on system was breached only months ago during testing. The National Cyber Security Centre is yet to endorse the scheme. Further, 8.5 million adults lack the requisite digital skills to make use of these IDs, and many do not own a smartphone or have reliable internet access. Labour’s digital inclusion action plan is currently inadequate for the need and does not account for the structural barriers that vulnerable individuals face.

Finally, this presumably comes at a considerable cost to the taxpayer. Perhaps when he speaks, the Minister could give us some estimate of the likely costs for hardware, software, development and the operation of the system. The Government’s proposal for digital IDs is costly, controlling and risky. We do not think it will stop the boats and we do not think it will streamline services without very significant, and as yet unknowable, investment and programme delivery. Instead, we are concerned that it represents an illegitimate state encroachment on people’s privacy that they themselves are forced to fund. We are deeply alarmed.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the introduction of compulsory digital ID represents another fundamental error by this Government. The Liberal Democrats strongly oppose this proposal, which is a serious threat to privacy, civil liberties and social inclusion. We thank the Minister for bringing the Secretary of State’s Statement to this House today, but my disappointment and opposition to the Government’s plan more than mirrors that of my honourable friend Victoria Collins in the Commons yesterday.

The core issue here is not technology but freedom. The Government insist this scheme is non-compulsory, yet concurrently confirm that it will be mandatory for right-to-work checks by the end of this Parliament. This is mandatory digital ID in all but name, especially for working-age people. As my party leader Sir Ed Davey has stated, we cannot and will not support a system where citizens are forced to hand over private data simply to participate in everyday life. This is state overreach, plain and simple.

The Secretary of State quoted Finland and the ability of parents to register for daycare, but I think the Secretary of State needs to do a bit more research. That is a voluntary scheme, not a compulsory one. We have already seen the clear danger of mission creep. My honourable friend Victoria Collins rightly warned that the mere discussion of extending this scheme to 13 to 16 year-olds is sinister, unnecessary and a clear step towards state overreach. Where does this stop?

The Secretary of State sought to frame this as merely a digital key to unlock better services. This dangerously conflates genuine and desirable public service reform with a highly intrusive mandate. First, the claim that this will deliver fairness and security by tackling illegal migration is nothing more than a multibillion-pound gimmick. The Secretary of State suggests that it will deter illegal working, yet, as my colleagues have pointed out, rogue employers who operate cash-in-hand schemes will not look at ID on a phone. Mandatory digital ID for British citizens will not stop illegal migrants working in the black economy.

Secondly, the claim that the system will be free is disingenuous. As my honourable friend Max Wilkinson, our home affairs spokesman, demanded, the Government must come clean on the costs and publish a full impact assessment. Estimates suggest that creating this system will cost between £1 billion and £2 billion, with annual running costs of £100 million pounds. This is completely the wrong priority at a time when public services are crumbling.

Thirdly, the promise of inclusion rings hollow. This mandatory system risks entrenching discrimination against the millions of vulnerable people, such as older people and those on low incomes, who lack foundational digital skills, a smartphone or internet access.

The greatest concern is the Government’s insistence on building this mandatory system on GOV.UK’s One Login, a platform with security failures that have been repeatedly and publicly criticised, including in my own correspondence and meetings with government. There are significant concerns about One Login’s security. The Government claim that One Login adheres to the highest security standards. Despite this commitment, as of late 2024 and early 2025, the system was still not fully compliant. A GovAssure assessment found that One Login was meeting only about 21 of the 39 required outcomes in the NCSC cyber assessment framework. The GOV.UK One Login programme has told me that it is committed to achieving full compliance with the cyber assessment framework by 21 March 2026, yet officials have informed me that 500 services across 87 departments are already currently in scope for the One Login project.

There are other criticisms that I could make, but essentially the foundations of the digital ID scheme are extremely unsafe, to say the least. To press ahead with a mandatory digital ID system, described as a honeypot for hackers, based on a platform exhibiting such systemic vulnerabilities is not only reckless but risks catastrophic data breaches, identity theft and mass impersonation fraud. Concentrating the data of the entire population fundamentally concentrates the risk.

The Secretary of State must listen to the millions of citizens who have signed the petition against this policy. We on these Benches urge the Government to scrap this costly, intrusive and technologically unreliable scheme and instead focus on delivering voluntary, privacy-preserving digital public services that earn the public’s trust rather than demanding compliance.