Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

I think the hon. Lady is talking about the amendment tabled by the shadow Minister. We do not agree with that amendment. We believe that piloting and then the Secretary of State laying a report before the House is a perfectly proportionate way of assessing the pilots’ success. Let us not forget that we are talking about youth courts and magistrates courts using civil orders, with all the safeguards that are in the regime. This regime mirrors similar regimes used in, for example, gang injunctions. We should have trust in our youth courts and others that they will be able to meet the expectations of the House in terms of ensuring the wellbeing and the welfare of the young people they are looking after. The aim of these orders is to protect young people and also the wider community. On the proposal that a full report should be laid out, I am afraid that, in the usual way, such regulations are not subject to any parliamentary procedure, and the Government see no reason to adopt a different approach in this case.

There are of course other provisions that I have not even begun to address, although I may well have a chance do so at the end. However, I hope that my focusing on the three main issues arising during the passage of the Bill meets with colleagues’ approval. I very much look forward to hearing their contributions in the rest of the debate.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

I thank those in the other place for their careful consideration of this Bill, which is certainly in better shape than when it left this Chamber.

As the Minister has outlined, we have offered our sincere and constructive support throughout the passage of the Bill for the Government’s attempts to respond to the surge in violent crime. We offered our support in Committee, on Report and at Third Reading. We have fought to enhance protections on the sale of knives, to close dangerous loopholes in our gun laws, to force the Home Office to release evidence on the consequences of cuts to vital services for levels of serious violence, to force the Government to assess whether the police have the resources they need to tackle violence involving offensive weapons and to put the rights of victims of crime on a statutory footing—rights that have been neglected despite repeated manifesto promises by the Conservative party.

Let us not forget the absolutely farcical spectacle of the Home Secretary and the Minister, on Second Reading and in Committee, making the case for a ban on high-powered rifles—guns that have an effective range of 6 km—and then coming back to the Chamber on Report and making the exact opposite case in the face of Back-Bench rebellion. Our gun laws are in need of updating, and it is a sad reflection on the Government that all the passage of this Bill has done is weaken the provisions on firearms and kick the can down the road once again in pushing the issue to consultation. Furthermore, the Bill as it stands still ignores much of the key evidence contained in a leaked Home Office report on the drivers of serious violence. This included compelling evidence that violence was, in part, being driven by a precarious and vulnerable youth cohort shorn of the support, early intervention and prevention work necessary to stop those vulnerable people falling into a spiral of serious violence.

Turning to the amendments, I am grateful for the work of the noble Lord Kennedy, and that of my hon. Friends the Members for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), who have managed to find a consensus on the delivery of knives to residential premises that protects children while not unduly hampering specialist knife manufacturers and businesses. We are therefore happy to support the amendment in the name of the Home Secretary whereby businesses will need to prove they have taken all necessary measures to ensure that a knife is delivered into the hands of an adult or will feel the full weight of the law.

On kirpans and Sikh ceremonial swords, I again congratulate my hon. Friends the Members for Slough (Mr Dhesi) and for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) on their work. We understood the concerns raised across the House, and I am pleased that the Labour Lords amendment has been accepted that will allow Sikhs to practice their religion freely without fear of criminalisation.

But undoubtedly the biggest change has been the introduction of knife crime prevention orders, and that is what I wish to focus my remarks on. It is important when making any changes to the suite of police powers that Parliament has the fullest opportunity to consider the evidence and implications. That is why we are extremely concerned about both the way in which these proposed orders have been brought forward and some of their content. Our concerns are threefold, and I will address each in turn. As the Minister said, our amendments to the Lords amendments speak to those concerns.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

To correct the record, these orders have been discussed in the serious violence taskforce, which is attended by the Children’s Commissioner and many of the others that the hon. Lady mentioned. This is action that the police required of us. We turned it around as quickly as we could to get it into the Bill, in order to protect children. We are doing it on the advice of the police.

[Louise Haigh]

I would respectfully suggest that putting before Parliament orders that would criminalise children for up to two years requires more than discussion at a meeting. It requires full consultation and full parliamentary scrutiny, and none of that has happened.

Before Parliament approves any roll-out, the Government should release a report giving an explanation of what guidance has been given to authorities on the burden on proof, which is a civil standard, the impact of orders on the rights of children and the impact on different racial groups as defined in section 9 of the Equality Act 2010.

Emergency Summit on Knife Crime

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Friday 22nd March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The urgent question is the gift that keeps giving.

Before I start my reply, may I, on behalf of the Home Office, reflect on the very sad anniversary that we mark today of the events that occurred in this place two years ago and the terrible loss of PC Keith Palmer? Our thoughts are with his family and loved ones, and with the wider policing family.

We all want our children and young people to be safe on our streets. As the Home Secretary has said, there is no one single solution; we must unite and fight on all fronts to end this senseless violence. We are listening to what the police need, which is why we are introducing knife crime prevention orders on their request, in the Offensive Weapons Bill; we have increased police funding by up to £970 million next year, including council tax; and in the spring statement we announced there will be £100 million of additional funding in 2019-20 to tackle serious violence. This will strengthen police efforts to crack down on knife crime in the areas of the country where it is most rife. The funding will also be invested in violence reduction units, bringing together agencies to develop a multi-agency approach.

It is important, however, that we recognise that greater law enforcement alone will not reduce serious violence. We have already announced a multi-agency public health approach and will be consulting very soon on a new statutory duty of care to ensure that all agencies play their part. We are investing more than £220 million in early intervention projects to stop the most vulnerable being sucked into a life of violence. We are also addressing the drivers of crime, including the drugs trade, with the launch of our independent drugs review. But we continue to look for new ways to tackle this epidemic.

The Prime Minister announced that she would be hosting a serious youth violence summit. The event will champion the whole community public health model, which is crucial if we are to address the root causes of youth violence, as well as disrupt it in our neighbourhoods and local communities. Given the broad array of experts and interested parties, we have been working across government in recent days to ensure the right arrangements are in place. I am pleased to confirm that the summit will take place in the week commencing 1 April, and that we will provide further details shortly, in the normal way. This underlines this Government’s absolute commitment to tackling knife crime and serious violence with our partners across the country, because we all want this violence to stop.

[Louise Haigh]

May I, too, say many happy returns to the Minister and apologise for dragging her to the Dispatch Box for the second time this week? I am sure that she and you, Mr Speaker, will be pleased that there are no more sitting days left this week for me to pester you in. May I also add my thoughts to those expressed on this anniversary of the death of PC Keith Palmer? Not a day goes by when I enter this place that I do not remember the ultimate sacrifice he made in defending us and defending democracy, and I am sure that the same is true for many other hon. Members.

There is no doubt the country is in the midst of a political crisis consuming this Parliament and the entire Government. But a parallel crisis is taking place on our streets, one that is leaving young people afraid to leave their houses and leaving communities paralysed in the wake of more and more young lives senselessly lost, with families destroyed forever, never being able to see their son or daughter again. There has been a 93% rise in the number of young people being stabbed since 2012-13. There is a serious danger, in these tumultuous days, of the Government losing sight of the desperate need for leadership on knife crime. This is no second-order priority; there is no excuse for ignoring it.

The Prime Minister, 16 days ago, promised this House that she would

“be holding a summit in No. 10 in the coming days to bring together Ministers, community leaders, agencies and others, and I will also be meeting the victims of these appalling crimes to listen to their stories and explore what more we can do as a whole society to tackle this problem.”—[Official Report, 6 March 2019; Vol. 655, c. 950.]

I appreciate the pressures on the Prime Minister—we all do—but to break that promise to the victims is inexcusable. Since she made that announcement, more young lives have been lost. Nathaniel Armstrong was killed in west London. There have been stabbings in Leicester, London and Cambridge, and as we heard yesterday, a young boy was stabbed in Clitheroe in Lancashire.

Just this week, the former chief inspector of constabulary laid bare the Government’s failing response to violent crime. He said that the Home Office’s flagship response to serious violence, the serious violence strategy, is

“really, really inadequate”

and

“more concerned with its narrative and less with action”.

He said that it contains “almost nothing” about where violent crimes take place, who the victims are and what deterrent measures are effective, and concluded that the “layer” of police protection that can guard against surges in knife crime has been “breached” because there too few officers to patrol neighbourhoods.

We welcome the £100 million that was announced in the spring statement, but it is regrettable that it will be focused entirely on overtime and not on additional officers. Does the Minister recognise how overstretched our police officers are, how much overtime they are already undertaking, how many rest days they have had cancelled and how much leave they are owed? Does she really believe that there is £100 million-worth of slack in the system to cover the additional overtime that is necessary this year?

The critique of the Government’s approach to violent crime by the former chief inspector of constabulary was devastating. Their fragmented approach and drift are risking lives. They must get a grip, and it must be led by the Prime Minister. It is welcome to hear that a date for the summit is now in place. Will the Minister confirm what its objectives will be, how they will be measured and how they will be reported back to the House? It is not good enough that time and again Ministers have to be dragged to the Chamber through urgent questions. They should be reporting to Members on their progress on a near-weekly basis.

It has been reported today that the Prime Minister visited the violence-reduction unit in Glasgow in 2011 and subsequently wrote in a report that a long-term evidence-based programme was needed. Will the Minister confirm that that report exists and explain why it was never acted on? Is that why last year the Government chose to whip against an amendment to the Offensive Weapons Bill that called for a report on the causes of youth violence?

Will the Minister also confirm what progress is being made by the serious violence taskforce, what actions have been agreed and what outcomes have been achieved? We have had reports that Ministers from certain Departments, notably the Department of Health and Social Care, are not engaging in the taskforce, and participants have described it to me as nothing more than a talking shop. How can the Minister assure us that is not the case? When will the Government open consultation on the public health duty? In the light of the stinging criticism from the former chief inspector of constabulary, will they now review their failed serious violence strategy, which has no analysis of deterrents and failed even to consider the effect of police cuts?

I am afraid all the evidence points to a Government who simply do not have a grip on this crisis—a Government in name only. Fundamentally, this is down to complete vacuum in leadership, and I am sorry to say that, political crisis or not, that is unforgiveable.

[Victoria Atkins]

It is interesting—is it not?—that this urgent question is essentially about process. If we focus on what the hon. Lady has just said, we can see that she applied for this urgent question because she wanted to know the date of the knife crime summit hosted by the Prime Minister. As I say, I can confirm that the summit is going to be held in the first week of April. I wish the hon. Lady had just asked me quietly in the corridors of this place. I am always happy to speak to any colleague about tackling serious violence. We did not need to have an urgent question about setting a date for a meeting.

[Louise Haigh]

We know you don’t like scrutiny—

[Victoria Atkins]

The hon. Lady is saying that I do not like speaking to the House. Come on, let us not be silly about this. This is such an important topic and it requires collaborative work. Frankly, urgent questions and press releases may be very helpful to the hon. Lady’s profile, but that is not what the hard work of tackling serious violence is about.

The hon. Lady wants to know what the Government have been doing. Last autumn, we set up the national county lines co-ordination centre, which has seen more than 1,000 arrests and more than 1,300 people safeguarded. Last week, there was the latest iteration of Operation Sceptre, as part of which every police force in the country adopts knife crime investigation methods appropriate to their areas to tackle knife crime. I do not have the figures for the latest iteration, because it ends at the weekend, but the previous week of Operation Sceptre resulted in more than 9,000 knives being taken off our streets.

We are funding Redthread to offer services in accident and emergency departments in hospitals with a particular problem with knife crime. We are funding projects across the country through the £22 million early intervention youth fund and smaller projects across communities through the anti-knife crime community fund. We have a long-running social media campaign—#KnifeFree—targeting young people most vulnerable to being ensnared by criminal gangs or to being tempted to leave their homes with knives and walk up the street with them. Only last week, I met the Premier League, which is working with us to get the message out through its vast network of contacts, including through its Kicks programme.

We are working with the Department for Education to publish best practice guidance for alternative providers, because we are well aware of the problems that seem to be arising with alternative provision. We are about to consult on a new legal duty to require a multi-agency public health approach to tackling serious violence. We have launched an independent review into drugs misuse because we know that the drugs market is the major driver of serious violence. We are launching the youth endowment fund: £200 million over 10 years for intervention on young people at various stages of their lives to move them away from gangs or prevent them from being ensnared by them.

We announced in the spring statement last week a further £100 million. That came about because chief constables told the Home Secretary they needed help with surge policing. They need it. We have delivered it. I remind the House that we are about to welcome back the Offensive Weapons Bill next week from the House of Lords. I urge—I implore—the shadow Minister to support the knife crime prevention orders that the Metropolitan police have asked us for to help that small cohort of young people who can be helped through those orders. I hope that the Labour party will stand by its words at the Dispatch Box and help us to pass those orders into law so that we can help exactly the young people I think we all want to help.

Child Sexual Exploitation Victims: Criminal Records

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 19th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department to make a statement on criminal records disclosure for victims of child sexual exploitation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

I am conscious that, as you outlined, Mr Speaker, this question relates to an ongoing legal case, and that as such it would not be appropriate to comment on the specific case or cases. I assure you that the Government want all victims and survivors of sexual abuse and exploitation to feel that they can come forward to report abuse, and get the support they need when they do so. We are committed to working across Government to ensure that victims can move on from the abuse they have suffered, and that professionals, including the police, who come into contact with a victim recognise exploitation when they see it and respond appropriately.

The Government are committed to acting to protect the public and help employers make safe recruitment decisions. The disclosure and barring regime plays an important part in supporting employers to make informed recruitment decisions about roles that involve working with children or vulnerable adults, and in a limited range of other circumstances. The criminal record disclosure regime seeks to strike a balance between safeguarding children and enabling individuals to put their offending behind them.

The House will be aware that the Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment in the case of P and others that affects certain rules governing the disclosure regime. We are still waiting for the order from the Supreme Court, but we are considering the implications of the judgment and will respond in due course. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court recognises that the regime balances public protection with individuals’ right to a private life. It applies only to certain protected jobs, and it is for employers to decide someone’s suitability for a role once they are armed with the facts.

[Louise Haigh]

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. Just before Christmas, you welcomed Sammy Woodhouse to this Parliament. You, the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister and the leader of the SNP all praised her bravery in speaking out and waiving her anonymity in order to protect other victims and survivors of child sexual exploitation. In that instance, we discussed CSE survivors’ experience in the family courts. It is good to see the Justice Minister in his place. I hope we can make progress on that issue.

Everyone in this House owes it to Sammy and all victims of child sexual exploitation to do everything in our power to reward her bravery and ensure that no one has to endure the appalling, unimaginable abuse that she experienced. We must all ensure that the state in all its forms no longer fails CSE survivors. They are forced to confront their past every day of their lives through the painful trauma that never leaves them, which many simply cannot escape. Their bravery in the face of all that has happened to them is humbling.

The victims are forced to live not only with their trauma but with convictions linked to their sexual exploitation in childhood. They are blighted by an obligation to disclose criminal convictions linked to past abuse. They are forced to tell employers and even local parent teacher associations about their past convictions. That punitive rule means that they simply cannot escape a past in which they were victims.

I understand your ruling that we are unable to refer to sub judice cases, Mr Speaker, but Sammy will not mind me referring to her record, which includes possession of an offensive weapon and affray. Both are explicitly linked to her grooming. When she was 15, the police raided the property of now-convicted serial rapist Arshid Hussain. Sammy was half-naked and hiding under his bed. Hussain was not detained, but Sammy was arrested and charged. She was a victim of exploitation and is now forced to disclose her criminal convictions—crimes she committed only through her exploitation.

Judges in the High Court have already ruled that forcing victims of CSE to disclose past convictions linked to CSE is unjust. They argued that

“any link between the past offending, and the assessment of present risk in a particular employment, is either non-existent or at best extremely tenuous.”

I ask the Minister, what is the Government’s position on record disclosure of CSE survivors?

One of the single biggest tasks of this Parliament and society is to create an environment in which victims of child sexual exploitation are given the best possible chance not to allow their past abuse to define them. Will the Minister consider bringing forward what is known as Sammy’s law, which would give CSE victims the right to have their criminal records automatically reviewed, and crimes associated with their grooming removed? At present, anyone has the right to apply to the chief constable of their force area to have their records reviewed, but it is little known. Surely there must be a specific case in those circumstances.

Child sexual exploitation is fundamentally about an imbalance of power that is used to coerce, manipulate and deceive. It leads many victims to commit crimes relating to their exploitation. I know the Minister will agree that it cannot be right that victims are forced to live with the consequences of their exploitation for the rest of their lives.

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the hon. Lady for her urgent question. She knows, because we have discussed the issue behind the scenes on many occasions, the concerns, feelings and sympathy that the Home Secretary and I have for victims of child sexual exploitation and abuse, and that this Government have done more than any other to tackle it. By setting up institutions such as the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, the Prime Minister, when she was Home Secretary, sought to uncover these terrible hidden crimes. We know of the experience in Rotherham, of course, and I note that the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) is in her place. I have seen for myself the vital local work to support victims and bring the perpetrators of these terrible crimes to justice.

I am afraid that I am not able to comment on individual cases at this moment—it is a matter of timing—but the Government are considering the Supreme Court judgment very carefully. Sadly, I am not in a position to comment on other aspects of the urgent question, but we have, I think, acknowledged as a society that when children initially present as suspects, the police and others must ask questions to see whether there is more to the picture. I am sure that we all agree on that, and I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to reiterate it.

Merseyside Police Funding

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 19th February 2019 Westminster Hall

[Victoria Atkins]

There is a great debate in my home constabulary of Lincolnshire at the moment, which, although very rural, has its crime demands and faces similar pressures. The problem, as we have discussed before and as the Policing Minister has gone through in detail, is that the funding formula needs reform.

[Louise Haigh]

Do it then.

[Victoria Atkins]

The hon. Lady says, “Do it then.” We tried to do it in 2017 and sadly were not able to achieve that. We have tried since the general election to consolidate the formula as it is at the moment. The Policing Minister has spoken to every single chief constable and police and crime commissioner about the needs in their local area, to try to make the existing formula work and to reflect the rising demand. We are conscious that the demands on the police are changing, which is why the Home Secretary has made dealing with police funding a priority in the next comprehensive spending review.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Monday 21st January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

The hon. Lady will know that we have recently announced an independent review of the 21st-century drugs market. Indeed, only last week I had the pleasure of visiting a drug treatment centre in south London to see the important work of doctors and health professionals to help those who are sadly addicted to these very harmful substances.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

For the victims of county lines and youth violence, the trauma from their experiences will be devastating, yet far too often police forces and mental health trusts do not work together to make sure that their needs are automatically assessed, leaving children extremely vulnerable and at risk of being re-exploited. Will the Minister commit to working with her colleagues with responsibility for mental health to ensure that all such victims receive an automatic referral to mental health services? Will she commit to coming back to the House at the earliest opportunity with a full update on progress against the wider serious violence strategy?

[Victoria Atkins]

The hon. Lady will know that we are very conscious of the impact that mental health issues can have, not only on the immediate victims of serious violence but, of course, in respect of the ramifications further afield for communities affected by serious violence. A great deal of work is going on to help people with mental issues who are being dragged into county lines, in particular. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing met the relevant Minister in the Department of Health and Social Care only last week to discuss this issue.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 28th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

Indeed, and I thank my hon. Friend for being kind enough to show me his great city only a few months ago. We met with senior police officers and others to discuss a number of issues relating to vulnerability, including the vulnerability of those being stalked. He brings to the Chamber his commitment to helping the most vulnerable in his constituency, and he has hit the nail on the head. Filling that gap to cover threatening behaviour in a private place makes it possible to address the sort of situation that he has described. Where gangs are in somebody’s home, perhaps at a party, and things turn nasty, the location of the person holding the knife changes under the current law depending on where they are in relation to the front door. The purpose of new clause 16 is to make it irrelevant whether their threatening behaviour takes place when they are standing on one side of the front door or the other.

New clause 5 concerns the secure display of bladed products. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, who tabled it, knows that I have taken great interest in this area. We have looked carefully at whether prohibition as set out in the new clause would address the concerns that she and others have rightly raised. Our concern is that the prohibition is a blanket requirement. I have looked into whether there are ways that we could make it more targeted, so that councils with a particular problem with knife crime can lay an order covering the display of bladed products in shops in their locality. What we are doing—not what we would like to do, but what we are in the process of doing—is encouraging much stronger voluntary action by retailers to take more robust measures on displays using a risk-based approach.

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister is absolutely right that new clause 5 would impose a blanket ban on retailers displaying bladed products, but the Government are proposing a blanket ban on the sale of bladed products to residential premises. Why is it one rule for online and another for face-to-face retailers?

[Victoria Atkins]

We are indeed introducing a blanket ban on the delivery of bladed products to homes, first because we know that test purchases online have not led to the sort of results that we have seen with retailers. We wanted to close that gap and make it clear to online retailers, some of which do not seem to understand that they currently are not allowed to sell bladed products to under-18s and should have robust measures in place to ensure that they do not. The Bill seeks to re-emphasise that, but we also want to ensure that the person picking up the knife has to go to a post office, delivery depot or local shop with such arrangements and show identification to establish that they are over 18. That is the purpose behind those measures.

We do not currently have evidence of the rate of shoplifting of knives by young people who go on to use them in crimes. That is part of the problem. As a first step, my officials are working with retailers to come up with a much stronger voluntary response, which we know retailers are responding to well, because, in fairness, the voluntary commitments have been working well.

Offensive Weapons Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 11th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time in the Committee after recess, Mr Gapes. Welcome back to our scrutiny of the Bill. We now turn to the measures relating to firearms and, particularly, amendments to the Firearms Act 1968.

Opposition Members have received numerous representations relating to this part of the Bill; indeed, several of my hon. Friends have received even more representations in the last couple of weeks relating to several of our amendments. I say to those watching the Committee’s proceedings that if they wish to persuade politicians of the merits of their holding firearms and firearms licences and the genuine, legitimate uses for which they use those firearms, they should stay away from veiled threats and aggressive language and should genuinely seek to persuade us. We are persuadable.

I have no prejudice against legitimate shooting activities, although I have to say that I have not been exposed to them much. I grew up in the middle of Sheffield. Not much shooting goes on around there, other than illegitimate shooting, sadly. We have no prejudice on this side of the Committee, but it is the job of Parliament and of this Committee to ensure that we get the right balance between allowing people to participate in legitimate shooting activities and ensuring that the public are as free as possible from risk. The Bill is designed to strike that balance, and it is the Committee’s job to ensure that we get that balance right. The Opposition believe that clause 28 gets that balance right at the moment. We received evidence to the contrary, but we also received significant evidence in support of the measures brought forward by the Government in the clause.

I reassure the Minister that the Opposition fully and wholeheartedly support the prohibition of .50 calibre rifles with a kinetic energy of more than 13,600 joules. It is important to say exactly why we support the measures. The range and penetrative power of .50 calibre rifles makes them more dangerous than other common firearms. Their use in criminal or terrorist activities would present an absolutely unacceptable threat to the public and would be uniquely difficult for the police to control.

Following the theft of one of these large-calibre rifles, the police drew the attention of the Government and the Committee to the potential dangers of such a weapon being available for civilian use and have made the case that such a threat outweighs the arguments made by those who use these weapons for target practice and other undeniably legitimate hobbies. The issue is that such weapons hold the potential to pose a significant danger to public safety, given that .50 calibre rifles were originally designed for military use, to allow for firing over long distances in a manner capable of damaging vehicles and other physical capital. They are also designed to be able to penetrate armour worn by soldiers.

Some submissions argued that the specific ammunition needed to penetrate armour over a long distance are already prohibited. That is right, but if these rifles were used in a criminal capacity, it would allow for the penetration of police body armour and defensive protections, which would not be possible with lower calibres. Even the Fifty Calibre Shooters Association recognises that it is possible for the rifles to immobilise a light or medium-sized vehicle or truck at 1.8 km, and that is at the minimum end of the scale.

The police told the Committee that the weapon has a maximum range of 6.8 km, according to Ministry of Defence data. We know that, according to the National Ballistics Intelligence Service, no protective equipment in the police’s arsenal would guard against a .50 calibre rifle. We are extremely sympathetic to the concerns of NABIS and others around legally held firearms being stolen and subsequently used in crime. The threat is that we see an increasing trend of legally held firearms being stolen from certificate holders.

The number of guns being stolen is increasing. So far this year we know from the national firearms licensing management system that 39 rifles from a range of calibres—although none of them .50 calibre—and 165 shotguns have been stolen. Again, we are seeing an increase in the use of firearms in crime—mainly shotguns, as they are the volume guns being stolen. However, there have been examples of rifles coming into use by criminals. This is not fearmongering; firearms, including rifles and shotguns, are being stolen and used in criminal and violent activity. One was used to murder our colleague, Jo Cox, and a .50 calibre rifle was stolen in an incident that was provided to this Committee, an example that provided the basis for their outright ban.

Criminals have shown that they are increasingly determined to steal the weapons of lawful firearm holders. The truth is that we can either pretend that this is not happening and do a severe disservice to our constituents, or we can act to take the most powerful and dangerous weapons out of public hands altogether. Furthermore, we know that the terror threat is sustained and growing. There has been a dramatic upshift in the terror threat, which the director-general of the MI5 described as

“the highest tempo I have seen in my 34-year career”,

and which is,

“especially diverse and diffuse within the UK”.

We should not doubt the determination of terrorists to get their hands on firearms. Twenty Islamist terror attacks have been disrupted since 2013. The plotters have discussed or planned the use of a variety of firearms. The trend in terrorist incidents is to target political symbols, police officers or members of the armed forces or, crucially, areas with large numbers of people. That is why rapid-firing rifles, such as the vz. 58 manually actuated release system rifle, will also be banned under this clause. This rifle can discharge rounds at a much faster rate than conventional bolt-action rifles and is therefore closer to self-loading rifles, which are currently prohibited for civilian ownership. The fire rate of these rifles means that they are capable of inflicting large amounts of casualties or damage within a very short period of time.

In the light of the destructive power of these weapons, we agree that clause 28 strikes exactly the right balance. Nevertheless, I understand that depriving firearms holders of these weapons is an important step by this Parliament, and I want to ensure that during this debate we are fully engaged with the concerns and comments of the Fifty Calibre Shooters Association and others who have expressed concerns. I have read the evidence of all those who are opposed to the move to prohibit this weapon. What I fear is misunderstood by those opposing this move is that it is an assessment of risk by us as parliamentarians.

Finally, I want to deal with a few other queries and points raised with the Committee. Some have argued that other lever firearms have the capacity to fire as quickly as a MARS or lever-release rifle, but will remain legal after the passage of the Bill, so why the focus on MARS and lever-release rifles? NABIS has told us:

“In terms of lever action rifles, they can fire rapidly, but only in the hands of highly skilled experts. They are also very slow to reload. The MARS is much easier to fire rapidly by someone who is not experienced and, using a detachable magazine, they are rapid to reload”.

In addition, we are not convinced of the case for the semi-automatic rifles chambered in calibre .22 to remain legal while other MARS or lever-release rifles are being prohibited for justifiable reasons. The .22 calibre was recently used in a double murder, according to NABIS. While NABIS argued that there has been no request for the semi-automatic .22 to be prohibited, if the concern is over a weapon’s rapid fire capability—that is certainly the justification for prohibiting the .50 calibre—that justification would seem to carry over to the .22 calibre semi-automatic as well. Do the exact same principles behind these provisions not also apply to this weapon?

There is undoubtedly an urgent need to tackle violent crime and mitigate the threat of powerful firearms getting into the hands of organised criminals and terrorists. We therefore wholeheartedly reaffirm the Opposition’s support for these proposals.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gapes.

It is widely acknowledged that the United Kingdom has some of the strongest gun controls in the world. Nevertheless, it is important to keep those controls under review. Clause 28 seeks to strengthen the controls on two specific types of powerful rapid-fire rifles. Both are currently available for civilian use or ownership under general licensing arrangements administered by the police under section 1 of the Firearms Act 1968, which means they can be owned only by somebody who has a firearms certificate for which they have been vetted. However, following advice from experts in the law enforcement agencies, we believe it is important to take action to ensure that the controls around these weapons are tightened.

One option is to add these weapons to the list of prohibited firearms provided for in section 5 of the 1968 Act. Such weapons are subject to more rigorous controls than other firearms and may be possessed only with the authority of the Secretary of State. All firearms are by their very nature potentially lethal, but these two types are significantly more powerful than other firearms permitted for civilian ownership under section 1 of the 1968 Act. It is not our intention to unnecessarily restrict the lawful use of firearms, such as for legitimate sporting purposes; however, we are concerned about recent rises in gun crime and the changing threats and heightened risk to public safety.

As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary explained at the start of Second Reading, the proposals were based on concerns about the potential for serious misuse of these weapons if they were to fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists. That is not to say that there is an imminent threat that they are about to be used by them, but in view of the threat assessment received, the Government have a clear duty to consider the need for these particular types of firearms to be more strictly controlled. However, the Government also recognise that the vast majority of people in lawful possession of firearms use them responsibly and that any controls need to be proportionate. In line with the undertaking given by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, we should continue to listen and consider further whether there are other effective alternatives to banning high-powered rifles, such as requiring enhanced security for their storage and use.

Turning to MARS rifles, as they have been called, or rapid-fire rifles, our focus is on weapons that can discharge rounds at a much faster rate than conventional bolt-action rifles, which are permitted under licence and are normally operated manually with an up and back, forward and down motion. The definition refers to the use of the energy from the propellant gas to extract the empty cartridge cases. That brings them much closer to self-loading rifles, which are already prohibited for civilian ownership under section 5 of the Firearms Act. Indeed, the National Ballistics Intelligence Service witness who gave evidence to the Committee, Mr Taylor, described them as being designed to “get around” the UK’s firearms legislation. That is why this measure is in the Bill.

The other change we propose to make to section 5 of the 1968 Act relates to bump stocks. Bump stocks were used in the Las Vegas shootings on 1 October 2017, in which 58 people were killed and more than 800 injured. The gunman used them to significantly increase the rate of fire of his self-loading rifles. The Government responded quickly to the shooting by placing an import ban on bump stocks from 4 December 2017. There are no legitimate uses for bump stocks and we do not think there are any in the UK. The import ban is designed to keep it that way.

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[Victoria Atkins]

Schedule 2 sets out the consequential amendments to various Acts as a result of the prohibitions in clauses 28 and 29.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 31

Surrender of prohibited firearms etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

I wonder whether the Minister could provide a bit more detail on the timeframe that she anticipates chief officers will provide holders of firearms that will become prohibited under clause 28 with the requirement to surrender to a designated police station in their police force area.

My understanding is that firearms prohibited under proposed new paragraph (5)(2)(ag) to the Firearms Act 1968—that is, rifles

“with kinetic energy of more than 13,600 joules”—

are used only in specific licensed areas. I do not know the right terminology. Would it not be more appropriate for the police to go and collect them from those areas, sporting clubs or whatever they are, rather than ask the licence holders to transport them to a police station to deposit? Will the Minister provide clarification on whether that would be a more appropriate surrender for those weapons?

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[Louise Haigh]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The last national research on why young people carry knives was in 2006. Therefore we do not know the implications of social media, of drill music, which is often blamed in the media and by some politicians, or of austerity, because there has been no research. We are asking the Government to underpin their measures and legislation with evidence—not to pass legislation for the sake of headlines or just to be able to say, “We are doing something about the problem,” but to pass legislation and introduce measures that will tackle the problem.

I hope the Minister accepts the new clauses in the spirit in which they are intended to get to the root of the problems we see in every single one of our communities. Too many of us on both sides of the House have had to speak to families or witnessed the aftermath of the completely avoidable deaths of young people who would have had wonderful lives ahead of them had it not been for the whole-system failure that we are currently experiencing. Therefore, as I said, I hope the Minister accepts the new clauses in the spirit in which they are intended, so that we can get to the root of the issues.

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the right hon. Member for East Ham for tabling new clause 1 and very much appreciate the interest he has and the expertise he brings—sadly it is from his own constituency. He and I do not restrict our discussions to activities in the Chamber or parliamentary questions. We of course discuss it outside the formal parliamentary procedures as well, because it is a concern that he, I and other Members of the House share.

The right hon. Gentleman has raised many questions, on Second Reading and in Committee, about the statistical data for corrosive attacks. He will know from the parliamentary questions he has tabled that the Home Office does not collect specific data from police forces on acid and other corrosive attacks as part of its regular data collection. That is going to change. As he said, Assistant Chief Constable Rachel Kearton, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on corrosive attacks, has stated that my officials are working with the NPCC to look at how offences involving acid and other corrosives can be captured better in police data, to understand the scale of the attacks.

A bid for a new collection on corrosive attacks has been submitted as part of the annual data requirement return to the Home Office. That bid is currently being considered by a group of Home Office and policing experts. If successful, it will require all 43 police forces across England and Wales to report instances of attacks involving corrosives to the Home Office on an annual basis. The intention is for the data collection to be routinely published. I am happy to look at the factors that the right hon. Gentleman has pressed, not just in new clause 1 but in the relation to the point about age. My officials have heard that and I have asked the police to action that.

The publication of data from police forces alongside data on other crimes involving serious violence is the best way forward to understand and address corrosives attacks. I do not believe that a statutory annual report on statistical data is the best way forward in helping us to understand the issue and prevalence of corrosive attacks. I intend the data to be collected and published and the right hon. Gentleman and others will then obviously have access.

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[Victoria Atkins]

It concerns me greatly. Edward Timpson, a former Minister of State for Vulnerable Children and Families at the Department for Education, is doing a big piece of work. He is conducting a review of alternative provision and the vulnerabilities that may be posed by children being in PRUs. We are very much looking into it just as we are supporting the work of charities such as Redthread and getting youth workers into A&E departments in the major hospitals—they are seeing an increase in young people coming in with serious stab wounds. They get those youth workers into the A&E department to act as a friend to those children at the teachable moment, as they call it, as well as staying with them while they are in hospital recovering from what often turns out, sadly, to be major surgery. We help children through knife crime through the anti-knife crime community fund, and support many charities, including larger ones such as the St Giles Trust, that have specific projects dealing with the issues in specific parts of the country.

I was most concerned to hear the concerns of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley about inconsistencies in delivery and policing. We introduced the system of police and crime commissioners in the coalition Government to try and draw accountability for policing closer to the communities served by police officers. The title is deliberate. Although policing is an important part of the brief, the “and crime” part is also an important part of their responsibilities—the prevention of crime, how they help victims in their locality and so on. If there are concerns about the consistency of delivery of services, I hope that we would all go to the police and crime commissioners and ask them what they are doing. It is our role as parliamentarians to hold them to account, just as they hold us to account.

The College of Policing has been a major step forward in terms of professionalising policing and giving it the status it deserves. These are public servants who often put their lives at risk to serve the public. We want to give them the recognition and status that their day-to-day activities deserve. The purpose of the College of Policing is to achieve that, but also to help spread best practice. The hon. Lady will know that a great deal of work is being done on, for example, county lines. We set up the National County Lines Coordination Centre because we recognise that, while major urban centres may have experience of gang activity, rural areas probably do not. We want to tackle that new phenomenon by helping the police draw together all their experience and intelligence, and ease the lines of investigation between forces.

[Louise Haigh]

The concerns about inconsistencies are not mine alone—far from it. I spoke at the Police Superintendents Association conference, where the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister are today. The conference theme is failures of collaboration, which drive inconsistency. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary has consistently—ironically—raised inconsistencies in policing over the last 20 years. I would argue, as would many policing stakeholders, that those inconsistencies have been worsened by the introduction of police and crime commissioners, because they have put further obstacles in the way of collaboration and evening out the issues we see across 43 police forces in the United Kingdom.

[Victoria Atkins]

Our expectation is that police and crime commissioners should collaborate. I am wandering a bit off my brief because this is technically the Policing Minister’s portfolio, but we have raised the point of collaborating on purchasing uniforms and so on. When I sat on the Select Committee on Home Affairs, I was surprised to learn that my local constabulary had bought the second most expensive trousers in the country. On any view, why would on earth would it do that?

I thank the hon. Lady for mentioning the inspectorate—I was just coming to it—which assesses constabularies’ performance. The message must be repeated to chiefs and PCCs that, when it comes to quality of services, we expect a member of the public, whether they are a victim or not, to receive the same quality regardless of where they live. I hope we can agree across the Committee on that aim. In giving PCCs the powers they have and making them accountable to the public in an election, we hope that the public will be able to judge them at the end of their five or four-year term.

The final piece of the delivery jigsaw is the National Policing Chiefs’ Council itself. The Committee has seen the work that NPCC leads can do and the influence they can have. If there are problems with delivery, I would be happy for colleagues to give me examples from their own constituencies so that we can hold the NPCC and the relevant chief to account. I hope the hon. Lady is reassured by the jigsaw of structures in place.

[Louise Haigh]

Before the Minister sits down, will she give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

I have a long way to go, but if it is on that point, I will.

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister mentioned the serious violence taskforce. Will she inform the Committee how many times it has met and what actions have arisen out of it since its introduction?

[Victoria Atkins]

If I may, I will come to that in a moment, after I have laid down the basis of the strategy as a whole.

The strategy arose out of the former Home Secretary’s concerns in the summer of last year that serious violence was beginning to rise. A great deal of work went into it. It also includes the assessment of preventative interventions, and our national and local responses to that. The hon. Member for Croydon Central referred to the Bill—perhaps I misheard her. I can reassure her that it is but one strand of the strategy. I know that she has studied it in detail, given her great interest through chairing the APPG, which I would be delighted to attend—she knows that I have been trying.

The strategy looks at early intervention, prevention and drugs as a major driver. Through that we have set up a new early intervention youth fund, which was doubled to £22 million by the Home Secretary in July. Please do not think that the early intervention youth fund is the only funding. Business-as-usual funding, including helping charities such as Redthread, St Giles Trust and so on, will continue. This is in addition. We have also continued our anti-knife crime community fund. As I said earlier, I hope to send a letter to colleagues so that they know the charities in their areas that may have benefited.

We deliberately used that fund to help smaller charities. We listened to people within the youth sector and to parliamentarians who told us that it is sometimes the smaller charities that can do great work in their local area. Indeed, I visited a great charity in Derby earlier this year. It was set up in a local community hall and, interestingly, has close links to the secondary school just down the road. The club acts as a friend—there is almost an older brother or sister relationship between many of its youth workers and the young people it helps. We are keen to help smaller charities as well as the larger charities such as St Giles Trust and Redthread.

[Louise Haigh]

I appreciate entirely what the Minister says about the burdens on smaller charities in achieving this. However, what evaluation will there be of the outcomes of the charities and organisations receiving grants, and particularly of the education programmes that we deliver in schools? Police forces have told me that they reached 30,000 children in their force area with a narrative or class, as if that is the only measure by which they should be judged. I worry that the performance culture inherent in the police, which I fully accept was a product of the last Labour Government’s obsession with targets, is still there and blocks money being directed in the right ways and to the most effective organisations.

[Victoria Atkins]

I do not for a moment criticise the officer who may have referred to that in that way. It can be difficult for officers delivering important education programmes on the ground, and it is sometimes difficult for him or her to express how they felt the programme worked.

However, we are clear that this is not a numbers game. I hope the hon. Lady knows of our trusted relationships fund, for example, which offers up to £13 million over four years to help the most vulnerable children, who have probably been let down by most if not all the adults in their lives. The focus is not on the number of children reached but on the qualitative impact the scheme has on each individual. That can involve speaking to youth workers, many of whom have lived experiences themselves, which can be critical in switching on the attention of a young person. The police can obviously play a vital role in education, but we know that for some young people, attitudes to the police are shaped by all sorts of factors outside the police’s control. Their being able to speak to someone who has lived experience and does not wear a uniform can break down the barriers that a police uniform can inadvertently instil.

The hon. Member for Croydon Central asked about young people. Shortly after I came into this role, I invited youth charities, young people and former gang members into the House, and she was good enough to attend. Such meetings are important not only for me as the Minister—I have the pleasure of meeting these young people and charities frequently—but for all colleagues across the House, to whom they are not necessarily available. Inviting people into the House to tell us of their experiences in their own words was part of the engagement exercise not only for the Bill but for the strategy. I want to continue that because it is very valuable. I also visit the many charities that we support, and value each enormously.

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[Louise Haigh]

We had a spike in knife crime and youth violence in 2008, which was not similar or not directly comparable to the current trend, because the current increase has happened over four years. However, during that spike, the Home Office led a similar taskforce to that which the Minister describes, which met weekly to deliver the implementation of a knife crime action plan. Does the Minister think that the current taskforce, having met three times since being set up in April, is sufficient to drive forward the many measures that are clearly needed, not just in the serious violence strategy but beyond it, as we have discussed?

[Victoria Atkins]

I am not familiar with the detailed workings of the previous taskforce. The current taskforce involves the Mayor of London. I do not know his diary, but I suspect that trying to get him together on a weekly basis with all the other players in the room, including Secretaries of State, the heads of Public Health England and other such organisations, is not easy, which is why we have set our sights on meeting once a month. However, that does not mean that intensive work is not going on in between the meetings. At the moment, the Home Secretary has set the meetings and is content that we are making progress, but it is about what we achieve through them.

The hon. Lady raised the issue of police funding. As she raised it, I will gently rebut her assertions—I hope in a similar tone. We are committed to working closely with the police and have protected police funding over the last few years.

[Louise Haigh]

Can the Minister confirm whether the Government have protected police funding in real terms in the last few years? What does she mean by the last few years?

[Victoria Atkins]

When the Prime Minister was Home Secretary, she insisted on that protection. That was in 2015. This year, the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service met or spoke to every chief constable. With the help of police and crime commissioners, we are securing an extra £460 million in overall police funding.

In terms of the numbers, the hon. Lady mentioned the last violent crime peak. I am not sure that it was just 2008—I do not necessarily accept her assertion that that is not comparable with this period. Of course, we had far higher police officer numbers in the mid to late 2000s, yet we had that last violent crime peak. That is why we are steering a middle course by raising police funding as far as we can, and by giving police and crime commissioners the power to recruit more officers if they wish to. Indeed, most police and crime commissioners are recruiting more officers, and we welcome that—that is their decision.

Offensive Weapons Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 11th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. As the right hon. Gentleman has set out, there are existing offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which deals with incidents of threat or possession on school premises. The Bill extends these offences to cover further education premises as well as school premises.

The intention behind the amendments seems reasonable, but there are several reasons why we did not consider it necessary to extend the corrosive substance provisions in this way when developing the Bill. First, the scale of knife crime is significantly higher than that involving a corrosive substance. There were more than 18,000 recorded offences of knife possession last year and more than 40,000 recorded knife offences involving a bladed article. By contrast, there are only around 800 attacks a year using corrosives.

The impact of any crime using a knife or a corrosive substance is devastating, but the scale of the problem is different. In drawing up the Bill, we tried to keep in mind the proportionate use of corrosives. We wanted to take action against the possession of corrosives on the street because there is little evidence to suggest that possession of corrosives on educational premises was an issue. However, I accept that crime and crime types change. We were reassured by the fact that existing offences that can already be used in relation to possession of corrosives on school premises, and in future on further education premises, cover the situations to which the right hon. Gentleman referred.

For example, if a student is carrying a corrosive cleaning fluid on school premises and there is evidence that they intend to use it as a weapon, such as indicating on social media or through talking to friends that they intend to do that, the offence of possessing an offensive weapon on school and further education premises would apply. Similarly, decanting the corrosive into another container to make it easier to use as a weapon would also be covered by that offence. Carrying any corrosive substance on the way to school or college would also be an offence under clause 5.

The only scenario in terms of possession that is not covered is where a student has a corrosive substance on school or further education premises in its original container and there is no evidence that they intend to use the substance to cause injury. This is a very discrete possibility, but one that the right hon. Gentleman has alerted us to. As I have already indicated, I will be happy to consider this further.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

I do not quite follow how that instance qualifies as possession of an offensive weapon. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham made the case that we could extend the definition. Is it the case that corrosive substances are now considered as offensive weapons under all other offensive weapons legislation because they come under this Bill? Will the Minister clarify that point?

[Victoria Atkins]

As I was saying, this is a discrete exception to the definition. I accept the point made by the right hon. Member for East Ham that there seems to be a gap in the law on the small area where corrosive substances are in their original container on further education premises and there is no evidence that they are intended to be used to cause injury. That is why I will take that point away to consider.

[Louise Haigh]

That was not the example I was referring to; I was referring to the example that the Minister gave first. I think she said that if an individual had expressed—for example, on social media—that they were going to use the substance to commit an offence, that would therefore come under possession of an offensive weapon on school premises. Will she explain why that would fall under possession of an offensive weapon, given that the legislation relates to the possession of corrosive substances? Corrosive substances do not fall under the definition of an offensive weapon under the legislation.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am just looking into the detail of that. The fact of the intention makes it different from the very limited set of circumstances that I have just dealt with, where the substance is in the original container and there is no evidence that the person intends to use it to cause injury.

On new clause 4, and the creation of a new offence of threatening with a corrosive substance on school and further education premises, the gap is perhaps even smaller. It is already an offence to threaten someone with an offensive weapon on school premises, which will be extended by the Bill to cover further education premises. Any student threatening someone with a corrosive substance would be caught because they clearly intend the corrosive to cause injury.

As I said, I will continue to consider new clause 3. On that basis I invite the right hon. Member for East Ham to withdraw it.

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[Louise Haigh]

I rise briefly to support the timely new clauses, and to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South on tabling them. It is indeed time for a public debate on airgun regulations in England and Wales, first because of the role they have played in fatal incidents in recent years, and secondly because of their increasing use in other types of crime.

The inquest into the tragic death of Ben Wragge, who was fatally wounded on 1 May 2016, aged just 13, heard that he had been playing with a group of friends at a friend’s home when the incident that was to take his life took place. The court heard that the friend did not even think he had fired the airgun—there was no safety catch on the weapon. After the incident, Ben’s relative Zoe Wragge said:

“Following the tragic death of Ben, we very strongly feel that had the law on the licensing, registration and storage of airguns been amended in the past, Ben’s death could have been prevented.”

The coroner, Dr Dean, asked the Home Office to review the laws relating to airguns, which it is in the process of doing. It is frankly unacceptable that we are still waiting for the publication of that review. In the summer, a further incident involving an airgun killed a six-year-old boy from east Yorkshire, although with an inquest ongoing, it would not be appropriate to comment further on the circumstances.

Such tragic incidents demonstrate the potential power of airguns. It is appropriate that we therefore consider whether Parliament has done enough to ensure that under-18s, in particular, are protected. Many have argued that trigger locks should be mandatory or that there should be increasing regulations on the storage and control of ammunition. Once again, the Committee has to return to the fundamental balancing act that politicians have to achieve. Given what we know the risks, are we satisfied that regulation of access to and use of air weapons is sufficient in this country, while acknowledging that they are legitimately used by tens of thousands of young people who pose no threat to the public at all?

We are concerned that the balance is currently off kilter—away from public safety—but we do not need to tip it far the other way to correct it. We have substantial and compelling evidence from the medical profession that these weapons are easily capable of penetrating human skin and causing serious injury. A report in The BMJ, now some years old, stated:

“At first sight, air guns and air rifles may appear relatively harmless but they are in fact potentially lethal weapons. They use the expanding force of compressed air (or gas) to propel a projectile down a barrel and have been in general use since the time of the Napoleonic wars. The projectiles are usually lead pellets or ball bearings. Technological refinements have increased the muzzle velocity and hence the penetrating power of these weapons. In a review of experimental studies”—

it was—

“concluded that the critical velocity for penetration of human skin by an air gun pellet was between 38 and 70 m/sec...Most modern air weapons exceed this velocity and many air rifles can deliver a projectile with similar muzzle velocity to a conventional hand gun.”

Potentially of even greater significance are the findings in relation to emergency admissions involving air weapons. The article’s authors found that almost half of admissions were for patients under 18, and the majority were the result of accidental shooting, usually in the absence of adult supervision. The full data found that between 1996 and 2001, 73 injuries were caused by air weapons, and 36% were aged 18 or under. That is old data, but as my hon. Friend has said, the data is missing. It is for the Home Office to collect updated data in order to form a proper picture of whether the Government should accept the amendment. Given that these weapons have a similar muzzle velocity to conventional hand guns and that there is evidence of skin penetration and, where the injury is accidental, of incidents predominantly involving under-18s, the question for the Minister must surely be what the justification is for allowing under-18s to have access to air weapons, even with supervision on private land.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol South, who has been campaigning on this issue because of the experience of a family in her constituency who were so terribly affected by an air rifle being used in circumstances that we cannot begin to imagine. The Government recognise concerns about air weapon safety, particularly with regard to access by under-18s and in terms of security in the home. The Minister for Policing and the Fire Service announced a review of the regulation of air weapons in October last year, following the death of Ben Wragge, who we have just heard about. The review has received more than 50,000 representations.

A large proportion of the responses concerned the shooting with air weapons of domestic cats and other animals, and we recognise that air weapon safety and regulation is a topic that arouses strong feelings. Naturally, the strongest feelings are among those who have been affected by air weapon shootings and, of course, the Members of Parliament who represent them. We will announce the outcomes of the review shortly.

New clause 7 seeks to abolish two of the exceptions, namely that which permits persons aged 14 and over to have an air weapon on private land with the consent of the occupier, and that for persons under the age of 18 when under the supervision of a person aged at least 21. If the new clause were implemented, it would mean that under-18s could possess air weapons in only two circumstances, namely if they shoot either as a member of an approved target shooting club or at a shooting gallery, such as at a fairground, where the only firearms used are air weapons and miniature rifles not exceeding .23 inch calibre.

I listened with great care to what the hon. Lady said. I am also conscious of the fact that the review has received many responses. The issue is being considered very carefully by the Policing Minister, and I, in turn, would like to consider the merits of restricting access to air weapons for under-18s. I will go away and consider it and I ask the hon. Lady not to press the new clause.

New clause 8 would require us to publish, within six months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent, a report on the safe use of air weapons, and it specifies the topics that the report must cover. The review is considering the specified topics, particularly safe storage and access by over-18s. It is also considering other topics, including manufacturing standards, post-sale modification and the merits of introducing a licencing system. We will publish the outcomes of the review shortly and I would therefore ask hon. Members not to press the new clause.

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[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for East Ham for tabling new clause 12, on one of the most difficult issues of our time—how we police the internet and ensure that those who profit from the exchange of information and ease of sales on the internet conduct their business in a socially responsible way. I am also grateful to the hon. Members for Sheffield, Heeley and for Lewisham, Deptford for new clause 31.

Let me say at the outset—because it sets the scene for my answer—that the Home Office is working jointly with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport on the forthcoming White Paper on online harms, which will be published in the winter. It will set out the details on the legislation to be brought forward to tackle the full range of online harms, both legal and illegal. Serious violence, including the consideration of the depiction of weapons, falls within its scope, and we are looking at what more we can do to ensure that persons or companies act responsibly and do not facilitate sales of “articles with a blade or point” or “corrosive products” in their platforms. The White Paper will establish a Government-wide approach to online safety that will deliver the digital charter’s ambition to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online while also leading the world in innovation-friendly regulation that supports the growth of the tech sector. The White Paper will include a review of the code of practice—which we are already asking technology companies to abide by—to establish transparency reporting. We should therefore consider the new clauses in the light of this major piece of ongoing work.

On new clause 12, as the right hon. Member for East Ham will know, it is already an offence to sell or hire—or to offer to sell or hire—offensive weapons to which section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies. That includes disguised knives. The new clause seems to be aimed at ensuring that the owner of the website where the item is listed is also liable for the offence, and not just the seller. I absolutely agree that website owners and marketplace platforms must comply with the law and should not allow sellers to advertise prohibited weapons in their marketplaces. However, section 141 already makes it a criminal offence to supply an offensive weapon to which it applies, or to offer to do so, and the offence is worded in such a way—this is certainly the CPS view—that it is sufficiently flexible to include the owner of a website on which the article is offered for sale.

[Louise Haigh]

Does the Minister accept that that legislation is clearly not remotely sufficient, given the proliferation of weapons that the Committee has seen and that are out there on these platforms now? Can she give the Committee an example of a successful prosecution against a platform that was taken forward in the manner that we are attempting to achieve with this new clause?

[Victoria Atkins]

As I said at the start of my speech, the backdrop to this debate is the major piece of ongoing cross-governmental work on the online harms White Paper. My officials have certainly been looking at the adequacy of existing offences as part of that review, but we already have in place legislation that applies to sales, be they face-to-face or remote, and it would be for the CPS to answer how many offences have been prosecuted under the relevant section. I hope that this debate has enabled the Committee to give comforting reassurance to those who investigate and prosecute that they can and should look at online platforms under the 1988 Act.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am coming to that. It is also possible to bring charges under sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007—that is, for intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence, encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed, or encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed. It is possible that a website that facilitates sales, either by selling directly or through a marketplace model, could be prosecuted for allowing an advertisement to sell a prohibited weapon on the website, even if the site is not the seller. Powers are currently in place for persons or companies that list, advertise or facilitate the sale of an offensive weapon through a website registered under their name. In the circumstances and against the backdrop of the online harms White Paper, new legislation to criminalise such behaviour is not required at this stage. I invite the right hon. Gentleman to not press the new clause to a vote.

Subsection (1) of new clause 31 refers to offensive weapons. Those who have looked at it in detail wonder whether, in fact, the intention was to refer to articles with a blade or point, which are subject to age restrictions under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The new clause uses the term “offensive weapon” and, like new clause 12, duplicates existing legislation. It is already an offence under section 141 of the 1988 Act to advertise, list or sell offensive weapons to which the section applies, regardless of the age of the buyer. We consider that if any company or person who owns the website were proven to be selling, offering to sell or exposing for the purpose of sale offensive weapons listed in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, they would have committed an offence under section 141. On age-restricted sales of articles with blades or points, it is an offence under section 141A of the 1988 Act for any person to sell to a person under the age of 18 an article to which the section applies.

[Louise Haigh]

I seek the same clarification as my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham. I take the Minister’s point that the new clause probably should refer to bladed articles. Is she confirming that, under existing legislation, a platform that hosts a seller who is selling an offensive weapon is committing a criminal offence? Will the platform be committing a criminal offence in that instance? If not, new clause 31 would not duplicate existing legislation.

[Victoria Atkins]

Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies to weapons listed in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, which include any knife that has

“a concealed blade or a concealed sharp point and is designed to appear to be an everyday object of a kind commonly carried on the person or in a handbag, briefcase or other hand luggage”.

The offence applies to all kinds of sales, be they face-to-face or remote. We consider that a website selling directly, or using a marketplace model to allow sellers to use a website, would probably be caught under the wording of the legislation. The Crown Prosecution Service agreed with this analysis—in fact, I have just been handed information that says that there seem to have been no such cases. This is an untested area of law, but the Crown Prosecution Service seems to be of the view that the legislation already covers this area.

Last week, we discussed kitchen knives—or rather, knives that have a legitimate purpose and are not offensive unless they are used with an offensive intent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 17 introduces the simple requirement of prohibiting the display of bladed products in shops. The clause is the result of a huge amount of work, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford, who is not only the Opposition Whip on the Committee but the chair of the Youth Violence Commission. Due to the horrendous number of deaths in her constituency in the very short time since she and I were elected to Parliament in 2015, she has been leading on this work with Members from across the House, academics, practitioners, youth service workers, the police and experts from the whole range of people connected with youth violence. She is probably one of the foremost experts in this room, if not in Parliament now, on the causes of youth violence and what we need to do to tackle it. I very much commend to the Committee and to any observers of our proceedings the work of the Youth Violence Commission and the report that my hon. Friend recently published.

One of the commission’s basic and important recommendations is the prohibition of knife displays in shops, a matter that was discussed when experts gave evidence to the Committee. We asked USDAW, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, whether it believed that putting knives behind displays would be helpful. Doug Russell, representing USDAW, said:

“It would be. Obviously, now big retailers are increasingly going down the route of making it more difficult for customers to get their hand on the product until they have been age-checked and it is a transaction is safe. The problem with it, of course, is that all sorts of bladed things are being sold and it is about where you draw the line.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 19 July 2018; c. 98, Q239.]

Clearly, we want retailers to check people’s ages properly when they seek to purchase knives, but the fact of the matter is that many young people who want to access knives will go into shops and steal them if they are readily available. If they want to get their hands on a knife, they will get their hands on a knife, and if knives are readily available in a shop, not behind any kind of restriction or control, young people will steal one if they want to commit a crime with one.

Similarly, we have spoken to the British Retail Consortium, which has concerns about the definition of bladed products, as we discussed under earlier clauses. New clause 17 is in no way a reflection on the excellent work that the consortium has done on a voluntary commitment on open sale, which went some of the way towards restricting the ready availability of knives. Retailers have to ensure that knives are displayed and packaged securely, as appropriate, to minimise risk. This will include retailers taking practical and proportionate action to restrict accessibility, avoid immediate use, reduce the possibility of injury and prevent theft. However, that only covers those retailers that are signed up to the voluntary agreement. We would like to see those measures go further and to limit the open sale of knives altogether. Ultimately, there is little point in having the provisions in this Bill, and putting all these restrictions and burdens on online retailers, if we are not asking face-to-face retailers or platforms to abide by the same regulations as well.

There are a number of restrictions under law relating to other products, most obviously the extremely restricted provisions relating to the sale of tobacco, which prohibit the display of tobacco products in the relevant shops and businesses in England, except to people over the age of 18. Many believe—as I did before researching the issue—that general display is forbidden, but actually the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002 specifically references under-18s, so the principle already exists in law to protect under-18s from harm by prohibiting the open display of goods. We see no reason why that should not be extended to bladed products, given that that is the definition elsewhere in the Bill. Given that the Government are so committed to clamping down on online sales, we hope that they recognise that face-to-face sales is a clear issue that needs further consideration.

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley for raising those important points. The issue of the display of knives was raised by the British Retail Consortium and the British Independent Retailers Association during the Committee’s oral evidence sessions. We note their concern about the potential cost implications for small retailers of having to operate the secure displays and install the fixtures and layouts in their stores. The voluntary agreement with retailers, including larger retailers already sets out a requirement in relation to the display of bladed articles.

[Victoria Atkins]

I was not aware of that specific example, but I appreciate the concerns. I am told that we would have to have a full public consultation on such a measure. That is certainly something about which I would like to think further, to see what can be achieved within the realm of the public consultation and so on. I would like us to keep the pressure up on those retailers that are already signed up to the voluntary agreement. I will consider this point in further detail.

[Louise Haigh]

Given the importance of the new clause and the fact the Minister has agreed to go away and look at the details, I am content to leave it and return to the issue on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 19

Controls on miniature rifles and ammunition

“(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit subsection (4) of section 11 (Sports, athletics and other approved activities).’—(Louise Haigh.)

This new clause would amend the Firearms Act 1968 to prevent persons being able to acquire an unlimited number of .22 rifles and ammunition without background checks or making the police aware.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clauses 19 to 21 consider various loopholes that we know law enforcement officials are concerned about. We know that the architecture of firearms law in this country is incredibly strong, but there are still weakness in that armour that it is always necessary for Parliament to review and consider. As we have heard, as the supply of guns becomes ever more restricted, the lengths to which determined criminals and organised crime are prepared to go in order to find guns become ever more sophisticated.

National counter-terrorism police are concerned about a particular loophole, which our new clause 19 seeks to fix. The concern is focused on the section 11(4) exemption of the Firearms Act 1968, which allows for non-certificate holders to acquire and possess miniature rifles not exceeding .23 calibre and ammunition in connection with the running of a miniature rifle range. It is the strong belief of law enforcement that that exemption needs to be repealed to avoid persons completely unknown to the police having access to firearms and ammunition.

There are concerns that persons who have been convicted for firearms offences, who would not be granted a firearm or shotgun certificate under any other circumstances, could be acquiring .22 rifles using the section 11(4) exemption. Let me outline the concerns of the National Ballistics Intelligence Service. Section 11(4) allows a person claiming they are running a miniature rifle range to acquire an unlimited number of .22 rifles and ammunition without any background checks being completed or the police being aware. Those persons or clubs operating under the section 11(4) exemption are able to allow members of the public immediate access to firearms and ammunition, on payment, without any backgrounds checks having taken place.

The Home Office scheme for the approval of shooting clubs is specifically designed not to allow day membership, and limits the number of guest days. Yet the section 11(4) exemption continues to undermine that important control, and we know of incidents where such rifles have been stolen from commercial premises and used in crimes. I am genuinely interested to hear whether the Government intend to support the new clause. It is of clear concern to the national counter-terror police, and it is vital that the loophole is dealt with.

[Victoria Atkins]

The new clause would remove the provision in the Firearms Act 1968 that exempts from control the operators and users of miniature rifle ranges and shooting galleries. For those who are not familiar with firearms, those are less powerful than other weapons under clause 28.

Section 11(4) of the 1968 Act allows a person conducting or carrying on a miniature rifle range or shooting gallery at which only miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 inch or lower-powered air weapons are used to purchase, acquire or possess miniature rifles or ammunition without a firearm certificate. Additionally, a person can use those rifles and ammunition at such a range without a certificate. The 11(4) provision is used extensively by small-bore rifle clubs, and by some schools and colleges. There are smaller clubs, which do not meet the criteria to qualify as Home Office-approved clubs, that would be severely affected by removal of the exemption.

Exemption certificates issued by the National Small-bore Rifle Association or the Showmen’s Guild do not have legal force, but the Home Office firearms guide indicates that they may be considered proof that a person is operating a miniature rifle range or shooting gallery when, for example, a person relying on the 11(4) provision is purchasing a firearm from a registered firearms dealer. The exemption from certificate control for miniature rifle ranges and shooting galleries has been in place for many years, and removal of the provision did not feature among the recommendations for legislative change made by the Law Commission in its December 2015 report.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister confirm whether she has received representations from NABIS or counter-terrorism police that the exemption be removed?

[Victoria Atkins]

I have not.

Many of the Law Commission recommendations were subsequently acted on by Government, with the aim of strengthening firearms controls and protecting public safety, in the Policing and Crime Act 2017. The Bill’s priorities must be to address the areas that present the most risk to public safety. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley to withdraw the new clause. However, it is vital that firearms law is kept under review. We will continue to assess the position relating to section 11(4) and listen carefully to the advice of law enforcement personnel and any concerns they have about how the provision operates.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is a simple probing new clause. Like the previous new clause, it deals with an area where there is a potential loophole in the law. It attempts to close the loophole of section 9 of the Firearms Act 1968, which provides an important exemption for auctioneers. Again, law enforcement authorities are concerned that the loophole means that there is significant potential for firearms to be stolen. Under the exemption, auction houses and carriers are exempt from firearms checks, which means that individuals who have not had any background checks completed on them or any of their employees have access to large quantities of section 1 and 2 firearms.

We would welcome a report on the exemption, which has been in place for many years, perhaps by the new firearms committee, which we hope to establish in new clause 21. We must consider what further safety measures must be put in place to prevent such weaknesses in the architecture of the firearms law. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Victoria Atkins]

New clause 20 would require the Home Secretary to review the exemption under section 9 of the Firearms Act 1968, which relates to auctioneers, carriers and warehousemen, and to report back to Parliament within six months. The exemption allows auctioneers, carriers, warehousemen and their servants to possess firearms and ammunition in the ordinary course of their business, without needing to hold a firearm or shotgun certificate.

However, there are some controls relating to the exemption. Section 14 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 requires that an auctioneer, carrier or warehouseman must take reasonable precautions for the safe custody of the firearms or ammunition in their or their servants’ possession. The loss or theft of any such firearm or ammunition must be reported to the police immediately. Failure to comply with those requirements is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment. Before an auctioneer can sell firearms or ammunition by auction, they must either be registered with the police as a registered firearms dealer, or they must have obtained a permit from the police for that purpose.

It is also worth noting that the exemption does not apply where those people want to possess prohibited weapons or ammunition. In such circumstances, they must first obtain the Secretary of State’s authority under section 5 of the 1968 Act. The Government are not aware that the exemption is causing any public safety problems, and nor have the police and wider law enforcement agencies identified it to us as a priority for Government action. I have noted, however, what the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said. Although I invite her not to press the new clause, I will take that point away for confirmation. Of course, we keep all aspects of firearms law under review in order to maintain public safety and to tackle crime.

[Louise Haigh]

I am grateful to the Minister for that response. This was a probing amendment and I am satisfied, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21

Firearms Advisory Committee

“(1) There shall be established in accordance with the provisions of this section a firearms consultative committee consisting of a chairman and no fewer than 12 other members appointed by the Secretary of State, being persons appearing to him to have knowledge and experience of one or more of the following matters—

(a) the possession, use or keeping of, or transactions in, firearms;

(b) weapon technology; and

(c) the administration or enforcement of the provisions of the Firearms Acts 1968 to 1997.

(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, a member of the committee shall hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms of his appointment.

(3) Any member of the committee may resign by notice in writing to the Secretary of State; and the chairman may by such a notice resign his office as such.

(4) It shall be the function of the committee—

(a) to keep under review the working of the provisions mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above and to make to the Secretary of State such recommendations as the committee may from time to time think necessary for the improvement of the working of those provisions;

(b) to make proposals for amending those provisions if it thinks fit;

(c) to advise the Secretary of State on any other matter relating to those provisions which he may refer to the committee; and

(d) to make proposals for codifying the law on firearms.

(5) The Committee shall make particular reference to the working of the provisions in relation to counter-terrorism, serious organised crime and crimes of violence.

(6) The committee shall in each year make a report on its activities to the Secretary of State who shall lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) The Secretary of State may make to members of the committee such payments as he may determine in respect of expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties.”—(Louise Haigh.)

This new clause would establish a firearms advisory committee empowered to make recommendations to the Secretary of State concerning firearms law and the codification of that law.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The purpose of the new clause is to ensure that changes in firearms legislation are considered on an expert basis in a way that does not further confuse and fragment the legislation. I accept that the Minister says that firearms legislation and the exemptions are kept under constant review, but the advisory committee was in existence until the last Government abolished it, and we are suggesting it be re-established because it played an important part in advising Government on firearms legislation from a variety of experts.

This issue has been a key concern of the Law Commission, particularly in relation to the codification of the legislation. The view of law enforcement, from a counter-terror perspective, is that the Firearms Act 1968, as amended, is not fit for purpose given the nature of the current threat.

There are a number of glaring examples of how vulnerable public safety is from potential acquisition of firearms and ammunition from the lawful community. We have already debated some of them in relation to miniature rifles and auctioneers, and we will come on to another in the next clause on the component parts of ammunition. There is also a system for issuing visitor firearm permits to non-residents of the UK, to permit them to travel to the UK with their firearms and ammunition. However, UK police make minimal background checks and the whole scheme assumes that their country of origin has a robust licensing scheme in place. I cannot quite wrap my head around the folly that the police would assume that any other country in the world would operate a similar licensing scheme as robust as ours, given that we are proud of the fact that we have such strict controls on firearms in this country.

It is of great concern that there is no system in place at our borders to ensure that firearms and ammunition brought into the UK by virtue of visitor firearm permits are actually taken back out of the UK by the visitor. The Law Commission recommended codification of the Firearms Act in its December 2015 report, but so far the Home Office has not progressed that—I would have thought that the Offensive Weapons Bill would be a convenient vehicle for doing just that. The purpose of the re-establishment of the firearms committee is to allow for expert consideration of such loopholes in the current law in the light of the current threat environment and to allow for consideration of the implementation of the codification of firearms law.

[Victoria Atkins]

A firearms consultative committee existed for a number of years following the introduction of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988. It consisted of representatives from shooting organisations, law enforcement, technical experts and other interested parties. The purpose of the committee was to keep the workings of the Firearms Acts under review, following the terrible shootings by Michael Ryan in Hungerford in 1987 and the subsequent introduction of the 1988 Act.

The committee was discontinued in 2004, so it is something for which the coalition Government cannot be blamed. Thereafter the views of interested parties and experts have been sought by Government when particular issues arise. For example, the Government have held meetings and sought views widely when developing policy on issues in relation to antique firearms and fees for prohibited weapon authorities, and we will shortly be conducting a public consultation on the introduction of statutory guidance to the police on firearms.

This consultative approach continues in a more flexible way than is envisaged through the proposed introduction of a statutory consultative committee. There would inevitably be greater administration and cost associated with introducing and supporting the functioning of a statutory body to which particular members are appointed, and potentially less flexibility and speed of response than there is with the current approach, whereby the Government consult interested parties swiftly as firearms issues arise. I therefore invite the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

[Louise Haigh]

I apologise to the Committee, to the Government and to the previous Government—the abolition took place under the previous Labour Government. I am normally one to hold my hand up to mistakes made by former Labour Governments. I am comforted by the Minister’s assurance that the Government will consult on the codification. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Possession of component parts of ammunition with intent to manufacture

‘(1) Section 1 of the Firearms Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (5) insert—

“(6A) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control the component parts of ammunition; and

(b) the person intends to use such articles to manufacture the component parts into ammunition.

(6B) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction—

(i) in England and Wales to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or in relation to offences committed before Section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force six months) or to a fine or both;

(ii) in Scotland to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, to a fine, or to both.’—(Louise Haigh.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause proposes a simple change that I hope the Government will support, on something that came to light during the evidence session. I think that many Committee members were surprised to hear about the ease with which individuals could get their hands on deactivated or antique weapons. They can manufacture ammunition, and no offence has been committed until the ammunition is viable and capable of being used. Over the summer there was also a good documentary—I believe it was a “Panorama” one—on antique weapons, which demonstrated clearly the ease with which people could get their hands on them without committing an offence and be in possession of deadly weapons.

Everything up to that point—purchasing deactivated or antique weapons and collecting component parts from which ammunition can be manufactured—is perfectly legal. As Gregg Taylor of NABIS stated about the case of Paul Edmunds, a rogue firearms dealer who sold weapons to gangs:

“The ammunition was actually key to that case. As I said, guns are exempt from the Firearms Act if they are kept as a curiosity or an ornament. If ammunition is made to fit the gun, that is when it reverts back to being a prohibited weapon, so the making of the ammunition is key. That is what we see in criminal use right now. People out there make ammunition to fit these obsolete guns, and there are no restrictions on the components of the ammunition. It is only when the ammunition is made as a whole round that it becomes licensable, but the actual components, and the sourcing of them, can be done freely on the internet.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 17 July 2018; c. 39, Q91.]

That is clearly unjustifiable in the current climate. Our restrictive gun laws are leading to criminals attempting to find—and easily finding—plausible ways around the lack of supply of legal weapons.

Gregg Taylor was extremely critical of the loopholes in the law. He also said:

“There is a lack of control and legislation around purchasing and acquiring ammunition components. People can freely acquire all the equipment they need to make ammunition; the offence kicks in only once you have made a round.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 17 July 2018; c. 42, Q99.]

Mark Groothius of counter-terrorism policing said:

“In respect of the ammunition…I think we need to go further, in so much as we find people with the primers. The possession of a primer is not an offence. Possession of the cartridge case is not an offence. Possession of bullet heads is not an offence. With the question of the powder, there probably is an offence, but it is one of those offences hidden in the explosives regulations and it is difficult to actually prosecute. If we had a new offence for possession of component parts with intent to manufacture, that would assist us greatly. We do not have that at the moment.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 17 July 2018; c. 44, Q102.]

The Opposition in Committee heard that evidence. We want to assist the counter-terror police and NABIS greatly in their work and in their aim to stop organised criminal gangs getting hold of weapons that they can turn into deadly ones as easily as they can now. We therefore hope that the Minister will be willing to support our simple amendment.

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the hon. Lady for this new clause, which addresses an issue raised in Committee by the police during the evidence sessions.

Those who look at such things and know about drafting are of the view that the new clause as drafted is probably technically defective. It would insert the new offence into section 1 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, although that section amends section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968 to extend the class of prohibited weapons and ammunition and to enable the Secretary of State to add weapons or ammunition to section 5 by order.

The key components of ammunition are the gunpowder, which burns rapidly to propel a projectile from a firearm, and the primer, which is an explosive chemical compound that ignites the gunpowder. The remaining components are the cartridge case and the projectile itself, which are inert metal. Primers are controlled by the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. Under section 35, it is an offence to sell or purchase primers unless the purchaser is authorised to possess them, for example, by being a registered firearms dealer or by holding a firearms certificate authorising them to possess a firearm of the relevant kind. The maximum penalty for this offence is six months’ imprisonment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

We have heard evidence from law enforcement that the clause would help them in their ability to disrupt gang networks and access to lethal weapons. Although I appreciate that there may be issues with the drafting of the amendment and there is legislation that covers some of it, I have not heard a good argument for why we should not bring this in to help law enforcement even more.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am not saying this critically, but we can only vote on the clause we have before us. On the substantive point, we are looking at these issues in the context of antique firearms. The Government intend to introduce regulations later this year. On that basis, unless there is anything else, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the clause.

[Louise Haigh]

We will come on to clauses on antique weapons. It is quite frustrating that we are waiting for the regulations to come forward, but we will have to wait for them to be able to scrutinise them properly. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Antique Firearms

‘(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 16A (1) (Possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence) for “or imitation firearm” substitute “, imitation firearm or antique firearm”.

(3) In section 19 (carrying a firearm in a public place), after subsection (d) insert—

“(e) antique firearm.”

(4) In section 20 (1) (Trespassing with firearm) for “or imitation firearm” substitute “, imitation firearm or antique firearm”.

(5) In section 20 (2) (Trespassing with firearm) for “or imitation firearm” substitute “, imitation firearm or antique firearm”.’—(Louise Haigh.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister just mentioned the recommendations of the Law Commission, which formed the consultation last year. In the “Panorama” documentary that I just referred to, the police suggested that it was irrational to impose greater obligations on scrap metal dealers than upon those who sell firearms, albeit antique ones. At present, an antique firearm can be bought for cash with no verification of the identity of the purchaser. That means there is no way of tracing who has purchased an antique firearm.

This state of affairs seems particularly unsatisfactory when one considers that by virtue of section 12 of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013, which was mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, a scrap dealer must not pay for scrap metal except by cheque or electronic funds transfer, including by credit or debit card. Additionally, by virtue of sections 11 to 15 of the Act, scrap metal dealers must record each transaction, the method of payment and to whom the payment was made, having verified their identity.

The benefit of imposing a similar obligation upon those who sell antique firearms is that it would aid the investigation of crimes in which such items are used, and that is what new clause 26 is designed to do. The Law Commission provisionally provides that the sale of antique firearms ought to take place by cheque or electronic funds transfer. The National Ballistics Intelligence Service and the Crown Prosecution Service are in favour of imposing such an obligation. Although we realise that dealers and collectors have expressed serious misgivings, we believe the balance should tip in favour of keeping the public safe.

New clause 24 seeks to change the offences in sections 17 and 18 of the Firearms Act 1968 to make it absolutely clear that antiques are covered by that Act. The Law Commission stated that, on one interpretation, the Act exempts antique firearms

“from every other provision in the Firearms Act 1968, including the offences contained in sections 16 – 25. This part of the Act is entitled Prevention of crime and preservation of public safety. The relevant offences are…possession of a firearm with intent to cause any person to believe that unlawful violence will be used against him or her…use of a firearm with intent to resist or prevent the lawful arrest or lawful detention…carrying a firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence…carrying a firearm in a public place…trespassing with a firearm…purchasing or selling firearms to minors…supplying a firearm to a minor…supplying a firearm to a person drunk or insane.”

I do not know whether we use such language in legislation any more.

The Law Commission continued:

“To take one example, the effect of section 58(2) might be that it would not be an offence contrary to section 17 to use an antique firearm to resist arrest. This strikes us as a loophole that ought to be closed.”

This is similar to our discussion about imitation firearms. The commission added:

“If it is an offence to use an imitation firearm to resist arrest, then it should also be an offence to use an antique firearm…The offences in section 16 – 25 could be amended to put beyond doubt that they can also be committed by someone with an antique firearm. This…we believe…would have no detrimental impact upon legitimate antique firearms collectors.”

[Victoria Atkins]

The Government share the concerns expressed about the increasing use of antique firearms in crime, and we are committed to strengthening controls to tackle the problem. That is an important part of our work to tackle gun crime, as set out in the “Serious Violence Strategy”.

It may help to explain our position on the new clause if I explain the background to this issue and what the Government are doing to address it. As has been stated, in 2015 the Law Commission carried out an independent review of firearms law. It raised the issue of the increasing use of antique firearms in crime and recommended that the exploitation of the definition of “antique firearm” to obtain old, functioning firearms should be addressed by introducing a statutory definition. The Government accepted that recommendation and included provisions in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to define “antique firearm” in regulations by reference to a firearm’s propulsion system and the type of cartridge it was designed to use. A cut-off manufacture date, after which a firearm cannot be considered an antique, can also be specified.

Late last year, the Home Office undertook a full public consultation to seek views on the detail of the regulations. As I said, we are considering the responses we received, many of which were unnecessarily technical, and it is our intention to lay regulations before Parliament by the end of the year. I hope that reassures the Committee that the Government are taking steps to tackle this serious issue.

New clauses 23 and 24 would add antique firearms to the scope of specified offences in the Firearms Act 1968. I am pleased to say that the new clauses are not necessary, since their effect is covered by existing legislation. Section 126(3) of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 will amend the 1968 Act by extending the offences in sections 19 and 20 of that Act to antique firearms. Section 126 will be brought into effect early next year. The remaining offences covered by the two new clauses already apply to antique firearms because those offences require the weapon to be used with criminal intent. Anyone using an antique firearm in that way would not be possessing it as a curiosity or ornament and the exemption for antique firearms would therefore not apply. The Law Commission reached the same conclusion in 2015.

New clause 26 would make it an offence to purchase antique firearms by cash and other non-traceable methods. That is intended to provide a record of transactions involving antique firearms that would enable the police to trace the supply chain when they are recovered in crime. The Law Commission considered that aspect of the controls in 2015. It concluded that although stopping cash payments might in theory allow the police to trace a purchaser, it could work only if they knew who the seller was. The owners and dealers of antique firearms are not licensed and so are not known to the police or other authorities. In that light, the Law Commission made no recommendation on that point.

The new clause would therefore not be effective—it would require a form of licensing of antique firearms and those who deal in them and there are no current plans to introduce such a licensing scheme. The vast majority of owners and dealers are law abiding and do not present a public safety risk. We want to be proportionate in controlling antique firearms, targeting criminal misuse while recognising legitimate collectors and dealers. We are none the less strengthening the controls on antique firearms by defining them in law. We have also proposed arrangements regularly to review the controls, to give us a chance to monitor how they are working and, if necessary, to consider further measures.

New clause 27 would require anyone who trades in antique firearms to keep a register of transactions. Like new clause 26, it is intended to provide an audit trail of transactions to allow the police to trace the supply of antique firearms that are recovered in crime. The Law Commission considered that and made no recommendation. As with the cash payments proposal, it could work only if the police knew who the seller was. In the absence of any licensing or registration of owners and dealers, it is not possible. New clause 27 would therefore not work.

As I set out, we are actively strengthening the controls on antique firearms by defining them in law. We are also committing to regular reviews of the controls involving law enforcement and other stakeholders. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley for tabling the new clause. I hope the explanation of the Government position has helped with the complexities of this important issue and therefore ask her to withdraw the proposals.

[Louise Haigh]

I am grateful to the Minister for her comprehensive reply. I am satisfied and pleased to hear that new clauses 23 and 24 are not necessary given their introduction in the Police and Crime Act 2017—the Government have beaten me to it. However, I am not convinced by the argument against new clauses 26 and 27. An audit trail when purchasing firearms, be they antique or otherwise, is vital. That a licensing or registration scheme for antique firearms dealers does not exist to make it workable does not mean that we should not introduce one. If people want to sell weapons that can be used as deadly weapons on our streets to maim and kill children in every one of our constituencies, we should be able to establish who they are selling them to. We could return to that on Report and possibly when the regulations are introduced, before the end of the year. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause is also based on the compelling evidence that the Committee received early on, particularly from Mark Groothuis from counter-terrorism policing, who said:

“It is actually relatively easy to obtain shotgun ammunition. If you want to purchase it, you must produce a shotgun certificate, but I can give shotgun ammunition to a person who is 18 or above without a shotgun certificate. In theory anyone in this room could possess up to 15 kg net explosive quantity of shotgun cartridges, which is a huge quantity—probably in excess of 10,000 rounds—with no certification at all. The controls around shotgun ammunition are particularly loose. The control is there to purchase, but not to be given”—

that is, not to supply. He continued to say that, as another witness had said,

“if you have shotgun ammunition, you can take the shooter’s powder out of it and use it for other purposes.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 17 July 2018; c. 43, Q102.]

That is what the amendment seeks to address. I appreciate why the exemption is already in law, because when someone is out on a hunt, they should not be criminalised for passing shotgun cartridges or ammunition to a fellow hunter or shooter, but surely that threshold of 15 kg is far too high and creates unnecessary loopholes in the legislation. I hope the Government will seriously consider our amendment and maybe give us just one little win.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am tempted. I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the new clause, but again—I feel sorry to point this out—those who know about these things believe the wording to be technically defective. The relevant certificate would be a shotgun certificate rather than a firearm certificate, for example.

On the substance, we believe that the new clause is unnecessary, because legislation already contains an appropriate level of control on shotgun ammunition. It is not subject to licensing, and therefore does not have to be entered on a certificate in the same way as firearm ammunition, but section 5 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 applies an important check at the point of sale by making it an offence to sell shotgun ammunition to anyone who is not a registered firearms dealer or a shotgun certificate holder. The maximum penalty is six months’ imprisonment.

A purchaser must present a valid shotgun certificate to a dealer before she or he can be sold shotgun ammunition, or must otherwise demonstrate their entitlement to be sold the ammunition. It is true that that does not prevent someone who has lawfully purchased shotgun cartridges from subsequently gifting them to a non-certificate holder, but we are not aware that that is happening in practice or that it is causing a serious public safety problem. If it is, we would be keen to see the evidence so that we can consider what might be done in response.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister explain to the Committee why the threshold is so high, at 10,000 rounds of shotgun ammunition? If the exemption is there to allow me to pass ammunition to a fellow shooter, why does it have to be at 10,000 rounds? It seems completely excessive.

[Victoria Atkins]

That is a very interesting question, and one that I might need to reflect on. If I may, I will take the chance to reflect on it now, because that does seem like a very large number of shotgun cartridges. I do not shoot myself, but I know those who do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

That is a very interesting suggestion. The explosives regulations also come to mind, because the limit on holding gunpowder is set by those regulations, and these are the limits set by those regulations. I will take away the suggestion that perhaps the regulations need to be looked at to ensure that they meet the public safety test and expectations that we all have. That will be consistent with us keeping firearms law under review, as always, and examining any significant vulnerabilities that are brought to our attention. I hope the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley will withdraw her amendment.

[Louise Haigh]

Although I am still unsatisfied as to why the threshold should be so excessively high, I will go back and look at the explosives regulations and perhaps we will return with further amendments on Report. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

On a point of order, Mr Gray. As we are nearing the end of our deliberations, may I say a few words of thanks to everyone who has been involved in the scrutiny process? We have scrutinised the Bill seriously and thoroughly, and have had plenty of time to consider it in great detail. I am grateful to you, Mr Gray, and to Mr Gapes, for the excellent chairing, keeping us all in order in what has been a very warm Committee Room.

I am incredibly grateful to all Committee members for the constructive way in which they have approached their deliberations. I am also grateful that, despite points of disagreement, the Committee’s passion and determination to help law enforcement and others to tackle these serious crimes has come through very strongly. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley and the right hon. Member for East Ham for their many considered and expert contributions, and to—wish me luck—the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He is not even here to appreciate my efforts, but he brought a different perspective to the issues we have been debating.

I also thank my officials. Our consideration of the issues has demonstrated how complex their job has been, both in preparing the Bill and as we have been scrutinising it. I also thank everyone who has supported the Committee, including the Doorkeepers, the Hansard reporters and, of course, the Committee Clerks. I am sure that our deliberations in Committee have put us in a good place as the Bill progresses.

[Louise Haigh]

Further to that point of order, Mr Gray. I, too, thank you and Mr Gapes for keeping us in order and for your invaluable guidance in Committee. I thank the Minister for her thoroughness and graciousness in taking our interventions and providing us with thorough responses. I also thank all Committee members who have engaged in such a constructive, thoughtful debate. I believe we have scrutinised the Government’s legislation before us and brought forward additional clauses that we think the Bill is lacking. We hope that will continue as the Bill passes through Parliament.

I thank in particular my fantastic team on the Opposition side—sorry to the Government Back Benchers—and my fantastic Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford, who is such an expert in this area as chair of the Youth Violence Commission. I think I am uniquely blessed in that I have a team of people who wanted to be on the Bill Committee and have such personal expertise and interest in this area. I hope the others will not mind if I thank in particular my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, who has schooled us all in scrutiny of the legislation and brought his personal expertise and experience, which is sadly born out of the horrific experience and events in his constituency.

I also thank the officials, the Clerks, the Doorkeepers and Hansard as well as everyone who gave evidence to the Committee, who have been heard. They might not all be satisfied with the outcomes, but we have listened and considered all the evidence submitted. If I may, Mr Gray, I will also thank my researcher, Danny Coyne. The Government have an entire team of civil servants, but my poor researcher has been up till midnight most nights helping me write my speeches.

[The Chair]

Of course, both points of order were entirely bogus, but none the less they were extremely welcome.

Offensive Weapons Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 6th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Louise Haigh]

As the Minister has just made clear, in that instance the seller committed a criminal offence under the existing legislation. Clearly, there is an issue of enforcement, and, as she said, of some online retailers’ awareness of the existing legislation. Can she make clear what the clause requires of online retailers that is not already required? Are they not currently required to have a system for checking that buyers are over 18, and if they are not, how is the current law enforced?

[Victoria Atkins]

Months of work have gone into the “Serious Violence Strategy”, and the Bill will try to assist not only the police but online retailers. I do not for a moment suggest that they are deliberately trying to evade the law, and we want to help law-abiding retailers to fulfil their responsibilities under the law. We hope that setting out these conditions, which will no doubt be widely disseminated in the industry and among retailers, will help retailers satisfy themselves that they have met the expectations of the law on those sales. The clause should be read in conjunction with clause 15, which is another stage in the process of preventing knives that are bought online being delivered to residential premises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

It was sold by means of Amazon. It was a Scottish case, so I will have to find that out for the right hon. Gentleman, but I make the point about Amazon. If he remembers, we had this discussion about the difficulty with Amazon or a business such as Amazon. That difficulty is discerning when Amazon is selling in its own right as Amazon and when it is acting as a marketplace, antiques fair or whatever analogy one wants to use. That is difficult, a very tricky area in which to put into law the ill-harm we are addressing. The provisions on overseas sales try to address that. I do not pretend that we are 100% there, but we are trying to weave our way through to ensure that companies that knowingly take on online delivery of overseas sales meet the threshold. We will return to that at the appropriate clause.

Clause 12 amends section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which makes it an offence to sell bladed articles to people under 18. That defence—namely, that the seller took

“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”—

is modified, or explained, in clause 12 for when the sale is conducted remotely. If sellers do not put in place minimum requirements to meet the conditions set out in the clause, they will not be able to avail themselves of the defence that they took “all reasonable precautions” or “exercised all due diligence” to avoid an offence being committed.

The first requirement is that the seller has a system in place to verify the age of the purchaser. Sellers are expected to have robust age-verification processes to reassure themselves that the person to whom they are selling is 18 or above. The legislation does not prescribe what constitutes a robust age-verification procedure, and that is deliberate, because we know all too well how quickly the online world is moving. The age-verification industry is evolving rapidly, as we saw with the Digital Economy Act 2017. We do not want to put something in statute that is a commercial decision for retailers or that might result in out-of-date measures in 12 months’ time or ones that could already be improved.

Frankly, it is for business owners to decide which solution is best for their business model. I draw an analogy with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which does not set out what is expected of anyone running a business such as a construction company or an iron foundry, but does set out the expectation that those employers will take all reasonable practicable steps to protect their workforce and members of the public.

[Louise Haigh]

We had part of this debate on Tuesday, when it was made clear that we should not be putting technological processes or procedures into primary legislation. However, it is reasonable to set minimum standards in primary legislation. I am afraid that the comparison with the Digital Economy Act, in relation to age restrictions for online pornography, does not hold water because the issue with age verification there is that there is no connection to an online sale in that Act, but there is in the Bill. That is why the age verification for online gambling is a good standard and should have been replicated in the Bill, because it is connected to a sale. For example, a bank can verify whether an individual is over 18. That does not get us round the issue that I mentioned earlier—that although the age of the card holder can be verified, it is not possible to tell whether the individual using it is over 18—but software is available to enable selfies to show that the person using the card is the owner.

[Louise Haigh]

I am sorry, Mr Gray. My point is that the provision is too vague for online retailers. It is too vague to be effective. We would like the Government to bring forward at least draft guidance for the Committee to show what standards they will require of online retailers.

[Victoria Atkins]

As I say, we have set out the expectations. We have already discussed, in the context of corrosive substances, things like checking the electoral roll and providing proof of a council tax bill, for example, and so on. I think retail will find ways in which to satisfy themselves that the buyer is over 18. Government can do so much, but if retailers are selling these products, all they have to do—I do describe it in that way—is work out that the customers with whom they have a relationship are over the age of 18.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister make it absolutely clear that it will not be sufficient to meet the requirements of the clause for retailers to ask the customer to tick a box confirming that they are over 18?

[Victoria Atkins]

Yes, that is absolutely what we are trying to improve upon. Some retailers think that that is sufficient. It is simply not sufficient. If they are going to make those sales, I am afraid that, in the interest of the wider community, they have to ensure that they are lawfully permitted to sell to the people to whom they are selling. A tick-box exercise is simply not good enough.

A second requirement is for the package to be marked clearly to the effect that it contains an article with a blade—or one that is sharp and pointed—and that it can be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Frankly, I should have hoped that sellers would already have similar arrangements, if they wanted to ensure that a knife sold remotely would not be handed over to a person under 18, under current legislation. However, unfortunately some sellers do not mark the package as age-restricted, so we are building the further safeguard into the Bill.

The third requirement is for the seller to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that when the package is delivered it is handed to a person aged 18 or over. Again, the seller has a responsibility to ensure that the company delivering the item understands that age must be verified before it is handed over. The fourth requirement is for the seller not to deliver the package, or arrange for it to be delivered, to a locker. Some delivery companies nowadays have those facilities. That is not permissible for the sale of bladed articles—bladed products—under the clause. Obviously it would fall foul of the age verification process.

We expect that, with the placing of those minimum requirements on a statutory footing, they will be standard practice to comply with existing legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his amendment. We have tried to limit the impact of these measures wherever possible to the issue of real concern: preventing young people from having access to the most offensive types of knives online. We are not trying to make life difficult for the constituent of the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn. It is a balancing act.

Amendment 46 would have the effect of restricting the range of addresses to which a remote seller can send a bladed product. It might mean, for example, that bladed products bought online could not be sent to a school or a hospital, which may not be registered as business addresses. A person working from home—for example, someone working part-time or engaged in irregular work from home—might not have registered their home as a business address. A farm might or might not be registered as a business address. We are very conscious of the fact that clause 15 will already have an impact on the online trade of bladed products, which can cover anything from breadknives to specialist bladed knives used for woodworking or agricultural activities, as the right hon. Member for East Ham described. We are trying to limit the impact on that legitimate trade by allowing deliveries to businesses to continue. The business could be a farm, a hospital, a school or a business run from someone’s home.

We considered using a registered business address as the basis for the offence, but we decided against that because there is no simple way for sellers to ascertain whether a premise is a registered business address—particularly if the person working there is self-employed or part-time. Of course, not all types of businesses that we would want to be able to receive deliveries will necessarily operate from a registered business address. We therefore took the approach of preventing the dispatch of bladed products to a premise that is used solely as a residential premise. That will allow deliveries to continue to hospitals, hotels, care homes, schools, restaurants, farms and any residential premise from which a business operates, such as a plumber who operates from home.

The right hon. Gentleman gave the example of a flat above a shop. It depends on the construction of the premise, but if it is a divided premise—in other words, if the flat has nothing to do with the shop—I suspect it would be viewed as a residential premise and so would be covered by the clause.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister confirm how the seller is meant to confirm that a residential premise that they are being asked to deliver a bladed product to is used only for residential purposes?

[Victoria Atkins]

There are a range of ways in which the seller may satisfy themselves of that purpose. They could ask the buyer to produce evidence that the address to which they are delivering is a business. It might take the form of a document confirming that it is a registered business address. It might be that the buyer supplies business papers showing the address, a document setting out that the property is subject to business rates or a simple confirmation email from the buyer to confirm that they work from that address.

There are many ways in which to tackle this issue, and the step-by-step process that the Bill proposes will make it less and less likely that a young person who is sadly on a path of criminality will think it is worth the hassle, frankly. Sellers emailing buyers to confirm their business address and to ask what sort of business they operate and so on will put a responsibility on the buyer as well, and rightly so. I hope that that explanation of our approach satisfies the right hon. Gentleman, and I invite him to withdraw his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 15 provides that where a sale is carried out remotely, it is an offence for a seller to deliver or arrange for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises or to a locker. Checks should not be done only at the point when the seller processes the sale, but at the moment when the product is being given to or issued by the despatcher. The reason for that is the methodical journey of the sale process. If young people want to get their hands on dangerous knives, we must make it as difficult as possible, with the help of retailers, and ensure that that does not happen.

Various points have been raised. I have noticed in the correspondence over the past few months that there seems to be a misunderstanding, so this is a great opportunity to clarify exactly what is meant by clauses 15 and 17. We are not seeking to stop the online sale of knives or bladed products. We are trying to craft the law so that those who are entitled under the law to buy knives that have sharp blades can do so if they are over 18. We have used the phrase “bladed product” precisely because we want to differentiate it from the phrase “bladed articles” used in the 1988 Act, which is not as restrictive.

In answer to the right hon. Gentleman’s question, we have excluded cutlery, because we appreciate that people will want to be able to buy cutlery. With the best will in the world, a table knife will not meet the criteria set out in clause 17(1)(b). If we had not defined it, it would be an offence to sell a disposable plastic knife to someone under-18, which would miss the point of the legislation. The wording seeks to pinpoint the risks that we are trying to address.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

I will just finish this point. The hon. Lady has raised concerns from a variety of stakeholders and if their products fall within the definition of clause 17, they must satisfy themselves that they fall within it. We are not saying they cannot sell the products online. We are simply saying they have to meet the conditions of clause 12 and that, when it comes to delivery, the product should be delivered to the local post office, delivery depot or village shop that acts as the delivery depot for a company. Picking up packages from the post office and delivery depots is a fact of life in the modern age, when we all order stuff on the internet. The clause is not about stopping food processors being sent to people; we will just have to go to the post office to pick them up. I represent a rural constituency, so I am rather pleased that we will drive more business to rural post offices so that they continue to thrive in our villages and market towns. The clause is not about stopping bladed products being sold and delivered to people in a lawful manner.

[Louise Haigh]

Is the Minister confirming that the definition of a bladed product will cover food processors, coffee grinders, scissors and razors, and that those products will no longer be able to be delivered to residential addresses?

[Victoria Atkins]

Folding knives with a blade of less than 3 inches are excluded from the definitions of both “bladed article” and “bladed product”, and a scalpel would be covered by both. All I am saying is that the purchaser will have to go to the post office with identification to pick up such a product—that is it.

[Louise Haigh]

But what about the examples I just gave: food processors, coffee grinders, razors and scissors?

[Victoria Atkins]

I am afraid I do not have expert knowledge of the lengths of the blades in a Magimix food processor. The definition is clear. Products with blades of less than 3 inches are excluded from the definitions of both “bladed article” and “bladed product”.

[Louise Haigh]

I am sorry, but the definition is not clear in the slightest. Will it cover scissors? Will it cover razors? The people who gave us evidence were not clear, and I do not know about other Members but I am not clear either. I do not think it is unreasonable to ask the Minister to answer to those questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Precisely. We have tried to acknowledge the different ways in which we rely on blades in day-to-day life. We know children do not go out with encased razors to threaten people on the street. They use knives, clearly. That is what the definition seeks to clarify. If Opposition Members had a yearning to buy a pair of scissors with blades longer than 3 inches, they could do so—they would just have to go to the post office to pick it up. That is the point.

If we did not have such a system, the seller could do everything they were supposed to do to check age at the point of sale, but the item may be put through the letterbox anyway and get into the hands of someone under 18. We know that has happened; we just want to stop it happening again. Again, I do not pretend that this is a magic solution that will solve all knife crime, but we are trying to build a journey for bladed articles and products that makes it substantially more difficult for young people, if they are so minded, to get around the measures that retailers take when selling them.

The condition that such articles cannot be delivered to a locker is also important. The clause is about deterring young people from trying to buy such articles online and getting around the law.

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister helpfully mentioned that the Government’s assumption is that such an article will be delivered to someone’s local post office or sorting office, or to a depot. Why, therefore, is there no mention in the Bill of the requirements on the individuals handing over the bladed product? Will there not be a corresponding offence for them of not verifying someone’s age? If there is not, how can we enforce checking at that point of the delivery?

[Victoria Atkins]

It is actually because the Government are trying to help post office workers by not making them criminally liable for handing over a package when all they are doing is their job and when they have had no involvement in the act of purchasing. Indeed, we have been in a great deal of discussion with delivery companies, including Royal Mail, about how together we can ensure that the Bill’s intentions are met in a way that balances the risks regarding young people with not placing post office workers, delivery drivers and so on under such a level of criminal liability. If the retailer has not done its job, I would feel uncomfortable about putting that duty on post office workers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

Can the Minister confirm that the legislation will not ban the delivery of screwdrivers to residential premises?

[Victoria Atkins]

Again, if it meets the criteria of the Bill, it will. If it does not meet the criteria, it will not. I will not go into a long speculative list of items because someone will always come up with another item that has a blade. The idea of a gang member walking down the street with a Magimix is a new one in my portfolio. I will not list items, because the wording is there in the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

It is the job of business to have that conversation with their sellers. We know already that online retailers such as John Lewis, which has signed up to our voluntary code for businesses in trying to prevent the sale of knives and corrosive substances, have stopped selling knives online because that is a business decision they have taken. For other sellers, when somebody puts an order in, they will have that conversation and say, “I’m sorry; you will have to go to the post office to pick this up.”

[Louise Haigh]

I am afraid it is not the job of business; it is the job of the Committee and the Government. When introducing a new definition into legislation, we must be clear what that definition covers. We have to provide guidance to those that will come under the legislation and that definition. I asked about screwdrivers because, as the Minister knows, they are routinely used in violent offences. The legislation might stop children accessing knives online, but it will not stop them buying screwdrivers online and using them in violent offences. My point is that the ban will have far-reaching consequences for individuals and businesses, but it will probably not have a significant impact on the number of violent offences committed by children.

[Victoria Atkins]

I have to say that I do not share the hon. Lady’s pessimism. If I may say so, her assertion is not made on the basis of evidence. To accept that, one would be extrapolating from the idea that children, having listened to this Public Bill Committee debate, will then suddenly start purchasing screwdrivers to commit violent acts. I fully accept that young people use screwdrivers as well, but the purpose of the Bill is to try to address the concerns that the police, charities and others have about the types of wounds they see emerging in A&E departments, and we need to fill the loophole we have discovered when it comes to the online sale of bladed products.

I could go through every item and say tick or cross, but I do not believe that is the duty of this Committee. The definition is set out in the Bill. It is for those affected by the definition to ensure that they meet the standards expected by law, which are already in existence; the concept of not being able to sell knives to under-18s has been in existence now for nearly 30 years. This is about addressing the problem of children getting hold of knives online, which we want to try to stop as much as possible. The Bill is directed at achieving that.

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister has not answered the questions about the licensing system that many knife retailers have put forward. She mentioned a loophole, but it seems to me that the licensing system would address many of the loopholes, including the platform issues that we have discussed at length.

[Victoria Atkins]

We have based the Bill on existing offences, rather than setting up a completely new approach. There has been a lot of talk about small businesses. The system that the hon. Lady described strikes me, as someone who used to be self-employed, as a whole raft of new bureaucracy, in a way that these measures will not be. We did not consider that option, because we felt that this system is preferable to trying to construct a whole new system that would place a burden on the woodcutter in Hampstead or the occasional crafter in rural areas. We believe that these conditions are sensible and reasonable, and I think that they will become part of day-to-day business life very quickly.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Defences to offence under section 15

Offensive Weapons Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 6th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

I want to consider a couple of other areas that we have not covered on which the Committee received evidence. One such example is a request for a defence under the clause for Scout groups and other such charities. We have received evidence that a large number of people who buy knives from this particular business are Scout groups and Scout leaders and, because of the way they operate, the majority of their orders are placed by Scout leaders and delivered to their homes. They are concerned that this ban would stop that and force them to go and pick up from other access points. The evidence we received requested that a specific defence could be made allowing charities to have knives delivered to their registered addresses. All Scout groups are registered charities.

The other area of concern that has been raised is antiques. I appreciate that in another part of the Bill we will be discussing antiques and the need for more controls on antique firearms, but just for the purposes of clarification and to respond to the many people who are concerned about this bit of the Bill, could the Minister tell us why she has rejected the proposals to include purchases for charities and of antiques as a defence under this clause?

[Victoria Atkins]

In clause 16, we have responded to the consultations made in the course of the Bill’s being drafted. I am conscious that I read out some of my speech on this previously. With the Committee’s consent, I will not repeat that, because the evidence is on the record.

We will come on to museums a little later in the knife provisions. I am seeking to pass an amendment to include museums under the clauses outlawing possession of weapons that are so offensive that Parliament has previously judged that they should not be sold, imported, or anything of that nature. We are just trying to close that gap. We will seek an exemption for museums, which may have flick knives or zombie knives in their collections.

If I may, I will write to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley about charities, because I would like to explore whether the definition of a business would also include a charity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Meaning of “bladed product” in sections 15 and 16

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

I just want to reiterate the concern about the clarity of the definition. Will the Minister confirm that, essentially, any blade over 3 inches will be covered by this definition?

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady. Would it help if I repeated my point of order?

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us that we have been in this world of expecting deliveries through the post because of online sales for only the last decade or so. He is right that to buy a pair of kitchen scissors, a steak knife or whatever in the past a person had to go to a local shop.

[Louise Haigh]

That is absolutely right. But, apart from the issues for disabled people and people living in isolated areas, the burden is not really on the individual, although it will be a pain to have to go to the local post office when previously something could be delivered to people’s houses. The burden will be on business, in having to separate out products that can, at present, be delivered to someone’s home without any additional checks other than perhaps, for certain products, that the recipient is over 18. Now businesses will have to separate out those products and choose somewhere else to deliver them to. That is why we need clarity about which products can be delivered where, otherwise I fear the legislation will have a devastating impact, particularly on smaller online retailers.

[Victoria Atkins]

As I said, we have tried with the use of the new phrase “bladed product”, different from the language used in the Criminal Justice Act, to simplify the definition as far as possible so that, under clause 17, the test is whether the product

“is or has a blade, and…is capable of causing a serious injury to a person which involves cutting that person’s skin.”

That is why, for example, encased razor blades are not included, or table knives, cutlery knives and disposable plastic knives, but the definition does include knives such as bread knives, steak knives, kitchen scissors and so on. The Bill has had to balance the needs and concerns of everyone.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Delivery of bladed articles to persons under 18

Amendment made: 23, in clause 18, page 17, line 21, leave out “is guilty of” and insert “commits”.—(Victoria Atkins.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 17.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

At the risk of replicating the discussion, I will repeat some of the points I made earlier, because I do not think the Minister responded to the alternative proposal of expanding the clause to cover sales made internally in the UK, rather than just sales outside the United Kingdom.

We believe it could be possible to mirror this clause to cover internal UK sales, so someone would be entitled to purchase a bladed article online from a retailer outside of the UK and all they would have to do is prove that they were over 18 when it was delivered. Much of that would circumvent the issues that we discussed regarding clause 15.

Although the term “article” has, as we discussed, a different definition, it is clear that many bladed articles will be captured by the definition of “bladed products” in clause 18. Therefore a delivery to a residential address for an adult would be possible under clause 18, but not under clause 15. Will the Minister explain why there is not a similar provision to that in clause 18 for internal UK deliveries?

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[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 18 introduces a criminal offence if a delivery company delivers, on behalf of a seller based abroad, a bladed article into the hands of a person aged under 18. A bladed article is an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies. Eagle-eyed Committee members will have noticed that we have moved from talking about a bladed product to a bladed article. The law under section 141A of the CJA applies to knives and certain articles with a blade or point—for example, axes, razor blades other than those that are encased, and all knives other than folding knives with a blade of less than three inches. Actually, with bladed products the length of the blade is also irrelevant, unless it is a folding pocket knife.

I am very conscious of the points that the right hon. Member for East Ham made about clause 18(1)(d), and I will reflect on them. I am also very conscious of the points made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and will reflect on those, too.

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her observations. It is part of the balancing exercise regarding delivery. If a delivery company makes the commercial decision to enter into a contract or arrangement with someone overseas selling products, we have sought to place the responsibility on the delivery company for ensuring that all is well with the person to whom they are providing a service. Extra-territorial jurisdiction is sadly not just an issue in the case of offensive weapons, but in many areas, such as ordering drugs over the internet, particularly using the dark web. We have sought to control it through that mechanism.

For sales where the seller and buyer are in the United Kingdom, we asked delivery companies as part of our consultation exercise what they would make of placing criminal liability on their post office workers or delivery drivers. We concluded that were we to expand the provision to all online sales of knives, delivery companies might start to say to themselves, “It’s just not worth it commercially for us to deliver these knives or bladed products at all. We won’t do it.” That would leave our small businesses in great trouble, because they would be unable to get their products to their customers.

I know that small businesses are having to go through a number of checks to get their products into the hands of their lawful purchasers, but we hope that the provisions in relation to the online world overseas will mean that delivery companies are very careful when they enter into such arrangements.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister give an example of how a delivery company could ensure that, in her words, all is well with a seller overseas? Can she give an example of what that would have to look like to meet the standard in the Bill?

[Victoria Atkins]

These delivery companies are very big businesses by and large. They have extraordinary human resources departments. They will be drafting contracts with the people with whom they have delivery contracts. If someone orders anything from a major department store or online shop, it is unlikely, frankly, that they have their own in-house delivery service. They probably subcontract that to various companies—I will not advertise them in today’s proceedings, but we know who they are.

Frankly, I expect those delivery companies to understand what they are potentially delivering when entering into such arrangements. We are all aware of how illicit items can be posted from overseas to avoid customs and so on, so I expect those business to satisfy themselves that they are meeting the law. Every company conducts its contractual negotiations differently, but if a delivery company enters into an arrangement with a business that sells knives, it should be on red alert to ensure that it is a reputable business with which to do its trade.

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[Louise Haigh]

In the example that we have discussed at length—someone buying an offensive weapon or corrosive product off an individual through a platform—how does the Minister anticipate that the delivery company will satisfy itself about what the individual seller is selling? It is one thing saying that it should establish that it is delivering for a reputable business, but if it is an individual overseas, how will the company ensure that it is adhering to the standards in the Bill?

[Victoria Atkins]

To clarify, does the hon. Lady mean that the delivery company has a contract with Amazon, for example, which is being used as an antiques fair?

[Louise Haigh]

Yes.

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[Victoria Atkins]

In those circumstances, I hope the delivery company will have a good understanding from Amazon, which will have a good understanding from the seller about the products. I am not pretending that this is easy, but that is the conundrum we all face nowadays with the global internet marketplace.

[Louise Haigh]

The issue here is the individual seller that uses a delivery company. Amazon and other platforms do not have their own deliverers—well, they do if they are directly selling—but individuals contract a delivery company, so Amazon is taken out of it at that point. I struggle to see how a delivery company can satisfy itself to the standards rightly included in the Bill that the individual is selling what they say they are selling.

[Victoria Atkins]

We have had to restrict this to contracts with direct arrangements between a delivery company and the seller. As I say, we are trying to close the net on these sorts of products. That is why I will be very interested to reflect on the point made by the right hon. Member for East Ham about what happens if, having entered into the arrangement in good faith and not understanding that bladed articles are in the marketplace, the delivery company then discovers that. If I may, I will reflect on whether they are then opened up under the clause.

[Louise Haigh]

I am sorry to press the Minister on this. We could easily have a situation in which an individual advertises a knife on Amazon and sells it online, and then takes it to the equivalent of the post office in their country and tells it that the item is something completely different. Is it sufficient, in that situation, for the delivery company—whoever it is—to have been told that it is completely harmless? Will the delivery company have met the standards in the Bill?

[Victoria Atkins]

That scenario is not envisaged by the Bill. Subsection (1)(c) states:

“before the sale, the seller entered into an arrangement with a person who is a body corporate”—

in other words, a company—

“by which the person agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller”.

We foresee a relationship whereby someone sets themselves out as a knife seller. That is what they do—intricately carved knives, or whatever. They know that in the UK they have to get them delivered, and an arrangement is set up between the delivery company and the person selling the knife.

[Louise Haigh]

So is it the case that individuals who are not set up as body corporates will not be covered by this legislation?

[Victoria Atkins]

The wording in the Bill is “body corporate”, as in the delivery companies. I suspect by now the Committee has an idea of the difficult balancing exercise we have had to engage in to try to tease out these corners of the online international marketplace. This the arrangement that we have put into the Bill. In those circumstances, it will be up to the court to determine, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the individual circumstances of the case, whether reasonable precautions were taken and all due diligence was done. Particular subsections in relation to Scotland are in the Bill.

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[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the hon. Lady for that observation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Amendments to the definition of “flick knife”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

I have a few concerns to express on behalf of several organisations and individuals who have given evidence to the Committee. We of course wholeheartedly support the principle behind the clause, which is to update definitions in order to reflect change in weapon designs.

The existing definitions include,

“any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a ‘flick knife’ or ‘flick gun’”,

and any with a blade released by “force of gravity”. Respondents felt that neither of those particular knives was of the type used in criminal activity now. We are not convinced by that argument, because the definition the Government were considering had not been published during the consultation. Now that the new definition has been published, I think it adequately captures the offence and has the benefit of being broadly defined. Many organisations, charities and those in the legal and criminal justice sector agree with the proposal, but there are some legitimate concerns.

In other cases, the definition for any knife, bladed article or bladed product has tended to expand as it has made its way through the courts and into case law. For example, butter knives are now bladed articles, thanks to a judgment in 2004, I believe. The majority of reservations expressed by retailers and individuals were around the possibility that the revised definition might capture knives that can be opened with one hand but are used in everyday life by those pursuing a hobby, such as rock climbers, or by those who require such a knife for their work.

One concern related to the definition in subsection (1)(a), which refers to a

“button, spring or other device in or attached to the knife”,

rather than

“in or attached to the handle of the knife”.

I have been provided with examples of safety knives used by kayakers that can be deployed with one hand by using lateral pressure against the stud of the blade, rather than the handle. That type of knife, which now involves only a possession offence without the reasonable excuse defence, would be prohibited. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that she has considered the representations of such sports enthusiasts regarding the definition and that she is satisfied that it will not criminalise perfectly legitimate products?

[Victoria Atkins]

The good news is that butter knives are not bladed products under clause 7.

Clause 19 amends section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 to provide that the definition of a flick knife will include knives that mimic the way in which a flick knife is opened, where the open mechanism design does not bring the knife under the definition set out in 1959 Act. In existing legislation, a flick knife is

“any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife”.

That is an old definition and new designs are now available that mimic the speed with which a flick knife can be opened but that do not strictly fall under the 1959 legislation. There are suspicions that they have been designed deliberately to skirt around that definition. I have seen some models that allow the blade to open at great speed from a closed to a fully opened position, but the mechanisms are not in the handle. However, we know that they can be very dangerous and that they are the sort of weapons that people who have ill will in mind find very attractive as an option for arming themselves.

We have therefore set out to include in the new definition of a flick knife any knife that opens automatically from a closed or partially opened position to a fully opened position by means of

“manual pressure applied to a button, spring or other device”

contained in a knife or attached to it. Knives opened manually, including those opened with a thumb stud, will not fall under the new definition. Similarly, knives with a mechanism that opens the blade slightly but not completely and need to be opened fully by hand will not fall under the definition. We are very conscious of representations made by tree surgeons and others, and we have tried to encompass their concerns. The definition will ensure that knives for a situation in which it is necessary to open a knife with one hand are available in the market. For tree surgeons, for example, the fact of their occupation would lend them comfort under the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Prohibition on the possession of certain dangerous knives

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[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 21 amends section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to extend the offence to include further education premises. The change reflects the significant expansion in the number of students and the changes in such institutions since the law was amended by the Offensive Weapons Act 1996. The number of incidents of knife possession in education institutions other than schools is unknown because possession per se is not an offence at the moment, but the number of incidents reported in the media is low—although I know that, sadly, there is experience in some Committee members’ constituencies of such incidents. We want to give the police the powers they need to deal with an incident before it happens.

Colleagues have understandably asked why universities are not included in clauses 21 and 27. While standing by the promise I made on Tuesday to reflect further, I will explain the thinking behind that. It is that universities are generally attended by adults rather than children—in other words, people aged over 18. As such, a university can be regarded as more akin to an office or other place of work than a place where children, as strictly defined by the law, are taught. Not all parts of universities can be considered a public place—for example, halls of residence—and a person possessing a bladed article, or offensive weapon or corrosive substance, on part of a university campus that is open to public access would be caught by the existing and proposed offences.

I am conscious of the debate about keypads and stairwells and so on, and it reminds me that one of the most contentious cases in the last few decades in the Royal Courts of Justice was over the definition of a Jaffa cake. I am afraid that this is a similar sort of debate. We all know what it is and we know what we want to achieve; the issue is how we get the wording into statute in a way that can be applied properly by the courts.

I am delighted that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn and the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras have been visiting schools in London to talk about knife crime. Hon. Members may remember that, not long after I was appointed, I invited former gang members into the House of Commons so that we as Members of Parliament could listen to them and they could contribute their ideas about what Government and Parliament can do to help to safeguard them better. Their thoughts—delivered directly, but also delivered through the great charities we work with, such as Redthread, the St Giles Trust and Catch22—very much fed into the serious violence strategy. The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn will know that, having announced in April that we were setting aside £11 million to fund early intervention initiatives, the Home Secretary doubled that to £22 million over the summer recess, because we understand the importance of this issue and want to help organisations that are doing such great work on the ground to get the message out.

Just before schools rose for the summer holidays, I wrote to headteachers across the country and invited them to encourage their teaching staff to talk to children about knife crime before the holidays. We were conscious that sadly, summer holidays sometimes mean that children find themselves in very damaging situations. I do a lot of work on the curriculum with my colleagues in the Department for Education, and gangs and their impact form part of the latest safeguarding guidance from the Department. That issue is also addressed through the serious violence taskforce, which brings together the Home Office, all other Government Departments, senior Ministers, the Mayor of London, chief constables, police and crime commissioners, charities, healthcare providers, and so on. That taskforce is doing a great deal of work on what more we can do through early intervention to help children at an earlier stage.

This summer, we announced the results of the continuing anti-knife crime community fund, which is having a real impact on smaller charities in local areas that are working on the ground with children to safeguard them and lead them away from paths of criminality.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister explain why the Home Office was considering higher education premises at the beginning of the consultation period, when it knew that universities are not occupied by children? What has changed the Home Office’s mind during the consultation process?

[Victoria Atkins]

Just that we have been troubled by this definition of a “public place.” Having listened to the submissions made through the Committee, we will look at the issue again, but this is a difficult area, because higher education premises tend to be frequented by people who are adults in the eyes of the law. Of course, if an adult walks around with a knife or does anything worse with it, that is already caught by the existing legislation, but higher education premises are a grey area, as are stairwells in communal housing. I will see whether we can do anything more that will withstand any challenge through the courts.

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[Victoria Atkins]

The definition of “zombie knife” in the Bill is the existing definition under section 141(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 set out in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2016. I appreciate that we are fighting a constant battle to future-proof the definition of such knives, but that is the definition in law. I have listened to what the hon. Lady said about crossbows and I am happy to reflect on it. The definition of “zombie knife” was agreed by Parliament in a statutory instrument in 2016 and we have sought to be consistent with that.

[Louise Haigh]

Since that statutory instrument, how many possession convictions, or associated convictions, have there been in which the weapons cited by the statutory instrument were still being manufactured and sold?

[Victoria Atkins]

I will have to write to the hon. Lady about that. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Surrender of prohibited offensive weapons

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

There are some costings involved in clauses 24 and 25. I believe that the impact assessment estimated that a national amnesty would cost between £200,000 and £300,000, and the cost of compensation for surrendered knives would cost about £200,000. Whose budget will that come out of?

[Victoria Atkins]

The budget for compensation?

[Louise Haigh]

The amnesty and compensation budgets.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 24 provides for the regulations for compensation. I will provide a draft of the regulations in due course, and there will be an opportunity to scrutinise the arrangements when they are laid before the House following Royal Assent. The budget for the compensation will come from the Home Office.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Offence of threatening with offensive weapon etc

Amendments made: 24, in clause 26, page 25, line 14, at end insert—

‘( ) Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (offence of threatening with offensive weapon in public) is amended in accordance with subsections (1) and (1A).

This amendment and Amendments 25 to 28 provide for the repeal of the definitions of “serious physical harm” in section 1A(2) of the Prevention and Crime Act 1953 and section 139AA(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Clause 26 replaces references to “serious physical harm” in section 1A(1) of the 1953 Act and section 139AA(1) of the 1988 Act with references to “physical harm”.

Amendment 25, in clause 26, page 25, line 15, leave out from “In” to end of line 16 and insert “subsection (1)—”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 24.

Amendment 26, in clause 26, page 25, line 21, at end insert—

‘(1A) Omit subsection (2).

(1B) Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offence of threatening with article with blade or point or offensive weapon) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).’

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 24.

Amendment 27, in clause 26, page 25, line 22, leave out from “In” to end of line 23 and insert “subsection (1)—”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 24.

Amendment 28, in clause 26, page 25, line 28, at end insert—

‘(1A) Omit subsection (4).’—(Victoria Atkins.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 24.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

The clause attempts to lower the threshold for the offence of threatening with an offensive weapon. The offence of threatening with an article with a blade or a point, or an offensive weapon, set out in section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant threatened another person with a weapon

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person.”

This modification will strengthen the law to make prosecution easier.

The clause amends existing offences of threatening with an offensive weapon or article with a blade or point. There is a mandatory minimum custodial sentence of a four-month detention and training order for children aged 16 and 17 and a custodial sentence of at least six months for an adult convicted under the existing legislation. Let me take this opportunity again to put on the record the Opposition’s concerns about mandatory minimum sentences for children and the conflict between the Sentencing Council’s advice and the Government’s legislation.

The clause raises a number of questions, and several organisations have made their concerns clear. The Law Society stated:

“We are not persuaded that the proposed change to the definition of this offence is necessary. The requirement that the prosecution prove that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm arising from the threat, as introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, remains an appropriate, sufficient and objective, test.”

As far as I could see, the consultation paper provided no examples of cases where the current law proved inadequate, so will the Minister elaborate on that? Can she provide examples where someone should have been convicted of an offence but the threshold could not be met? If not, why is the clause in the Bill? What advice has she received from the police service about the evidential threshold being difficult to meet? The impact assessment suggested there would be a 10% uptick in prosecutions. Presumably that figure was not plucked from thin air, so may we have more information about how the Home Office arrived at it?

The Law Society continued:

“It is not clear what exactly is the asserted inadequacy with the current law to justify this change in the law. While we note the inclusion of an objective element of the reasonableness of the victim’s fear, by reference to a hypothetical person of reasonable firmness, this will provide fertile room for debate and appeals, in much the same way as occurred in relation to the old defence of provocation.”

That is important. As the Minister will know, the old defence of provocation is in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 and was changed in 2009. In its first report, the Law Commission stated that there were significant problems with that defence as it did not appear to be underpinned by any clear rationale, and that the concept of loss of self-control had become troublesome.

In the 2005 case of Harriot v. DPP, for example, a man at a bail hostel returned to find his room had been burgled. He placed two knives in his pockets and started becoming agitated in the communal reception area. He then went outside into the front garden of the hostel. The staff locked him out and the police were called. After searching him and finding the knives, they arrested him for possession of sharply pointed implements and he was convicted. However, he won his appeal by arguing that the private front garden was not a place where that offence could be committed merely because the public’s access to the area was unimpeded. That goes back to the problems with the definition of “public area”. In that scenario, could the staff be regarded as having a reasonable fear that they were at risk of physical harm? Would that be any more the case under the Bill than under existing legislation?

This is the ultimate question: has the Minister properly scrutinised the clause for such unintended consequences, and does she intend to define “reasonable” in clause 26(1)(b)?

[Victoria Atkins]

I should declare an interest: I used to prosecute for the Crown Prosecution Service and other law enforcement agencies. I say with my legal hat on that I am very pleased that we are changing the test from subjective to objective. The problem the CPS has under current legislation is that, to prove the offence, it has to get the victim to court to show they were worried that they were at risk of violence. We want to stop victims having to come to court to give evidence in situations where, frankly, a reasonable person would feel in fear. The old offence made it difficult for the CPS to bring prosecutions in cases where someone walked around shouting and threatening to use their knife. That is why so few prosecutions were brought.

I met a senior member of the CPS to discuss how we could help the police and the CPS to tackle that criminality, and the test in the clause was arrived at. It is a perfectly standard, objective test of a reasonable person. I do not accept the proposition that the courts will be unable to grapple with the “reasonable person” test. The objective test is used across the criminal justice system for all sorts of offences. This is simply about placing someone in court when they choose to go out and threaten people with a knife or put people in fear of their actions. It is about ensuring that we protect the community and that the police have the powers they need to bring such people to justice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Offensive Weapons Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 4th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

The amendments have been tabled following, as I said at the beginning, very good engagement with the Scottish Government, and they reflect the different legal system in Scotland. Amendments 13, 15 and 18 extend the time limits that would otherwise apply for the prosecution of the summary-only offences contained in clauses 1, 3 and 4. Under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, any summary-only offence in Scottish law is required to be prosecuted within six months of the commission of the offence.

However, that time limit can be changed if express statutory provision is made. The amendments do just that by providing that prosecutions will be required to be brought within 12 months of the commission of the offence, rather than six. That is because forensic testing may well be required to prove the offences in court. That is particularly an issue under Scots law, given that all criminal offences prosecuted in Scotland require corroborated evidence. It is therefore anticipated that forensic testing may become more of a feature in prosecutions in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK, and this extension seeks to reflect that position.

New clauses 5 and 6 are the substantive clauses that create an evidential presumption in Scotland. New clause 5 relates to the offences in clauses 1, 3 and 4 and provides that any substance that is in or was in a container is recognised as being a substance as described on the label for the container. However, that presumption can be rebutted by the person accused of the offence if they give at least seven days’ notice of such an intention prior to trial. New clause 6 provides for a similar presumption for the offence in clause 5. The intention behind the amendments is to make the prosecution of the offences in clauses 1, 3, 4 and 5 more straightforward in Scotland.

If I may, I will speed over the very interesting notes I have on Scottish law, because I suspect I would only be trying to repeat what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East knows very well. The basis behind the clauses is to assist the implementation and effectiveness of the clauses in Scotland and under its legal system.

[Louise Haigh]

I hope this is in order. As these clauses relate to sentencing, evidential provisions and technical definitions of “defence”, I wanted to seek clarity from the Minister on the different thresholds contained in the clause in relation to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, separate from Scotland. There appear to be small, but significant differences in the wording of “defence” as stipulated in the legislation; clause 1(2) and clause 1(3) contain one example, whose formula is repeated throughout the Bill. The clause states that

“it is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales or Northern Ireland…to prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.”

Whereas for Scotland, the due diligence and precautions are explicitly included in the Bill.

As regards the sale of corrosive products under clause 1(4),

“the accused is to be treated as having the accused is to be treated as having taken reasonable steps to establish the purchaser’s age if and only if…the accused was shown any of the documents”—

namely, a passport, an EU photocard driving licence or any other document as Scottish Ministers prescribe—

“and…the document would have convinced a reasonable person.”

Will the Minister clarify whether there are different evidential thresholds for the separate jurisdictions? It seems preferable that we would have the same prescriptive threshold in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as in Scotland.

[Victoria Atkins]

The differences are simply to reflect the differences between Scottish law and the law in the rest of the United Kingdom. As I said, Scottish law requires corroborated evidence. We need to ensure that any necessary forensic testing can be undertaken, for example. The reasons behind the defences are to keep things in step with the law that is already the case in Scotland and to enable the defences to be applied appropriately. As I referred to, we have a legislative consent motion from the Scottish Government already, and they are supported by the Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service, which will be responsible for prosecuting the offences in Scotland.

Amendment 13 agreed to.

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[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I hope that I can reassure him that this is not, as he fears, a failure to cut and paste and ensure that the Bill is consistent; it is entirely deliberate. In clauses 1 to 4 we have sought to deal with the most harmful corrosive products. We have used the word “products” in clauses 1 to 4, and “substances” in clause 5 and onwards, because those are the products that we want to ensure that retailers have listed, and understand very clearly must not be sold to under-18s. The offence of selling a corrosive product to a person under 18 is defined by clause 1(9) of the Bill as any product that is a substance listed in schedule 1, or that contains a substance with a concentration level higher than the limit listed in the second column of the schedule.

I know that the right hon. Gentleman has noted that we have put hydrofluoric acid down at 0%. There is a certain intellectual, philosophical point about whether something can exist at 0%. The concern of the scientists, and this is all led by scientific evidence, is that that acid is so dangerous that any trace elements of it whatsoever have the potential to do real harm. We have sought to make it as clear as possible to manufacturers and retailers that selling a product that contains any amount of that substance to under-18s falls foul of schedule 1. We understand that manufacturers and retailers need clarity on which products they can and cannot sell to under-18s if they are to avoid committing a criminal offence.

Corrosive substances appear in a vast range of products—everything from vinegar and lemon juice to industrial strength cleaners. The intention in clauses 1 to 4 is to ban the sale of products that contain sufficient amounts of particular corrosives that they are capable of being used in acid attacks, which is the particular harm that we are seeking to address. It is not the intention to ban the sale of corrosives per se—only the ones that can be used as a weapon.

We need to be clear to manufacturers and retailers that the intention is that they will barcode the appropriate products, so that the shop assistant at the till will be alerted to any potentially restricted sales. It will also enable online retailers to be clear about which products can and cannot be sent to a residential address. The approach of setting out particular chemicals and concentration levels mirrors that used in the Poisons Act 1972, which is an approach already understood well by retailers and manufacturers.

I turn to clause 5 onwards, which is the offence of possession in a public place. The right hon. Gentleman asked me whether hydrofluoric acid is included in clause 5; it is. All the substances in schedule 1 are, by definition, there because they could do harm. It follows that they fall into the simpler definition of corrosive substances under clause 5.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister clarify whether all these substances at any concentration will fall under the definition in clause 5?

[Victoria Atkins]

I will return to that point in a moment, if I may.

On clause 5 generally, we have taken a different approach because we want to reflect the operational realities of police officers on the ground trying to deal with situations in which they think a young person or people have potentially decanted corrosive and harmful substances into different containers. They are not chemists and they do not have a laboratory on the street to help them decide whether the exact concentrations set out in schedule 1 have been met, so we wanted to come up with a definition that could be used widely as part of operational policing, based on the effect that the substance could have.

We use “substance” from clause 5 onwards to differentiate it from the schedule 1 substances. The resulting definition captures all the substances listed in schedule 1, all of which are capable of burning human skin, but it might also include other substances that are capable of such burning, by corrosion, for example an acid not currently listed there. It will also help police, subject to the stop-and-search consultation that we have open at the moment, to seize substances they find on the street without having to worry about their specific chemical make-up. We hope, therefore, that by having two separate definitions of corrosives in the Bill we are addressing both the operational needs of the police and the expectations of manufacturers and retailers, while also helping them.

In response to the hon. Lady’s query about lower concentrations, the level could be lower, for example 10% rather than 15%, but for some it is a very low concentration, for example at 0.5% it may no longer burn the skin. The point is to enable officers on the ground to make arrests as they deem appropriate, and in due course the substances will no doubt be examined and the appropriate offence charged, if a charging decision is made.

I hope that I have reassured the right hon. Member for East Ham on his concerns about having two different definitions. Ultimately, they are meant to try to ensure that the most dangerous, harmful substances are caught by schedule 1, while also ensuring that police officers are able to do their job on the ground, day to day, under clause 5.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

As we have noted, there has been support from right hon. and hon. Members for the principles behind restricting the sale of acid and for acid possession offences. My hon. Friend the Member for West Ham has made a compelling case in many previous debates for restrictions on and licensing of acid, particularly when she spoke about the implications of the bonfire of the quangos in 2015 and the consequences of that deregulation.

We are living with the consequences of changes under that legislation, which meant that a whole band of corrosive substances and poisons were made freely available for sale with little to no real control. We believe that was a big mistake and I hope the discussion today will give the Government cause to rethink, particularly as regards some of the evidence presented in this amendment and in new clause 16, which calls for a much broader rethink of the classification under section 1A to the Poisons Act and the decision to create a sliding scale of regulatory controls on reportable substances and regulated substances, despite evidence of serious harm in both categories. The principle behind that deregulation of poisons and corrosive substances was made in a very different climate to that of today. In 2015, corrosive substances was seen, in the words of the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), as “perfectly innocuous,” rather than the potentially offensive weapons that we are discussing today.

As amendment 49 attempts to address, there are also issues with which poisons would be available for sale to under-18s. In our view, as we heard in discussions of previous amendments, it is much too narrowly drawn. Although it is not perfect, we accept the amendment would at least establish controls on a band of poisons and corrosive substances that were deregulated previously, preventing their sale to under-18s. In reality, we believe that the Government should go much further and look at re-designating many of the reportable substances as regulated substances, in line with the recommendations of the Poisons Board before its abolition.

Schedule 1, which we believe is too narrowly drawn, counts only nine corrosive substances that would be prohibited for sale to a child. We believe that is problematic, as it allows for sale certain poisons that are harmful to health and that can be bought and sold online with ease. I will refer to just a few of the substances, by way of example. They include nitrobenzene, which is toxic if swallowed, can cause acute toxicity if it comes into contact with skin, is toxic if inhaled, is suspected of causing cancer, and may damage the fertility of an unborn child. Although it is a reportable substance under schedule 1A to the Poisons Act, it does not currently feature in schedule 1 to this Bill, meaning that it can be sold to any child who wishes to buy it.

Yesterday, while I was searching for reportable substances, I looked at whether it was possible to purchase pure acetone on eBay. Again, acetone is a reportable substance under schedule 1A to the Poisons Act, but under this Bill any child could buy it. According to the Government’s own website, acetone is toxic following inhalation or ingestion, is an irritant to skin that can cause dermatitis and can lead to corneal damage if it comes into contact with eyes. It is manufactured in large quantities to produce a variety of products, including nail polish and varnish removers, plastics, paint, adhesives and inks, and it is also used to make other chemicals, such as acetylene. In South Africa, pure acetone was used in an acid attack that scarred a woman for life and caused severe burns to her face and body. Pure acetone of a concentration of 99.5% can be bought on eBay for £17.50. In this instance, however, that is not the fault of the platform; it is very clearly the fault of the lack of existing regulation of substances that, in the wrong hands and in high concentrations, can cause serious damage.

Methomyl is perhaps the most troubling. It was originally used as an insecticide for agricultural purposes, before widespread concerns began to emerge about its potential toxicity. Despite that, it is readily available online as we speak and within the UK it is only a reportable substance, meaning that retailers only have to report suspicious transactions. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency has said that of methomyl that it is

“a highly poisonous material in humans. It is highly toxic if it is ingested or absorbed through the eyes, moderately poisonous when inhaled, but of lower toxicity with skin, or ‘dermal’, exposure…Methomyl is a highly toxic inhibitor of cholinesterase, an essential nervous system enzyme. Symptoms of anti-cholinesterase activity include weakness, blurred vision, headache…abdominal cramps, chest discomfort, constriction of pupils…muscle tremors, and decreased pulse. If there is severe poisoning…confusion, muscle incoordination, slurred speech, low blood pressure, heart irregularities, and loss of reflexes may also be experienced. Death can result from discontinued breathing, paralysis of muscles…intense constriction of the openings of the lung, or all three”.

We believe that we need a comprehensive approach to restrictions on sale and we are concerned by the measures in schedule 1. The focus on under-18s entirely ignores the evidence and fails to consider the issue in the round. Quite frankly, it is chilling that such poisons, which can cause so much harm in the wrong hands, are freely available online.

The previous regime was not perfect, but the most dangerous substances could only be sold by a pharmacist in a retail pharmacy business and sales had to be recorded on a register. Substances in part 2 of the poisons list could be sold only by retailers that had registered with their local authority. Under the previous system, acids could only be purchased from registered retailers, which were usually hardware or garden stores. According to the Government’s explanatory notes to the Deregulation Act 2015, that Act was intended to

“reduce the burdens on business. The Poisons Act 1972 and the Poison Rules 1982 were highlighted as adding burdens to businesses”.

We also note that during the 2012 review the Government rejected the views of the Poisons Board, which has now been abolished. The board had suggested tighter controls on the sale of corrosive substances, so I ask the Minister if she will now commit to publishing that evidence, which has never entered the public domain.

As I have said, we would like to see the Government to go much further in this area. We need to see wholesale reform of the treatment of individual poisons, so that where there is clear evidence that an acid is capable of causing harm and is toxic to human health, it is designated as a regulated substance, which will bring with it a suite of controls, including on possession and supply. That would include substances such as hydrochloric acid and ammonia, which have no place on general sale. This amendment is a starting point, as it would regulate all poisons and corrosive substances under section 1A to the Poisons Act, preventing them from getting into the hands of children.

[Victoria Atkins]

Amendment 49 seeks to amend schedule 1 to include all substances under schedule 1A of the Poisons Act 1972. The substances covered by the Poisons Act are regulated poisons, regulated explosive precursors, reportable poisons and reportable explosive precursors. The reason we have a separate schedule for the Offensive Weapons Bill, rather than aligning with the provisions in schedule 1A of the Poisons Act, is that the Bill seeks to prohibit the sales of certain corrosive products by retailers to those under the age of 18. There are similarities between the two schedules, and schedule 1 of the Bill contains eight substances that are also included in schedule 1A of the Poisons Act. Those are two regulated explosive precursors—nitric acid and sulphuric acid—and six reportable poisons.

We have based the substances in schedule 1 on scientific advice from DSTL. I hope members of the Committee have had the opportunity to read that evidence. As I have said, the rationale for having a separate list rather than using the substances in the Poisons Act is that the Bill focuses on the harm caused by attacks using corrosive substances.

Substances that could be used in the illicit manufacture of explosives or that are poisonous are already subject to control on sale and supply to members of the public through the Poisons Act. For the schedule of corrosive products in the Bill, we have included those substances, after taking the scientific advice I mentioned, which we know have been used in attacks or which are so corrosive that, if misused, could cause permanent harm and leave someone with life-changing injuries. In order that the schedule continues to reflect the latest intelligence or evidence, there is a power in the Bill that allows the Secretary of State to amend the schedule should anything need to be added, removed or amended.

It should also be stressed that the Poisons Act and the Offensive Weapons Bill, although having a small number of the same substances in their schedules, seek to achieve different legislative controls. We are of the view that it would not be right to combine the two given the very distinct policy aims of each piece of legislation. The Poisons Act is primarily aimed at controlling substances that could be used in the illicit manufacture of explosives or are poisons, which is dealt with through a cohesive licensing and reporting regime, whereas the prohibitions in this Bill are aimed primarily at preventing the retail sale or delivery of products that we know have been used in attacks. We are of the view that having two different legislative rationales and regimes for control of substances in one schedule would lead to burdens on law enforcement, retailers and manufacturers alike.

[Louise Haigh]

Before the Minister concludes her remarks, will she confirm whether the Department received scientific or medical advice specifically on the chemicals I mentioned—nitrobenzene, acetone and methomyl—and in particular acetone, given that there has been an attack using that substance?

[Victoria Atkins]

If I may, I will write to the hon. Lady, because she raises an important point. I emphasise that the Bill has a schedule that reflects its policy intent and not that of other legislation. I ask her to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I fear that my inadequacy in chemistry at school is about to be shown up. I will not try to give expert evidence on the concentration of hydrofluoric acid except to describe what I have been told: that hydrofluoric acid is highly reactive with glass and many metals; that it is apparently used for specialist purposes in stained glass working, glass etching and geology; that it is highly corrosive and readily penetrates intact skin, nails and deep tissue layers; and that skin exposure to any quantity can be dangerous. When the laboratory was asked for safe concentrations, the advice was that it is difficult to set a concentration limit due to the high corrosiveness of this acid.

However, I have heard what the right hon. Gentleman says about his disappointment with the evidence given by the laboratory, and I will ask it to provide him with a more detailed response, since this is obviously of interest to him. The test or threshold that was set was whether the product could cause permanent damage and whether it was available in products that people can buy. I am also happy to commit to write to the Committee on the point he made about borderline products. As for the point about 0.0000001%, I will ask the laboratory specialists to answer it in the correspondence. I appreciate his testing of the inclusion of these substances in the schedule, but we have done that on the basis of the evidence we have been given by scientists, obviously following analysis of the offences committed.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about bleach, which is also known as ammonium hydroxide. Household bleach is not captured by the age restrictions under schedule 1. Sodium hypochlorite is a primary constituent of various household bleaches but is contained within thresholds where it would not cause permanent or life-changing injuries. The threshold for sodium hypochlorite has been set at 10% as that is the threshold beyond which the chemists at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory have advised us permanent damage would be caused. The kind of products captured within that threshold include commercial bleaches, swimming pool disinfectants and oxidation products. I reiterate: if in the future it is thought that further substances should be added, or the schedule amended, we have the power to make changes through statutory instruments made under the affirmative procedure. I hope that I have reassured the right hon. Gentleman, subject of course to the extra information to be provided by the laboratory. I invite him not to press his amendment if he feels able to at this stage.

[Louise Haigh]

I thank the Minister for her as ever thorough response. I look forward to receiving the written representation about the chemicals I mentioned. I understand and accept why the Poisons Act contains a different schedule. I am satisfied that the provisions under subsection (10) will enable sufficient flexibility to allow modification of schedule 1. I hope that all of us, collectively as Parliament, will be able to hold the Government properly to account to ensure a review as and when evidence is forthcoming. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Offensive Weapons Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 4th September 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

The appropriate national authority will be the Secretary of State in England, Wales and Scotland, and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. We will consult the Scottish Government, however, because clauses 1 to 4 deal with matters that are reserved in relation to Scotland.

The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point about where in the Bill the affirmative procedure is specified. Clause 37(2) requires that regulations be

“approved by a resolution…of each House of Parliament.”

As ever, I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his forensic eye for detail, and I invite the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley to withdraw the amendment.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

As with the previous group of amendments, I thank the Minister for her response. I am satisfied that the legislation referred to in clause 1(10) will fulfil the objective that our amendment was attempting to achieve. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 14, in clause 1, page 2, line 29, at end insert—

“( ) See section (Presumptions in proceedings in Scotland for offence under section 1, 3 or 4) for provisions about presumptions as to the content of containers in proceedings in Scotland.”

This amendment and Amendments 16, 19, 20, 31, 33, NC5 and NC6 provide for certain evidential presumptions relating to the nature of substances that are or were in containers to apply in Scotland in relation to an offence under section 1, 3, 4 or 5 involving a corrosive substance or product.—(Victoria Atkins.)

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

There is an issue that has not been raised through any amendments, and I hope the Committee will bear with me as I briefly address it. Clause 1(8) relates to the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. We attempted to table an amendment to ensure that this provision is enacted within six months of the Bill coming into force. The subsection was legislated for 15 years ago and is still to come into practice. There is concern that the Government continue to bring forward legislation—as I am sure the previous Labour Government did—that rests on magistrates courts being able to give sentences of up to 12 months.

I understand from previous conversations with the Minister’s colleagues that there are some issues for the Ministry of Justice around enactment but, 15 years on, we need to overcome them. If we cannot, we should not be putting such provisions into new legislation, pretending that we can. I would like the Minister to clarify whether we are likely to see those provisions coming into force. If not, should we not be clear in the legislation that, in reality, the sentencing is six months and not 12 months?

[Victoria Atkins]

I note that the amendment in question was not permitted in the groupings, Mr Gray. With regard to the 2003 Act, the hon. Lady has correctly identified that this is a Ministry of Justice matter, and this small Bill is not the place to introduce a provision that will have ramifications across the whole of the criminal justice system. We keep magistrates’ sentencing powers under review, but there is currently no intention to implement provisions of the 2003 Act in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 2

Defence to remote sale of corrosive products to persons under 18

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Just for the information of the Committee, the consultation responses from the Government are now available and in the room, if hon. Members would like to have a look.

[Louise Haigh]

Thank you, Mr Gray, and I thank the Minister for providing those consultation responses. We welcome clause 2 on defence to remote sale. It is an extremely important part of the Bill, because a significant proportion of the purchasing is likely to occur online, as it does at present.

Our concerns relate to the defence to remote sale under condition A, which I referred to earlier:

“that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”.

In subsection (6)(a), a seller is regarded as having taken all due diligence if they

“operated a system for checking that persons who bought corrosive products…were not under the age of 18”.

We know from evidence given to the Committee that there are concerns about what a system for checking persons who bought corrosive products would look like. Would it look like the online age verification controls introduced by the Digital Economy Act 2017? That would present significant difficulties. That legislation was limited to major commercial players, which have the means and capacity to implement age verification controls. However, such controls have proven perilously difficult to implement in a workable form. Has the Home Office considered what standard of age verification software or controls would be acceptable under clause 2?

The British Retail Consortium said:

“Ideally, we would like to see some standards, so we can be sure that online age verification systems developed by businesses such as Yoti and others will be accepted as due diligence by the enforcers.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 17 July 2018; c. 62, Q154.]

Currently, offline systems are standardised and clearly laid out in the legislation, but it is difficult for retailers to be sure that they are complying with online systems, which is why the Government are banning the delivery of corrosive products and bladed articles to residential premises, to make sure they are complied with. However, I want to press the Minister on what age verification controls the Government have considered and, as we will come to later, why they do not consider them sufficient to prevent the delivery of corrosive products and bladed articles to under-18s.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her speech. We have not set out in the Bill the measures that businesses could take to satisfy themselves that the person to whom they are selling is under 18 because we are conscious that different age verification systems are available, and the technology is developing at a very fast pace, as we have seen in relation to the Digital Economy Act 2017. We did not want to stipulate a specific approach in primary legislation for fear that it would quickly run out of relevance.

However, there are conditions of due diligence under the defence in clause 2. There has been a certain amount of misunderstanding about the conditions in the defence relating to knives—which I will come to in due course—but clause 2 is about ensuring that these dangerous substances are not sold to under-18s. We want sellers of these products to understand from the very beginning that they have a duty of due diligence to determine the age of those to whom they are selling. We know, from experience of other age-controlled items, that businesses will quickly develop these systems. It will be for the seller to show that they have robust age verification systems in place.

[Louise Haigh]

I completely agree, and I would never advocate including technological guidance or prescriptions in primary legislation. However, would it not be advisable to set standards that we expect retailers to comply with, for both corrosive substances and bladed articles, particularly given the very low rates of prosecution by trading standards? Perhaps there is an issue with “due diligence” being too vague for trading standards to be able to bring prosecutions forward.

[Victoria Atkins]

In other statutes—for example, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974—we have the test of “reasonably practicable”. I am anxious that, if a case reaches the court, we do not bind the hands of a magistrate in determining the facts of the case. I will happily consider what I think is the hon. Lady’s point about whether there is scope to provide best practice, guidance and so on, but we are of the view that the defence as it stands should be set out in statute and that it should then be for businesses and retailers to ensure that they comply with the law.

[Louise Haigh]

I am grateful for that reply, but a bit concerned that the Home Office had not already planned to issue guidance to online retailers. With something like this, I would have thought that, given that some retailers are not currently subject to age verification legislation at all, the Home Office would automatically issue guidance on what it would expect such age verification to look like—not best practice, but a standard beneath which a retailer would not be able to fall under the legislation. Is that not the case?

[Victoria Atkins]

We will publish guidance when implementing the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Delivery of corrosive products to residential premises etc

Amendments made: 15, in clause 3, page 4, line 35, at end insert—

‘(13) In Scotland, proceedings for an offence under this section may be commenced within the period of 12 months beginning with the commission of the offence.

(14) Section 136(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (date when proceedings deemed to be commenced) applies for the purposes of subsection (13) as it applies for the purposes of that section.”

This amendment provides for proceedings in Scotland for an offence under Clause 3 to be brought within 12 months of the commission of the offence. Under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 the default period for bringing summary proceedings is 6 months.

Amendment 16, in clause 3, page 4, line 35, at end insert—

‘( ) See section (Presumptions in proceedings in Scotland for offence under section 1, 3 or 4) for provisions about presumptions as to the content of containers in proceedings in Scotland.” —(Victoria Atkins.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 14.

Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Delivery of corrosive products to persons under 18

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I rise briefly to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the ingenious way he has brought forward the new clause to tackle the thorny issue of websites outside the UK and the difficulties that the Government will have in prosecuting those who attempt to sell corrosive substances and, indeed, bladed articles, which are dealt with later in the Bill.

I want particularly to address the issue of platforms. As my right hon. Friend said, platforms such as Wish, eBay, Facebook Marketplace and Amazon proliferate the use of horrendous weapons. In 2016, a teenager killed a young man called Bailey Gwynne in a school in Aberdeen. He was cleared of murder, but convicted of culpable homicide. He had paid £40 on Amazon for a folding knife with an 8.5 cm blade. It is illegal even under the current law—prior to the Bill—to sell a folding knife to a buyer aged under 18 if the blade is more than 3 inches long, but that 16-year-old had been able to get around Amazon’s age-verification checks by pinning a note to his front door rather than accepting delivery in person.

I am sure that large retailers and online providers such as Amazon will comply with this new legislation, but individual sellers who sell through Amazon, Facebook Marketplace, eBay and so on are unlikely to comply, so there has to be a way, if we do not use the exact wording that my right hon. Friend has proposed, for us to crack down on platforms; otherwise, we will leave a gaping hole that will render essentially meaningless the worthy principles that the Bill is designed to implement.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and the right hon. Member for East Ham for the amendments and the new clause. If I may, I will deal with amendments 43 and 44 first and then move on to new clause 9.

I start by saying that, sadly, it is of course not just in the context of the use of offensive weapons that there are people who do not have the scruples that we do when it comes to crimes and harms; they use online platforms to sell their wares. Indeed, only yesterday my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary gave a powerful speech on his expectations of all members of the tech industry when it comes to addressing the horrific prevalence of child sexual exploitation online. We are discussing here a different form of criminality, but of course we have to work to ensure that criminals do not have a gaping hole open on the internet to sell these horrific weapons.

Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 prohibits the sale, importation and other things of disguised knives. The Bill extends that to cover their possession, so I hope that that addresses the point made about the disguised weapon that Mr Butt—

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 5, page 6, line 44, after “otherwise” insert

“, and any place other than premises occupied as a private dwelling (including any stair, passage, garden, yard, garage, outhouse or other appurtenance of such premises which is used in common by the occupants of more than one such dwelling).”

This amendment would extend the definition of public places in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.

This amendment was specifically requested by serving police officers because of concerns about the definition of public place referenced in this clause. I appreciate that it is also referenced in other pieces of legislation, so I fully accept and expect that the Minister will raise concerns about differing definitions of public place, but it is important to have this debate about the clause, given the gravity and extent of the offences that could be committed, and because of the police’s concerns that the definition is too narrow and limits their powers in the event of possession in a communal area of a residential dwelling.

Our intention is to make it absolutely clear that “public place” also refers to any area that is exempt from the definition in the Bill due to its not being a place where any ordinary member of the public has access, but which is still regarded as a public place because it is not within a premise occupied as a private dwelling. Such places include any stair, passage, garden, yard, garage, outhouse or other place of such premises that is used in common by the occupants of more than one dwelling.

The amendment helpfully mirrors legislation in Scotland that gives the police broader powers to ensure the safety of residents in communal areas—clearly because of criminality that has taken place in such areas and in response to the police’s limited powers to take action. The existing definition of “public place” in section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 is

“any highway and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise”.

In Scotland, in this Bill and other legislation, it is

“any place other than premises occupied as a private dwelling”,

such as a garden, yard or outhouse. That reflects the existing definition of “public place” in Scottish legislation. The offence of having an offensive weapon, or a bladed or pointed article, in a public place is set out in sections 47 and 49 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995.

A 2011 report by the Scottish Government explained that the definition was changed to capture locations such as the ones in our amendment. The explanatory note to section 37 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 made it clear that possession in a public place offences

“may be committed by possession of an offensive weapon or a knife on the common parts of shared properties such as common landings in tenement blocks of flats.”

We strongly believe that these measures must be extended to those public places to bring security to residents in those areas and to give the police the power to act if offensive weapons are possessed within them. It is clear that the police need and want this power, and we see no reason why we should not align ourselves with the measures in Scotland.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to Opposition Members for tabling this amendment. It proposes that we extend the definition used in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to bring it closer to the definition used in Scotland, which would be an extension of the current definition and would include private properties. I absolutely understand why the police and others are seeking to close what they perceive to be a gap in the law. It appears that some private properties would not be covered by the offence in clause 5.

Of course, possessing a corrosive substance in a private place is not an offence. It may well be that some of us have an assortment of cleaning products that would qualify as corrosives in our home, so the Bill does not seek to make it illegal to possess a corrosive in a dwelling. There may well be properties that are not homes and have legitimate uses for corrosive substances, some of which we have already discussed during our scrutiny of the Bill. We do not want the Bill to criminalise members of the public who are going about their daily lives or enjoying a hobby outside their home.

The amendment applies solely to the offence of possession. It is worth noting that a number of other criminal offences are available to the police, in relation to threatening with a corrosive. For example, there is the offence of threatening the use of a corrosive substance as an offensive weapon, and it would be possible to charge a person with common assault under the 1998 Act or with a public order offence. I can see that there may be some benefit in expanding the definition to cover possession in all places that are not dwellings. I would be grateful if the Committee would allow me time to consider this matter further with my officials.

[Louise Haigh]

I am very grateful that the Minister is willing to consider the amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 20, in clause 5, page 7, line 4, after “See” insert “—

(a) section (Presumptions in proceedings in Scotland for offence under section 5) for provisions about presumptions as to the content of containers in proceedings in Scotland;

(b) ”—(Victoria Atkins.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 14.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I will definitely have to write to the hon. Lady on that last point. That is all about concentrations and how long the substance has to be on the skin to corrode.

In answer to the question that the right hon. Member for East Ham asked about how subsection (2) as a defence adds to subsection (3), which is the specific work defence, it is to cover situations where, for example, someone might have bought a high-strength drain unblocker and are taking it to use at home. In the example he gave of the substance being decanted into a Lucozade or drinks bottle, the act of decanting the substance into another bottle would be a strong aggravating feature, certainly if I were prosecuting and hoping to prove my case on not being able to rely on subsections (2) or (3).

On the clause as a whole, we hope that this new offence will be able to help the police in the important and difficult work they do in tackling these crimes. I heard what the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said about testing kits. We will have to review the policy of supplying them on the basis of what we know. After all, as the right hon. Member for East Ham said, his borough sadly has the highest incident of acid or corrosive substance attacks, but in other parts of the country they simply do not happen. I do not want to tempt fate or to mention the word “resources,” but we want to ensure that the resources are best deployed where the need is clear, as it is in some parts of London.

I hope that the Committee supports the clause, which will mean that the police can deal with someone carrying around acid for no good reason—

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

I shall give way just before I sit down.

[Louise Haigh]

I am grateful to the Minister—I appreciate that she was literally about to sit down. I am a bit concerned about how that will work in practice. As a former special constable—I know I mention that often—I struggle to see how I would have implemented this offence without the testing kit being available. If I do not have such a kit and I stop and search someone, perhaps finding a water bottle, what am I meant to do? Obviously I am not going to test it on my own skin, so I would have to take the person to the police station to do forensic tests there, which seems like an unconscionable use of police resources. It is difficult to envisage how the police will implement the legislation if they do not all have the testing kit available, although I completely appreciate the Minister’s point about directing the kits to where the problem is most prevalent.

[Victoria Atkins]

Of course, the police will be leading our knowledge on this with the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs Council, so I do not want to commit to every single constable having a kit in their possession, in case those who know day-to-day policing in and around their force areas say, “Actually, we don’t think we need it in this area.” I do not want to make a promise, only for it not to happen in good faith. If I may, I will leave the Government’s answer as being that we will of course consult the police on the deployment of the testing kits.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I think my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South was asking whether it would be possible for this information to be made available before the Bill returns to the Floor of the House on Report. In particular, although I appreciate that its roll-out will be a decision for chief constables and police and crime commissioners, will it be made clear whether they will be provided by the Home Office or whether police forces will have to pay for them out of their budgets?

[Victoria Atkins]

I am conscious that the project team is being appointed and a work programme is being developed. I will use my best endeavours to bring those answers before the next stage of the Bill, but if I am not able to, that will be because these matters are out of my hands and the laboratory or others may need more time to provide those answers. We want to get the Bill passed as quickly as possible and we want to be able to help officers to use clause 5, where they need it, as quickly as possible.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Appropriate custodial sentence for conviction under section 5

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

As with the entirety of the Bill, we fully support the intention and most of the content of the clause, but we share the concerns of some of those who have given evidence to the Committee and to the Home Office about mandatory minimum sentencing for children. The clause has been lifted from an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, proposed by the former Member Nick de Bois, that introduced a two-strikes sentence, meaning that adults convicted more than once of being in possession of a blade will face a minimum six-month prison sentence and a maximum of four years, and that children aged 16 and 17 will face a minimum four-month detention and training order.

Since that legislation was introduced, there have been multiple media reports that have suggested that those sentencing arrangements are not being carried out for adults or children covered by that clause. Will the Minister provide details of how many offenders have been sentenced under those provisions and whether there has been monitoring of how many offenders do not receive a custodial sentence included in that clause, having been charged and convicted of knife possession on two separate occasions?

For example, the Telegraph reported in March 2016 that provisional data indicated that since the legislation was introduced, only 50% of offenders had been jailed, while another 23% had been given suspended sentences. Of those offenders, 907 were adults and 50% received a custodial sentence with an average sentence length of 6.6 months. It stated that

“The remaining 59 cases were offenders aged 16 or 17, with…46 per cent receiving an immediate custodial sentence.”

Has there been any review by either the Home Office or the Ministry of Justice of whether those reforms in the 2015 Act are being implemented by the courts—and, more importantly, of whether those reforms are effective? Are they improving public protection? Are they acting as a deterrent to children and adult offenders? Are they reducing recidivism? Has there been any review of the measures? If not, would it not have been desirable to conduct such a review before bringing forward the identical measures in this Bill?

Part of the written evidence we received came from the Standing Committee for Youth Justice, which made a compelling case as the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 passed through Parliament—it restates it here: that mandatory minimum sentences for children do not necessarily act as a deterrent, do not necessarily rehabilitate children who are caught with knives and do not ensure that the public are protected, as opposed to when the judiciary has full discretion.

The Children’s Commissioner said in evidence:

“I want to have a system that can respond to individuals, so my instinct is not to go down the mandatory minimum sentences route but to look at individual cases.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 19 July 2018; c. 90, Q223.]

I fully acknowledge that during that same evidence session we heard from the Victims’ Commissioner, who said:

“I have to say that victims tell me they want mandatory; only then will it be effective.”––[Official Report, Offensive Weapons Public Bill Committee, 19 July 2018; c. 91, Q223.]

Of course, it is understandable that victims and the public at large should want to see people who commit, or intend to commit, abhorrent criminal offences sent to prison for a reasonable amount of time, but the ultimate objective of custody must be to reduce offending and keep the public more secure. To achieve that, we believe that we have to look at each individual case, especially when it involves children, and the judiciary should have full discretion to respond appropriately.

The Standing Committee for Youth Justice’s evidence is compelling in that regard. On the claim that custody acts as a deterrent, it contests that awareness of second sentencing among children is perceived by frontline practitioners to be low. There are many children in and around the criminal justice system who we would not expect to make rational choices, in the economic, behavioural sense of the word.

As well as that, children carry knives and weapons for numerous and complex reasons, often because of the perception that it is necessary for self-protection. Punitive measures, particularly custodial measures, are unlikely to act as a deterrent, even if the child is aware of the punishment and able to act rationally. In other words, for those children who fear for their safety and their lives, carrying a knife or corrosive substances may be seen as the rational course of action, and the threat they are facing—perceived or real—will be more significant than the threat of a custodial sentence. Research on deterrents has consistently supported that, with studies finding little or no evidence that sentence severity or the threat of custody acts as a deterrent to crime for children.

The statistics on knife-crime offences also support that evidence. Since the introduction of mandatory minimum custodial sentencing in 2015, the number of children convicted of possession or threatening offences involving bladed articles or offences weapons has risen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. She has done amazing work chairing the all-party parliamentary group on knife crime, following the tragic experiences of her young constituents. She brings that evidence and wealth of experience to bear, to show that it is not a deterrent.

The other argument made is around public protection. It seems obvious that if an offender is removed from the streets and detained, the public are better protected. That is undeniably true for many offence types and for prolific offenders, but children in and around the criminal justice system are a relatively transient group. They are quickly replaced by others. They can sometimes—more often than not—go through phases of criminality that they grow out of, so custodial sentencing is unlikely to have a significant impact on public protection.

The reoffending rates for children leaving custody are stubbornly high. Last year, more than 68% of children who left custody reoffended within a year, yet for those who received youth community penalties the figure—still too high—was 58%, which is significantly lower. We know from all the evidence that diverting children away from the formal youth justice system is more effective at reducing offending than any punitive response. I completely accept what my hon. Friend said about custody being a relief, but the evidence also indicates that custody is itself criminogenic: it encourages crime.

I am not for a second saying that offenders under 18 should not serve custodial sentences under any circumstances. Only a couple of weeks ago, a constituent of mine was attacked in the street and stabbed five times—including once in the heart and once in the lungs—by a 15-year-old, and I have urged the Crown Prosecution Service to review the sentence that he received on the grounds of undue leniency. However, that just demonstrates that every case is different.

Clearly, in the vast majority of cases, the carrying of acid for a second time should result in a custodial sentence. However, if the youth justice service and the judge deem that other interventions would be more effective, they should have the full discretion to impose them. I do not believe that subsections (2) or (4) provide for that. Will the Minister furnish the Committee with examples of the use of the sister clause of subsection (2) in the 2015 Act? It would be very helpful for us to understand in what circumstances that

“relate to the offence, the previous offence or the offender”

judges have chosen not to implement the mandatory sentencing otherwise expected in the 2015 Act.

I was interested to hear the Minister mention that one reason why the Government decided not to go above the age of 18 for the sale of corrosive substances and knives is that 18 is the internationally recognised age of the child. She is absolutely right: the UN convention on the rights of the child states that clearly. On that basis, how can we justify delivering mandatory minimum sentences for children, when so much of the evidence suggests that it is not effective or appropriate? The UN convention on the rights of the child states that mandatory sentences remove judicial discretion and the ability of courts to ensure that the penalty best fits the circumstance of the offence. Indeed, our own Sentencing Council in the UK said that a custodial sentence should always be a measure of last resort for children and young people; it seems that the clauses directly contradict the Sentencing Council’s guidance.

The Law Society also backs up those concerns. It said:

“In our view, courts should be trusted to impose the most suitable and just sentence in the unique circumstances of the offence and the offender before them. Sentencing guidelines exist to provide consistency and indicate aggravating factors, such as previous convictions. We accordingly do not support the setting of a minimum sentence for corrosive substance offences for the same reason.”

I appreciate that, even if the Minister agrees with these concerns, there are difficulties, given that we are trying to mirror what is already in legislation. However, I hope the Minister will accept the concerns that have been raised. If she is wedded to going ahead with the clauses, perhaps she will provide us with the evidence base for requiring mandatory minimum sentences for children, particularly relating to reoffending, public protection and deterrence.

[Victoria Atkins]

The clause is being inserted in the context of corrosive substances because we want to mirror the provisions in legislation concerning knives and to send out the clear message that corrosive substances are just as much as an offensive weapon as knives.

On the first occasion when someone comes before the court, the sentencing judge will obviously have all powers and options open to her or him to sentence the person in possession of a corrosive substance or a knife; they will have that power to exercise their discretion. However, as is the case with knives, we want to send out a tough message. Someone who has already been through the court process and stood in front of a judge—who may have given them a community penalty rather than imprisonment if that was deemed appropriate—is then on notice that, if they walk around with a knife or corrosive substance again, a court will have the power to impose an immediate custodial sentence, unless subsections (2) and (4) apply. Subsections (2) and (4) are important, because they allow the court to divert from the mandatory minimum sentence, if it is

“of the opinion that there are particular circumstances”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I fully appreciate that there is a wide spectrum of views out there. In regard to the campaign led by the former Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, I would say that hard cases make for bad law. I made several requests in my speech for the evidence underpinning the clause and the provision in the 2015 Act. Rather than ceding to those siren voices that we routinely hear in this place about increasing sentence lengths—I often add my voice to them too—I would be grateful if the Minister provided us with the evidence that the provision will improve public protection and reduce reoffending.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am so sorry; I have got a note here. I am going to ask the Ministry of Justice and write to the Committee with a response to the questions the hon. Lady asked about figures and statistics and so on. That material is held by the Ministry of Justice, which owns this territory. I hope that assists the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Offence under section 5: relevant convictions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

If I may, I want to ask for one quick clarification in relation to subsection (2), which states:

“References in subsection (1) to a conviction for an offence are to a conviction for an offence regardless of when it was committed.”

Will the Minister confirm that that is compliant with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974? Is subsection (2) the case even if any such conviction is now spent?

[Victoria Atkins]

Those who spend a great deal of time and effort in drafting the provisions of the Bill will no doubt very much have that at the forefront of their mind. It might well be that it is such a nuanced position and topic at 8.18 at night that I might have to write to the hon. Lady.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Search for corrosive substances: England and Wales

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

The Minister made a slight reference earlier—it came as a surprise to me—to the Home Office consulting on stop-and-search powers. I note the consultation that the Home Office released last month, which I believe relates to codes C and H of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That does not cover stop-and-search, but I note the Home Secretary’s announcement today that he is mulling over increased powers for officers on stop-and-search in relation to corrosive substances. I was confused by that, because clause 8 clearly provides constables with the power, under an amended PACE, to stop and search offenders who they have reasonable grounds to believe have committed, are committing or are going to commit an offence under the Bill.

Can the Minister confirm whether the Home Office is considering additional stop-and-search powers? Is it not convinced that the reformed stop-and-search powers in the Bill are sufficient to tackle the issue of corrosive substances? Does it have further plans to lower the stop-and-search threshold to levels currently associated only with section 60 of PACE, which, as far as I can see, is the only distinction that the Home Secretary could have been making in what he said today? He said that officers would have to have only suspicion, which I assume is a lesser threshold than the current threshold of reasonable grounds. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified exactly what the Home Office is taking further steps on. If it is not convinced that the Bill is sufficient, why is it not tabling amendments at this stage?

[Victoria Atkins]

While existing powers allow a police officer to conduct stop-and-search for a corrosive substance where it is suspected that a person is in possession of a corrosive substance to cause injury, they do not extend to the proposed new offence of possession in a public place. The proposed extension of stop-and-search seeks to address that gap to enable the police to take preventive action. We have to consult on such an extension, so it is clause 8 that we will be consulting on, but the consultation has not opened yet.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 9 and 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Consequential amendments relating to section 5

Offensive Weapons Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 17th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

Q There was an incident, sadly, in recent years where we saw the threat posed by bump stocks, was there not?

Gregg Taylor: In the US, yes, with the Las Vegas shooting. I think 12 out of the 14 weapons that were used in, or recovered from, that event had the bump stocks attached. We are all aware of the rate of fire and the number of people who were killed in that event.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

Q Can I just confirm something? When you said 129 licences, was that just for the .50, or was that the total number of licences?

Mark Groothuis: It includes two other calibres: 14.5 mm and 20 mm. If the prohibition went ahead at 13,600 J, it would capture not only the .50, but larger and more powerful calibres as well. I believe the 14.5 mm firearms are effectively Soviet anti-tank weapons and the 20 many might be a bespoke-built firearm. Most of them are from a military background.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q So your concern is about volume as opposed to the act on the shoot of people handing cartridges to each other to help while they’re shooting.

Mark Groothuis: The volume is a concern, yes—the fact that it is just so easy to transfer shotgun ammunition. You shouldn’t be transferring shotgun ammunition to a prohibited person, but how do you know whether the person you are standing next to is prohibited or not? They could be prohibited by virtue of a suspended sentence or a custodial sentence. You would probably know about the custodial sentence if you are a close friend, but there might be someone who has got a suspended sentence, and they may be prohibited. I would also ask how some people who have got suspended sentences know they are prohibited because, as far as I know, there is no mechanism for educating them on that at the moment.

[Louise Haigh]

Q Can just come back to the points about the firearms licensing teams in the police? How big is the team in Durham, for example?

Assistant Chief Constable Orford: We are just over 10 people, and different forces will have different requirements. One thing that surprises a lot of people outside of this world is that the size of the force does not necessarily indicate the amount of work involved. North Yorkshire police is a small force but has a significant amount of firearms licensing and will have a bigger department, commensurably. That very often goes with the rural side of policing. As you have heard from the statistics, shotguns are a lot more prevalent than firearms.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q We obviously want to stop young people using acids in the first place. Are there any emerging thoughts on how we can prevent young people—or anyone—from using corrosive substances in such a vile manner?

Assistant Chief Constable Kearton: A lot of work has been put into a preventive strategy in the last 12 months, working very closely with the British Retail Consortium, which represents 170 or more retailers across the country. That activity has included voluntary agreements with those retailers to restrict sales to individuals that they have concerns about, communication to young people through education projects, and multi-agency work to emphasise the impact that these attacks can have. I again emphasise that psychological and physical impact, which I believe—based on the research done in recent months—has not been fully understood by a lot of our young people.

One example I want to highlight is Project Diffuse, which has been carried out by the Metropolitan police—working with the Institute of Licensing and the Security Industry Authority—in the context of nightclubs and licensed premises. It engages security personnel in the identification of liquids before they enter an entertainment premises and in taking appropriate action to remove substances that may cause harm. A lot is being done around prevention to address this emerging problem.

[Louise Haigh]

Q What is your analysis of why, particularly over the last four years, we have seen such a rise in knife, gun and acid-related crime? Why is it suddenly so prevalent?

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Ball: I will start with knife crime. There are obviously huge challenges in the knife crime picture at the moment. We have seen a 20% increase in knife crime nationally in the last calendar year. It is a hugely complex issue and there are a huge number of contributory factors.

One real issue with younger people coming through at the moment is their frame of reference and how they view knives. It could be argued that there is a social acceptance in some circles of the legitimacy of carrying knives. We can look at, for example, the impact of social media; people being anaesthetised to violence and sexual violence on the internet; pornography, which is readily available to young children; or video games. All those things end up anaesthetising them and with a certain acceptance of that sort of violence, or a predisposition to violent activity. They also play into a potential fear of crime in young people in particular; that is certainly something we hear from young children. We know that a lot of children or young people do not go out carrying a knife specifically to use it, but they will carry it for self-protection. The more that knife crime happens, the greater the risk of young people perceiving that the issue is worse than it is, and therefore going out with a knife and continuing to arm themselves.

There are some challenges with availability of diversion services for young people on knife crime. With austerity in general it is important that money is focused toward the right areas, and we have certainly seen some good initiatives for doing that. More than that, though, we see the rise in knife crime as being quite cyclical. If you look back over the years, it tends to rise and fall, and what is important in stemming that rise is recognising that it requires a whole systems approach.

Everybody has a part to play; it is not enforcement, because realistically, by the time the police get involved and somebody has actually picked up a knife it is perhaps too late. It is a multi-faceted challenge, and the answer is not one particular channel, but all agencies, charities and communities working across the sectors bearing down on that. The way I view knife crime is that every particular stabbing could, but for the skill of a surgeon’s knife, end up in murder and absolute tragedy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q How are you going to work with your members if these voluntary arrangements become statutory?

Vin Vara: We have got a channel of communication—normally it is emailing and texting—but we also have a publication for our members, and we will be sending out guidance from the Home Office to all our members and other retailers on our target list.

Graham Wynn: The main desire is to be clear about exactly what people are supposed to do. That is one reason why we would particularly like to see clause 17 —the requirements there, and what you can and cannot deliver to a residential address—be perhaps a bit more precise, either in guidance or in the Bill itself. That’s knives, of course. We largely represent larger and medium-sized retailers, so they have their own processes for ensuring compliance with the law. Our role is to make sure they understand as far as possible what is required so that they can comply.

[Louise Haigh]

Q Do you share the concerns of the USDAW trade union about the criminalisation of shop workers and shop owners? Do you agree there should be an offence for attempting to purchase weapons, and what implications will the offence on shop workers and shop owners have for your members?

Graham Wynn: I understand from our surveys that there are probably about 50 offences a week—attacks—on shop workers. That is extrapolated from some research. We do share the USDAW view that carrying out an attack on a shop worker in the course of their employment should be a specific offence: either a generalised offence, or one that relates to age checking, but certainly some sort of specific offence. At the moment, people feel under threat, and that is one reason there is general support for the overall objectives of the Bill.

Offensive Weapons Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the publication of written evidence, but the responses to the consultation that was the forerunner to the Bill have not yet been published. A summary of the responses is on the Home Office website, but several of the witnesses who will give evidence today reference their consultation responses in their biographies, and we have not had access to them. Could we at least have the consultation responses from the witnesses who are giving evidence today and on Thursday, if not all the responses?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

Yes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q Thank you. May we hear your views on the availability of knives and acids to young people at the moment? We will start with Mr Poynton.

John Poynton: I do not have the precise statistics on what is coming in, but there is no question that there is no place for zombie knives, machetes and large weapons like that. My concern is that a number of young people will come to hospital with all sorts of improvised weapon injuries from screwdrivers and the like. Clearly it is important to make weapons less easy for young people to get hold of, but there will always be a need for education and earlier intervention, to look at how we get young people to understand that certain weapons are tools, and that there are ways to use them. This should not be about finding any sharp implement, be it a screwdriver or something else that has been sharpened, to use. When young people come to hospitals, it is not as clearcut as saying that it is just about zombie knives or kitchen knives.

With regard to availability, a lot of young people talk about the traditional method of ensuring that the public feel safer that weapons are being taken off the streets: we see the traditional use of photos of weapons that have been found or taken, and that helps us to feel that those weapons have been removed. The broader picture—the public health approach to looking at this issue—is that lots of young people will see those same pictures that make us feel safer, but they will perhaps not read all the copy that goes with the picture and they will see those pictures as showing the weapons that are available, and they are somewhat traumatised by the idea that those weapons are available. The availability or lack of availability of certain weapons needs to sit alongside a clear and simple narrative to ensure that the entire community—including young people and us—understands that the community needs to be safe. We all need to have the same perception that the community is safe, and not have this misunderstanding of what they need to do to feel safe.

It was interesting for the police to recognise last year that only 25% of knife crime could be attributed to gangs. My question is about what we do with the 75% of “normal”—for want of a better phrase—non-gang members. How do we really educate them to understand that they do not need to pick up a knife to feel safe on the streets?

Rob Owen: Picking up on John’s point about escalation, it is almost like an arms race. What is happening with county lines in particular is that London gangs are looked up to as the grandfathers of gangs, and regional areas aspire to be more like London gangs, often because of social media. They are saying, “We now need to have weapons, because we need to up our game.” In the old days the drug market in a market or coastal town was safer. Nowadays the kids who are involved in county lines or local drug dealing groups are thinking, “We need to have the next big thing.”

There is definitely an escalation in violence, and there is definitely an escalation outside London of the use or ability to use a weapon. The really sad thing is that a screwdriver is more deadly than a knife. If you talk to a surgeon, they will say that it is more complicated to sort out a stab wound from a screwdriver than from a knife, which I was surprised by. In primary schools, it is about demystifying. On social media, people see that there are safe places to stab each other—this is well documented. Actually, there is no safe place to stab someone, because if you hit an artery, it is pretty much game over.

A public health approach has to be taken. When the police catch a kid with a knife, one of the things that has to happen is that has to be seen as a beacon of need—that that kid needs some support to try to break that cycle. The kid is carrying that knife for a multitude of factors, but we are not going to solve things by taking that knife away or taking the drugs off them—then they would have a drug debt, too—and throwing them in prison. They will come out and have the same problems. It is about putting in that intensive care, even if they are caught with a knife, however unpalatable that is to the Daily Mail or whatever it is. It is about a beacon of need. All these kids who are being targeted by gangs are either in pupil referral units or have been excluded from schools. So 100% of the clients we are working with on county lines who are carrying weapons have been excluded from school. If you ever want a beacon of need for where resources should go, it is kids who have been excluded from school.

Patrick Green: Clear, unambiguous messaging around knives is important in the preventive world. If you are working with young people and there is any ambiguity, you get the “but” argument—“but I know somebody who this didn’t happen to”. You can lose the group. We are working with peer groups in schools, and that is so important.

I believe that it is important that the online world is brought into line with the retail world in terms of sales and the restrictions on sales. I have no figures for you, but from the conversations we have with the young people we deal with—particularly those who admit to carrying a knife or having carried a knife—knives will mostly be got from domestic settings, but shoplifting comes very high up in where they get knives from.

I feel that the voluntary code for e-tailing is not delivering as it should be. That possibly relates to the second part of your sitting today. The open display of knives gives young people an opportunity to take knives that they might use in other places. They are less likely to buy a knife and are more likely to shoplift it. That is why I think the legislation is important. It will help the preventive agenda and our conversations with young people. It will make it clearer to them what they can and cannot do, and that is important at this time.

Jaf Shah: I would echo much of what has been said, particularly around deploying a public health approach to addressing the root causes of this escalation not only in acid attacks, but in violent crime. In the case of acid and the availability of corrosive fluids, many complications clearly arise from the availability of lots of household products that contain high levels of corrosive content. How you regulate access to those types of products is a challenge. What the Bill proposes around licensing for sulphuric acid is an important step, because sulphuric acid at a concentration of 98% causes enormous physical and psychological damage to survivors. That licensing is a vital step, but the passing of legislation in itself is insufficient.

We need to ensure that we deploy a long-term approach to dealing with the root causes. We know that once you reduce the availability of one type of weapon, another weapon becomes available, and I think that is what has happened with the rise of acid attacks. It came at a time when there were greater attempts by law enforcement agencies to control other weapons. Many would-be perpetrators saw loopholes in the existing system that are now being addressed, so they chose to use acid, because it is a lot easier and cheaper to purchase and causes an enormous amount of physical and psychological scarring.

[Louise Haigh]

Q May I echo the Minister’s thanks for coming to give evidence to the Committee today? Your evidence so far already shows the vast experience that you have in this area. You mentioned exclusions and the fact that gangs target pupil referral units. That is certainly the experience in my constituency, where every child who has been murdered so far this year had been permanently excluded from school, and was murdered by another child who had been permanently excluded from school. In your experience of working with schools, are they all willing to co-operate? If not, is there anything that the Government could do to help that co-operation at a local level, with the voluntary sector, the police and local authorities?

Rob Owen: I think it is very varied. We do work on prevention. Through SOS+ we go into quite a few PRUs. They have been fantastically helpful and welcoming. It is really mixed. A lot of schools do not like to admit that there is a gang problem—some primary schools particularly are very worried about admitting that they are becoming targeted.

The gangs are becoming much more sophisticated in the way they recruit. They often do it through siblings. It is not simple. The different county lines are not uniform; they all have their own style and tolerance to violence. They all do it slightly differently, but there is a theme emerging that any child excluded from school becomes a target, because they have become alienated, and are the sort of material that the gangs are looking for.

Sadly, the people we are looking at are 10, 11 and 12-year-olds. It is no longer 16 or 17-year-olds. County lines have been going forever, but it was always older kids doing it. Now the real problems are the level of sophistication in almost brainwashing them into the gang, the levels of violence that are associated with those gangs, and the targeting of kids who have been excluded from school.

Patrick Green: I would echo that. It is really sad. We work with a lot of young people who have been excluded from school. There is no question that they are in a particularly difficult place in terms of the level of intervention and support that they need. I feel that some schools, as you would expect, do that a lot better than others.

I do not think that there is universal engagement at the moment. Things have definitely changed. Certainly, schools listen to Ofsted. We could get far more co-operation from Ofsted in terms of safeguarding, not just in the school itself but in the surrounding area and on the journey that young people make to and from school.

I just think that far too many young people are being excluded from school in the first place. We can probably tell when primary schools come to us and highlight young people whom we are already concerned about, purely from the attitude that we can see in a short two-hour workshop. Far more could be done in terms of safety nets and checks and balances on young people. When they get to being excluded from school, it is really difficult and a tough road back.

John Poynton: There is a real need to not make the schools and the young people feel as if they just have to focus on a lesson on gangs and knife crime. We have all mentioned that knife crime, gangs and county lines are symptoms of much deeper, longer-term root causes. Schools will probably not have any problem recognising that they have children who have had adverse childhood experiences throughout their lives. They have parents who perhaps are not able to support their children in quite the way they need. I suppose I really want to look at how schools are supported to engage the families and the children on those root-cause issues, rather than at trying to talk a headteacher into just having a gangs, knives or county lines lesson plan in their personal, social, health and economic education. I think you need to do both but, again, this is similar to my point about showing weapons that have been taken off the street. In going into schools, my colleagues here obviously do a very good job of ensuring that children are not traumatised. For children who perhaps are not engaging or listening in quite the same way as those who are going to stay on in mainstream education and do well, they might hear that this is normal. There is an element of re-traumatising, or possibly triggering a previous childhood trauma.

For me, it is again about ensuring that schools are better supported to work as early as possible around adverse childhood experience and support the parents through primary school, so that, as Rob pointed out, we are not having to bring the personal, social and health education lessons around county lines and gangs lower and lower, because we should be meeting it at the very beginning.

It is less threatening to teachers and to heads to talk about how we support all children with adverse childhood experience from reception, rather than to try to go backwards in talking about the more worrying subjects. I am not saying it is either/or; it is both.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q The measures on knives are mirrored when it comes to corrosive substances. What are your views on that?

Andrew Penhale: Again, it is important and needed. There is this gap with online provision, and it is really important that that is duplicated from knives. It is exactly the same problem: there needs to be a verification process to ensure that they are delivered to people 18 or over.

Ben Richards: We mirror the importance of this, and we understand that. As Trish has touched on, the issues are within statutory duties and resources to be able to take on duties on top of those already being carried out.

[Louise Haigh]

Q Ms Burls, did you say that the Bill is still missing the statutory powers you need?

Trish Burls: For trading standards officers, yes, it is.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Monday 16th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

Today, the Daily Mail published the results of an exclusive survey, which showed that 57% of people say that police officers have surrendered control of our neighbourhoods and criminals have no fear of being caught; a quarter of people do not feel safe going out at night; and more than half of respondents who reported a crime did not have a police officer attend. Does the Minister accept any responsibility for those figures, or does the Home Office still labour under the dangerous delusion that its cuts have not affected community safety?

[Victoria Atkins]

I gently remind the hon. Lady that the Government have provided £460 million in additional funding for the police this year, which I understand she voted against. Again, we have to look at this as a strategy. The problem cannot be solved by police officers alone, vital though they are. Early intervention and tackling young people before they get dragged into criminality are key, and I hope that the Labour party will support the Offensive Weapons Bill, which gives the police the powers they need.

Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 20th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

I am coming on to that.

Any cross-border sharing of personal data must be consistent with our international obligations and be subject to appropriate safeguards. On the first point, the provisions in clause 109 are entirely consistent with the requirements of the draft modernised Council of Europe data protection convention—convention 108—on which the preventions of part 4 are based. It is pending international agreement.

The provisions in the convention are designed to provide the necessary protection for personal data in the context of national security. The Bill already provides that the intelligence services can make transfers outside the UK only when necessary and proportionate for the limited purposes of the services’ statutory functions, which include the protection of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purpose of criminal proceedings.

In addition, on the point the right hon. Gentleman just raised, the intelligence services are already under statutory obligations in the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to ensure that no information is disclosed except so far as is necessary for those functions or purposes. All actions by the intelligence services, as with all other UK public authorities, must comply with international law.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

Yes, but I am coming on to further safeguards, if that is the point the hon. Lady wants to raise.

[Louise Haigh]

Under those pieces of legislation, are the intelligence services subject to the Information Commissioner, and will they be subject to the commissioner under the Bill’s provisions?

[Victoria Atkins]

I am about to come on to the safeguards that govern the intelligence services’ information acquisition and sharing under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. They ensure that any such processing is undertaken only when necessary, lawful and proportionate, and that any disclosure is limited to the minimum number of individuals, in accordance with arrangements detailed in those Acts.

Those Acts, and the provisions in the relevant codes of practice made under them, also provide rigorous safeguards governing the transfer of data. Those enactments already afford proportionate protection and safeguards when data is being shared overseas. Sections 54, 130, 151 and 192 of the 2016 Act provide for safeguards relating to disclosure of material overseas.

Those provisions are subject to oversight by the investigatory powers commissioner, and may be challenged in the investigatory powers tribunal. They are very powerful safeguards, over and above the powers afforded to the Information Commissioner, precisely because of the unique nature of the material with which the security services must act.

Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Morning sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Thursday 15th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

Again, surely it is for the Executive—elected officials—to take responsibility for decisions that are made by data controllers in the Ministry of Defence. Obviously, the Department has considered the Information Commissioner’s representations, but this is not a blanket exemption. The high threshold can be met only in very specific circumstances.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

National security: certificate

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move amendment 161, in clause 27, page 17, line 2, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“A Minister of the Crown must apply to a Judicial Commissioner for a certificate, if exemptions are sought from specified provisions in relation to any personal data for the purpose of safeguarding national security.”

This amendment would introduce a procedure for a Minister of the Crown to apply to a Judicial Commissioner for a National Security Certificate.

Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Thursday 15th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

Again, surely it is for the Executive—elected officials—to take responsibility for decisions that are made by data controllers in the Ministry of Defence. Obviously, the Department has considered the Information Commissioner’s representations, but this is not a blanket exemption. The high threshold can be met only in very specific circumstances.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

National security: certificate

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move amendment 161, in clause 27, page 17, line 2, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“A Minister of the Crown must apply to a Judicial Commissioner for a certificate, if exemptions are sought from specified provisions in relation to any personal data for the purpose of safeguarding national security.”

This amendment would introduce a procedure for a Minister of the Crown to apply to a Judicial Commissioner for a National Security Certificate.

Data Protection Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Thursday 15th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

Thank you, Mr Hanson. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again.

I will first provide some context for this part of the Bill. The provisions in the Bill relating to national security exemptions and certificates are wholly in line with the provisions in the Data Protection Act 1998 and its predecessor, the Data Protection Act 1984. What we are doing in the Bill is preserving an arrangement that has been on the statute book for more than 30 years and has been operated by successive Governments.

The national security exemption is no different in principle from the other exemptions provided for in the Bill. If it is right that certain provisions of data protection legislation can be disapplied for reasons of, for example, crime prevention or taxation purposes, or in pursuit of various regulatory functions, without external approval, surely it is difficult to take issue with the need for an exemption on the grounds of national security on the same basis.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

The Minister is absolutely right that the provisions mirror those in the DPA. That is exactly why we take issue with them. They mirror unacceptable preventions of rights in the tribunal appeal process, but do not mirror the rights in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Why were safeguards put in place in that Act, but will not apply in this Bill?

[Victoria Atkins]

If I understand the hon. Lady’s argument correctly, she has presented the judicial commissioners as permitting, for example, warrant to be granted. Having sat through the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill and then the Public Bill Committee, I can tell her that I am afraid that is not how that Act works. What happens is that the Secretary of State grants the warrant and then that decision is overseen by the judicial commissioner. I will come on to the difference between the Investigatory Powers Act and this Bill in due course, because the terminology used draws on that in the Investigatory Powers Act, but that Act is very different from this Bill, which is about the processing of data, in its engagement with people and their rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

But what the national security certificate does not require is a statement of what data is being processed or the exemptions under which the Ministry of Defence or the intelligence services require it. That is what our amendments seek to introduce. If the Bill proceeds unamended, national security certificates would require only very broad details and no information on what data was being processed. It would therefore not be very likely that a tribunal would be able to oppose the decision on the basis of a judicial review.

[Victoria Atkins]

I have a copy of a live certificate granted by the then Secretary of State, David Blunkett, on 10 December 2001. In the certificate, he sets out in summary the reasons why the certificate has been granted, including:

“The work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown requires secrecy.”

I assume hon. Members do not disagree with that. Another reason is:

“The general principle of neither confirming nor denying whether the Security Service processes data about an individual, or whether others are processing personal data for, on behalf of with a view to assist or in relation to the functions of the Security Service, is an essential part of that secrecy.”

Again, I assume that hon. Members do not disagree with that. As I said, this is a live certificate that has been given to the Information Commissioner, and is in the public domain for people to see and to check should they so wish. Those reasons are given in that certificate.

[Louise Haigh]

That is wonderful, but the Bill does not require that. It is great that my noble Friend Lord Blunkett put that on his national security application, but the Bill does not require that in law, so I am afraid that it is not a sufficient argument against the amendments that we have tabled.

[Victoria Atkins]

What we are doing is transposing the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 into the Bill. It is difficult to see a situation in which a national security certificate will be granted on the basis that the work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown does not require secrecy.

[Victoria Atkins]

Very much so—indeed, this debate ran through the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which was one of the most scrutinised pieces of legislation. Senior parliamentarians who served on the Committee on that Act during long careers in this House, including the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes), said that it was an incredibly well scrutinised Bill. There was constant debate about the battle, or tension, between ensuring the national security of our country in the most transparent way possible, and the fact that by definition there has to be some secrecy and confidentiality about the ways in which the security agencies work.

What was important in the debates on that Act, as it is in those on the current Bill, was making it clear that the idea that rogue civil servants or security agents can run around with people’s information with no checks is very wrong. We are replicating in the Bill the system that has been used for the past 30 years, because we consider that that system has the appropriate and necessary safeguards in the often very fast-moving context of a national security situation.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

I will make a little progress, then I will take more interventions.

To be absolutely clear, a national security exemption is applied not by a Minister but by a data controller. Data controllers—be they the intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence or any other body—are well placed to make the determination, given that they will have a detailed understanding of the operational context and the extent to which departure from the requirement of the general data protection regulation—or parts 3 or 4 of the Bill as the case may be—is necessary to safeguard national security. In short, a data controller decides whether the national security exemption should be applied in a particular case, and the certificate is the evidence of the need for such an exemption in the event that someone challenges it.

[Louise Haigh]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

I will give an example first, because I think it is so important. I fear that a bit of misunderstanding has crept in. Let us take the example of a subject access request. Mr Smith asks an intelligence service whether it is processing personal data concerning him and, if so, for information about that data under clause 94. The intelligence service considers whether it is processing personal data, which it will have obtained under its other statutory powers, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

If the agency determines that it is processing personal data relating to Mr Smith, it then considers whether it is able to disclose the data, or whether a relevant exemption is engaged. For the agency, the key consideration will be whether disclosing the data would damage national security, for example by disclosing sensitive capabilities or alerting Mr Smith to the fact that he is a subject of investigation. If disclosure does not undermine national security and no other exemption is relevant, the intelligence service must disclose the information. However, if national security would be undermined by disclosure, the agency will need to use the national security exemption in relation to processing any personal data relating to Mr Smith.

If the intelligence service does not process any personal data relating to Mr Smith, it will again have to consider whether disclosing that fact would undermine national security, for example by revealing a lack of capability, which could be exploited by subjects of investigation. That is why, on occasion, when such requests are made, a “neither confirm nor deny” response may be necessary, because either confirming or denying may in itself have ramifications, not only in relation to Mr Smith but in relation to other aspects of national security.

Mr Smith may complain to the Information Commissioner about the response to his request for information. The intelligence service may then be required to demonstrate to the commissioner that the processing of personal data complies with the requirements of part four of the Bill, as set out in clause 102, and that it has responded to the request for information appropriately.

If, in legal proceedings, Mr Smith sought to argue that the national security exemption had been improperly relied upon, a national security certificate could be used as conclusive evidence that the national security exemption was required to safeguard national security. Any person who believed they were directly affected by the certificate could of course appeal against it to the upper tribunal, as set out in clause 111.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

Does the Minister accept that in response to the case of Watson and others against the Government, the Government conceded that additional safeguards, including a far more robust system of independent oversight, were necessary? That test of judicial review is simply not sufficient as oversight. It cannot contest the merits of the case and applies only to the very limited, narrow appeal right of judicial review. It is just not sufficient.

[Victoria Atkins]

I will come on, if I may, to the judicial review test. I have quite a lot about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

There might be many reasons why we process information. The end result of processing might be for national security reasons or law enforcement reasons—my officials are scribbling away furiously, so I do not want to take away their glory when they provide me with the answer.

I have an answer on the Watson case, raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, which dealt with the retention of communications by communications service providers. Again, that is an entirely different scenario from the one we are talking about, where the material is held by the security services.

Amendment 161 goes further than the 2016 Act, because it places the decision to issue a certificate with the judicial commissioner. As I have said, national security certificates come into play only to serve in legal proceedings as conclusive evidence that an exemption from specified data protection requirements is necessary to protect national security—for example, to prevent disclosure of personal data to an individual under investigation, when such disclosure would damage national security. The certificate does not authorise the required use of the national security exemption, which is properly a matter for the data controller to determine.

Amendments 163 and 164 relate to the form of a national security certificate. Amendment 163 would require a detailed rather than general description of the data identified on a national security certificate, but we believe this change to be unnecessary and unhelpful, given that much data can be adequately described in a general way. Amendment 164, which would prevent a certificate from having prospective effect, appears to be dependent on the prior judicial authorisation scheme proposed in amendments 161 and 162, and again contrasts with the prospective nature of certificates currently under the Data Protection Act 1998.

Prospective certificates of the type issued under the 1998 Act are the best way of ensuring that the use of the national security exemption by the intelligence services and others is both sufficiently foreseeable for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and accountable. The accountability is ensured by the power to challenge certificates when they are issued, and that is something that has real teeth. The accountability is strengthened by the provision in clause 130 for the publication of certificates. The documents we are discussing will therefore be in the public domain—indeed, many of them are already. But it will now be set out in statute that they should be in the public domain.

Amendments 166 to 168 relate to the appeals process. Amendment 166 would broaden the scope for appealing a national security certificate from a person “directly affected” by it to someone who

“believes they are directly or indirectly affected”

by it. I wonder whether the Opposition did any work on the scope of the provision when drafting it, because the words “indirectly affected” have the potential to cause an extraordinary number of claims. How on earth could that phrase be defined in a way that does not swamp the security services with applications from people who consider that they might be indirectly affected by a decision relating to a national security matter? I do not see how that can be considered practicable.

[Louise Haigh]

As I have already said, the issue is that the judicial review process for appeal is incredibly narrow and limited. Under section 28 of the DPA, where an individual requests to access his or her data that is subject to a certificate, they will merely be informed that they have been given all the information that is required under the Act. They would not be informed that their data is being withheld on the grounds of a national security certificate. That means that it is impossible for them to know whether they even have the right to appeal under a judicial review, and they do not have the information available to allow them to take that judicial review case forward. That is why the amendment is drafted in this way. If the Minister would like, she can suggest some alternative wording that would solve the problem.

[Victoria Atkins]

We get to the nub of the problem. Is the hon. Lady seriously suggesting that the security services should notify someone who puts in an access request that they are the subject of an investigation? That is the tension facing the security services. That is why we have internationally met standards, with regard to article 108 of the convention, which the Bill complies with. That is why we have to build in all these safeguards, to try to ensure that those people who intend ill will to this country do not benefit from our natural wish to be as transparent as possible when dealing with people’s personal data.

[Louise Haigh]

I have already explained that there would of course be an exemption for not informing individuals if they were under surveillance or being processed, but there are not sufficient oversights, safeguards or appeals. In the absence of any of those three, the Minister has to accept that there are absolutely no checks and balances on the exemptions listed under the clause.

[Victoria Atkins]

There most certainly are: they have the right to appeal to the upper tribunal.

[Louise Haigh]

Under judicial review?

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

The Government have listened to the concerns of the House of Lords. We added clause 130 in the Lords to provide for the publication of national security certificates by the Information Commissioner, so that they would be easily accessible to anyone who wished to mount a subject access request, and could be tested accordingly. In her briefing to noble Lords about the Bill, the Information Commissioner said that the clause was

“very welcome as it should improve regulatory scrutiny and foster greater public trust and confidence in the use of national security certificate process.”

It will also ensure that any person who believes that they are directly affected by a certificate will be better placed to exercise their appeal rights.

The Bill’s approach to national security certificates is tried and tested. We rely on those 30 years of experience of the regime being in place. In her written submission to the Committee, the Information Commission has not raised any issues in respect of the provisions in clause 27.

I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley. I suspect from the interventions that she may well press the amendment to a vote, but I invite her to withdraw it. We have scrutinised this matter, and the Government are clear that the Bill reflects the past 30 years of the regime. It has worked and the Information Commissioner has not raised any concerns about clause 27.

[Louise Haigh]

I am afraid that the Minister is correct; she has not reassured Opposition Members. The amendment is not about putting obstacles in the way of our intelligence agencies going about their operational capabilities—that is the last thing we want to do—but the Minister has been unable to give us a clear argument as to why there should be stronger safeguards on the collection of data than on processing. That the Home Office would like to have the data is not a sufficient argument.

[Victoria Atkins]

Please do not trivialise the matter. It is not the case that the Home Office would like the data; this is national security. This is the regime that our security services use at the moment. It is the regime they need. That is why the Government are pressing the issue. Again, I would have thought that this week of all weeks is the week to back our security services, not to put more barriers in their way.

[Louise Haigh]

The intelligence agencies, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill has said, take parliamentary oversight and scrutiny seriously. The safeguards and oversights are not built into the Bill in the way they were in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. There is no clear argument why those safeguards should be in place for collection, but not for processing. The Minister has constantly relayed that that decision is based on 30 years’-worth of data but, as has already been said, the scope for the collection and processing of data is so far transformed, even from when the Data Protection Act was written in 1998, that the oversights and safeguards need to be transformed as well. That is why we are proposing these amendments.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has suggested that the exemptions put forward in the Bill are not legal and introduce arbitrary interferences into people’s privacy rights. It is this Committee’s responsibility to ensure that the amendments pass. That is not trivialising the issue, but ensuring that there is a proper debate about security and the individual’s data subject rights. That is why we will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

There is the example of Durham police force—an excellent police force in many regards—using automated decision making to decide who does and does not remain in custody, and when people receive their charge. A human is involved in that decision-making process at the moment, but the Bill would enable that to be taken away and allow it to be done purely on an automated basis. I am sure the Minister understands our concerns about removing humans from that decision-making process.

[Victoria Atkins]

I have to say that I am not familiar with that example. I look to my officials—

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I will pick up on the comments by the right hon. Gentleman, if I may.

In the Durham example given by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, I do not understand how a custody sergeant could sign a custody record without there being any human interaction in that decision-making process. A custody sergeant has to sign a custody record and to review the health of the detainee and whether they have had their PACE rights. I did not go into any details about it, because I was surprised that such a situation could emerge. I do not see how a custody sergeant could be discharging their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 if their decision as to custody was based solely on algorithms, because a custody record has to be entered.

[Louise Haigh]

I thank the Minister for allowing me to clarify. I did not say that it was solely an algorithmic decision already. Durham is using an algorithm known as the harm assessment risk tool. A human makes a decision based on the algorithm’s recommendations. The point I was making was that law enforcement is using algorithms to make very important decisions that limit an individual’s right to freedom, let alone the right to privacy or anything else, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about PACE and the need for a custody sergeant, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further and to remove the human right—

[Victoria Atkins]

This has been a moment of genuine misunderstanding. Given how the hon. Lady presented that, to me it sounded as if she was saying that the custody record and the custody arrangements of a suspect—detaining people against their will in a police cell—was being done completely by a computer. That was how it sounded. There was obviously an area of genuine misunderstanding, so I am grateful that she clarified it. She intervened on me when I said that we were not aware of any examples of the police solely using automated decision making—that is when she intervened, but that is not what she has described. A human being, a custody sergeant, still has to sign the record and review the risk assessment to which the hon. Lady referred. The police are using many such examples nowadays, but the fact is that a human being is still involved in the decision-making process, even in the issuing of penalties for speeding. Speeding penalties may be automated processes, but there is a meaningful element of human review and decision making, just as there is with the custody record example she gave.

There was a genuine misunderstanding there, but I am relieved, frankly, given that the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill was making points about my being unaware of what is going on in the Home Office. I am entirely aware of that, but I misunderstood what the hon. Lady meant and I thought she was presenting the custody record as something that is produced by a machine with no human interaction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 35 establishes the principle that subject access requests should be provided free of charge in most cases. That will be the default position in most cases. In terms of the fees, that will not be a matter to place in statute; certainly, I can write to the right hon. Gentleman with my thoughts on how that may develop. The intention is that in the majority of cases, there will be no charge.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Meaning of “applicable time period”

Amendments made: 29, in clause 54, page 32, line 14, leave out “day” and insert “time”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.

Amendment 30, in clause 54, page 32, line 15, leave out “day” and insert “time”.—(Victoria Atkins.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.

Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 55 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Data protection impact assessment

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 64, page 37, line 2, leave out “is likely to” and insert “may”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I have just a small correction. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said in error that the Home Office were holding on to the photographs. It is not the Home Office. It is individual police forces that hold that.

[Louise Haigh]

No, it is on the police national computer. That falls under the responsibility of the Home Office, not individual forces.

[Victoria Atkins]

That is run by the police. I do not want the misapprehension to be established that there is an office in the Home Office in Marsham Street where these photographs are held on a computer. It is on the police national computer, which is a secure system that people have to have security clearance to get into. It is not completely accurate to say that the Home Office has possession of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Haigh]

I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm that all the examples we raised today will fall under the “high risk” category in the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

I will deal with the definition of high risk in a moment. Clause 64 separates out the processing most likely significantly to affect an individual’s rights and freedom, which requires an additional level of assessment to reflect the higher risk. The amendments would water down the importance of those assessments. That is not to say that consideration of the impact on rights and freedoms can be overlooked. It will, of course, remain necessary for the controller to carry out that initial assessment to determine whether a full impact assessment is required. Good data protection is not achieved by putting barriers in the way of processing. It is about considering the risk intelligently and applying appropriate assessments accordingly.

On the question of high risk, officers or data controllers will go through that process when considering whether a data protection impact assessment is correct. I will write to the hon. Lady to clarify whether the bodies and lists she mentioned will be defined as high risk. The fact is that they are none the less regulated by various organisations.

[Victoria Atkins]

Indeed. A pertinent example of that is the development of artificial intelligence to help the police categorise images of child sexual exploitation online. That tool will help given the volume of offences now being carried out across the world. It will also help the officers involved in those cases, because having to sit at a computer screen and categorise some of these images is soul-breaking, frankly. If we can use modern technology and artificial intelligence to help categorise those images, that must surely be a good thing.

[Louise Haigh]

There is absolutely no argument over that. As a former special constable myself, I have no wish to put obstacles in the way of law enforcement. There is a particular need to develop technology to help digital investigations, and I think the Government have been delaying that. Human failures in those investigations have led to the collapse of several trials over the past couple of months.

The Minister says that the surveillance camera commissioner has a role. The commissioner has said that there needs to be further clarity on regulatory responsibility. It is not clear whether it is the surveillance camera commissioner, the biometrics commissioner or the Information Commissioner who has responsibility for facial recognition software. Does she accept that the Government urgently need to provide clarity, as well as guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council and police forces, about the use of this potentially invasive software?

[Victoria Atkins]

Specifically on clause 64, which is about the data protection impact assessment, the judgment as to whether the proposed processing is high risk must be a matter for the controller. On the face of it, many of the systems that the hon. Lady described in her speech will involve high risk, but with respect the decision is not for me to make as a Minister on my feet in Committee. We must allow data controllers the freedom and responsibility to make those assessments. They are the ones that make the decisions and what flows from that in terms of processing.

If the hon. Lady will write to me on the more general, wider point about oversight of the surveillance camera commissioner and so on, I would be happy to take that up outside of Committee.

[Louise Haigh]

The issue about whether it is high risk is of course a matter for the data controller, but we are scrutinising this Bill, and the Minister is asking us to support a test of high risk. I am sure the whole Committee would agree that all the cases that have been suggested today involve an incredibly high risk. They involve deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy. The idea that we would accept a definition of high risk that does not cover those examples is too much for the Opposition to support. That is why the amendment exists. We need to test exactly what the Government envisage in the definition of high risk.

[Victoria Atkins]

May I just clarify whether the hon. Lady intends to amend her amendment to list the various categories she listed in her speech? I have been very clear that high risk is defined as including processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. I would be very cautious about listing examples in the Bill through an amendment, because as we have all acknowledged, criminality and other things develop over time. It would be very bold to put those categories in the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

No one is suggesting that such examples should go in the Bill. I appreciate this is the Minister’s first Bill Committee, but the job of the Opposition is to test the definitions in the Bill and ensure that it is fit for purpose. My concern is that the definition of high risk is set too high to cover law enforcement agencies and will allow egregious breaches of individuals’ data rights, privacy rights and right to liberty. It is our job as the Opposition—there is nothing wrong with us exercising this role—to ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose. That is what we are seeking to do.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for clarifying her role. My answer is exactly as I said before. High risk includes processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. That must be a matter for the data controller to assess. We cannot assess it here in Committee for the very good reason put forward by members of the Committee: we cannot foresee every eventuality. Time will move on, as will technology. That is why the Bill is worded as it is, to try to future-proof it but also, importantly, because the wording complies with our obligations under the law enforcement directive and under the modernised draft Council of Europe convention 108.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 65(2) states:

“The controller must consult the Commissioner prior to the processing if a data protection impact assessment prepared under section 64 indicates that the processing of the data would result in a high risk”.

There are many complicated cases that the police and others have to deal with. That is why we have guidance rather than putting it in statute—precisely to give those on the frontline the flexibility of understanding, “This situation has arisen, and we need to calibrate the meaning of high risk and take that into account when we look at the prejudices caused to a person or a group of people.” That is precisely what we are trying to encompass. Presumably, that is what the Council of Europe and those involved in drafting the law enforcement directive thought as well.

Of course, there will be guidance from the Information Commissioner to help data controllers on those assessments, to enable us to get a consistent approach across the country. That guidance will be the place to address these concerns, not on the face of the Bill.

[Louise Haigh]

Can the Minister confirm that the Metropolitan police consulted the Information Commissioner before trialling facial recognition software? I appreciate that she might not be able to do so on her feet, so I will of course accept it if she wishes to write to me.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am afraid that I will have to write to the hon. Lady on that.

The intention behind this part of the Bill is not to place unnecessary barriers in the way of legitimate processing. Nor, we all agree, should we place additional burdens on the commissioner without there being a clear benefit. These provisions are in the Bill to address the need for an intelligent application of the data protection safeguards, rather than assuming that a one-size-fits-all approach results in better data protection.

Amendment 149 would insert a new subsection (8) to clause 65, which would permit the commissioner to exercise powers of enforcement if she was not satisfied that the controller or processor had taken sufficient steps to act on her opinion that intended processing would infringe the provisions in part 3. It is worth noting that the purpose of clause 65 is to ensure consultation with the commissioner prior to processing taking place. It is therefore not clear what enforcement the commissioner would be expected to undertake in this instance, as the processing would not have taken place. If, however, the controller sought to process the data contrary to the commissioner’s opinion, it would be open to her to take enforcement action in line with her powers already outlined in part 6.

I do not know, Mr Hanson, whether we have dealt with new clauses 3 and 4.

Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Tuesday 13th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley for affording me the opportunity to update the Committee on our progress in establishing a national register of missing persons, and to touch on the missing children and adults strategy that the Government are currently working on, which I hope will be published shortly. It will address many of the themes that the hon. Lady drew on in her speech, particularly the deliberate targeting of vulnerable children by county lines gangs, children who go missing—usually, sadly, from care homes—and the exploitation that occurs.

As the hon. Lady said, this is an important subject because each year more than 337,000 calls are made to police stations in England and Wales about missing and absent people. Happily, the vast majority are found within 24 hours, but 2% or thereabouts remain missing for more than a week. Anyone who has ever met the parents of children who go missing knows the heartache that those parents face, not just on an annual basis, but on a daily, minute-by-minute basis. They feel that pain constantly.

People who go missing are often the most vulnerable in society, and it is vital that those tasked with investigating their disappearance have the most accurate and up-to-date information available. We accept that the current technology available to frontline staff to deal with missing persons is insufficient. For example, the police national computer identifies only those currently reported as missing, while the National Crime Agency database includes only those missing for more than 72 hours. We know that the search must start the moment that a child or vulnerable person is identified as missing; we cannot wait for 72 hours. There is no national record of the history of missing persons in England and Wales.

The Government’s “Tackling child sexual exploitation: progress report” published in February last year set out our commitment to deliver a national missing persons register. This will enable police officers to access up-to-date data about missing people across force boundaries and take appropriate action when they investigate missing person incidents or encounter a missing person who is away from his or her home force area. The register is being established as part of the national law enforcement data programme, which will replace the police national computer and the police national database with a new national data service. The current timetable, agreed with the police, is to launch the capability for forces to record manually missing and associated found incidents from mid-2019 with releases thereafter, including automation and establishing the ability to share controlled information beyond policing to other agencies.

In terms of the way in which the register and the scheme interplay in the Bill, the processing of the personal data held on the database will take place under either the GDPR or part 3 of the Bill. Processing of the data by the police will often be for a law enforcement purpose, including the prevention, investigation or detection of a criminal offence and any sensitive processing would fall within paragraph 3 of schedule 8, which enables processing where necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another individual, or under the new safeguarding condition, which we have just debated. Where the processing is undertaken under the GDPR, the conditions in respect of protecting the vital interests of the data subject, or preventing or detecting unlawful acts, may apply. Again, the new safeguarding condition may also be applicable.

Given those provisions and the very clear timetable that the Government and police have for their programme, we are of the view that the amendment is unnecessary, but I am, of course, very appreciative that the hon. Lady has raised this in the Committee. Obviously, I will keep her informed of progress on the new register.

[Louise Haigh]

That is fantastic news. It is a very ambitious deadline for a police IT transformation programme. I know that South Yorkshire is going through the transformation on the CONNECT programme at the moment; it is woefully behind the timescale envisaged and over budget, as every IT transformation in the history of any Government, of any colour, has always been. I wonder, therefore, given the urgency of this issue, whether it is possible for this information to be recorded on the PNC for the time being.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I am looking at my officials and they will stop me if I am wrong, I hope. If she prefers, may I write to her? I do not think that the PNC has the capability at the moment. That is why we are having to develop this new programme, but we will write to the hon. Lady in any event. As I say, I will keep her up to date with progress. But I invite her to withdraw the amendment, please.

[Louise Haigh]

Given that the Minister asked so nicely, I will. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 87, in schedule 1, page 127, line 30, at end insert—

“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”

This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 15(4) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for an insurance purpose).

Amendment 88, in schedule 1, page 127, line 39, at end insert—

“( ) is of data concerning health which relates to a data subject who is the parent, grandparent, great-grandparent or sibling of a member of the scheme,”.

This amendment provides that the condition in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 (occupational pension schemes) can only be relied on in connection with the processing of data concerning health relating to certain relatives of a member of the scheme.

Amendment 89, in schedule 1, page 128, line 6, at end insert—

“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”

This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for determinations in connection with occupational pension schemes).

Amendment 90, in schedule 1, page 131, line 14, at end insert—

“( ) If the processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association described in sub-paragraph (1)(a), or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met even if, when the processing is carried out, the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place (see paragraph 5 of this Schedule).”

This amendment provides that when processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association that is responsible for eliminating doping in sport, or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in paragraph 22 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (anti-doping in sport) is met even if the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place when the processing is carried out.

Amendment 91, in schedule 1, page 133, line 17, leave out from “interest” to end of line 21.—(Margot James.)

This amendment removes provisions from paragraph 31 of Schedule 1 (extension of conditions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 referring to substantial public interest) which are unnecessary because they impose requirements which are already imposed by paragraph 5 of Schedule 1.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

There may be occasions when there is a person we have lost track of whose status is irregular. If we know they have a child, we will seek from the Department for Education assistance to find the whereabouts of the child. That child has not committed a criminal offence, so I would be very concerned to ensure that the Home Office, Border Force or whoever else acted lawfully when seeking that data in order to enable them to find the parent or whoever is the responsible adult, as part of the immigration system.

[Louise Haigh]

In that example, would the exemption not be covered under the safeguarding exemption, as brought by the Government amendment to schedule 1?

[Victoria Atkins]

I have to say, that had not occurred to me as an obvious—

[Louise Haigh]

A missing child?

[Victoria Atkins]

No—the child is not missing, but the parent is; so we seek advice from the Department for Education about where the child is. It may be that cleverer lawyers than me in the Home Office will find an exemption for that, but the point of this exemption of paragraph 4 is to cover the lawfulness of the Home Office in seeking such information in order to find parents or responsible adults who may have responsibility, and either to regularise their stay or to remove them.

I encourage the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill to withdraw his amendment, as we believe that it is not the wholesale disapplication of data subjects’ rights, and it is a targeted provision wholly in accordance with the discretion afforded to member states by the GDPR and is vital to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of our immigration system.

Hate Crime

Debate between Victoria Atkins and Louise Haigh

Monday 12th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her impassioned plea for recognition throughout the country of the role not only of her local mayor, but of many other people in public life who happen to practise the Muslim religion as part of their way of life and who contribute so very much to our community. I put on record my thanks to her local mayor.

There are many definitions of Islamophobia, but most people tend to adhere to the one used by the Runnymede Trust. We do not accept the need for a definitive definition, but we know that Islamophobia is clearly recognised and that we have very effective monitoring of race-hate crimes. Considerable work is done on these matters by Tell MAMA and the anti-Muslim hatred working group.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) on securing it.

The despicable sentiments behind these sickening letters has caused revulsion throughout our communities. Although we can be confident that, thanks to the tireless dedication of community leaders, charities, faith groups and civil society, such deliberate attempts to divide us will not succeed, this act will have struck fear into the heart of communities—indeed, that was the intention. It is absolutely an incitement to violence and it cannot go unpunished.

As we have heard, hate crimes are rising nationwide. In London alone, there has been a fivefold increase in attacks on Muslims in the past year. As the outgoing counter-terror chief Mark Rowley has said, the threat from the extreme right wing is significant and requires urgent attention. We have seen the murder of our colleague and friend Jo Cox, the attack at Finsbury Park mosque, the proscription of National Action, the jailing of the leaders of Britain First, and the reports from the Anderson review, which suggested that the extreme right wing is engaged in credible attack planning, including bomb making. There is now overwhelming evidence that the threat from the extreme right is growing increasingly violent. We have to be clear that by threatening members of our diverse communities, these people are also a threat to our national security through their anti-democratic, dehumanising and murderous beliefs.

Given the overwhelming evidence, it is clear that so-called domestic extremism needs to be dealt with as a first-order threat, so will the Minister reassure us that, in line with the Anderson review recommendations, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre will start to produce national threat assessments of domestic extremism? Will she increase the role for MI5, JTAC and the counter-terrorism network in the monitoring and handling of investigations of domestic extremism? Is it not time to update the Contest strategy to reflect the growing threat from the extreme right?

More broadly, can the Minister assure us that counter-terrorism policing has the resources it needs? The Government’s funding settlement last month gave only half what the police requested for counter-terror purposes, while the police and our intelligence services are facing an unprecedented threat from terrorism in all its forms.

We all deplore these despicable letters. They are an attempt to divide us; in that, they will not succeed. We must be united as a House and as a country in bearing down on the insidious beliefs contained within these letters and be absolutely clear on how we are going to bring together the police, schools, colleges and all authorities to stand up to hate crime and terrorism in every single one of their forms. Finally, we must ensure that all of us, as elected politicians, are at all times responsible in our language and rhetoric and never seek to embolden those who hold such insidious and extremist views.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am sure that everyone in the House agrees with the hon. Lady, particularly on that last point about the importance of using language very carefully. She asked me about police resources; of course, we have increased them and, as she will know, the Home Secretary reviews those resources constantly. We ask the police whether they have the resources that they need, and the Home Secretary acts accordingly. May I undertake to write to the hon. Lady specifically on JTAC and her other queries? Finally, let me say that it is gratifying to see so many Members present, unified in condemning these dreadful letters and their sentiments and in our determination to tackle them.