(5 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that intervention. As the hon. Lady knows, I worked in Northern Ireland for five years with the Northern Ireland Policing Board. I know how deeply this is felt in Northern Ireland across all communities. I was there for two days last week. I made the point there that, although we have concerns about the backstop, we do accept that there must be a backstop, it is inevitable and that, therefore, notwithstanding those concerns, we support a backstop. That is very important.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way because I actually find that I agree with a great deal of what he is saying. He is saying that leaving with no deal would bring huge consequences for our economy and we should not countenance it. He is also saying that within the withdrawal agreement he sees the need for a backstop. I have listened closely to what he said before: that he also agrees on the elements about needing a transition period and certainty on citizens’ rights. Given that he now appears to agree with everything that is in the withdrawal agreement, why will he not vote for it and what more does he need?
I am not sure the hon. Lady carefully read the proposition we were voting for on the meaningful vote. It was the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration taken together. The statute requires them to be taken together, because we cannot read the withdrawal agreement without reference to the political declaration and vice versa. What I have said about the backstop is important and it is important I say it for the whole of the United Kingdom, but particularly for people in Northern Ireland, and I stand by it.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman asked me a question and I am answering him. Whether we like it or not, the Government’s deal is what we are voting on. We are not voting on what any one of us may think, say or do. Having not made any attempt to engage seriously with the Opposition on amendments and proposals, it is a bit rich for Government Members to now say that it is somehow the Opposition’s fault that the Government are in a mess and cannot get their deal through. I gently say that there is huge interest in what the Opposition think. Why? Because, in an ordinary set of proceedings and absent the snap general election, there would be a majority on the Government Benches for the Government’s own proposition. This challenge needs to be put in its proper context: it is because Conservative Members know full well that they are not all going into the same Lobby.
If anyone wants to intervene on me and say that the Conservatives are all going into the same Lobby, they can, but I do not think that is the case. The point is that the Government are so divided that they cannot get their own deal through. That is the truth of the matter.
Order. I am well aware that the hon. Lady is a former chair of the Internal Market Committee of the European Parliament. In case there are people present who were not aware of that, among the litany of achievements that she can proclaim, I have done a public service in advertising that important fact. However, it does not give her an automatic right to intervene. The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) will decide whether he wishes to give way to the hon. Lady, and at the moment he is not giving way.
I am not going to give way.
It is no good us pretending about this. I have said in recent weeks and months that the future relationship document is 26 pages long and that it is thin and flimsy, and the answer that now comes back occasionally is, “It was always going to be that way. What did you expect? It’s a future relationship.” Well, I will tell Members what the Prime Minister expected. I see nods from Conservative Members, but the Prime Minister was very clear about what she expected, and she set it out in her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017:
“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded.”
I repeat:
“I want us to have reached an agreement.”
She continued:
“From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements”.
At the time, I was proposing that that was a transition period, and the Prime Minister and various Secretaries of State for Brexit kept insisting it was not a transition period, because that would imply that we were negotiating in it; instead it was an implementation period, because—[Interruption.] No, this is what they argued. They said that the agreement would have been reached and all we would need to do was implement it—to phase it in—during the two-year period. So the idea that this is as it was always going to be—that a blind Brexit was inevitable or an inherent part of the process—is completely contradicted by the Prime Minister’s own words when she said what was going to be achieved.
There are very serious consequences to having such a flimsy document on the future relationship. First, it invites this House to vote on a blind Brexit. I and other Labour Members have very strong views on what the future relationship should look like. Given a document that does not set out whether it might end up as a distant Canada-style model of some sort, or a closed Norway-style model, how can one expect any responsible Member of this House to say, “I don’t know where this is going to end, I don’t know what it’s going to look like, it could actually turn out to be an agreement I fundamentally disagree with, but I shall vote for it”? That just cannot be right. That is the problem—it is a blind Brexit. Secondly, as I have said, because the document is so thin, nobody serious, either here or in Brussels, is suggesting for one moment that the agreement is actually going to be ready by January 2021.
That means that we are going on to either an extended transition or the backstop. That is going to happen. If anybody is intending to vote next week on the pretence or understanding that we are not going to be here arguing about this in July 2020, I genuinely think they are labouring under a misconception—they are wrong. We will either be going on to the transition or going on to the backstop if the deal goes through in this form. We cannot escape that and simply pretend it is not going to happen.
I have said a few words about the backstop. As the Secretary of State rightly said, it provides for citizens’ rights and financial obligations. I do not shy away from the commitments made under the Good Friday agreement. I certainly have no truck with those who play down the importance of the Good Friday agreement—it is not the Secretary of State, the Government or the Prime Minister—or even say that their version of hard Brexit somehow overrides it. Those commitments are serious, and they have to be kept.
I also accept that, given the lack of progress in the 26-page document that we have, at this stage, sadly, some sort of backstop is inevitable. Having got to this stage of the article 50 exercise, it is now inevitable that we cannot finish the exercise within the transition period. There are risks under the backstop, and the Attorney General’s advice, which we fought to uncover last year, set them out pretty starkly. There is the fraught question of whether the backstop would, in truth, be indefinite or temporary. We can have views on that, but we cannot avoid the fact that it is a live dispute, and the Attorney General gave his view on that.
It is also indisputable that once we are in the backstop, if that is what happens in January 2021, it will introduce barriers to trade between England, Wales and Scotland and the EU. That is spelled out in the document. We are putting up barriers to trade in January 2021 if we go into the backstop. I have already touched on the inadequacy of the proposed customs arrangements.
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that intervention, which builds on our previous exchange. I agree; this is in relation to the final advice about the interpretation of the proposed withdrawal agreement and in particular any backstop arrangement that may be put in place.
I am deeply unclear—are you asking for publication of the final advice or of any legal advice in full that has happened during the entire negotiation? [Interruption.] With due respect, I am being asked for my vote regarding the motion on the Order Paper. Are you asking for what is on the Order Paper, which is,
“any legal advice in full”—
that is, during the whole negotiation? Are you asking me to vote in—
No, I will not. I have barely started responding to the hon. Lady’s last intervention.
I have set out clearly three times—not for the sake of an intervention, where there is an element of deliberately not listening, but for the benefit of the House—precisely what we are asking for, and I do not think I could be any clearer.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that intervention. I will come to that, because I am coming to the detail now and I will go through it.
I turn to the facilitated customs union arrangement, because it demonstrates how unworkable the White Paper is. It is based on the idea that traders can reliably distinguish at the border between goods intended for the UK and goods intended for the EU. Paragraph 16a of the White Paper says that
“where a good reaches the UK border, and the destination can be robustly demonstrated by a trusted trader, it will pay the UK tariff if it is destined for the UK and the EU tariff if it is destined for the EU.”
The idea is that, at the border, someone can safely distinguish between goods that are going on to the EU and those that are not and then apply different tariffs and regimes to them. Whatever “robustly demonstrated” means is not set out, but it is a complicated two-tier system, which is why business has been so concerned about it. It involves the idea that we will account to the EU for the tariffs that are collected. If the destination of goods is not known, the higher tariff is paid at the border and recouped at some later stage. That is a hugely complicated two-tier system, with a third system overlaid for goods the destiny of which is not known.
I have heard it said that, happily, for 96% of goods, the destiny will be known on the border. The reference for that is footnote 6 on page 17 of the White Paper. I do not know whether the Secretary of State has chased that footnote, but I have. I challenge him to explain on some occasion—now, if he can—how that 96% figure is arrived at, because it is not at all clear from that footnote. However, the important point is this: whether it is 96%, or some lesser percentage, there will need to be checks to ensure the integrity of the system and to avoid abuse.
The solution that the Government have put forward is the tracking mechanism that was floated last summer. It is an interesting idea; it is a shame that it does not yet exist. It is no good Ministers on the Front Bench shaking their heads. If the position is that there will be no checking at all after the event to see whether the right tariff was indeed paid, to avoid abuse or to protect the integrity of the scheme, I will let the Secretary of State intervene on me to say that the proposal is that, as goods pass the border, that is it—no check. If that is not the case, he must accept that, as with any system, whatever the percentage rightly designated or not at the border, there will have to be tracking systems to check that the correct tariff was paid; otherwise, it is very obviously open to gross abuse.
This time last week I met Members of the European Parliament, including one from the Socialist group who explained to me that a senior member of the Labour party had addressed their group and, in the words of that parliamentarian, effectively they had been discouraged from giving the UK too good a deal because it would encourage other countries to Brexit themselves. Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm whether he or any other Opposition Front Bencher has indeed addressed the Socialist parliamentary group of the European Parliament, and can he confirm that if and when negotiations are concluded along the lines of the White Paper, he will encourage people to vote for it in the best interests of our country?
I am grateful for that intervention. I have made many, many trips to Brussels. I have had many discussions with political parties across all of the EU27 countries, and I have never, on any occasion, sought to undermine the Government in any of those discussions. I made that commitment to the former Secretary of State when he started his role and when I started my role. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing in what the hon. Lady has said.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do agree, and that is a very important point. Essentially, the OBR is saying that it cannot do its job because it does not have the information to do it. That is why it is far better to proceed on the basis of assessments of risk and impact, and to allow the OBR to do its job.
I will give way in one minute, but may I just finish this point?
Having been a civil servant for five years and having engaged in risk assessments, I can say that the purpose of the exercise is to identify the risk, the size of the risk, and the likelihood of the risk. The fourth column, which is always the really important one, is what the Government will do to mitigate the risk. That is why these risk assessments are so important.
I thank the shadow Secretary of State for giving way. I agree with him on the important work of the civil service. Many real stakeholders, including the digital industry, the banking industry and the legal services industry, have come to me this week to say what a good job our civil service is doing in preparing for the Brexit negotiations. My understanding of this paper is that it suggests that the no-deal scenario is not very attractive and that cutting and pasting the Canada or the Norway deal is also not very attractive, but that is not what the Government are proposing. Does he not agree that it would be better if our Ministers got out of this House and on with their work to deliver a better deal?
I am grateful for that intervention. The hon. Lady will remember that one question I asked of the Minister yesterday was whether the model that the Government are pursuing has also been subjected to an impact assessment. I did not actually get any of the questions that I asked—about six—answered or even addressed by the Minister yesterday. I hope that some of them might be addressed later on today.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will press on. I know that Members want to intervene, but I heard what you said, Mr Speaker, about the number of Members who want to make speeches. I will take interventions at intervals, if that is satisfactory to the House.
Clause 7, “Dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal”, takes the same approach as clause 9, as does clause 8, “Complying with international obligations”. All those provisions are channelled into the negative procedure with the least possible scrutiny: they constitute a giant sidestep from parliamentary scrutiny on the most important issues of our day. But let me top it off. If you think that is bad—and I do—try clause 17. Subsection (1) states:
“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate in consequence of this Act.”
So anything in consequence of the Act can be done under clause 17. Again, this is a proper, robust Henry VIII provision. Let us look at subsection (2). It states:
“The power to make regulations under subsection (1) may…be exercised by modifying any provision made by or under an enactment.”
That means amending primary legislation. In case anyone is in doubt, subsection (3) states:
“In subsection (2) “enactment” does not include primary legislation passed or made after the end of the Session in which this Act is passed.”
So the Government can amend any legislation whatsoever—primary legislation—including legislation in this Session. Everything in the Queen’s Speech that is coming down the track could be amended by delegated legislation under clause 17. I have never come across such a wide power, although I have come across consequential powers. The Secretary of State will no doubt point to other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers; I have looked at them, but I have never seen one as wide as this.
Members should not just take my word for it. A minute ago, the Secretary of State said that no one could suggest that this was a legislative blank cheque for the Government. Let me read out what has been said by the Hansard Society—not a political body, not the Opposition, but the Hansard Society—about clause 17.
“Such an extensive power is hedged in by the fact that any provision must somehow relate to withdrawal from the EU, but given that this will arguably extend to every facet of national life, if granted it would, in effect, hand the government a legislative blank cheque.”
Those are the words of the Hansard Society.
I will complete this part of my presentation, if I may.
What is the scope and extent of that legislative blank cheque? How many pieces of delegated legislation are we concerned with? As the Secretary of State said, the White Paper suggested that there would be between 800 and 1,000, the vast majority of which would be dealt with via the negative procedure route. I do not think that the White Paper could, or did, take into account the further instruments necessary to implement the withdrawal agreement, but there could be very many more—well over 1,000 pieces of delegated legislation, given the least possible scrutiny.
I will complete this point, and then I will give way.
I was glad to see that the Prime Minister was here earlier. Yesterday, during Prime Minister’s Question Time, she told the House that “the approach”—the Government’s approach to the Bill—
“has been endorsed by the House of Lords Constitution Committee.” —[Official Report, 6 September 2017; Vol. 628, c. 148.]
I read the report again last night, and I have doubts about that endorsement.
When I have finished this point.
As the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State will know, this morning the House of Lords published a further report on the Bill, which reached the following conclusion:
“The executive powers conferred by the Bill are unprecedented and extraordinary and raise fundamental constitutional questions about the separation of powers between Parliament and Government.”
The report—published by the Committee that the Prime Minister prayed in aid yesterday—went on to say:
“The number, range and overlapping nature of the broad delegated powers…would fundamentally challenge the constitutional balance of powers between Parliament and Government and would represent a significant—and unacceptable—transfer of legal competence.”
Far from being an endorsement, that is an explicit and damning criticism of the Government’s approach.
If it did not come under clause 9, it would certainly come under clause 17.
I give way, and I apologise for giving way to the two Members in the wrong order.
As a new Member, I also looked at advice on how Parliament has looked at statutory instruments, and I, too, saw that the last time such instruments were annulled by this House was back in 1979. The issue then was the cost of paraffin, and I remember 1979 and the high cost of fuel; it was a significant issue. However, given that the Secretary of State has said in response to the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) that he is prepared to consider a sifting process, which means serious issues do come back to this House, what is the right hon. and learned hon. Gentleman’s alternative—what is he proposing?
It is not as if this point is being made for the first time today: these are the points that have been made since the White Paper was published—the moment we dealt with it. That was in March, the Bill was published in July, and there have been numerous reports since then, and I raised at the time the significant issues I am raising now, and there has been no move from the Government.