European Union (Withdrawal) Act Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateKeir Starmer
Main Page: Keir Starmer (Labour - Holborn and St Pancras)Department Debates - View all Keir Starmer's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure finally to be able to resume this debate.
Thirty days ago, on 10 December, the Prime Minister told the House that the meaningful vote would be deferred. She did, of course, do so without consulting the House on the issue. The ground that she laid out on 10 December was that if the Government
“went ahead and held the vote”,
which was due to take place the next day,
“the deal would be rejected by a significant margin.” —[Official Report, 10 December 2018; Vol. 651, c. 23.]
That was her judgment call. She said that she would do everything possible “to secure further assurances”, particularly over the issue of the Northern Ireland backstop.
The Leader of the House went further, saying:
“going back to the EU and seeking reassurances, in the form of legally binding reassurances”
was
“absolutely doing the right thing”.
The implication was that this was a pause to allow further assurances—legally binding reassurances, according to the Leader of the House. The International Trade Secretary, with his usual foresight, said:
“It is very difficult to support the deal if we don’t get changes to the backstop.
I am not even sure the Cabinet will agree for it to be put to the House of Commons.”
That was his assessment.
Those were senior members of the Cabinet, indicating to Parliament and to the country that the deal, the proposition before the House, needed to be changed if it were to be voted on and not defeated by a substantial majority. They were, of course, challenged. They were challenged on the basis that this was just a way of delaying and avoiding a humiliating defeat, and they were running down the clock. Now, 30 days on, those rebuttals ring hollow.
The Prime Minister is often mocked for saying that nothing has changed, but this time nothing has changed. The proposition before the House today is the same proposition as the one that the Prime Minister put before the House on 5 December, when she opened the initial debate. I have my own copies of these two documents, but the two copies that I have here were laid on the Table at the beginning of the debate. They are the proposition that is before the House, and, as everyone in the House knows, they are precisely the same two documents that were put before the House on 5 December. When we go through the Lobby next Tuesday, we will be voting for or against these two unchanged documents.
Given that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just picked up the withdrawal deal, I am sure that, being the learned gentleman he is, he has read, on page 307, the guarantee and the protection for the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—and the consent principle. Twenty years ago, his party, the Labour party, was the architect—thank the Lord—of that agreement, which put an end to the appalling violence of more than 30 years in Northern Ireland, when 302 police officers lost their lives and thousands of innocent people lost theirs in the terrorist campaign. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain to the House, and to the Irish diaspora in Labour constituencies, how it is that the Labour party is voting down a deal that guarantees the agreement?
Let me take that point head on, because it is very important. Our party—both parties—played an important part in the peace process, and I genuinely think that there is a consensus, or a near-consensus, across the House on the importance of that agreement. We have been very proud of upholding it. Even in the course of these debates over the last two years, every time it has come up there has been a reiteration of the principles. I myself worked in Northern Ireland for five years, with the Policing Board, implementing some of the recommendations of the Good Friday agreement, and I therefore have first-hand knowledge of how both communities see it, what the impact was before change, and what it is now. However, I do not think it fair to characterise anyone who says that these two documents are not the right deal for our country as undermining the Good Friday agreement. That simply means that there can be no criticism, no issue, no challenge to the Government, which cannot be right.
In addition, I have stood at this Dispatch Box and moved amendment after amendment whose objective was a customs union and a single market deal, which I genuinely believe constitute the only way of securing no hard border in Northern Ireland. On every occasion, the Government voted those amendments down. To say at this stage that we have tried to do nothing to protect the position is simply not right. [Interruption.] I will come to the issue of the need for a backstop—I will tackle that issue—but I wanted to deal with the intervention.
I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has answered the key question asked by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). I cannot understand why the Labour party is joining in the criticisms of the Irish backstop. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has repeated his commitment to a permanently open border. He has also repeated—and I agree with him about this—that there can only be a permanently open border if there is a customs union and regulatory alignment. If they are to be permanent, that must be kept permanently.
What the critics on this side of the House are saying about the backstop agreement is “We are not allowed to cancel it unilaterally.” If they are given that power, it is no longer a permanently open border. With the greatest respect, it does smack of opportunism that the Labour party is joining opponents of the backstop with whom it has no agreement whatever politically. The answer is to have the same open border for the whole United Kingdom and for the United Kingdom to be in a single market and regulatory alignment, and that is not inconsistent with the referendum.
That suggests that the customs arrangements under the backstop are the same as customs arrangements that we have currently, but they are not. I have read the document in detail several times, and I know what the customs union that we are in looks like and I know that the one under the backstop is fundamentally different. It is fundamentally different from the amendments that we have been faithfully tabling for 12 or 18 months. It is therefore unfair to say that because it is called a “customs arrangement” or a “customs union” that it is all the same; it obviously is not. The arrangements for Northern Ireland are different from those for England, Wales and Scotland, and even the arrangements for England, Wales and Scotland are not the same as the customs union that we are in now.
Among the deficiencies is that we would not have any say over future trade agreements during any period in the backstop, which has not been built in because the Government are pretending that any period would not last long. I will address the point about having a say, but we would not be able to strike our own agreements and would take no advantages from trade agreements struck by the EU. That is a fundamental deficiency of being in the backstop. It is not right or fair to pretend that such issues do not exist, that we cannot seriously engage with them, or that the importance that the Labour party puts in the Good Friday agreement is somehow undermined. That just removes the ability to challenge. The withdrawal agreement is a serious document, and it is what the Government have put before us to analyse and vote on, so we are entitled to say that it is not good enough. However, that does not mean in the next breath that we do not stick by the commitments in the Good Friday agreement.
I will make some progress and then take further interventions.
The withdrawal agreement is the same document that was before the House when the Prime Minister announced that she was postponing the vote. It is the proposition that she said she thought would be defeated by a significant margin. No changes have been made either to the 585-page, legally binding withdrawal agreement or to the incredibly vague political declaration. There is no new text for this House to consider.
Some of us expected the Prime Minister to make a statement on Monday to tell the House what had happened while we were in recess, to update us on any meetings or discussions that she may have had—we read about them in the press—and to say whether anything had changed. She did not come to make a statement. The Brexit Secretary handled an urgent question, the central thrust of which was about what progress had been made and what changes there had been. The Brexit Secretary defended his position with a smile, attacking the Opposition, as he always does, by asking, “What’s your proposition?” while ignoring the fact that we are voting on the withdrawal agreement, not on what anyone else is saying. He smiled, attacked the Opposition and swerved challenges, but he did not answer the question, and the reason why is that there has been no meaningful change.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I will just make this point and then give way.
I was here for Prime Minister’s questions today, and I carefully noted what the Prime Minister said in answer to the first question from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. First, she said that the changes that she is now relying on are the results of the December European Council summit, at which the EU agreed that it would use “its best endeavours” to secure the future relationship as quickly as possible. What else could it say? Of course, we would hope that it would do that. However, the EU also said at the same summit that the withdrawal agreement cannot be renegotiated, so that does not take us very far.
Secondly, the Prime Minister said that further clarifications might be “possible” by Tuesday, so we are in exactly the same position as we were on 10 December, with a hope for possible assurances—there may be something coming.
Thirdly, the Prime Minister referred to the paper on Northern Ireland published this morning, and the Brexit Secretary referred to it, too. Members may not have had the chance to read this 13-page document, but I have read it. I do not dismiss anything that marks a step towards ensuring that the concerns in Northern Ireland and across the whole United Kingdom are addressed, whatever they are, so I am not dismissing this document. However, on my reading—if I am wrong, I will correct this or be corrected—I think I am right in saying that the document does not contain any new commitments. It brings together the unilateral commitments made in other places at other times into one document. I have been going through the document as I have been in the Chamber, so if I am wrong, I will be challenged but, as far as I can see, it just builds on the unilateral commitments in paragraph 50 of the phase 1 joint report document from December 2017 and adds the commitments that the Prime Minister has made in Belfast and other places. I am not saying that those commitments are not important or are without significance. I do not dismiss them, but we need to see the document for what it is, which is a bringing together of existing commitments. The position has not changed between 10 December and today.
The fourth thing that has been relied upon as a change that the House needs to take into account is that it is now said that Parliament will have a role in July 2020 when we must choose whether to apply for an extension of the transition or to go on to the backstop. There are several points about that, one of which is that it does not change the options, and I will develop why I think that those options will have to be exercised. Arguably, it is the logic of the article 50 case in the Supreme Court, certainly if we go on to the backstop, because the whole argument in the Supreme Court was that if we change the rights of individuals in this country as a matter of international law then we have to have a vote in this House, so I am not sure that this is much of a gift or concession from the Government.
The other point is the practical reality, which we have seen today and yesterday: the idea that the Prime Minister or anybody else was going to get away with freezing Parliament out of that decision in July 2020 is misconceived. We were always going to have a say on that, because it is such an important position. So the proposition on the table is not altered. The Brexit Secretary did not answer substantively on Monday because the December summit does not really take us anywhere: further clarifications may be possible but they are still long awaited, the Northern Ireland paper is a bringing together of existing commitments that does not change anything, and Parliament was always going to find a way of having a say in July 2020 as to which option we take.
I promised earlier to take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), so I will give way to him first.
I concur with my right hon. and learned Friend that nothing has changed. Does he therefore agree that the Prime Minister’s decision to delay was not only wrong, but irresponsible, because on every single day that has gone by during that time we have seen the Treasury spending more and more taxpayers’ money to prepare for a no deal that it says it does not want, businesses cancelling investment plans, and jobs being put at risk? All of that is deeply irresponsible, particularly when nothing has changed.
I agree with that, because if the Prime Minister’s own judgment is right that this deal as it was on 10 December is likely to go down by a significant margin, that brings into sharp focus the role of this House in debating and deciding what happens next, and the more time we have for that, the better. We have just been deprived of 30 days of that because we will not now get on to it, probably, until next week.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has listed a series of things that have not changed. One thing that I note has not changed are the terms of his and the Leader of the Opposition’s amendment in calling for
“a permanent UK-EU customs union”,
a perfectly clear phrase that we all understand completely, and a “strong single market deal”. I am one of those in this House who would like in some way or another at some point or another in the not too distant days to arrive at some cross-party agreement about something we could actually go forward with, and therefore I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to explain to the House what kind of “strong single market deal” would need to be delivered in order to get an agreement.
I can deal with that because, as Members know, I have been talking to the EU and the EU27 for quite a long time now, not to undermine the Government’s position—it was actually facilitated by the first Brexit Secretary of State in some respects—but to explore what other options are possible. At present the customs union operates on the basis that the Council sets the mandate for the Commission, the Commission does the negotiating, and Parliament then has a role. So if we want a customs union that replicates the benefits of the current customs union and we want the UK to have a say in that we must find something that is similar to that, but obviously not the same as it, and the central question I have been addressing is whether the EU would be interested in a discussion about what that sort of working customs union would look like. [Interruption.] I actually had the discussion. [Interruption.] It is very easy for Members on the Treasury Bench to chunter, but I have been responsible and actually gone and had the conversation asking whether there is a basis for a discussion about a customs union that would work in that way. I have been very clear that if it ended up as something akin to the Turkey customs union—which works for Turkey—that really would not be good enough.
As for a single market deal, my own view is that there are advantages in what we call the Norway model but that there are also disadvantages in that, and therefore it must be possible—again, I have had discussions—to explore a close economic relationship that keeps alignment, with, of course, oversight and enforcement mechanisms to go with it, but which is not simply the EEA.
I say all that in some detail in order to reassure the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) that when we talk about a close economic relationship, a customs union with a say, and a close single market deal, we are talking about concepts that I have surfaced only after I have had discussions with EU27 countries and the EU about their possibility. I am not going to stand here and pretend that that will be easy; rather, I am standing here saying that we have been pressing for at least 12 or 18 months to have that. One of the major problems—this is at the heart of the debate and the fractiousness about it—is that the Prime Minister and the Government have pushed Parliament away. They had a choice—
I will give way in a moment, but I want to make this point because it is very important.
I campaigned to remain; I wanted to remain.
I agonised over whether we should trigger article 50, but I worked out that, having accepted the result of the referendum, it was not open to me to stop the Prime Minister starting the negotiations. What I wanted is for this House to have a proper role—by consensus, or at least by majority, if possible—in finding a way forward.
It was obvious that the sorts of arguments that are happening in the House, particularly among Conservative Members, if I may say so—I do not think that is controversial—would break out. It was obvious because for 30 years there has been a discussion, for want of a better word, in the Conservative party about not just the relationship with Europe but the vision for our country. That argument was always going to break out, and it was always going to divide Conservative Members. That is obvious, and it is not just an Opposition point. In those circumstances, a different Prime Minister might have said, “I can see what is going to happen down the line, and I need to bring Parliament into this.” That has been refused at every twist and turn.
Let us be honest that we are having a vote on Tuesday only because we fought to have it. I coined the phrase “meaningful vote”, and, working across parties, we got the amendment, which was resisted by the Government. They went through the Lobby to say no. We said, “You have to publish a plan,” and the only reason we got a plan was that we won an Opposition day motion—the Government were going to oppose that motion. We said that we wanted to know what the impact would be, and the Government said, “You can’t.” We had to get it via a Humble Address. We have seen the Supreme Court and the idea of even voting on article 50 in the first place, and then the Attorney General’s advice. The Government have persistently voted down every motion. The one thing I remember the first Brexit Secretary saying to me, over and again, on the article 50 Bill was that he wanted a clean Bill: “I want a clean Bill, and I will make sure that every amendment is voted down.” That was his avowed aim.
I completely accept the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s central point, which is that there is space for completely honourable debate within and between political parties in this House about the outcome of the negotiations on the future permanent relationship between this country and the EU27, and the various options, from Norway to Canada and every variation in between, have their champions in this place. But from his conversations with the EU institutions and with members of the 27 Governments, surely he will have accepted that the essential and unavoidable gateway to any such destination of a final agreement has to be the withdrawal agreement, which covers citizens’ rights, the Irish border and the financial settlement, which is the key document that we are being asked to endorse and ratify. What is his objection to that document?
I accept that there has to be a withdrawal agreement, and I accept that it has to cover citizens’ rights and that there are payments. I have on more than one occasion stood here and said that the progress on citizens’ rights under the withdrawal agreement is a step in the right direction, although it does not go far enough—we have quibbled about that, but there will always be an argument about whether we have gone far enough.
I have also stood here and said that we will have to fulfil our financial obligations, for the very reason the Brexit Secretary said, which is that we will not get very far in trying to reach trade agreements, or any agreements, with anybody else on the international plane if, at the same time, we are walking away from the international agreements or obligations that we have.
That does not mean I do not have concerns about the withdrawal agreement, and about the backstop in particular. The backstop has become the central issue for two reasons: first, the lack of progress on the future relationship, and I will develop that point in just a moment; and, secondly, the avowed aim of some Conservative Members to diverge as far as possible from EU alignment. It is that fear that has driven the debate on the backstop, and it could have been avoided months ago.
I am doubly grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way again. It is helpful to address this point after the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office.
Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman take this one stage further? If there were a cross-party agreement on the terms of an EU-UK customs union of the kind he describes, and if there were some variant of a “strong single market deal”—whether Norwegian or otherwise—is he saying it is the position of the Labour party that it would then co-operate with Her Majesty’s Government to arrive at an agreement about how to reshape the political declaration in such a way as to enable the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration to go forward so that we can exit on 29 March?
There is the customs union point and the single market deal point, and there are other issues relating to rights and protections, whether they are workplace rights or environmental rights and so on. Obviously, at some stage, if we are to leave other than without a deal, there has to be a consensus in this House for something. That is why the wasting of the past 30 days has been so regrettable, because that is where we need to get to. At no point have the Government reached out across the House at all, even after the snap election. I actually personally thought that at some stage somebody might give me a ring and ask what would be the main features that we could at least begin to discuss, or whether it was worth even having a discussion about them.
The second point gives meat to this. Time and again we have tabled amendments along the lines I have been talking about, and time and again the Government have just blindly whipped against them, without any regard to whether they were good, bad or indifferent; they were just Opposition amendments, so they were going down.
We know from the author of article 50 that it was drafted with the intention that it should never be used, so 29 March is an arbitrary date. It is only now that the Government have started to reach out and indicate that they might be willing to discuss Brexit with other parties in this House in order to get consensus, but we have run out of time. Surely the Government now have to listen and consider the fact that we may have to suspend article 50, or even to seek its revocation.
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I do accuse the Government of running down the clock, and it is a serious allegation. The article 50 window is two years—it is very short. The Government started the two years by having a snap general election, and lost two or three months. They then went through to the end of the phase 1 agreement, but it was not until June last year that we even had a Chequers plan, so the two-year window has in effect been run down. There is a question of the extension of article 50, which may well be inevitable now, given the position that we are in, but of course we can only seek it, because the other 27 have to agree.
The other serious question with which I have been engaging is about the appetite of the EU, after the negotiations have gone the way they have, to start again and to fundamentally change what is on the table. I have to say, with regret, that I genuinely think that the way the Government have gone about the negotiations, particularly in respect of the red lines that the Prime Minister laid down in the first place, has undermined a lot of the good will that would otherwise have been there.
I will give way once more and then I really am going to get on, because I have been giving way for around half an hour.
This is my last intervention. To go back to the intervention by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), which was pertinent to the situation we are all in, he asked whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying on behalf of the Labour party that, if there were a cross-party agreement on a form of customs union, sufficient regulatory alignment and so on, his party would join in that positively, with a view to reaching a solution and moving on to the serious negotiations. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has turned that question into an attack on the Government, and I agree with him. I share his criticism that the Government should have made serious overtures to the Opposition long, long ago; but as we are now so short of time and we are all in danger of going towards a no-deal exit, which only a small minority in the House positively wants, is it not time for him to answer the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset? Is the Labour party available for discussions with a positive view to reaching a conclusion on a customs union and sufficient regulatory alignment to keep open borders?
I have been available for discussions for the whole time I have been in this post. I have spoken to Members on all Benches about amendments, some of which have had cross-party support. We are going to have to have a discussion—I think starting after Tuesday—about where we go next. We will all have to enter that in the right spirit, because I genuinely think that leaving with no deal would be catastrophic. I also genuinely think that we cannot do it on 29 March this year; it is simply not viable for so many practical reasons. We are going to have to look at what available options are realistically still on the table and what now are the merits of each of them. There are different options; we are just discussing one of them. There are other options that I know members in my own party feel very strongly about, such as a public vote. But we are going to have to sit down and consider credibly what are the options and how Parliament takes control of what happens next. We will enter that in the right spirit, but we will all have to acknowledge, I am afraid, that some of the options that may have been there a year or two ago are not there in the same shape and form as they would have been at the time of the manifestos.
No, I really am going to make some progress now because I have been giving in—hopefully, I have been giving way, though I may have been giving in as well!
I have made the point about this being the same proposition on the table, but let me just go to the heart of the problem of why we are so stuck on this question of the backstop on which I have been challenged. At the heart of the problem is the future relationship document. The truth is that there has been barely any progress on the future relationship. It is a flimsy 26-page document. In truth, it is an options paper—a 26-page options paper—which could and should have been written two years ago. Paragraph 28—I know that everyone has marked it up, but it is worth having another look at—covers the implications for checks and controls. This is the future relationship. It says:
“The Parties envisage that the extent of the United Kingdom’s commitments on customs and regulatory cooperation, including with regard to alignment of rules, would be taken into account in the application of related checks and controls, considering this as a factor in reducing risk.”
It then goes on to say that there is a “spectrum of different outcomes”. What it is saying is that we do not know yet what the commitments on customs and co-operation will be. We do not know what the alignment will be. If it is close it might lead to one result; if it is not close it might lead to another result—a spectrum of different outcomes.
The document has 26 pages, at the heart of which is a “spectrum of different outcomes”. We keep calling it a deal, but this is not a deal; it is an options paper. It is an options paper that has been written by others. We have all mocked up an options paper, as have various academics. Let me contrast this with what the previous Brexit Secretary, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), said. We were challenging him over the summer about the future relationship and trying to get an assurance from him that we would have a precise and detailed document that we could vote on so we know where we are going. He said this:
“What is important is that it is clear and specific enough”—
the future relationship document—
“that we are not talking about options for negotiations”—
that is what it would not be—
“but we are clear on the choice of model”—
so it is a clear model that he said we would have—
“and therefore that it reads as a direction for the UK and the EU to get on with it—that we are really implementing heads of terms for an agreement.”
This is miles away from that. This is not a deal, and that is the cause of the problem.
The cause of the problem is this: whatever the Secretary of State says, nobody but nobody who is serious about this thinks for one moment that this document will turn into the future relationship and come into force on 1 January 2021. Nobody credible thinks that. It is a complete myth. It is precisely the same as the myth that this would all have been negotiated by now, which is why there is such anxiety about the backstop. The backstop should never have been the driving force—the focus. We should have been so far advanced in this part of the negotiation that the backstop would have been a bit of a non-issue.
I just want to make this point. We need to understand why this document is so flimsy. It is not just an accident. It is not just that people were not working hard. It is not just that the civil servants, who have worked really hard in all this, were not doing their job. It is for two primary reasons.
The first was that the Prime Minister laid down her red lines in autumn 2016 without consulting the House and, I think, without consulting the Cabinet. She said that those red lines were: outside the customs union, outside the single market and no role for the European Court of Justice. She added the suggestion that
“if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere.”
That was an interpretation of the referendum—we can argue whether it was a good or bad one—by a small team of, I think, three of four people. That was not even the interpretation of the Cabinet, and certainly not of this House. We only have 26 pages on the future relationship, because that got us off to the worst possible start to the negotiations. Those were political choices, not necessities. They were the Prime Minister’s choices, which set her on a path, and this is where it ended.
Add to that the fact that we only got the Chequers proposal in June last year. Anybody who visited Brussels between the triggering of article 50 and June 2018 will have heard the same complaint that I heard: “We don’t know what the UK is actually asking for, and therefore we can’t really advance the negotiations.” When we first got the Chequers proposal in June last year, those in Brussels acknowledged that at least there was now a plan on the table. Of course, Chequers did not unlock the problem, because it was a plan that led immediately to Cabinet resignations, that MPs were quick to say they opposed and would not agree to in any circumstances, and that the EU rejected. That is why there are only 26 pages, which expose the thinness of the proposals.
I will just crack on.
What we see from this document is that the envisaged future relationship will not deliver frictionless trade; it does not aspire to any more. There is no plan for a permanent customs union and no certainty for financial services. In fact, there is almost nothing for financial services. On workplace rights and environmental protections, there is nothing to ensure that standards do not fall behind over time. No wonder the general secretary of the TUC said:
“This is a bad deal for working people: bad for jobs and bad for rights.”
It also places us outside a whole raft of common EU programmes and agencies. Again, much of that flows directly from the Prime Minister’s insistence that there should be no role whatever for the European Court. She put that red line down, and once she had done so, any meaningful participation in those bodies became very difficult.
For five years, I was the representative of the UK in Eurojust, which, as the House will know, plays an important part in the investigation and prosecution of very serious offences across Europe, as do other agencies. In order to have the full participation that makes sense, we have to accept the oversight and enforcement mechanisms that go with it, but the red line made it impossible and led to such a thin document as this.
I have heard colleagues ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman repeatedly about the Labour party’s proposals and whether it would work on a cross-party basis. He indicated at the Dispatch Box that he would enter into cross-party discussions. Is he speaking for the Labour party or as an individual, and what proposals does he have?
I have to say that I love this. We are voting on the Government’s deal, but Members are attacking the Labour party’s plan. Well, that makes a lot of sense. Whatever else we are going to do next Tuesday, we are not going to vote on our plan. Let us be serious.
The hon. Gentleman asked me a question and I am answering him. Whether we like it or not, the Government’s deal is what we are voting on. We are not voting on what any one of us may think, say or do. Having not made any attempt to engage seriously with the Opposition on amendments and proposals, it is a bit rich for Government Members to now say that it is somehow the Opposition’s fault that the Government are in a mess and cannot get their deal through. I gently say that there is huge interest in what the Opposition think. Why? Because, in an ordinary set of proceedings and absent the snap general election, there would be a majority on the Government Benches for the Government’s own proposition. This challenge needs to be put in its proper context: it is because Conservative Members know full well that they are not all going into the same Lobby.
If anyone wants to intervene on me and say that the Conservatives are all going into the same Lobby, they can, but I do not think that is the case. The point is that the Government are so divided that they cannot get their own deal through. That is the truth of the matter.
Order. I am well aware that the hon. Lady is a former chair of the Internal Market Committee of the European Parliament. In case there are people present who were not aware of that, among the litany of achievements that she can proclaim, I have done a public service in advertising that important fact. However, it does not give her an automatic right to intervene. The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) will decide whether he wishes to give way to the hon. Lady, and at the moment he is not giving way.
I am not going to give way.
It is no good us pretending about this. I have said in recent weeks and months that the future relationship document is 26 pages long and that it is thin and flimsy, and the answer that now comes back occasionally is, “It was always going to be that way. What did you expect? It’s a future relationship.” Well, I will tell Members what the Prime Minister expected. I see nods from Conservative Members, but the Prime Minister was very clear about what she expected, and she set it out in her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017:
“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded.”
I repeat:
“I want us to have reached an agreement.”
She continued:
“From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements”.
At the time, I was proposing that that was a transition period, and the Prime Minister and various Secretaries of State for Brexit kept insisting it was not a transition period, because that would imply that we were negotiating in it; instead it was an implementation period, because—[Interruption.] No, this is what they argued. They said that the agreement would have been reached and all we would need to do was implement it—to phase it in—during the two-year period. So the idea that this is as it was always going to be—that a blind Brexit was inevitable or an inherent part of the process—is completely contradicted by the Prime Minister’s own words when she said what was going to be achieved.
There are very serious consequences to having such a flimsy document on the future relationship. First, it invites this House to vote on a blind Brexit. I and other Labour Members have very strong views on what the future relationship should look like. Given a document that does not set out whether it might end up as a distant Canada-style model of some sort, or a closed Norway-style model, how can one expect any responsible Member of this House to say, “I don’t know where this is going to end, I don’t know what it’s going to look like, it could actually turn out to be an agreement I fundamentally disagree with, but I shall vote for it”? That just cannot be right. That is the problem—it is a blind Brexit. Secondly, as I have said, because the document is so thin, nobody serious, either here or in Brussels, is suggesting for one moment that the agreement is actually going to be ready by January 2021.
That means that we are going on to either an extended transition or the backstop. That is going to happen. If anybody is intending to vote next week on the pretence or understanding that we are not going to be here arguing about this in July 2020, I genuinely think they are labouring under a misconception—they are wrong. We will either be going on to the transition or going on to the backstop if the deal goes through in this form. We cannot escape that and simply pretend it is not going to happen.
I have said a few words about the backstop. As the Secretary of State rightly said, it provides for citizens’ rights and financial obligations. I do not shy away from the commitments made under the Good Friday agreement. I certainly have no truck with those who play down the importance of the Good Friday agreement—it is not the Secretary of State, the Government or the Prime Minister—or even say that their version of hard Brexit somehow overrides it. Those commitments are serious, and they have to be kept.
I also accept that, given the lack of progress in the 26-page document that we have, at this stage, sadly, some sort of backstop is inevitable. Having got to this stage of the article 50 exercise, it is now inevitable that we cannot finish the exercise within the transition period. There are risks under the backstop, and the Attorney General’s advice, which we fought to uncover last year, set them out pretty starkly. There is the fraught question of whether the backstop would, in truth, be indefinite or temporary. We can have views on that, but we cannot avoid the fact that it is a live dispute, and the Attorney General gave his view on that.
It is also indisputable that once we are in the backstop, if that is what happens in January 2021, it will introduce barriers to trade between England, Wales and Scotland and the EU. That is spelled out in the document. We are putting up barriers to trade in January 2021 if we go into the backstop. I have already touched on the inadequacy of the proposed customs arrangements.
I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen the article written over the weekend by Peter Hain and Paul Murphy—both former distinguished Members of this House and Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland who played an important part in the peace process—in which they made the case that the backstop is an important element that we must honour. Has he had an opportunity to reflect on that?
I have read the article, and I reflect on it. I used my words carefully; I said that there are risks in the backstop, which the Attorney General’s advice set out, and they are real risks.
There is a risk that we should not be blind to. The Attorney General spelled out in his advice that the backstop, as a matter of international law, may well be indefinite—he said that it is arguable either way—and that we therefore cannot get out of it unilaterally. We know that, and we have had a discussion about it. However, he went on to say that we cannot get out of it even if the negotiations completely break down and an allegation of bad faith is found. That is not just—
indicated dissent.
He did say that. I flushed that advice out, and I have read it over and over again. It is absolutely clear. The Attorney General says that if an allegation of bad faith is found, the only remedy is to ask the parties to act in good faith. That is spelled out in the advice. I know that the Minister is an honourable man and will concede that. I am not suggesting for a moment that there is bad faith—of course I am not. I do not think that the negotiations have been or will be negotiated in bad faith, but a country ought to pause before it simply says that an international agreement with those sorts of arrangements is to be waved through because we have used so much time up that we cannot do anything else.
The point I was making—I apologise for making it from a sedentary position—is that the Attorney General said that, on the balance of probabilities, the backstop would not be entered into. He also pointed out that it could be challenged legally under European law were it ever to be entered into.
I understand the argument that article 50 can only be a vehicle for a temporary arrangement and not a permanent one. The Attorney General addressed that, and it is obvious to anybody who has read and understood article 50 rightly. However, the point the Attorney General was addressing was the circumstances in which we could bring the backstop to an end once we were in it, as a matter of international law. Whether article 50 permits it or not, or what the Court would do if it were challenged, is an open question.
The Attorney General said that the backstop may be indefinite—he did not say it was indefinite—but he called into question the argument that it will be temporary. I have noticed that the Prime Minister is very careful in the way she puts it: she always says that the backstop is intended to be temporary. I do not think she has ever used any other phrase, presumably because she is bearing in mind what the Attorney General has advised. I am not saying that there does not need to be a backstop or arrangements to protect the Northern Ireland situation, but we cannot simply and casually say that these are matters to which we should not have too much regard. I honestly cannot think of another treaty that the UK has ever entered into that it could not exit in such circumstances. We might say that that is a good thing or a bad thing, but it is a very unusual thing to be doing.
I want to address the notion that rejecting the deal somehow leads to no deal. I have never accepted that, and it is deeply irresponsible of the Government to pretend that this is a binary choice. No Prime Minister has the right to plunge the country into the chaos of no deal simply because the deal has been rejected, or to run down the negotiations. I believe that that view is shared across the House. There is no majority for no deal. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the right hon. Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) and others for the amendment to the Finance Bill that the House passed yesterday. It will not formally prevent no deal, but it will give consequences to a non-endorsed deal.
The amendment is also symbolic, in that it shows that the House will not simply sit by and allow a no-deal exit. I do not think that the Prime Minister would attempt that, because I think she understands that a no-deal exit in March this year is not practically viable. I have been to Dover several times to look at the customs arrangements, and it would be impossible to get from the arrangements as they are today to those that would need to be in place on 29 March in the time available. Whatever anyone else says, it would be impossible to do that. There are plenty of other examples. However, if the Prime Minister attempts a no-deal Brexit, we will fight her tooth and nail every inch of the way.
Every Member of this House has a solemn duty to consider the deal before us—not the deal that the Prime Minister pretends to have negotiated or the deal that she promises to change between now and when we go through the Lobby, but the text before us. Labour is clear that the deal is not in the national interest. It does not come anywhere near to meeting our tests, it will make the country poorer and more divided and it will not protect jobs and the economy. I say that with sadness, because I have shadowed three different Brexit Secretaries, and the fact that we now have a deal that is so demonstrably not uniting the country and not able to command the support of this House is a tragic waste of the two years that have been available for negotiations and a miserable end to this part of the process. We will have to vote on the deal next Tuesday. After that, it will be time for this House to decide what happens next.
Order. The House is now embarking on the resumption of the debate started on 4 December and interrupted. A lot of Members put in to speak on 9 and 10 December, and the order just agreed allows those who have already spoken the possibility of a second speech. I must tell hon. and right hon. Members that if they wish to speak on any of the next four days of debate, they should put their names in to my office, and that they cannot rely on notification that was given a month ago. Apart from anything else, the days have changed and my team cannot be expected to anticipate the thought processes of hon. and right hon. Members, so if people would notify my office, that would be greatly appreciated.