Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Tristram Hunt Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards]

I wish to speak also to amendments 12 and 13 in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), the Leader of the Opposition and his hon. Friends, as well as new clauses 4 and 5. The amendments go to the crux of the Bill—the establishment of a specific period between elections and the date on which we hold the next UK parliamentary elections.

My party is in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, for many of the reasons outlined on Second Reading. A fixed-term Parliament removes a Prime Minister’s ability to seek the dissolution of Parliament for pure political gain, taking away that significant incumbency advantage—more of which later in my speech. It would end speculation about the timing of the next election and a near-obsession with opinion polls and psephologists about when an election might be called. It provides stability for the political programme, as we have found with the One Wales agreement in Wales, a four-year term, where parties understand what can and cannot be achieved within the required legislative time frame—even in our case where the byzantine workings of legislative competence orders have held up the progress of our law-making, denying us prompt action to solve our problems. By providing a settled timetable, fixed-term Parliaments provide a firm basis for electoral administration, taking away the shock of a snap election and giving a more generous timetable to ensure participation in the voting process.

However, I cannot understand the Government’s reasoning behind the insistence on a five-year legislative term, either in this parliamentary term or in the future. To be perfectly honest, there does not seem to be any reason. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government have consistently failed to provide a good reason why the next election should be held in May 2015, not in May 2014. On Second Reading, the Deputy Prime Minister, with bizarre Liberal Democrat logic, presumably taken from a “Focus” leaflet bar graph, claimed that a five-year Parliament would probably amount in practice to a legislative working term of four years. As many hon. Members will already know, the five-year maximum term was implemented in 1911, but even that was introduced with the expectation that the working parliamentary period would probably be four years—a period in which, as Lord Asquith said at the time, a Government had either the political mandate from the previous election or the unwillingness to commit to unpopular decisions ahead of the next election.

Four years—the length of time between elections for the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the London Assembly, the London mayoral elections and local authority, community and even parish council elections in all four parts of the UK—is quite clearly and obviously the norm for the electoral cycle in the nation states.

[Tristram Hunt (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, internationally, the four-year term is pretty much the norm, particularly in Westminster Parliaments? Is he further aware of the academic opinion from Robert Hazell at University College London’s constitution unit to Professor Blackburn, who consistently say that five years is too long and smells like a political fix?

[Jonathan Edwards]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. For every legislature where the Executive is decided from the legislature, the average is four years rather than five.

The only elections that break that cycle in the UK are the European elections. The elections held and the terms that we expect are the same for elections at all levels, so why are the UK Government seeking to introduce a term that is different from all meaningful precedents?

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[Mr Shepherd]

There is a simple amendment which the hon. Gentleman did not table, and which was not discussed in the lengthy and closely read speech of the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards). That amendment would state that the general election must take place on, let us say, the first Thursday in October. That would meet the point for which the hon. Gentleman argued at such great length—that he should not have to deal with the coincidence of elections on the same day. He did not table that simple amendment, however, and as it is not on the amendment paper I cannot speak to it.

I find Professor Blackburn a most interesting speaker on the constitution. In the evidence he gave in a memorandum on electoral law and administration, he makes the following point:

“In the UK, there can be little doubt that the period between general elections should be four years.”

That is what we are debating now, and it is arguable. He continues:

“The proposal for fixed term Parliament as a whole should fit as closely as possible into existing constitutional expectations, and the idea that four years is about the right length of time between elections is very prevalent. It was the period expressly approved of as being normal in practice, when the Parliament Act set the period of five years as a maximum.”

That is a reference back to Asquith. Professor Blackburn goes on to say:

“In an ideal democracy it may be that there should be elections as frequently as possible—even annually as supported by the Chartists in the eighteenth century”.

The hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell), who is present, has tabled an amendment proposing a period of three years, and we could refer back to the Chartists, so it is clear that these arguments were not unfamiliar at different times in the history of this country. There was an argument that we should have annual elections; that was a powerful movement in the early 19th century. It was thought that Parliaments and Governments must not move too far from the opinion of the public and the electorate.

[Tristram Hunt]

Professor Blackburn’s speech is particularly interesting, because he goes on to say—[Interruption.] Well, I will let the hon. Gentleman read it out then, because the key point is in the following paragraph.

[Mr Shepherd]

I have lost my place as a result of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, so let me recap what Professor Blackburn said:

“It was the period expressly approved of as being normal in practice, when the Parliament Act set the period of five years as a maximum. In an ideal democracy it may be that there should be elections as frequently as possible—even annually as supported by the Chartists in the eighteenth century—but a government must be allowed a sufficient period of time in which to put its programme of public policies into effect before submitting its record of achievement, or otherwise, to the voters. Three full legislative sessions, and certainly four, is sufficient for this purpose.”

I believe that that is correct.

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[Austin Mitchell]

I agree entirely. I am sorry to have interrupted my hon. Friend’s intervention with the answer to the question, but that is right. This is an arrangement by two parties seeking to hang together, to bind themselves to each other and to carry on for five years. There is no system of constitutional thought or political theory—it is sheer, simple opportunism.

[Tristram Hunt]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) did not give the key quote from Professor Blackburn, who said:

“It is likely that the Coalition’s concern with concretising its political alliance, and having the longest period possible in which to implement its tax increases and cuts in public expenditure and then recover sufficient popularity in time for its next meeting with the electorate, has affected its judgement in this matter.”

Is it not politics that is driving this rather than any grander constitutional vision?

[Austin Mitchell]

As an ex-academic, I find that the best way of alienating the House is to quote other academics, so may I just say yes to that question and move on?

I was making the point that around the world, the most democratic polities—I gave Australia and New Zealand as the examples—have more frequent and more regular elections. The less democratic polities have longer spaces between elections—witness the French presidential system, where it was seven years, or the old British constitution when it was an oligarchical system with seven-year terms. This is an issue of basic democracy.

The measure is not an attempt to think about the constitution and to reform it along sensible lines; it is a political fix. The Government have just gone for the longest time they think they can possibly get away with. That is it. They want the coalition to be bound together, nailed together and stuck together for five years and they hope that they can do that with this measure. They are entrenching bad practice. Most Governments in this century have gone for shorter terms than sitting out the maximum. As I said earlier, it is only the bad Governments—the failing Governments—who have gone right up to the buffers. Governments who are in a mess cling on because they are deeply unpopular.

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[Mr Harper]

No, I am terribly sorry, but the hon. Gentleman has not been here for the debate, so I am not going to give way to him.

My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) drew attention to one of our arguments about the need for long-term thinking. Many commentators, politicians and members of the public would argue that Governments can be too short-term in their planning and decision making. We want to encourage future Parliaments and Governments to take a long-term view rather than look for short-term advantages. As a number of my hon. Friends have argued, a five-year fixed term would provide the country with a strong and stable Government.

I turn to the amendments in this group. The hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell), who is not in his place, seeks to set the length of Parliaments at three rather than five years. I think perhaps he did himself a disservice when he quoted remarks of his own constituents suggesting that a three-year term was needed so that he might last it, because of his age. I am only repeating what he said; I do not agree with it myself. However, I simply do not agree with his argument. The flaw in it came when he said that the Government parties wanted not a fixed term but a five-year term. However, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is perfectly capable, while the Government retain the confidence of the House, of having a five-year term of office. That has always been the constitutional position, and the Bill is not necessary to ensure it.

[Tristram Hunt]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Harper]

I will, because the hon. Gentleman has been here for the debate.

[Tristram Hunt]

In some of the speeches that we have heard from the Deputy Prime Minister—I understand that he is giving one to the Hansard Society tonight rather than being in the Chamber to discuss the Bill, which is rather scandalous—there has been much talk about the Chartists and how this great reform is an echo of the 1840s. The Chartists were in favour of yearly elections, so why does the Deputy Prime Minister deny the will of the people by keeping Parliaments at five years?

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right about the point that the Chartists made, but I do not happen to think that annual elections would be a good idea, and from my experience I am not sure that the people of this country would be over-enamoured of us if we said that we would trouble them with a general election every year. I believe that they will be content with our proposal. We do not want to end up with a situation in which the people of the United Kingdom are subject to a permanent election campaign. That is the evidence that the Constitution Committee in the other place has received. My hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr Jackson) drew attention to the matter when he looked at the US congressional experience in the lower House where, effectively, as soon as Congressmen get elected, they instantly turn their thoughts to their re-election and spend most of their period of office having to raise money for expensive election campaigns.

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[Tristram Hunt]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Harper]

Let me just finish this point. The Government could not accept amendment 32 as drafted even if we thought that keeping the clock ticking was the right thing to do. However, we thought about the issue carefully, which we also debated a little on Second Reading. The Government did not think that resetting the clock made sense for this reason. If there were an early election because the Government had lost their majority and gone to the country, and a Government were then returned with a significant majority, it would not be right for that Government, perhaps with a clear mandate, to be unable to put their programme to the country and carry it through. When people go to the polls, they expect that they are electing a Government who will last for a full term, with the ability to carry through a full programme. The Constitution Committee in the other place considered the evidence from other countries, including the Swedish model, and was told that the prospect of leaving the clock ticking actually protected the Government—the Executive—rather than the Parliament.

[Tristram Hunt]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Harper]

Let me make some progress.

Finally, new clauses 4 and 5 would provide that elections to this House and the devolved legislatures could not occur on the same day. The problem with that proposal is that if it were agreed, it would provide that where a devolved legislature’s general election had been moved, the following poll would take place on the first Thursday in May four years later. For example, if one of the devolved legislatures delayed its 2015 elections by one year, elections to that legislature and the House of Commons would coincide again in 2020. New clauses 4 and 5 would mean that those elections would have to be moved again in 2020, so they are actually a back-door method of substituting a five-year term for the devolved legislatures.

I do not know whether that was the intention of the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr, who spoke so powerfully against a five-year term and in favour of a four-year term, but the effect of his new clauses would be to deliver a five-year term through the back door. For that reason I do not think that it would be very sensible to accept them. Also, new clauses 4 and 5 do not make provision for a super-majority, which appears to suggest that a majority Government in a devolved legislature could just play around with the election date to suit themselves, which is the opposite of what we are trying to achieve in this Bill. The Government therefore cannot accept new clauses 4 and 5, and I would ask the hon. Gentleman not to press them to a Division.

In conclusion, I thank all hon. Members who have taken part in this debate, particularly those who were here for the whole debate and those who have tabled or supported amendments to clause 1. The Government are convinced that our Bill as drafted provides the right approach. I would urge hon. Members not to press their amendments to a Division and to support clause 1.