Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I do agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I said in my statement that I thought there were lessons to learn but also lessons not to learn, and the lesson not to learn is that intervention is always wrong. There are occasions when it is right to intervene, because it is in the interests of our national security or because we are trying to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. We should be very clear about the fact that there have been occasions when we have not intervened and when we have seen almost as much chaos and difficulty as we are seeing in Syria.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement, but will he join me in expressing slight concern not only about the shape of the centre of government that was there at the time of the Blair Government, but about the Departments that supported it? The top of the pyramid cannot work unless the supporting pillars are in place. I have only read the executive summary, so I cannot comment in detail, but it seems clear to me that parts of the Ministry of Defence, including the chiefs of staff, were not delivering the advice that the Government needed, and that elements of the Foreign Office had succumbed to a form of group-think that leaves me deeply concerned about the structure and the advice that are available to Governments..

[The Prime Minister]

I am going to hesitate before replying to my hon. Friend, because there is not a huge amount about that in the executive summary of the Iraq inquiry. I think we will probably have to dive into the volumes to see exactly what Sir John has to say about advice from the MOD, advice from the Foreign Office, how much group-think there genuinely was, and all the rest of it. So I would hesitate. I think we need to study the report, and then we can discuss the matter during next week’s debate.