Tom Hunt
Main Page: Tom Hunt (Conservative - Ipswich)(2 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe are making splendid progress. I will again disappoint those who like cliff-hangers by saying right at the beginning what our attitude is towards clause 2. We find it concerning, both of itself and on its own merits. We believe that reversing decisions in Cart, and subjecting Cart judicial reviews to ouster, is wrong on its own merits. We also think, as the Government have perhaps unwisely said, that the clause may serve as a template for further or wider use of the ouster, possibly including in more controversial areas further on. We have an issue of practicality and an issue of principle, and are therefore very likely to vote against the clause.
This short group of amendments is an attempt to improve, ameliorate and mitigate clause 2. Frankly, we found it very difficult. There is very little to recommend in clause 2, unlike in clause 1, where we at least sought to find some imaginative ways of improving it. It is difficult; nevertheless, I will in a little while speak specifically to the amendments that we have tabled. However, I will start as I did with clause 1 by setting the background so that it is clear where we are coming from on the amendments and on the clause as a whole.
An ouster clause is a clause in legislation that seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. The desired effect is that the subject matter of the ouster clause cannot be challenged in the courts. If given effect by the court, this would mean that the decision or action of an official in relation to that subject matter is final and cannot be challenged legally.
Rule of law objections to ouster clauses have often been made in Parliament. For example, in relation to the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords objected to an ouster clause, stating that
“the Rule of Law is diminished if an aggrieved citizen is barred from challenging an allegedly unlawful decision taken by a public authority.”
It is reasonable to say that ouster clauses are at odds with the rule of law. The orthodox view is therefore that courts will give effect to them only if the statutory language introducing them is absolutely clear. The courts have said:
“It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject’s recourse to Her Majesty’s courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words.”
In reality, courts are adept at reading even very clear words which purport to establish an ouster clause as not actually having the effect of creating an ouster clause.
The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 contained an ouster clause relating to decisions of the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal deals with appeals from the administrative appeals chamber, the immigration and asylum chamber, the lands chamber and the tax and chancery chamber. In the case of Cart, the Court of Appeal stated that
“the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, well known to Parliament as one of the great historic artefacts of the common law, runs to statutory tribunals both in their old and in their new incarnation unless ousted by the plainest possible statutory language.”
There is no such language in the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court confirmed this approach. This has led to what are known as Cart judicial reviews, whereby a decision of the upper tribunal can be judicially reviewed.
There has been an on-going debate about how effective Cart judicial reviews are in catching errors of law made by the upper tribunal. The Independent Review of Administrative Law panel found that there were errors of law in only 0.22% of cases. The Public Law Project has questioned the empirical evidence for that and suggested that Cart judicial reviews are much more effective, with an actual figure between 2.3% and 9.2%. It is difficult to know what the true figure is, but it is conceded that the 0.22% figure is a significant underestimate. I will say more about this later. However, I felt that that there was a degree of consensus around some of the evidence we heard on Tuesday that the figure was certainly about 3%, and possibly around 5%. I will come on to what I think the significance of figures of that kind may be.
Whether it is 0.2%, 3% or 5%, we are still talking about a figure at least 10 times lower than the average success for other types of judicial review, which is 40% or 50%. Surely that is a significant point to consider?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point. We did hear a number of different figures. I am now stretching my memory to recall exactly who said what. Was it Professor Feldman who said 30% to 50%, and Dr Morgan who posited 5%? I cannot quite remember. However, yes, there are different success rates for different types of judicial review. The point is that, even if the figure is small, Cart judicial reviews are important—I will come on to that more fully. However, if it is 5%, that is not a negligible figure. One in 20 is still a lot of cases. I am going to give some case examples to show the type of case that we are dealing with here. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be persuaded that there are sufficient by way of number and variety or that the compelling facts of the cases are such that he would want to retain Cart reviews. We will see.
The Government said they would introduce legislation to reverse the law on Cart judicial reviews. They said that they would seek to widen ouster clauses to other areas, although accepting that they would be rare. They also said they would legislate for modifying quashing orders so that they could be suspended or have limited effect. The proposals announced by the Government appear to be more radical than those envisaged by the independent panel—I think that is true.
The Lord Chancellor recently suggested that there may be more reforms to come on judicial review. His view was that judicial review meant that public money was being squandered, as courts are overturning Government decisions. However, as the commentator Joshua Rozenberg recently put it, commenting on a decision of the Transport Secretary on the Stonehenge case, which I have already referred to today, if the Transport Secretary
“had got it right the first time, taxpayers’ money would not have been squandered.”
Rather than a Minister complaining about a court rectifying unlawful decisions, it would be better to make lawful decisions in the first place.
The clause would take away proper, full judicial oversight in a specific area of public decision making, leaving vulnerable individuals affected by decisions more at risk of injustice. It does so in a way that the Government explicitly state is a test run for other ouster clauses—trying to get rid of judicial oversight in other policy areas. We have been left with a Bill that is bad for claimants bringing cases, disincentivises others who have been wronged bringing their own, fetters discretion while dragging courts into matters of policy, and jettisons a vital safeguard for very little gain. There is nothing in this part of the Bill to help improve the quality of decision making. It simply risks making it worse. The judicial review aspects make up only a small amount of the Bill, but there is very little that we think can be salvaged.
Clause 2 introduces the ouster in respect of decisions of the upper tribunal. That means that some decisions will now be final and cannot be appealed to another court, because the clause would abolish the Cart judicial review. The upper tribunal deals with a host of appeals from various tribunals. The context is the importance of scrutiny and accountability mechanisms to hold public authorities to account.
Cart judicial review is used in cases where no other right to appeal exists. This type of judicial review is a crucial safeguard against errors in the tribunal system in decisions of significant importance for the people concerned, which often involve the most fundamental rights.