Intelligence and Security Committee

Tom Brake Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I echo the thanks of various Members to the members of the intelligence and security services for the work they do on our behalf to keep us safe. I also thank the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) for setting out in a lucid and measured way what his Committee has found, which has led in turn to a measured and lucid debate so far, consistent with what the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) said about members of the Intelligence and Security Committee putting aside party political allegiances. I welcome that, as we do not want party political differences to get in the way of the important security considerations that the ISC has highlighted.

Both the ISC in its response and annual report and the Government in their detailed response have provided a useful framework for formulating a small number of questions for the Minister who will respond later. I hope he does not take offence at that. Let me deal with the recommendations in the report.

Recommendation A deals with the savings to be derived from the single intelligence account. It talks about making the supporting functions more efficient and delivering new operational capability as a means of reducing the need for savings. I wonder whether a breakdown has been done to determine how the savings will be split between those two areas. The most certain way of achieving the savings safely is having a clear plan that identifies how those savings will be derived over future years.

Recommendation B deals with the spending review settlements and poses the question whether they can be adjusted if there is a significant change in the threat. A number of Members have referred to this issue, including the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). He is no longer in his place but spoke about the cyber-threat. The Government response states that

“the SIA will first look to reprioritise from within its existing work.”

The use of the word “first” suggests that the SIA might look to do something different secondly, but no second alternative is outlined, which makes me wonder what it is that the Government do not want to put on the record. What is clearly understood is that if a very large and significant new threat emerges, the Government would want to respond in a way that would involve resources. We would all expect that to be the case.

Recommendation D deals with information assurance and making sure that it has the required backing. The Government’s response states that

“the Deputy National Security Adviser will continue to work with the Communications-Electronics Security Group…to develop a suitable funding model that will ensure the long-term sustainability of their IA work.”

Is it clear at what point that work is going to be completed?

In a similar vein, in response to recommendation E the Government have rightly identified the need to take proactive steps to address the issue of retaining a suitable cadre of internet specialists. I hope the Minister will tell us what proactive steps have already been taken. I should state now—perhaps I should have done so at the outset—that the Minister, for clear operational reasons, might not be able to give answers to every question. Clearly, he will not respond if it is not appropriate for him to do so.

Recommendation G identifies the need for GCHQ to be able to account for lost equipment. The ISC made it clear that GCHQ should ensure that the problem does not happen again and the response noted that good work had been undertaken with the National Audit Office since 2008-09. I wonder whether GCHQ has been able to provide the Minister with the assurance that those incidents of lost equipment, and the potential risks associated with them, will not happen again.

Recommendation K deals with the Security Service’s need for IT specialists. A useful initiative has been set up with

“the three Agencies…engaged in setting up a single unified mechanism for hiring interim specialists and contractors.”

I suspect that this will make a substantial contribution to savings. I was hoping that a time frame might be identified for delivery.

Recommendation P refers to the overlap between the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism and the National Security Secretariat. Although that overlap is limited, I hope that the Minister will be able to explain how problems caused by the duplication of work are addressed.

Recommendation V refers to BBC Monitoring. I know that work is proceeding on that front, but the Minister may be able to tell us something about the intended time scale for the review.

Recommendation X refers to Shaker Aamer. Other Members may welcome an update from the Minister on any discussions that are taking place with the United States authorities.

Recommendation Y refers to the Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers. I thank the Minister for a recent briefing that clearly identified the difficulties and complexity that surround those issues, especially when Government agencies or the intelligence services are having to deal with a range of agencies abroad.

Recommendation AA refers to the Government’s announcement of the publication of a Green Paper. That is very welcome, and I hope that the Green Paper will receive a wide response. Some parts of it may be deemed controversial, particularly those dealing with the use of special advocates and other aspects of the reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee. There is clearly a huge amount of expertise in the Chamber in that regard, and I am sure that Members who are present have already made an important contribution simply by giving their informed views, which can be read in Hansard tomorrow.

Recommendation GG refers to the vulnerability of some of GCHQ’s sites. It is not clear to me whether the necessary resilience already exists, or whether it is being developed and is expected to be rolled out at some point in the future. Perhaps some clarification will be possible either now or at a later date.

Recommendation HH proposes the establishment of a single SIA vetting service. That is, on the face of it, a sensible proposal. It has been under discussion since early 2010, and now, in late 2011, I should like to think that an end date is in sight.

I hope that the Minister will consider the limited number of questions that I have asked to be pertinent. Let me restate my support for the work that is being done by the intelligence and security community and for the work that the ISC has done in ensuring not just that we are safe, but that due scrutiny is given to the services that are responsible for our safety.