Intelligence and Security Committee

Debate between Tobias Ellwood and Malcolm Rifkind

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend talks about the change in attitude and style in the work of our security services. Does he agree that after 9/11, in a bid to counter the asymmetric threats, the clandestine services lost their way for a period? I think of such things as Guantanamo Bay, water-boarding, rendition, dodgy dossiers and so forth. Does he agree that with the freedoms that were given to those services in a bid to try to find Osama bin Laden and hunt down the enemy we lost the moral high ground for some time and that it has taken a while for us to redeem ourselves?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I certainly agree that serious issues came to prominence during those years, some of which were the responsibility of the agencies and some of which were more the responsibility of government. However, I think we should get this into perspective. So far as I am aware, not a single British intelligence officer has ever been accused of personally being involved in water-boarding, torture or maltreatment of an individual. The issue—and it is a very serious issue—is whether they were aware of those matters and whether they might indirectly have colluded in such activity. I do not wish to diminish the seriousness of these matters but it is very important to make that point and get things into perspective because the same is not true of many other countries around the world. That is an important point that has to be made.

I want to speak briefly about four points in the report and then say something about the issues in the Green Paper, particularly about what is called the control principle, with regard to the handling of intelligence. Finally, I shall address the reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I shall try not to detain the House too long. The first of the four points in the report I want to address concerns the single intelligence account—the £2 billion that goes to the intelligence agencies. They have had a very large increase over the past few years but a cut is now being imposed—and understandably so—of 11% if one takes account of inflation over the next four years. The Committee has said:

“It is essential—given the fundamental importance to our national security of the Agencies’ work—that the settlement is kept under review and that there is scope to adjust it if there is a significant change in the threat.”

I know that every single recipient of Government funding would like to be able to say that, but I hope there is no dispute that when we are dealing with the fundamental issues of national security, if the threat were to change in a material way, it would not be acceptable to say that those resources could not be reviewed by a Government because that might in some way contradict public expenditure decisions. I have no reason to believe that the Government would take that view, but it is important to make that point, and that is what the Committee would like to stress.

The second point is the security that will be needed for the Olympics. The director general of the Security Service—again, I quote from our report—

“told us that he considers the Service to be well placed to manage the risks that the Olympics will bring.”

However, he added that

“the effort required to cover the Olympics will inevitably divert resources from the Service’s other work.”

The Committee would like to emphasise that the National Security Council must take such steps as are necessary to minimise that risk. Although we understand that the Security Service is not at present making representations and feels that the task can be handled effectively, it is too early to be certain that that will remain the case and it must be kept under consideration.

The third point relates to cyber security. In its reports of 2008 and 2009, the Committee drew attention to the increasing risks this country faces from cyber attacks. The Committee welcomes the fact that the Government have said that cyber is now a tier 1 interest in our national security strategy and have provided more than £600 million in new resources for that purpose.

The Committee’s concern is not those sums but the potential over-interest within Government in cyber matters. We note in our report that there are 18 units with responsibilities in this field across the three agencies— two law enforcement bodies and five Government Departments—and express our concern, which the Government share, about the risk of duplication. It is extremely important that these matters are looked at to ensure that, with such large sums and so many elements of Government involved, we do not do mischief to our own objectives.