(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is right. I will not dwell on that point, because I do not think it takes us much further forward, but there was again the substitution of wishful thinking for critical analysis. The evidence was there that the troops were being massed on the Ukrainian border. We knew there was an intent to use them and yet in a number of European capitals there was still the triumph of hope over experience. That lack of preparedness among some of the western nations put the Ukrainians at a disadvantage at the beginning of the conflict.
A number of Members have said that the sanctions on Russia cannot be lifted until all Russian troops leave Ukraine. I would go further: the sanctions on Putin and Lavrov and the architects of this war can never be lifted. That is a different question from what happens to the rest of Russia. Of course, there must be a potential new course in a post-Putin era, but our aim must be to increase the tensions within the Russian regime by making it clear that those who stick with Putin and those who are the architects of the war in Ukraine cannot escape from the sanctions—they crossed the Rubicon; they are war criminals. On the other hand, those who choose a different path for the future can have an alternative future. It is very important that our messaging is consistent and utterly clear.
My right hon. Friend is linking the impact of sanctions to the military progress and what we should be doing on the ground; he is therefore in danger of coming close to having a strategy, and Britain, the west and NATO must have a grand strategy to deal with a resurgent, adventurist Putin.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
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My hon. Friend is right to raise that question: what assurances do we have that Iran would maintain the deal? I shall certainly try to answer the questions that have been asked. I am, to the horror of my team, going to abandon the speech that they have carefully prepared for me, and do my best to answer the questions from the debate. I offer my apologies if I do not manage to answer all the detailed questions. I shall read Hansard—not because I like reading what I have said, but because it is important that I read what Members have said and reply in writing, if I may, to keep dialogue going.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy asked whether the agreement was intended to be a non-proliferation or arms control treaty. It is a mixture, as I have made clear. It important for us to be able to maintain that, because there are breakout weapons systems that we are concerned about in addition to what Iran is doing on the nuclear side. He mentioned Iran’s foreign policy objectives, for itself and the wider region, which I want to touch on in relation to other concerns. Iran’s role, and where it sees itself in the region, is a major issue. It has a responsibility not just to itself but in the wider region and we look to it to act responsibly.
My hon. Friend mentioned the United States foreign policy aspects of the matter, and my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) raised the question whether there was a legacy issue. I have never heard the line before that a President is most dangerous in his second term. It could be argued both ways; a President in that case is not tied by anything and therefore can be more robust in some of the measures that he or she is willing to pursue.
I want to go through the eight major headings of the deal, which may help the House to understand where the conversation and agreement are going, leading up to 30 June. First there is the question of a durable and verifiable deal. The first heading is enrichment, which covers Iran’s capacity and its enriched stockpile. The number of centrifuges is obviously part of that. Many figures have been given in the debate, but the number is less significant than the breakout time—how quickly a weapon could be procured if it was decided to close the doors and prevent IAEA from carrying out inspections. We have set that as a year. Whatever the experts are saying, that leads to the number of centrifuges that we would consider acceptable. We are less focused on the actual numbers at the moment, and more on the breakout time.
The second area heading is research and development, covering types of centrifuges, and leading to a mutually agreed scope and schedule. Thirdly, the Arak plutonium reactor has been mentioned. There will be a redesign to cut off the plutonium route to a nuclear device. Fourthly, Fordow, which has also been mentioned, will no longer be a site for the enrichment of uranium. The fifth area is duration. There are programme restrictions in a number of areas. A period of 10 years for the agreement has been mentioned. It could well be that parts of it will last longer, and parts might even be shorter. That is some of the detail being worked out.
The sixth heading is the possible military dimensions, which I have touched on. That covers the measures that Iran must address: the IAEA’s concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. If there is one area that is of concern in the discussions at the moment, that is probably the most difficult. The seventh area is sanctions: relief from the comprehensive EU and US economic and financial sanctions in return for IAEA-verified actions on Iran’s programme; an agreement on the termination of UN sanctions, with limiting transfers of sensitive technologies and activities; and other issues relating to conventional arms and ballistic missiles. The eighth and final area is transparency and verification, which many hon. Members have mentioned. That covers the ability to make sure that nothing is being done behind our backs, and a robust and credible monitoring programme including the implementation of various protocols to give the IAEA greater oversight of Iran’s activities.
My right hon. Friend is right; we must have such access. I am pleased that the IAEA has confirmed that it currently has the access it needs. Were that to be closed down, those would be the consequences—it would be about whether sanctions would be brought back. I acknowledge my right hon. Friend’s understanding of and interest in the matter. He spoke about the Iranians as a proxy power elsewhere in the area. If Iran is looking for a more responsible role, as he mentioned and encouraged, it must be seen to take greater responsibility in events in places such as Syria. It is propping up Assad, so no space is being given to moderate Sunnis. They are then pushed, or encouraged, to join ISIS. Iran could easily assist the international community in progressing with a political solution for Syria, and could help immensely with what is happening in Anbar and Nineveh province in Iraq. General Soleimani is pushing across with the Hashed militias and causing sectarian friction in Iraq; that is unhelpful in the long term. Likewise in Yemen, weapons systems coming by boat and the provision of weapons for the Houthis, further complicate an already difficult and complex issue.
There are ways for Iran to show its initiative and greater responsibility in the region, and I think that many hon. Members would like to see that. It is not happening now and we are concerned about that. I am conscious of the time; I will write to hon. Members with more details. The debate has been extremely good. I simply want to make it clear that we are working hard for the deal, but, as has been explained, we need to make sure we reach the correct one. Without the correct deal, we have no deal.