Ukraine

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The paralysis of the G20 statement reflects the difficulties of the geopolitics we face. The absence of a communiqué to confirm that it is Russia at fault here shows what leadership is still required in leaning in to what is happening in Ukraine. This remains the biggest war since world war two. Although it is dragging on—as the Minister for Armed Forces said, we are on day 564—we should not be desensitised to what is happening; we should be concerned that there continues to be economic and security disruption right across the continent. This is a test of our staying power and our ability to continue our support. To dry up our support for Ukraine is exactly what Putin wants us to do.

Since the last time we had a debate on this matter, dramatic events have taken place over the summer. They affect what is happening on the ground in Ukraine and in Russia, and they could be game-changing. It is worth remembering that Putin thought he could win this war because he saw a divided Ukraine. President Zelensky did not enjoy the command and support that he has today. If we go back to the Maidan in 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was pressed by Putin to lean his country to the east when it was clear that the nation—or at least half of it—wanted to face the west. Putin saw the west being risk-averse in wanting to support Ukraine in its hour of need. He then pressed further by taking on Crimea and the Donbas. Again, the west did little. He then invaded in 2021, as we know, hoping to repeat what happened in 1968, when the Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia with 50,000 troops and, I think, around 5,000 tanks. It was the courage of Ukraine that meant it stood up to the mark and stood up to the third largest army in the world.

This is where we can pay tribute to what the British Government have done, because there has been commendable engagement, even prior to the invasion itself. They have provided those important anti-tank weapon systems, training on Salisbury plain, those main battle tanks—the Challengers—as well as Storm Shadows and Brimstones. They have been leading in the Ramstein group, co-ordinating efforts with other allies to make sure that Ukraine has the necessary military assistance. We have learned and become less risk-averse as time has moved forward, conscious of the escalatory ladder and knowing we are dealing with a nuclear power that has invaded another state. The west has rekindled its cold war statecraft skills, but the fundamental issue is: if we want Ukraine to win and Russia to lose, we should not be half-hearted in giving what Ukraine requires. We need to be fully committed to giving Ukraine the tools to succeed for victory.

It has been clear and mentioned already in the Chamber today that the war has not gone well for President Putin. He expected a quick win and is now frustrated on the frontline. There is little to show for his efforts. He is using conscripts and prisoners and having to replace successive generals, because command and control is not what it was. He has spent the past 23 years coup d’état-proofing, as it were, the Kremlin, Moscow and Russia to make sure that he will not be removed, because that is the Russian way. Russian leaders remain in power because they exhibit strength and are infallible. As soon as they show any signs of weakness, that is when the oligarchs, the elites and so forth realise they can no longer have their back watched by the leader in charge, and they move to replace them. That is what we are seeing today because of the game-changing events involving the Wagner rebellion and Yevgeny Prigozhin. His removal by Putin was inevitable, for the very reason I have just raised: when a Russian leader is attacked in any way, it is the Russian way to crush one’s enemies—to remove them and to eliminate them in one form or another.

Prigozhin did something exceptional: not only did he challenge Putin and bury the myth that this war was going well, but he used his own forces to charge up through Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow. That illustrated that no Russian forces were able to take on the Wagner Group—the private army—to prevent a coup d’état and a mutiny. That weakness is now recognised across Russia; Putin’s time will eventually be up.

The other dynamic is that, of all the fighting forces in Ukraine, the most powerful, capable, potent and best equipped was the Wagner Group. It had the best equipment and was the most motivated. It has now been removed from the battlefield and that provides an opportunity for Ukraine.

Lots of western pressure has been placed on Ukraine, saying, “We have given you all this expensive, exceptional, ever-complex equipment. Why has the counter-offensive not advanced further?” Again, it is because—this happened in the second world war—various phases of operations need to be conducted. We have seen Ukraine probe the frontline across 1,000 km, and we are now seeing advances taking place as it penetrates through complex minefields and anti-tank defences, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia region. That is the progress we need to see, but we need to exhibit patience. This is not going to happen overnight—there will not be a quick phase of war, with this all being over by Christmas.

What Putin is now realising is that this could be the beginning of the end of his war in Ukraine, and it could be the beginning of the end of his existence as leader, too. I do not believe he will be replaced overnight, but I do believe that the weakness exhibited is enough to unrest and unnerve many of the leaders in Russia who will be looking for a replacement in the longer term. We therefore need to be cautious and perhaps stand up to those voices in the west who are saying, “Let’s draw a line. Let’s start negotiating. Let’s get round a table and draw a close to what is happening in Ukraine.”

We need to recognise the bigger picture and what Putin —indeed, even his successor—might be trying to do, and that is to expand Russian influence in the Slavic area of eastern Europe. Again, that is the Russia way. Let us go back hundreds of years; the view has been, “If we are not being attacked, the best way is to attack, otherwise, our defences will not be enough to hold the motherland together, so let’s take advantage of the west’s weakness or risk-averseness.” I am pleased to see that we are now starting to change that.

What is next for the west? Absolutely, we must keep up that military support—that is the tactical that has been talked about today—but I would advance two further areas where we could do more to support Ukrainians. First, we must recognise that more than $300 billion-worth of frozen assets belong to Russia. We need to develop a legal mechanism that would allow each month about $20 billion of that to be slid across the table to Ukraine to help in its reconstruction and development. That might focus minds in Russia—in Moscow, in the Kremlin and Putin himself—that the longer the war continues, the more Russian money it is costing.

Secondly, I would stress the grain shipments—I brought them up with the Prime Minister—which are critical for Ukraine as well as fundamental for our own economy, where food inflation remains in double figures. I would stress the symbiotic relationship between our economic security and our national security. I am pleased that the Government are organising and participating in a global food security summit. I hope that we will look towards creating some form of expeditionary force that can provide the necessary defence and support for a maritime taskforce to protect those ships and ensure they can depart from Odesa to feed the rest of the world.

I end simply by stressing what I think many colleagues will express: because our world is getting more dangerous, not less, our peacetime defence budget of just over 2% of GDP is simply not adequate. We had the 2021 integrated review, which introduced so many cuts across all three services. Because of Ukraine, we had another IR—IR ’23. Unfortunately, none of those cuts was reversed. I hope that the new Defence Secretary, who has the Prime Minister’s ear, will be able to persuade him on that and recognise that we have done so much in advancing our hard-power capabilities, but we need to go further because of where this very dangerous world is now headed.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the SNP spokesperson.