(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a good point, but it rebounds slightly on the Defence Committee because we have been told that we are responsible for applying for such debates and, I have to confess, we have not done so in recent months, so perhaps we ought to revisit that.
The Defence Committee launched an inquiry into defence and cyber-security in January 2012, as part of a series of debates and inquiries looking into emerging threats. It was the first time the Committee had investigated cyber-security as a discrete topic, although in 2009 we had looked at Georgia and Estonia, and visited Talinn, as part of another inquiry. The UK Government had identified cyber-threats as one of four tier 1 risks to national security, and in November 2013 published a UK cyber-security strategy, updating their 2009 strategy and setting out four objectives: first, to make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyberspace; secondly, to make the UK more resilient to cyber-attack and better able to protect our interests in cyberspace; thirdly, to help to shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace that supports open societies; and fourthly, to build the UK’s cyber-security knowledge, skills and capability.
The programme is to be implemented via a four-year national cyber-security programme costing £650 million, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an extra £210 million investment after the 2013 spending review. The funding is shared between the security and intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but most will be spent by the security and intelligence agencies.
During our inquiry, the Committee investigated whether the high profile given to the cyber-threat in the UK was matched by a coherent plan and a chain of command in the event of a major cyber-attack on our national infrastructure or our national interests. The complexity of the threat must be matched by an agile, many-layered response; accordingly, many different agencies are involved in the cyber-security effort, ranging across cybercrime, cyber-espionage and cyber-commerce. Cyber-security is therefore to some extent everybody’s responsibility, but we must avoid its ending up being nobody’s responsibility as a consequence. Someone has to be in charge.
It is good to see so many colleagues here to take part in the debate. If we contrast the approach taken in the United States, where there is a unified structure under CYBERCOM, with the disparate approach taken in the United Kingdom, does the right hon. Gentleman share my concern that we seem to have a number of lessons still to learn?
Well, there are pluses and minuses to having a unified structure, and there are risks in having a siloed approach. I said this is the responsibility of everyone, and so it is. I shall explain how wide that responsibility extends.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
No, that was a joke—at least, I think it was. But the cancellation of the project was the one change that troubled the Ministry of Defence most in the SDSR. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff told the Defence Committee:
“It would be fair to say that among the Chiefs of Staff and in the military advice, it was one of the most difficult decisions to come to terms with, because it has multiple uses.”
In the Government’s answer to the concerns that the Defence Committee expressed in our report on the SDSR of August 2011, they said:
“Like the Committee we regret that we had to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme. It was a capability that we would, in an ideal world, have preferred to acquire…we reluctantly concluded that cancellation was the least bad option.”
The reason for that unhappiness was described to us by Professor Julian Lindley-French. He told us that
“the point is that of the seven military tasks in the SDSR, the MRA4 could have played a very important role in all of them. It was the loss of the enablers, because the single services were forced back to defend their own core competencies by the process, which for me was the biggest failing of the SDSR process. Forget all the strategic stuff: there was a haggle at that last weekend, which was utterly unacceptable in terms of the national strategic requirements.”
The report that the Defence Committee produced earlier this week on defence acquisition contains a bit of an echo of that statement.
In our report on the strategic defence and security review, we expressed concern about the resultant capability gaps of cancelling MRA4. In their response, the Government acknowledged that there is currently no single asset or collection of assets that could fully mitigate the resultant capability gap. That is enough about Nimrod; let us look at the other assets and look to the future.
The Government said in 2011 that they continued
“to maximise the use of…assets”—
other than Nimrod—
“such as Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and C-130 to contribute to Anti-Submarine Warfare, Search and Rescue and Maritime Counter-Terrorism where possible. In the longer term, if the Government were to conclude that it needed to close the gaps completely because”
threats emerged that could no longer be managed in the same way as today,
“some additional funding or reprioritisation would be required.”
In our report, “Future Maritime Surveillance”, we concentrated on the strategic requirements for maritime surveillance, identifying current capability gaps and the future requirements for maritime surveillance and how they might be met. Given the wide range of maritime surveillance tasks and the number of Departments and agencies that require access to maritime surveillance capabilities, we also looked at cross-Government co-operation. We published our report in September 2012 and the Government’s response in December 2012. We have also placed on our website the Minister’s response to some follow-up issues that we raised following the Government’s response. I am grateful to him for that.
I pay tribute to the Committee’s staff and military advisers, who provide us with invaluable support and advice. We are all grateful to them. I would like to thank personally the Committee members themselves. They work extremely hard to very good effect, which is one of the reasons why chairing it is the best job that I have ever had.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way and I apologise for being slightly late. May I point out that the reason why it is such a good Committee is that its Chairman is so excellent?
The hon. Gentleman might say that, but as a former Chief Whip, I couldn’t possibly comment.
The threats that require maritime surveillance are evolving and have become more non-military in nature. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 rather illustrate that, in that they were launched from the sea. Our report concluded that it was a weakness that there was not a single individual within the Ministry of Defence who should be responsible for maritime surveillance. The Government did not agree.
We acknowledged that the new joint forces command could have a role in delivering, co-ordinating and strengthening maritime surveillance. We are nevertheless disappointed that the Government do not think that there is a requirement for an individual within the MOD to take responsibility for maritime surveillance. We accept that it is not the JFC’s role, but we are concerned that the left hand of the MOD may not know what its right hand is doing, let alone be able to co-ordinate the interests of the MOD with all the other Departments and agencies that require maritime surveillance capabilities.
Here I begin a number of requests to the Minister for information, which I will be grateful if he responds to, if not in today’s debate, perhaps in writing later, with whatever degree of classification he considers necessary. It will be helpful if he first outlines how the co-ordination that we are concerned about is being taken forward, particularly as the MOD starts work on the 2015 SDSR. Our concerns were highlighted when we were told that there was an “informal group of Ministers” who were responsible for taking forward maritime surveillance issues.
Although decisions may ultimately be taken in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we thought there should be greater ministerial involvement. This contains an echo of our report, “Defence and Cyber-Security”, published in January this year and our report, “Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses”, published in February last year: we worry that Ministers faced with a threat or a vulnerability that crosses departmental responsibilities have inadequate structures and insufficient practice in getting together to work out responses, which may be needed very quickly indeed.
Against that, we welcome the establishment of the maritime security oversight group and the National Maritime Information Centre. The Government told us that the risk assessment was expected to be completed in December 2012. Will the Minister update us on progress? What threats, including new ones, have been identified? Such strategic analysis is important. Future threats are increasingly likely to be identified through intelligence gathering.
Maritime ISTAR—forgive the acronym, which stands for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—of which maritime surveillance is a part, will be essential. Without effective surveillance, both maritime and elsewhere, the UK armed forces are operating at a much reduced effectiveness.
As I said, I know that my hon. Friend played no part in the decision to proceed. I cannot quite remember who was the Minister responsible for acquisition in the previous Conservative Government, but perhaps it will come back to me later in the debate.
Not just Ministers need to take some responsibility for mistakes; Ministry of Defence officials and the Royal Air Force need to take some, too. There was an 86% change in the aircraft specification from the time of commissioning under that previous Minister and October 2010. Mr Brady, you worked in industry prior to coming to the House. You know that making that amount of change to a project means that costs will go up and it will be delayed.
Does 86% of the blame therefore need to lie with the Labour Government?
I am sure that a previous Minister with responsibility for defence acquisition would always be happy to take responsibility for all the decisions that he made, even if he was not always fully aware of that at the time.
As our report on acquisition makes clear, the MOD must learn the lessons of past acquisition decisions. I think that I speak for the whole Committee when I say that, although we welcome the Government’s progress on acquisition, we are not convinced that they have learned all the lessons yet. There is still more work to be done. Perhaps the Minister will say more about what improvements can be made, in the light of those lessons.
The third responsible party is BAE Systems. It should not sit around and blame the MOD, the RAF and the two Governments, and try to get by without accepting some responsibility for its decisions. The Minister nods, and I welcome the fact that there is acceptance on both sides of the Chamber that BAE was not an exemplar: in much the same way as I have been critical of Lockheed Martin’s approach to the strike fighter, I consider that BAE Systems bears some blame.
Well, I cannot possibly comment on the sums. However, that principle of not committing to a future increase in spending is exactly what this Government have done. We saw it again yesterday at Prime Minister’s questions, when the Prime Minister, in response to what was not the most difficult question from the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire, the Chairman of the Defence Committee—
Indeed, but in response to it the Prime Minister failed to give a clear commitment to increase spending.
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be able to help us further? Has he heard Leader of the Opposition give a commitment to increase defence spending after 2015?
I will say two things. First, I have heard my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition speak on many occasions of his great appreciation for the role of our armed forces. Secondly, however, I am also fairly conscious that I am not sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—
It may not be happening any time soon after my earlier remarks, and I will perhaps leave it to other colleagues—including perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who is sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—to address the right hon. Gentleman’s point later in the debate.
The hon. Member for Beckenham made a point about seedcorn. On pages 41 and 42 of the Committee’s report, we very clearly tackled the point about seedcorn and future remuneration. We welcome seedcorn as a principle; we very much welcome the notion that we would use our international allies to provide training and personnel support. However, we are also very clear that we do not believe that that can continue beyond 2019, and we actually say that there is huge scepticism about it continuing until 2030. The more that we have examined the issue—again, the Minister can correct me if he wants to—the more that it looks as though 2030 is the realistic time line now, in light of both our inquiry and of course our recent correspondence with the Minister, before we will get back that full capability. I wonder whether the Minister has absolute confidence that our partners—particularly our Five Eye partners—will be able to continue to provide that support to us for effectively 17 years, or perhaps even longer?
On replacement platforms, I hope that one of the things that the Minister reflects on, particularly given the BAE Systems debacle, is that there are other ways to procure replacement platforms. Of course, he will be aware of the model of Saab aircraft. In effect, an existing, tried and proven airframe is taken and then the software is fitted on to that system. Obviously, that model needs to be considered in the light of our report on Tuesday about the need for a defence industrial strategy. Can the Minister confirm whether or not the MOD is actively considering that model as one of the options?
There has also been mention of what the MOD has now called remotely piloted aircraft, which we know as unmanned aerial vehicles, and their future role. Again, there was talk about joined-up government. When we had the debate before Christmas, with the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), who is the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement, the point was made by a number of colleagues that, in relation to maritime surveillance and the role of RPAs, a number of Departments clearly have an interest in maritime surveillance. The Minister might be able to correct me if I miss any on the list, but my note would say that, as well as the MOD, other Departments that have an interest in maritime surveillance include the Department for Transport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which has lead responsibility for fishing and ensuring that Icelandic boats or, indeed, those of our European partners do not break the law. The Home Office has a role for maritime surveillance, as has the Foreign Office, with its responsibilities for overseas territories.
I hope that the Minister takes this as genuinely helpful advice: the Committee believes that we need a much more joined-up Government. Perhaps the Minister can clarify, in a way that the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement could not, what proactive steps the Department is taking to bring other Departments together to discuss whether we can have a shared acquisition policy for RPA, rather than having four Departments acting differently.
I think that, up to now, this has been a genuinely consensual debate, but the final issue I want to raise, which we touched on in the report, is slightly contentious with the Department. It is about the wide area maritime underwater search project. My colleagues know more about it than I do, so I will not go into any great detail. The Committee feels that WAMUS is an exercise that should have been carried out before or during the SDSR and not afterwards, while we were undertaking an inquiry. It was only after extensive questioning by the Chairman of the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) that we discovered that the RAF and the Ministry of Defence had failed to tell us that the WAMUS project had not only started but had been completed while we were carrying out our SDSR inquiry. Air Vice-Marshal Green and the Minister’s predecessor both accepted that the information should have been shared with the Committee.
I am not suggesting that the RAF, the MOD and the Minister were malicious in withholding information, but I do suggest that there was either arrogance on the part of the Department—not the Minister—or incompetence. I think that it is fair to say that the Chairman of the Committee expressed his disappointment with both the Royal Air Force and the Minister. Mr Brady, I am sure that when the Chairman of the Committee was Chief Whip you never gave him the opportunity to express his disappointment in you. As one of the members of the Committee to whom that has occasionally happened, I can assure you that the Chairman’s disappointment is something that one does not seek to invoke. I hope that, in his response, the Minister will set out how the MOD has learnt the lesson of that mistake and how it is ensuring that the Committee is not let down by the Department again.
I commend the report to the House. This has been an excellent debate, and I look forward to hearing from colleagues.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend is, as always, helpful. I hope that he will now address the issue on which there is some dispute of fact—whether those in the military on whom compulsory redundancy is imposed are allowed to offer themselves for retraining; we have heard variously both that they are and that they are not. That is an important issue.
I now turn to the strategic defence and security review—although I do not want to take too much longer because a large number of people would like to speak. One of the main aims of the Defence Committee is to see how the next strategic defence and security review, in whatever year it will be—2014, 2015, 2016; we do not yet know—can be better than the last one. Our criticisms of the last one included the fact that it was rushed to fit in with the comprehensive spending review, and was therefore undertaken without sufficient consultation with academia, industry, Parliament or the country. I heard my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister say that taking longer over decisions does not necessarily make them better, and that is true, but having proper full discussion in the country before such decisions are made would make them more informed.
Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee agree that there was insufficient consultation with our closest allies about the implications of the SDSR?
Yes, I do. Embarrassingly, I was fully consulted by the French Government on the introduction of their “livre blanc”, and I felt honoured, but I have no impression that the chairmen of the Assemblée Nationale or Senate committees were similarly involved in the discussion of our strategic defence and security review. That is one example of how, although Anglo-French co-operation is very good, it could still work a bit better.
There was no sense in the strategic defence and security review of a discussion of what sort of country we wanted to be, and the threats that we were facing, followed by a decision about how we were going to face those threats. Instead, there was a feeling of, “This is what we can afford, so these are the threats against which we will defend ourselves,” whatever those threats turn out to be.
For example, we now have six Type 45 destroyers. Why is six the right number? The original number was going to be 12, then it was cut to eight and then to six. When I was a Defence Minister we used to say that the right number of major ships was about 50. Why is it that now about 19 can defend our interests around the globe? However powerful a Type 45 destroyer is, it can only be in one place at any given time. There is also a concern about a loss of contingent capability. We always get wrong our predictions about the wars that the country will face, so we must be able to address unpredictable concerns that may arise.
However, there are many things to praise in the SDSR. The cyber-strategy, very welcomingly, refocuses the Ministry of Defence, other parts of the Government and industry on future issues. It is partly to welcome that that the Defence Committee is doing a series of inquiries into the cyber-threats that we face.
Lord Levene’s determined look at reforming the Ministry of Defence is radical. A number of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and other right hon. and hon. Members, feel that in some respects his work may be too radical or going in the wrong direction, but the Defence Committee will look at that issue, too. Bernard Gray’s focus on changing defence procurement already looks extremely promising; the Defence Committee has always been extremely impressed when he has appeared in front of us.
I shall end as I began. In the interests of mending fences, I wish to repeat, with praise, what the Secretary of State said to the Committee in December:
“If there is one clear lesson, it is that we have to move away from managing this business for cash to managing it for value, and that is the transition process that we are now into.”
As I said at the time, if my right hon. Friend can achieve that, he will turn out to have been a great Secretary of State.