Human Rights (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I am very pleased to have secured this debate on the activities of the London-listed oil company, SOCO International plc, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Virunga national park. “Virunga”, a documentary that covers many of the matters I will highlight today, was shortlisted for an Oscar this past weekend. In the limited time I have today, I hope to draw attention to the allegations of corruption and human rights abuses that have arisen following the arrival in 2007 of SOCO International in Virunga, which is a UNESCO world heritage site.

It should be noted that SOCO International has been offered the chance to respond to the allegations that will be laid out this afternoon. It has strenuously denied making illicit payments or intimidating civil society opponents in Virunga. However, the company has so far failed to provide a convincing response to the specific evidence of wrongdoing that will be described this afternoon. The “Virunga” documentary and Global Witness’s report, Drillers in the Mist, contain further detailed evidence of improper behaviour.

SOCO International is one of the UK’s 200 biggest companies listed on the FTSE 250, with oil and gas operations in Asia and Africa. It turned its attention to Virunga after the DRC Government declared that 85% of the park would be divided up into oil blocks. There was an outcry at that decision, because Virunga is Africa’s oldest and most bio-diverse national park; it is home to some 220 endangered mountain gorillas. UNESCO says that oil exploration and drilling are completely incompatible with world heritage site status.

The “Virunga” documentary and research by Global Witness, the anti-corruption campaigners, have revealed that in addition to threatening the world heritage status of the park, SOCO International and its contractors have made illicit payments, appear to have paid off armed rebels and benefited from fear and violence in the Virunga area of the DRC.

As I have already said, SOCO International has denied these allegations. However, the evidence is compelling. In the documentary, SOCO International’s military liaison officer, Major Feruzi, is caught on a hidden camera offering a $3,000 bribe to a park ranger. Feruzi wanted the ranger to spy on Virunga’s chief warden, Emmanuel de Merode, who has been singled out by SOCO International representatives as a key opponent of the company’s ambitions in the park. The army officer refers to a SOCO International contractor as his “boss”. Under the UK Bribery Act 2010, it is a crime for a UK company to fail to prevent an act of bribery carried out on its behalf.

The film also presents evidence of payments to a Congolese MP for the area covering Virunga who, at the time, was also a Government Minister. He campaigned vociferously on SOCO International’s behalf and helped to organise payments to local organisations to hold a pro-oil demonstration in the park. Also, he was covertly filmed saying that SOCO International officials told him that signing a contract with him was likely to be illegal under British law, as he was a public official. SOCO International’s official “focal point” in the park authority is also on film, telling rangers that those who work with SOCO will get “money, money, money” and those who oppose the company will be fired.

From this material, it seems that there is a clear case for UK enforcement agencies to investigate SOCO International under the Bribery Act 2010. This information and film footage has been in the public domain for months. What assurances can the Government give that these allegations will be considered by the relevant enforcement agencies?

While SOCO International is listed in London, investigations by Global Witness note that the company also has links to the US. Its executive directors, Ed Story and Roger Cagle, are American citizens and are employed through a wholly owned subsidiary company registered in Delaware. These individuals therefore fall within the jurisdiction of the United States, and there seems to be a case to be made that SOCO International, under their stewardship, has breached the terms of America’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Bearing that in mind, can the Minister say whether the relevant British authorities will contact their American counterparts about an investigation into SOCO International plc’s activities in Virunga, and ensure that they are made aware of any evidence showing that SOCO International has committed any offence under that Act?

It is also worth noting that SOCO International is, in a sense, an ambassador for British trade and industry. In eastern DRC, “SOCO” is synonymous with “Britain”. Inevitably, UK companies investing in the developing world will often operate in environments with high bribery risks and in jurisdictions that may lack the infrastructure necessary for the proper oversight of corporate behaviour. For that reason alone, SOCO International should be obliged to hold its staff and representatives to the strictest and highest standards of business responsibility.

If a company’s code of ethics is failing and, as seems to be the case with SOCO, there is little willingness on its part to investigate its actions or omissions, can the Minister say what sanctions we might expect the British Government to apply to companies that break the law and damage the reputation of UK plc? Given that private UK investment in developing economies is supported as a policy of this Government, it is surely incumbent on the UK Government and their agencies to ensure that any credible evidence of corruption or other criminal behaviour by a UK company, as we have in this case, is fully investigated by the relevant authorities. Failure to do so risks sending a message that British companies will not be held accountable for their actions or omissions overseas. If the UK hopes to be taken seriously when we speak about responsible business practice internationally and the capacity for investment to grow economies and reduce poverty, it must be incumbent on this Government to act without delay and to investigate fully whether SOCO International has been paying bribes or corrupting officials in the DRC.

To date, the UK has secured only one corporate conviction of foreign bribery. I suspect that cases such as this, which involves SOCO International and which only came to light following an independent investigation by a film company, may represent the tip of the iceberg of corporate misdemeanours in high-risk environments. The Serious Fraud Office has suffered budget cuts and institutional uncertainty, which must lead to doubts as to whether the ambitions expressed in the Bribery Act will ever be met with the resources and political will they deserve. What assurances can the Government give that foreign bribery cases will be resourced adequately now and in the future?

Beyond the allegations of bribery, SOCO International’s actions in Virunga threaten the integrity of the park’s UNESCO world heritage status. Virunga was already on the list of UNESCO’s world heritage sites considered to be in danger before SOCO International arrived. That status should protect the park from being intentionally despoiled.

The Minister may be aware that last year, SOCO International backed down from working in Virunga following pressure from the World Wide Fund for Nature, the environmental campaigners. Indeed, in response to a question from the hon. Member for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham), my fellow vice-chair of the all-party group on anti-corruption, on 17 December 2014, the Secretary of State for International Development stated:

“I expect SOCO, as a British-listed company, to adhere to the highest standards. In June this year, SOCO and the WWF announced that it would complete their existing programme of work at Virunga and then not undertake or commission exploratory or other drilling within the national park unless UNESCO and the Government of the DRC agreed to it.”—[Official Report, 17 December 2014; Vol. 589, c. 1393.]

In reality, SOCO International committed not to work in the park unless the Congolese Government and UNESCO eventually

“agree that such activities are not incompatible with its World Heritage status.”

Therefore, the door is open for SOCO International to continue to explore and drill for oil inside Virunga national park if the boundaries of the park are redrawn, an option that the Congolese Government are understood to be considering.

The director of the Oscar-nominated documentary “Virunga”, Orlando von Einsiedel, recently described SOCO International’s statement as “purely a PR exercise.” The Church of England, which owns £3 million-worth of shares in the company, has recently demanded that SOCO International amend its statement to

“remove any room for doubt about their intentions within existing or future boundaries of a World Heritage Site”.

Given the evidence that has already been outlined, do the Government continue to accept the statement made by SOCO International, as the Secretary of State for International Development did—a position that has now been shown to be perhaps misplaced? Does the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stand by its 2012 statement, in which it opposed all oil exploration inside Virunga? Will the Minister hold SOCO International to those standards, and how will he do so? Moreover, what can and will the UK do to defend the integrity of UNESCO world heritage status in this case and in principle? Belgium, Germany and the EU Parliament have all passed resolutions critical of oil exploration in Virunga. Will the Minister follow suit?

Some of the most serious questions that SOCO International has to answer relate to allegations that its representatives and allies used threats and physical violence against opponents of the company’s operations in Virunga. There have been worrying reports from credible and respected local organisations since at least 2012 of SOCO International allies orchestrating a campaign of intimidation against local anti-oil activists. SOCO International’s army liaison, Major Feruzi, has been identified as the driver behind much of this terror, which includes arrests and violent intimidation, but other local allies are also implicated. Local non-governmental organisations said that Feruzi’s

“military status has been utilized to silence anyone who has questions about the true impact of the oil project.”

On 15 April last year, the park’s chief warden and SOCO International opponent, Emmanuel de Merode, was driving back to his Virunga HQ after depositing a dossier on SOCO International’s activities with the public prosecutor in the provincial capital. His car was sprayed with bullets by unknown gunmen. Emmanuel de Merode was hit twice, but miraculously survived. SOCO International felt moved to issue a public statement denying involvement in the shooting.

An article in The Daily Telegraph published in September said that, in April last year, two fishermen were killed by soldiers protecting SOCO International’s compound, just hours after arguing against SOCO International’s presence in their community. The deaths were verified by Human Rights Watch, according to the article.

In December, the all-party group on anti-corruption heard from members of civil society in the park, and their stories of intimidation were deeply concerning. One activist, Alphonse Muhindo Valivambe, told the group that he and his colleagues “faced death every day” in their campaign against oil activities in Virunga. Indeed, Mr Valivambe was forced to flee to London for three months in 2012, so concerned was he for his personal safety.

As per the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, I ask the Minister whether and in what capacity the UK’s diplomatic missions in the region will support the human rights and civil society activists who are trying to defend the park’s protected status. What have the field offices done thus far to support civil society activists, and does the FCO feel it has done enough? Those guidelines say that states must take responsibility for the actions of companies domiciled within their jurisdictions. What can the UK Government do to ensure that SOCO International is conforming to these guiding principles, and what sanctions can they impose if they find that SOCO International, its representatives or allies have committed human rights abuses?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I may come to that later.

My hon. Friend asked about our political engagement with the DRC Government. We are committed to working with the DRC Government to try to spread the values of the rule of law, transparency and good governance, which we believe are right in principle. Their implementation would help the DRC to bring about improvement in the material standard of living and a better quality of life overall for its people.

We are committed to supporting UK companies in the DRC. Foreign investment in sectors such as hydro- carbons and the extractive industries can play an important role in boosting the development of countries such as the DRC and lifting people out of poverty. However, the Government’s long-standing position has been, and remains, to oppose all oil exploration in the Virunga national park, a world heritage site listed by UNESCO as being “in danger”. Our position has not changed. Any investment in that world heritage site needs to be done responsibly and sustainably, in compliance with local law and conforming to international standards.

The UK Government welcomed the announcement that SOCO plc made on 11 June 2014, in conjunction with World Wide Fund for Nature. SOCO pledged that it would complete its existing programme of work in Virunga and committed not to undertake or commission exploratory or other drilling within Virunga national park unless UNESCO and the DRC Government agree that such activities are not incompatible with its world heritage status. We also welcome SOCO’s commitment not to conduct any operations in other world heritage sites. I emphasise that we expect SOCO to honour those commitments. If we had evidence that SOCO was breaking those commitments that it entered into publicly, we would not hesitate to press the Government of the DRC or, in another jurisdiction, the Government of that country, to take the appropriate action.

[Tessa Munt]

My right hon. Friend the Minister will understand my confusion. He just confirmed that the 2012 statement, which opposed all oil exploration inside the Virunga national park, is current, but there is potentially pressure from the company on members of the DRC Government or UNESCO—it is more likely to be members of the DRC Government—to redraw the boundary lines of the Virunga national park. Therefore, I should like him to confirm that the existing boundaries are those we recognise, and that that is final.

[Mr Lidington]

When I refer to potential breaches of the commitments into which SOCO entered, I include within that any attempt by SOCO to redraw the boundaries of the Virunga national park to suit those commercial interests. In the June 2014 statement, we welcomed the fact that any agreement on development would need the consent not only of the DRC Government, for the reasons my hon. Friend intimated in her speech, but of UNESCO. That was important and created a double lock on any such assessment.

There should be no attempts to delist Virunga as a world heritage site or a national park, nor should any further company be awarded exploration rights in Virunga. We continue to urge the DRC Government to respect the international conventions to which it is a signatory. We are aware of the allegations, which my hon. Friend has repeated today, of wrongdoing against SOCO corporately, its employees and the agents connected to its activities in Virunga. Some of those allegations were listed in the documentary film “Virunga”.

The Serious Fraud Office is aware of the allegations. I am sure the House will understand that it is important that the decision on whether to prosecute in any case is made by the prosecutorial authorities and not by politicians. We expect all companies either operating or registered in the United Kingdom to act appropriately and in compliance with the law. We encourage anyone with evidence of serious fraud, bribery or corruption to contact the SFO. The Government have explained to some of the Virunga campaign groups how exactly they should go about supplying securely any evidence they have to the SFO for it to investigate.

My hon. Friend asked about the UK’s broader approach to combating corruption and the implementation of the Bribery Act 2010. The Government published the United Kingdom’s anti-corruption plan in December last year. It sets out how the Government are doing more across Whitehall’s areas of responsibility to increase transparency, tackle money laundering and ensure that the UK is at the forefront of efforts to raise international standards. The plan sets out a range of measures that we are taking to tackle corruption around the world. Priorities include identifying illicit financial flows; the return of stolen assets; efforts to raise global standards for all, including our international development programmes; and the promotion of sustainable growth, which includes work to stop bribery.

We are committed to going further by leading the way on the international stage, as was done at the 2013 Enniskillen G8 summit, and by impressing on the international community the benefits of measures, such as publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership, in the fight against illicit financial flows. The purpose of embodying that in an anti-corruption plan is precisely to enable more effective and more transparent collaboration across Government to try to break out of a silo mentality, to ensure that the efforts of all Departments and agencies are directed effectively to securing our objectives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tessa Munt]

I thank the Minister greatly for letting me intervene again. Will he address the fact that American citizens are involved in the company? The masking of company identity and the individuals involved in companies registered in Delaware is a perpetual problem. Can something be done with our American counterparts on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?

[Mr Lidington]

I will write to my hon. Friend in more detail on that point. I want to check whether, in the case of the American prosecutorial and judicial authorities, any evidence or information that might lead to a prosecution has to be transmitted through international legal channels, rather than just being transmitted through diplomatic or political channels. If there is a legal channel that enables evidence to be sent to the American authorities, I will alert her to that.

To respond to the points that the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Anas Sarwar) made, the Prime Minister has made clear to the overseas territories that he wants them to follow the United Kingdom’s lead and mandate publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership. The overseas territories are not fully independent, but they each have their own legislatures and their own democratic and constitutional arrangements. Most of the overseas territories decided to consult on the question of publicly accessible registers. The majority of those consultations have taken place and most overseas territory Governments are still analysing the results. We are keeping them informed of how our register will work in practice, so that they can take that into account when considering what works best for them. The UK Government have made it clear that we expect the British overseas territories to apply the highest international standards when it comes to such things as registers of beneficial ownership. The Prime Minister has made it clear that he intends to pursue that.

I highlight the UK’s commitment to the region and to eastern DRC in particular. Our development assistance and political engagement are targeted on what is important: bringing people out of poverty; promoting the rule of law, transparency and good governance; supporting civil society; and encouraging economic growth. In pursuing those objectives, we will always ensure that while we support responsible investment in the DRC by UK companies, we expect high standards and we expect those companies to follow legal obligations. We will continue to make businesses aware of their obligations under the Bribery Act 2010.

Virunga is a jewel in the centre of Africa. The people who live there must be protected, and its rich biodiversity must be protected for future generations. We support the alternative vision for Virunga, which emphasises such enterprises as sustainable fisheries, eco-tourism and small-scale hydropower. I finish by applauding the tenacity and bravery of the director of the Virunga national park, Emmanuel de Merode, and his rangers. Their work has had a real impact in bringing this issue to the attention of the world and in ensuring that the importance of Virunga and the need to protect it are not forgotten.

Iran

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

That is an important point, which links to the previous question. I was giving examples of some of the additional IAEA inspection work that will result from the agreement. In addition, a joint commission will be formed from the E3 plus 3 countries and Iran to work on implementing and monitoring the deal. That means that there will be constant discussion between the E3 plus 3 countries and Iran, which will require the Iranians to respond to any concerns we have about inspection and verification. This is a big step forward in inspection, including intrusive inspection and verification, and we must keep up our determination to do that.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

Over the years, several thousand Iranian students have studied in the UK, with many paying full fees, renting properties and spending very large sums of money while resident here. Will the Foreign Secretary clarify what consideration he has given to lifting the sanctions that prevent their families and sponsors from transferring money to the UK during their stay? Will he at least consider nominating a single bank in the UK as a conduit for student support, much as the United States has done during the whole period of its sanctions against Iran?

[Mr Hague]

I will look at those points as part of the step-by-step upgrading of our bilateral relations. It is possible that in some cases students could benefit from the new authorisation rules in the European Union that I mentioned. While Iran cannot operate the embassy with Iranian staff, we are considering it being able to increase the number of locally engaged staff who can help with such issues. There may be things that help people in that situation, but I will look at the issue in more detail.

Lethal Autonomous Robotics

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Nia Griffith]

My hon. Friend is right. There will be a huge imbalance between countries that have these technologies and the potential to use them, and countries that do not.

LARs increase the distance, physical and emotional, between weapons users and the lethal force that they inflict. Drones already offer the states that deploy them the military advantage of being able to carry out operations without endangering their own military personnel, and thus distance the operators from the action. LARs would take that a crucial step further by lessening the weight of responsibility felt by humans when they make the decision to kill. They could lead to a vacuum of moral responsibility for such decisions.

Secondly, LARs give rise to legal issues. Given that they would be activated by a human being but no human being would make the specific decision to deploy lethal force, it is fundamentally unclear who would bear legal responsibility for the actions performed by them. If the legal issues are not tackled, an accountability vacuum could be created, granting impunity for all LARs users. Furthermore, robots may never be able to meet the requirements of international humanitarian law, as its rules of distinction and proportionality require the distinctively human ability to understand context and to make subjective estimates of value. The open-endedness of the rule of proportionality in particular, combined with complex circumstances on a battlefield, could result in undesired and unexpected behaviour by LARs. It is clear that existing law was not written to deal with LARs.

Thirdly comes a multitude of terrifying practical concerns. The lowered human cost of war to states with LARs, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) pointed out, could lead to the “normalisation” of armed conflict. A state with LARs could choose to pit deadly robots against human soldiers on foot, presenting the ultimate asymmetrical situation. States could be faced with the temptation of using LARs outside of armed conflict, finding themselves able to eliminate perceived “troublemakers” anywhere in the world at the touch of a button. LARs could be hacked or appropriated, possibly for use against the state, and they could malfunction, with deadly consequences.

This report corroborates the revolutionary difference between LARs and any previous weapons system, and proves the following: that our current understanding of the nature of war cannot support them; that our existing legislation cannot regulate them; and that we cannot predict the effects that they may have on our future world.

What is called for worldwide in response is both an urgent course of action, and a mutual commitment to inaction: immediate action to ensure transparency, accountability and the rule of law are maintained; and agreement to inaction in the form of a global moratorium on the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs until an international consensus on appropriate regulations can be reached.

Will the Minister explain the Government’s position on the recommendations in the UN report. It calls on all states to do the following: put in place a national moratorium on lethal autonomous robotics; participate in international debate on lethal autonomous robotics, and in particular to co-operate with a proposed high level panel to be convened by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; commit to being transparent about internal weapons review processes; and declare a commitment to abide by international humanitarian law and international human rights law in all activities surrounding robotic weapons.

At the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, a large number of states expressed the need to ensure legal accountability for LARs and pledged support for a moratorium. The UK was the only state to oppose a moratorium. Did the UK really consider existing law to be sufficient to deal with fully autonomous weapons, and was it completely dismissing the idea of national moratoriums on the development and deployment of LARs? What evaluation of the recommendations for an international moratorium, for transparency over weapons review processes, for discussion of the limits of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and for engagement in international dialogue did the Government carry out in advance of the debate in Geneva two weeks ago? I believe the UK should take a leading role in limiting the use of LARs, and use our considerable standing on the world stage to bring nations together to negotiate.

The UN report recommended a “collective pause”—time to reflect and examine the situation with open eyes, before the demands of an arms race, and of heavy investment in the technology, make such a pause impossible. Only with multilateral co-operation can an effective moratorium be achieved. As Christof Heyns observes, if nothing is done,

“the matter will, quite literally, be taken out of human hands.”

Turning to the UK’s own policy, in answers given by Lord Astor in the other place and a Ministry of Defence note, the UK has stated that

“the operation of weapons systems will always—always—be under human control”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 March 2013; Vol. 744, c. 960.]

and that

“no planned offensive systems are to have the capability to prosecute targets without involving a human.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 March 2013; Vol. 743, c. WA411.]

This could form the positive basis of a strong policy, but further clarification and explanation are urgently required, and there has been no mention of a moratorium.

In November 2012 the USA outlined its policy and committed itself to a five-year moratorium. In a Department of Defence directive, the United States embarked on an important process of self-regulation regarding LARs, recognising the need for domestic control of their production and deployment, and imposing a form of moratorium. The directive provides that autonomous weapons

“shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of force.”

Specific levels of official approval for the development and fielding of different forms of robots are identified. In particular, the directive bans the development and fielding of LARs unless certain procedures are followed. The UN report notes that this important initiative by a major potential LARs producer should be commended and that it may open up opportunities for mobilising international support for national moratoriums.

During a Westminster Hall debate on l1 December 2012, my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), the Opposition Defence spokesman, expressed support for the move by the United States to codify the use of UAVs. He suggested that the UK examines whether it should, in addition to existing law, have a code covering: the contexts and limitations of usage; the process for internal Government oversight of deployments; command and control structures; and acceptable levels of automation. The Minister who responded to the debate rejected that suggestion on the grounds of operational security—this may be one of the big stumbling blocks.

However, now that we are talking about the development of LARs, we do need greater clarity, both in respect of UK policy and on the international stage. Existing international humanitarian law and international human rights law never envisaged weapons making autonomous decisions to kill. Deciding what to do about LARs is not like simply banning a chemical agent—it is far more complex than that. We are talking about technological know-how that can be used in so many different ways, so we need to sit down with other countries to look at the limitations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I have listened to what the hon. Lady has said. Does she agree that the only way forward is an explicit ban, because international humanitarian law was, as she said, written before anyone could contemplate fully autonomous weapons? Does she agree that the most important thing is for human beings to make morally based decisions to stay within the law and the only way forward is a full ban?

[Nia Griffith]

The hon. Lady makes a very valid point, which shows why the negotiations are so crucial. We need to define exactly what is meant by LARs and examine that international law to see what we can do to regulate all the appropriate weapons. If we are to make progress on banning LARs, nations need to be clear about exactly what we mean.

We then need to look at what mechanisms could be used. One suggestion would be to use the convention on certain conventional weapons, the mechanism used to make an international legal agreement on a pre-emptive ban on blinding lasers. Another option would be to use the process that led to 107 states adopting the convention on cluster munitions, five years ago last month. That treaty was groundbreaking for three main reasons: first, it banned an entire category of weapons; secondly, it brought a ban into existence before the use of cluster munitions had become widespread; and, thirdly, the treaty process was multilateral, shaped through the initiative and sustained leadership of the Norwegian Government, with a strong partnership between states and organisations working together towards a clear common goal.

The UK needs to be at the forefront of the debate on LARs. Now is the time for further international discussion. Now is the time to encourage a wide range of states to adopt a moratorium on the development and deployment of LARs until a new international legal framework has been developed that takes account of the potential of LARs and lays the basis for discussion on their future regulation or prohibition. I very much hope that we will see the UK taking a lead on this matter.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Alistair Burt)]

I thank the hon. Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith), not only for bringing a very serious matter to the House and explaining it clearly, but for her immense courtesy this afternoon in sending us a copy of her speech, which enabled me to discuss it with officials and therefore answer the four key questions that she has raised.

I thank the hon. Lady for bringing the issue of lethal autonomous robotics before Parliament. It is clear from this debate and the one recently at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that this is an important subject which will inevitably become ever more so as technology develops. Let me clarify the scope of today’s debate. I agree with her that LARs are weapon systems which, once activated, can select and engage targets without any further human intervention. Her definition was correct and it is clearly one step on from drones, which have a human component—I will come back to discuss that in a moment.

Let me be very clear and back up the comments made by my noble Friend Lord Astor in the other place and quoted by the hon. Lady. He stated that

“the operation of weapons systems will always…be under human control”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 March 2013; Vol. 744, c. 960.]

and that

“no planned offensive systems are to have the capability to prosecute targets without involving a human”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 March 2013; Vol. 743, c. WA411.]

Let me reiterate that the Government of the United Kingdom do not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and have no intention of developing them. Such systems are not yet in existence and are not likely to be for many years, if at all. Although a limited number of defensive systems can currently operate in automatic mode, there is always a person involved in setting the parameters of any such mode. As a matter of policy, Her Majesty’s Government are clear that the operation of our weapons will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and of accountability for weapons usage.

By putting that information on the record I hope to make it clear that we share the concern that the hon. Lady has brought before the House, which others share, about possible technological developments. My argument is that the UK believes that the basis of international law governing weapons systems would prevent the development of weapons in the way that she suggests, but whether or not that is the case, the UK’s position on wishing to develop such weapons is absolutely clear.

The United Kingdom always acts fully in accordance with international humanitarian law and international standards. We are committed to upholding the Geneva conventions and their additional protocols and encourage others to do the same. We always ensure that our military equipment is used appropriately and is subject to stringent rules of engagement. I shall discuss that in more detail later.

I thank the hon. Lady for her summary of the report presented by Christof Heyns, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which was discussed in Geneva on 30 May. Let me summarise the report. Mr Heyns highlighted that the “possible” use of lethal autonomous robotics raises far-reaching concerns about the protection of life during war and peace. In his findings, he recommended that states establish national moratoriums on aspects of lethal autonomous robotics and called for the establishment of a high-level panel to produce a policy for the international community on the issue.

The hon. Lady asked whether the Government were willing to accept the four recommendations made in the report. I believe the point she particularly wanted to discuss was the question of why, as she said, the UK was the only state that did not support a moratorium. Let me make things a little clearer, if I may. The UK has unilaterally decided to put in place a restrictive policy whereby we have no plans at present to develop lethal autonomous robotics, but we do not intend to formalise that in a national moratorium. We believe that any system, regardless of its level of autonomy, should only ever be developed or used in accordance with international humanitarian law. We think the Geneva conventions and additional protocols provide a sufficiently robust framework to regulate the development and use of these weapon systems.

As I had the chance to read the hon. Lady’s speech before the debate, I noticed that she used the phrase “Furthermore, robots may never be able to meet the requirements of international humanitarian law”. She is absolutely correct; they will not. We cannot develop systems that would breach international humanitarian law, which is why we are not engaged in the development of such systems and why we believe that the existing systems of international law should prevent their development.

[Tessa Munt]

What is in place to protect against the development of such weapons systems by UK or UK-based companies, whether that is for export or to be taken to another destination, not to be used by us?

[Alistair Burt]

The basis of the Government’s argument, made by me and by my noble Friend in the other place, is that the system of law and conventions that govern the development of weapons would prevent anyone from developing the weapon in such a manner as the hon. Member for Llanelli has suggested. It would not fit export criteria, so I do not think that we are at odds on that. The issue is whether the legal framework is sufficiently robust to prevent that. The United Kingdom, having made its own decision that it is not developing these weapons, believes that the basis of the legal system on weaponry is such as to prevent that development.

Mau Mau Claims (Settlement)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Thursday 6th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Enoch Powell did, indeed, give a remarkable and powerful speech in the debate in 1959, and I read it in preparing for this statement. [Interruption.] I was not born at the time, so I did not read it then. There will be many strong views held about the events of that time, although most of us who are Members of the House now did not have a strong view at the time because we were not around then, but there is a strong tradition in this House going all the way back to the 18th century. In the 1780s, Edmund Burke called Governments to account for colonial misdeeds in India and sought to bring Warren Hastings to trial. There is a long and proud history of this House asserting itself on the errors that have been made during our imperial rule of other countries, and our recognition of these errors today is part of that long tradition.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement. It serves us well to approach this whole matter with sensitivity and humility. There are some fairly serious disputes about the numbers of people involved. The official figures say 11,000 Mau Mau rebels were killed and only 32 white settlers, but David Anderson, professor of African politics at Oxford, says that probably 25,000 people died at the hands of the colonial organisation. I wonder whether there should be a debate about the past, and whether we ought to make sure that adults, some of whom will remember these events, know about what happened, and also that young people learn from this period of history. Might the Foreign Secretary speak to the Education Secretary and consider whether this part of our colonial past, which did not cover us with glory, might be a topic for discussion in schools?

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her remarks. I do not suppose there will ever be universally agreed figures in respect of what happened and how many people were killed in what was such a confused and terrible situation in such a large country. I will refer her points on to my hon. Friends with responsibility for these matters, and the Deputy Leader of the House is present, hearing another bid for parliamentary time and discussion. It is very important for us always to learn, in whatever form, from mistakes of the past. We are recognising that today. Indeed, the abhorrence of torture and ill treatment, and the strictness of the rules we now have against that for everyone working on behalf of the United Kingdom, are part of our recognition that mistakes were made in the past.