Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Caroline Lucas

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 28th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point. I want to take him back to the threshold figure of £18,600, because it is so unfair, so unequal and so unjust. That is not even the minimum wage, so it deliberately splits up families, depending on the wealth of one person in that family. The Supreme Court says it has a particularly harsh effect on citizens who have lived and worked abroad. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is cruelty and callousness at the heart of this Government’s policy?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I absolutely agree. We could spend many hours debating, and highlighting the flaws of, so many of the features of the family migration rules. Another is the fact that this threshold only takes into account the earnings of the UK sponsor; it does not take into account, for example, the potential earnings of those who want to come and join their family members here. So these rules achieve absolutely nothing but keeping families apart—families split apart and destroyed.

Our asylum system also urgently needs important reform: to fix and extend the “move-on period” that forces newly recognised refugees into homelessness and poverty; to end the poverty support rates for asylum seekers and allow them the right to work; and to respect the vote in this House on the Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill to extend family reunion rights.

Data Protection Bill [Lords]

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Caroline Lucas

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 9th May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas]

Like others, I would like to associate myself with the very powerful arguments that have been made in favour of amendment 15, but I want to speak briefly to amendment 16 to extend the debate about the conditions under which someone’s rights can be breached. It would prevent the crime exemption in the Bill being invoked in relation to low-level offences under immigration law.

Few of us would dispute the overall principle that data might be shared in some circumstances—for example, to prevent a serious crime or to apprehend an offender—but when the crimes in question are not serious and arise simply because of someone’s immigration status, we have to question whether the grounds for suspending data protection rights really do stack up. It is clear that the majority of offences under immigration law are not serious crimes. Most result only in a custodial sentence of two years or less, or a fine. Rather, they are the mundane activities of people doing what they must to survive. The effect is already forcing undocumented migrants to avoid sending their children to school, visiting the GP, presenting to homelessness services and seeking social support, for fear they might risk detention and removal by doing so.

Last year, a woman who was five months pregnant went to report being repeatedly raped to the police but was subsequently arrested at a rape crisis centre on immigration grounds. My amendment 16 seeks to better protect her and all others like her whose data protection rights are routinely being breached just because they are undocumented migrants and who are therefore being automatically criminalised just for leading their lives. There must be a firewall between Home Office immigration control and other Departments if we are serious about ending the current hostile immigration environment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I echo the criticisms of the outrageous immigration exemption in the Bill and am pleased to add my name to amendment 15.

Little has been said today about international transfers of personal data by intelligence services, despite the serious concerns raised in Committee. I will therefore speak briefly to new clause 24, which it is all the more important we debate, given the moves by the Trump Administration in the USA to roll back on safeguards on the targeting of drone strikes and the significant increase in their use of lethal force outside armed conflict zones. These developments mean an increased risk of strikes being in breach of international human rights law, and we know that UK intelligence personnel are involved in the transfer of data that could be used in such drone strikes, so it is all the more important that there be safeguards and accountability on when and how information can be transferred and that legal certainty be provided for our personnel.

As the Joint Committee on Human Rights said in its 2016 report,

“we owe it to all those involved in the chain of command for such uses of lethal force…to provide them with absolute clarity about the circumstances in which they will have a defence against any possible future criminal prosecution, including those which might originate from outside the UK.”

The Bill fails to provide those safeguards and clarity. Clause 109 places no realistic restriction on such transfers, referring simply to necessity and proportionality in pursuit of statutory goals. The new clause would provide a clear bar on transfers for use in unlawful operations and introduce accountability and transparency by requiring that written reasons be provided for any transfer thought to be lawful, that there be ministerial sign-off, that certain information be provided to the Information Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and that guidance on transfers be laid before Parliament. The new clause would not hinder but help our personnel working in this area and ensure that the UK is seen as complying with the rule of law and its international obligations. This is an important debate to which we will have to return in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 13 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Destroying or falsifying information and documents etc

“(1) This section applies where a person—

(a) has been given an information notice requiring the person to provide the Commissioner with information, or

(b) has been given an assessment notice requiring the person to direct the Commissioner to a document, equipment or other material or to assist the Commissioner to view information.

(2) It is an offence for the person—

(a) to destroy or otherwise dispose of, conceal, block or (where relevant) falsify all or part of the information, document, equipment or material, or

“(b) to cause or permit the destruction, disposal, concealment, blocking or (where relevant) falsification of all or part of the information, document, equipment or material,

with the intention of preventing the Commissioner from viewing, or being provided with or directed to, all or part of the information, document, equipment or material.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to prove that the destruction, disposal, concealment, blocking or falsification would have occurred in the absence of the person being given the notice.”—(Margot James.)

This new clause would be inserted after Clause 145. It provides that, where the Information Commissioner has given an information notice (see Clause 141) or an assessment notice (see Clause 144) requiring access to information, a document, equipment or material, it is an offence to destroy or otherwise dispose of, conceal, block or (where relevant) falsify it.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Applications in respect of urgent notices

“(1) This section applies where an information notice, an assessment notice or an enforcement notice given to a person contains an urgency statement.

(2) The person may apply to the court for either or both of the following—

(a) the disapplication of the urgency statement in relation to some or all of the requirements of the notice;

(b) a change to the time at which, or the period within which, a requirement of the notice must be complied with.

(3) On an application under subsection (2), the court may do any of the following—

(a) direct that the notice is to have effect as if it did not contain the urgency statement;

(b) direct that the inclusion of the urgency statement is not to have effect in relation to a requirement of the notice;

(c) vary the notice by changing the time at which, or the period within which, a requirement of the notice must be complied with;

(d) vary the notice by making other changes required to give effect to a direction under paragraph (a) or (b) or in consequence of a variation under paragraph (c).

(4) The decision of the court on an application under this section is final.

(5) In this section, “urgency statement” means—

(a) in relation to an information notice, a statement under section141(7)(a),

(b) in relation to an assessment notice, a statement under section144(8)(a) or (8A)(d), and

(c) in relation to an enforcement notice, a statement under section147(8)(a).”—(Margot James.)

This new clause would be inserted after Clause 160. It enables a person who is given an information notice, assessment notice or enforcement which requires the person to comply with it urgently to apply to the court for variation of the timetable for compliance. It replaces the provision in Clauses 159(2) and 160(5) for appeals to the Tribunal. See also Amendments 54, 56 and 60.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 16

Post-review powers to make provision about representation of data subjects

“(1) After the report under section 182(1) is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a) exercise the powers under Article 80(2) of the GDPR in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland,

(b) make provision enabling a body or other organisation which meets the conditions in Article 80(1) of the GDPR to exercise a data subject’s rights under Article 82 of the GDPR in England and Wales and Northern Ireland without being authorised to do so by the data subject, and

(c) make provision described in section182(2)(e) in relation to the exercise in England and Wales and Northern Ireland of the rights of a data subject who is a child.

(2) The powers under subsection (1) include power—

(a) to make provision enabling a data subject to prevent a body or other organisation from exercising, or continuing to exercise, the data subject’s rights;

(b) to make provision about proceedings before a court or tribunal where a body or organisation exercises a data subject’s rights;

(c) to make provision for bodies or other organisations to bring proceedings before a court or tribunal combining two or more claims in respect of a right of a data subject;

(d) to confer functions on a person, including functions involving the exercise of a discretion;

(e) to amend sections162 to164,173,180,194,196 and197;

(f) to insert new sections and Schedules into Part 6 or 7;

(g) to make different provision in relation to England and Wales and in relation to Northern Ireland.

(3) The powers under subsection (1)(a) and (b) include power to make provision in relation to data subjects who are children or data subjects who are not children or both.

(4) The provision mentioned in subsection (2)(b) and (c) includes provision about—

(a) the effect of judgments and orders;

(b) agreements to settle claims;

(c) the assessment of the amount of compensation;

(d) the persons to whom compensation may or must be paid, including compensation not claimed by the data subject;

(e) costs.

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Margot James.)

This new clause would be inserted after Clause 182. It contains the provisions currently in subsections (4) to (7) of Clause 182, modified to take account of the changes made to that Clause by Amendments 61 and 62 (see subsections (1)(c) and (3) of this new Clause).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 17

Reserve forces: data-sharing by HMRC

“(1) The Reserve Forces Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 125 insert—

“125A Supply of contact details by HMRC

(1) This subsection applies to contact details for—

(a) a member of an ex-regular reserve force, or

(b) a person to whom section 66 (officers and former servicemen liable to recall) applies,

which are held by HMRC in connection with a function of HMRC.

(2) HMRC may supply contact details to which subsection (1) applies to the Secretary of State for the purpose of enabling the Secretary of State—

(a) to contact a member of an ex-regular reserve force in connection with the person’s liability, or potential liability, to be called out for service under Part 6;

(b) to contact a person to whom section 66 applies in connection with the person’s liability, or potential liability, to be recalled for service under Part 7.

(3) Where a person’s contact details are supplied under subsection (2) for a purpose described in that subsection, they may also be used for defence purposes connected with the person’s service (whether past, present or future) in the reserve forces or regular services.

(4) In this section, “HMRC” means Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.

125B Prohibition on disclosure of contact details supplied under section 125A

‘(1) A person who receives information supplied under section 125A may not disclose it except with the consent of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (which may be general or specific).

(2) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person reasonably believed—

(a) that the disclosure was lawful, or

(b) that the information had already lawfully been made available to the public.

(4) Subsections (4) to (7) of section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 apply to an offence under this section as they apply to an offence under that section.

(5) Nothing in section 107 or 108 (institution of proceedings and evidence) applies in relation to an offence under this section.

125C Data protection

‘(1) Nothing in section 125A or 125B authorises the making of a disclosure which contravenes the data protection legislation.

(2) In this section, “the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act).”—(Margot James.)

This new clause would be inserted after Clause 186. It provides for HMRC to supply the Secretary of State with the contact details of members of the ex-regular reserve force and former members of the armed forces so that they may be contacted regarding their liability to be called out or recalled for service under the Reserved Forces Act 1996. The details supplied may also be used for defence purposes connected with their service in the forces (whether past, present or future). It is an offence for the details supplied to be disclosed without the consent of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Caroline Lucas

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Thank you, Mr Hanson, for the opportunity to join hon. Members in their criticism of the extraordinary breadth of the Henry VIII powers contained in this Bill and the inadequacy of existing scrutiny procedures for dealing with them. I welcome the host of amendments that have been tabled by hon. Members to help remedy these concerns.

The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) helpfully identified that there are two different types of amendments that seek to improve the situation. One group seeks to limit the scope of the powers so that they are used only in appropriate circumstances and only for the specific purpose of correcting tightly defined deficiencies. A second group of amendments seeks to enhance our ability to scrutinise the statutory instruments that Ministers will make using these powers. All those ideas are welcome. If several of them were passed this evening, they could make this part of the Bill a little bit more palatable.

I will focus on a third type of amendment that throws up a different issue in relation to clause 7—an issue for which I am not sure we have found the perfect remedy. Rather than limiting the use of Henry VIII powers or strengthening oversight of them, this group of amendments would require that the Government take action to ensure that certain important provisions of EU law can operate effectively after withdrawal. After all, clause 7 expressly anticipates—in fact, the whole thing is premised on the fact—that there will be chunks of retained EU law that will not operate effectively if deficiencies are not prevented, remedied or mitigated.

The express purpose of this Bill is saving and incorporating EU law as it stands on withdrawal day, but this purpose would be undermined considerably if parts of that EU law were allowed, whether by accident or design, simply to fester away uncorrected and therefore unable to operate effectively. It is for those reasons that a number of amendments have been tabled positively requiring action to be taken, including new clauses 62 and 63 on environmental law, amendment 131 on the rights of EU citizens and amendment 385 on European protection orders. I will focus on a similar example—new clause 53.

New clause 53 would require changes to the immigration rules to retain the effectiveness of the Dublin regulation. Dublin III is far from a perfect set of rules, but it has the welcome goal of ensuring that an asylum claim is determined in the most appropriate EU member state. Its most positive feature is the ability for a person who has made a claim in one member state to seek to have that claim transferred and determined by another member state—for example, where a young asylum seeker has a sibling, aunt or uncle in that country. For all the flaws of the Dublin regulation, those provisions are surely worth saving, regardless of how negotiations proceed.

Even though the rules are retained by the Bill in theory, Dublin III would clearly struggle to operate effectively unless corrected under clause 7. To prevent that, new clause 53 is designed to ensure that those powers are used so that “take charge” requests can continue to be made in the UK. Going further, for one limited and vulnerable group, the new clause seeks to bring the definition of family contained in UK family reunion rules in line with the definition of family in the Dublin regulations. It would mean that an unaccompanied child could seek family reunion with a broader group of family members without needing to make dangerous journeys to Europe in order to claim asylum and make a Dublin request. Currently—with the exception of when joining parents—alternative options for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children under the immigration rules are too restrictive and costly. As a result, they are rarely used. As UNICEF makes clear, a failure to take action risks adding to the number of unaccompanied children forced to take dangerous journeys with smugglers and traffickers in order to reach close family in the UK. That is why new clause 53 is so important.

I turn finally to a more general question. For every amendment or new clause that we are debating today requiring that retained and incorporated EU law in a particular area must be corrected using these powers, there will be large swathes of other EU laws where there is no such requirement. The question that occurs to me is: what happens if, by oversight or choice, the Government do not fix those provisions, rendering key measures useless? What are our courts going to do if confronted, for example, by a citizen seeking to establish rights under retained EU law when that retained law is riddled with deficiencies? Is the court supposed to try to make that work? Does the person lose their ability to exercise that right? I do not think that this issue has been touched on in the debate. In short, I wonder whether we still have work to do to find the appropriate and comprehensive solution in this Bill.

Should there be a mechanism, for example, to put Ministers under an obligation or duty to ensure that retained EU laws operate effectively? Should our courts be required to interpret retained EU laws in such a way as to make them operate effectively wherever possible? Should there be a procedure to allow courts to flag up rules they have found cannot operate effectively? More modestly perhaps, do we simply need to require the Government to publish a list of all the deficiencies they have found in retained EU law and to detail what, if any, action they are taking to remedy them? That is, do we require the Government to list not only the statutory instruments they intend to table under clause 7, but what deficiencies they have identified that they are not going to rectify in that way? I am concerned that, without such changes, Parliament’s intention of retaining EU law and an efficient and effective statute book after exit day may not prove as effective as we would wish.

[Caroline Lucas]

I rise to speak to the provisions in my name, and particularly to new clause 27, which I hope to press to a vote later this evening. I apologise to Members for being absent from the debate for a couple of hours while I was in a Committee.

New clause 27 aims to preserve the high level of environmental protection that comes with membership of the EU. As we have discussed tonight, there is a very real risk that Brexit will create a big gap when it comes to the enforcement, in particular, of environmental law and standards in this country. The European Commission’s monitoring of member states’ action to implement and comply with EU law, backed up by the European Court of Justice’s ability to impose effective financial sanctions, have been an absolutely vital driver in pressing for and delivering environmental improvements in the UK. The example of clean air in London is just one case study that makes that point. In the absence of an effective domestic enforcement regime replicating the vital roles and functions currently performed by the Commission and the ECJ, it is difficult to see how the Government can deliver on their manifesto pledge to leave the environment in a better state than they found it.

On day 2 of the Committee, on 15 November, we had a good debate on the case for fully transposing the EU environmental principles into UK law. The debate was ultimately fruitless in terms of amending the Bill, but we heard a great deal from both sides of the Chamber about the importance of the EU environmental principles to the future protection of the environment in this country.

Perhaps most significantly, environmentalists such as myself were encouraged by a rather remarkable double act, with nods and comedic timing, of the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. From that, we learned a little more about the Secretary of State’s plan, first announced on 12 November, to consult on a new independent statutory body to

“advise and challenge government and potentially other public bodies on environmental legislation…stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and enforce standards.”

More to the point, we were led to believe that the Secretary of State now intends to introduce an environmental protection Bill to establish an environmental protection body with prosecutorial powers and independence from Government that is charged with policing and enforcing a national policy statement incorporating the EU environmental principles.

That amounts to a welcome recognition on the part of the Secretary of State of the risk of an ever-widening governance gap on environmental protection after the UK leaves the EU if there is not a domestic enforcement regime. Taken at face value, it also seems to be an acknowledgment that the new environmental protection body must be absolutely independent of Government; must be prosecutorial and investigatory so that it can hold the Government and other public bodies to account, including through the courts if necessary; and must be robust and durable so that it cannot easily be abolished or have its functions eroded by stealth.

However, what we still do not know is whether this is a concrete plan that will soon be put into practice so as to ensure the protection of environmental standards in the UK from March 2019, or something that the Secretary of State alone ruminates about while in the bath.