Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Stewart Hosie and Greg Clark

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

I will deal with the important recommendation made by my hon. Friend’s commission very shortly.

For the sake of completeness, let me summarise the Bill’s other main provisions.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The Minister said that electrification would work because the regulator—the PRA or the FCA where a financial institution is not PRA-regulated—will be given the power to ensure core services. Does he see any issues arising if the PRA and the FCA perhaps take a different approach to what they might do to the same institution? Is there a concern about two different regulators looking at different institutions on the same matter?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which we considered in drafting the Bill. We would expect all of these activities and institutions to be regulated by the PRA. The FCA was included in the Bill as a means of ensuring that if some other activities were to take place in the future—although we do not envisage that happening—it would not be necessary to come back to the House. That is our clear intention.

Let me summarise what the Bill does include before I go on to talk about what it does not. As proposed by the independent commission, the Bill provides that deposits protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme—the deposits of individuals and small businesses up to £85,000—will be preferential debts in insolvency. The Bill provides the regulator with the power to require ring-fenced banks to maintain a buffer of at least 17% of what is referred to as the primary loss absorbing capacity—that is, equity, other non-equity capital instruments, and debt that can be written down or converted into equity in the event that a bank fails. This allows losses to fall on the bank’s wholesale creditors—sophisticated financial investors—rather than on ordinary taxpayers, as was the case with RBS.

A legitimate question arises as to whether additional loss absorbency requirements should apply, in an international financial centre such as the United Kingdom, to the overseas operations of UK-based global banks. This has been much debated in the House, both before the parliamentary commission and elsewhere. It is obviously right that where the overseas businesses of a UK-based bank could pose a threat to UK financial stability, or to the British taxpayer, that bank should issue loss-absorbing debt against the entirety of its group operations. Equally, where overseas units do not pose such a threat they should be exempt from loss-absorbing debt requirements, not least to avoid creating a false impression that the UK somehow stands behind those overseas businesses.

The question that has exercised the commission is this: who should decide? The Government have listened to the Financial Services Authority and the parliamentary commission on how that should work. We agree that the requirement should follow the strategy for managing the failure of each group, known as the resolution strategy. Where a UK parent company will provide support to resolve failing overseas operations, the regulator must ensure that the parent company issues loss-absorbing debt against the entire group. However, where a bank’s overseas subsidiaries would be resolved locally by overseas regulators without reliance on the UK parent, the parent company should not be required to issue loss-absorbing debt against those overseas subsidiaries. Crucially, it will not be the bank’s call but the decision of the regulator and the Treasury as to whether group primary loss-absorbing capacity—PLAC—should be held.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

The resolution plans have to be agreed between the regulator and the Treasury, so both will have that responsibility.

[Stewart Hosie]

Just to get some clarity on the previous point about the relationship with overseas regulators, if both the Treasury and the regulator are required to be convinced of the plan, how will that work in the relationship with, say, the single supervisory mechanism in Europe? Will it, too, not be required to be convinced, or at least will discussions not have to take place, to determine first where liability might lie and then whether the resolution plans are adequate?

[Greg Clark]

The reason for arranging this through the resolution plans is that they should be agreed in advance and everyone should be clear who will be responsible. It is no good the Treasury or the regulator in this country thinking that an overseas jurisdiction will pick up the bill if they were actually blissfully ignorant of it, so the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there has to be that clarity.

As I promised on 4 February, I have provided Parliament with drafts of the principal statutory instruments so that the House, while scrutinising the Bill in detail, can understand more clearly how the powers that the Bill grants are intended to be used. As a further aid to scrutiny, I will also make available to the House, in advance of consideration in Committee, a so-called Keeling schedule giving a consolidated text of those parts of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that will be amended by the Bill, including the amendments the Bill will make.

Let me turn to some of the relatively few recommendations of either the Independent Commission on Banking or the parliamentary commission on which the Government have not been persuaded. There are four main areas to consider. The first is the timing of scrutiny, which the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) mentioned. I hope that hon. Members will accept, from the process I described earlier, that these proposals have already benefitted from an exceptional degree of consideration, both in the amount and, if I may say so, in the august quality of its scrutineers. It will soon be three years since the Vickers commission began its work, and it is less than two years until all the secondary legislation must be enacted if this work is to be completed in this Parliament, as I think we all hope it will be. The Bill is comparatively short—20 clauses— and the time envisaged for its Committee stage is not unreasonable for consideration of all the amendments proposed by the parliamentary commission in its report published today.

However, I know that the parliamentary commission has other advice to give, and I welcome its commitment to produce its final report by the middle of May. Once we have received the commission’s advice, we will of course want the chance to be able to take it. I therefore give this commitment: subject to the usual channels, I will make sure that this House has enough opportunity to consider and debate whatever further recommendations the commission makes in its final report.

Financial Services

Debate between Stewart Hosie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 6th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend speaks with great expertise. He has worked in and represented with distinction the City of London over the years, and more than anyone he recognises the importance of it re-establishing its prestige. Part of doing that and of sending a signal to the current generation working in financial services is to say clearly that the misdeeds of the past need to be put right. Where people or small businesses up and down the country have suffered detriment, we should not turn a blind eye. We should be rigorous in holding people to account, and acknowledging the harm done to businesses that have suffered from past mis-selling, and when we do that we should look—as in this case—to recover the costs of such mis-selling from the perpetrators. The Chancellor has set out that principle and I expect the banks to follow it in the months and years ahead.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I welcome the statement and particularly the fact that the fines will be paid by the banks and not the taxpayer. I also welcome the fact that the British Bankers Association will no longer have anything to do with LIBOR. However, this is not just about who calculates the LIBOR rate, but how it is calculated. Will the Minister update the House and say how we will have transparency and the confidence to know that rates submitted by the banks are those at which they can borrow money, rather than the acts of fiction, fixes and fiddles that we saw over many years with many banks?

Banking Reform

Debate between Stewart Hosie and Greg Clark

Monday 4th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My right hon. Friend makes a forceful point. The legislation is about the future. It is quite right that it should proceed with consideration and that we should not introduce things that might have unintended consequences without adequate consideration in this House. The Government are obviously the major shareholder in RBS. It is important that RBS should be returned as swiftly as possible to private hands. The current situation is far from ideal, and I know that my right hon. Friend shares our ambition on that.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

It is right that the taxpayer should never again be on the hook for the bad decisions taken by investment banks or the bad regulation that allowed them to be taken. I therefore welcome the ring-fencing and the provision to separate a given bank if necessary. However, I am not yet convinced of the need for the reserve power to separate any bank. Does the Minister envisage any circumstances under which the Government might include the reserve provision to separate a bank in this or future legislation?