Surrogacy Law and Legal Parenthood

Steve Yemm Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2026 Westminster Hall

[Steve Yemm (Mansfield) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Pritchard.

I will begin by recognising the very understandable motivation behind this petition. People who pursue surrogacy do so because they desperately want a family, and nobody should doubt the love that intended parents have for the children they raise. However, I cannot support the change proposed by the petition. The question before us is not whether intended parents are real parents, nor whether they should ultimately receive legal recognition; the question is whether the woman who has carried and given birth to a child should lose her legal status as that child’s mother from the moment of birth. I do not believe that she should.

In our society, some things should never be reduced to questions of contract, individual choice or intention, and motherhood is certainly one of them. Pregnancy cannot simply be a service provided by one person for another, a woman’s body cannot merely be the means by which someone else’s parental intentions are fulfilled and the relationship created through nine months of pregnancy and childbirth cannot be written off because an agreement was reached beforehand.

At present, our law recognises that reality: the woman who carries and gives birth to a child is the legal mother. Intended parents can subsequently acquire legal parenthood through a parental order, but crucially, that process cannot normally begin until six weeks after the birth and requires the mother’s consent. Some describe that as outdated and difficult bureaucracy, but I describe it as a safeguard. Before conception, we cannot know with certainty how a woman will feel after pregnancy, childbirth and holding the baby whom she carried for the first time. Consent matters enormously, but genuine consent must include one having the ability to change one’s mind when the reality is fundamentally different from what could have been understood beforehand. Consent given before pregnancy cannot simply become irrevocable after childbirth.

Another important question is that of independent oversight. Parental orders allow the courts to consider the circumstances of the arrangement, require the mother’s consent and provide for CAFCASS involvement. That protection becomes particularly important in the international dimension of surrogacy, which other Members have mentioned. In the first 11 months of 2025, 139 parental order applications were made for babies born through surrogacy in the UK, compared with 357 for babies born through surrogacy abroad. Therefore, we should think carefully before weakening the safeguards in our law. If parental orders take too long, let us consider making them quicker, and if intended parents face practical difficulties, let us try to address them. We can make the system work better without changing the principle at its heart.

Family, motherhood and childhood cannot be understood through the language of intention and contract, and it is particularly important that the law continues to recognise the reality of motherhood at the moment of birth. A woman who has carried and given birth to a child should not find that her legal relationship with that child has already been extinguished. I cannot support automatically recognising intended parents as the legal parents from birth. The six-week period after birth, the mother’s consent and independent judicial oversight are not antiquated obstacles to modern families, but protections for women and children—important safeguards that I believe are worth keeping.

--- Later in debate ---

[Josh Newbury (Cannock Chase) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson), for opening this debate so thoroughly and thoughtfully. When I read Adam’s petition, I was taken back to the moment that I became a dad. My husband and I fostered and then adopted our children. I remember holding my daughter and son for the first time like it was yesterday. In those moments, there was no question in my mind that I wanted to be their dad, and that is what I am. That is why I was struck by Adam’s description of the moment he and his partner first saw their baby. They became dads in that moment too. However, as my hon. Friend set out, the law does not recognise that reality.

I understand why the current system came about. The rights and autonomy of surrogates and the need to safeguard children should never be brushed aside. Judicial oversight is also important, and reform should not mean removing protections for the surrogate or the child. However, I think we should ask whether the current system gets that balance right.

We now have a situation where almost 1,000 children were born through surrogacy in 2025—roughly double the number a decade earlier. For families who choose surrogacy, the journey to having a child has often already been extraordinarily long. So once that child is born and is being cared for by their intended parents, it is reasonable to ask whether the law should leave their legal parenthood unresolved for months. That has practical implications, which I remember from my time fostering, such as not being able to give consent for something as simple as a vaccination or blood test.

There is a practical point here about our courts. We rightly ask our family courts to deal with cases where there is a genuine dispute, where a child’s welfare needs judicial consideration or where someone’s rights need to be protected. But if a surrogacy arrangement has been properly assessed before the birth, the intended parents have undergone the appropriate checks, the surrogate has had any independent advice and counselling she may need and the necessary safeguards are in place, do we really need to go through a court process to establish legal parenthood?

[Steve Yemm]

My hon. Friend neglected to mention the consent of the mother in his list. Does he agree that that is also of paramount importance?

[Josh Newbury]

Yes, absolutely. I am making the case that where everybody involved—of course, the mother is paramount in that—is happy with the arrangement and wants to go ahead with it, it could happen ahead of time. My personal belief is that there should be a cooling-off period, even if there is a reform, to ensure space for mothers to change their minds. I am making the point that the system could be far more efficient. I am not suggesting that we remove the courts from the process altogether—they should be there when needed—but a properly regulated system could allow straightforward cases to be dealt with before birth while retaining a route to the courts where there is disagreement, a safeguarding concern, consent changes or judicial oversight is required. That would not weaken safeguards; it would allow the courts to focus their time and attention on the cases where their intervention matters most.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member always comes to these debates well prepared and well briefed. I think the point he is making, which we can all agree on, is that this is an incredibly complex area that we cannot rush to legislate on, nor should we seek to water down the clear protections that currently exist.

[Steve Yemm]

We now prohibit commercial arrangements in the UK, yet we allow intended parents to travel overseas to exploit that type of arrangement. I am interested to know whether the shadow Minister thinks that that is a morally coherent position, and whether we should be looking at the rights of UK citizens to exploit commercial surrogacy overseas.