Industrial Strategy

Debate between Steve Baker and George Kerevan

Thursday 20th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

It is with considerable trepidation that I rise to speak in a debate led by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Chris White). The last time I did so, I think I persuaded the Government to accept only the first clause of his three-clause social value Bill, but he kindly asked me to serve on the Bill Committee, by which time the civil service had vastly expanded it into something of a Christmas tree Bill. I very much hope that on this occasion there will be a different outcome, but it was of course a great pleasure to serve on that Committee.

Competition on the merits is a perfectly reasonable industrial strategy for the Government to adopt. It is the one that creates the most wealth and it has been proven to lift people out of poverty. I encourage any Member and anyone listening to have a look at the website HumanProgress.org and its Twitter feed for bite-sized snippets that illustrate just how well entrepreneurship, strong property rights and freedom to contract in a market economy not only facilitate production but engage other social forces that are healthy. It is social co-operation through the mechanism of competition in the market. Other mechanisms have always brought about poverty and misery. The goal of the Government’s domestic policy should be to lower anti-competitive market distortions, and it is on that concept that I wish to focus my remarks.

Anti-competitive market distortions adversely affect economies and contribute to high costs. If we reduce distortions in both the UK and the world we could, according to the Legatum Institute’s productivity simulator, see a significant increase in productivity and public welfare. One of the great problems with domestic suggestions is that they increase the level of ACMDs, which can lead to higher costs and push more people into poverty.

I would like to offer a taxonomy of ACMDs from a paper in the competition law journal, Concurrences— No. 4 of 2014—entitled, “The effect of anticompetitive market distortions (ACMDs) on global markets” by Singham et al. The authors classify those distortions into six areas, and I offer them not as a menu from which interventionists might pluck their preferred action, but as a description of areas in which Governments take policy choices that push people into poverty by prejudicing competition.

The first and most obvious is the type 1 distortion, described as

“government laws, regulations or practices that eliminate competition completely. Examples might include a local content regulation that eliminates foreign production from competition, or a capital adequacy regulation set so high that some banks are forced to exit the market.”

That produces monopoly or oligopoly.

Type 2 distortions are

“government laws, regulations or practices that lessen competition. These are laws, regulations or practices that make markets less competitive, but do not necessarily foreclose competitors from the market entirely.”

Those distortions

“elevate the costs of certain companies.”

[George Kerevan]

I thank my colleague on the Treasury Committee for giving way. Does he accept that there is a middle way whereby Government can encourage competition, as we have seen with the superb Catapult centres, which are an example of an industrial strategy that works? By offering prizes for competitive solutions to technical problems, it is possible to create the ecology that the hon. Gentleman seeks.

[Mr Baker]

Well of course, the great prize in a free market should be a profit, which one is allowed to keep and invest in further production. I do not wish to bore the hon. Gentleman or the House, but by the time I get to point 5, he will see that I will turn to competition authorities.

I was saying that type 2 distortions that lessen competition create dead-weight costs in the economy. Examples would include distribution laws that increase costs for certain suppliers. Types 2a and 2b can be split up—[Interruption]—but I shall not go through them all. The hon. Gentleman has generously indicated that reading from this fascinating paper is perhaps not the most engaging speech for him, so I shall cut some of it down.

Type 3 distortions

“apply different rules to different firms”.

One would have thought that in a society governed by the rule of law, no one would stoop so low, yet they do. Other countries around the world—particularly, I am afraid, India and the Philippines—have such regulations.

Type 4 distortions

“are largely caused by state-owned enterprises”,

which include “government privileges in licensing” and distortions relating to the pricing practices of state-owned enterprises and to “abuse of regulatory process”; while type 5 are

“largely due to action or inaction by competition agencies”.

I will happily share with the hon. Gentleman some of the detail on how competition authorities, either by acts of omission or commission, fail properly to promote competition.

Type 6 distortions are

“caused by anticompetitive state aid or support”

whereby firms are given

“subsidies and other subventions that may or may not be anticompetitive”.

The point is that it is now well known in academic literature that various categories of Government interventions make us poorer. They can be subjected to a taxonomy, and their costs can be estimated—[Interruption.] I apologise if the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) does not like me using a particular word.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan]

He’s read his Adam Smith.

[Mr Baker]

I have; I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, my colleague on the Treasury Committee, for saying that. I absolutely have, but perhaps not the same extent that he has. I certainly cannot quote the passage that I know he has in mind.

I say to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central that I certainly did not suggest that a lack of competition is due only to the Government. I think she has applied her own ideas about what I stand for in order to come to that conclusion. I shall certainly read Hansard very closely tomorrow to see whether I suggested that. What I am suggesting is that in a taxonomy of six different categories of anti-competitive market distortion set out in a serious journal of competition law, two sub-categories of one category relate to mistakes that can provably be seen to be made by competition authorities. They are not perfect; no human institution is perfect, including competition authorities.

We are undergoing a process of becoming more open to trade, as indeed we should—seeking comparative advantage, seeking to supply new markets, and seeking to buy from new markets in order to drive down prices. However, the experience of trade negotiators whom I have consulted is that if we go and talk to nations in which the largest segment of the economy is agriculture, we find that we cannot do a deal with them if we take agriculture off the table. Why? Because of the extent to which we subsidise it. We must ensure that agriculture is well looked after, within the expectations that the Government have set; we must ensure we can continue to supply food. What we must not do, though, is try to negotiate with other nations if we ourselves are substantially distorting our own domestic markets in such a way that they cannot hope to compete with us.

I want to impress on the Government—there is substantial literature about this issue—that it is conceivable that both domestic and global productivity could be radically improved for the long term by means of a productivity and consumer welfare Act, which would entrench the very best of competition policy in British law in order to eliminate anti-competitive market distortion.

Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation

Debate between Steve Baker and George Kerevan

Tuesday 22nd March 2016 Commons Chamber

[George Kerevan]

Indeed, and I welcome all the supply-side measures, but—[Interruption.] Wait for it! We have had five Budgets in the past 15 months. Why did those measures not appear in the last four of them? In fact, if we count today as well as last week, we have had six Budgets in that time. Why did those measures not appear before? This is not about the Treasury officials, who are bright men and women; this is about the fact that there is no strategy apart from trying to run a budget surplus in a particular year, because the Chancellor knows that if he does not deliver in 2020, what is left of his reputation after this week will be in shreds.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I should like to draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to page 2 of the Red Book. It states:

“This is precisely why the UK has been working through its long-term economic plan. Since 2010 the plan has been focussed on reducing the deficit, while delivering the supply side reforms necessary to improve long-term productivity growth.”

Will he at least concede that the Chancellor has in his Red Book precisely the kind of strategy that he is criticising him for not possessing?

[George Kerevan]

I cannot accept that. There is a tension in the Chancellor’s mind. It is like good and evil sitting on either shoulder. One side is telling him to run a budget surplus, because that is an easy road to take. That is not badly thought out. Given the number of rules that Chancellors have thought up over the years and then failed to implement, running a budget surplus is an extremely simple rule. It is just too crude, however. That argument vies with the supply-side strategy.

Following on from the question from the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), another friend from the Treasury Select Committee, let us look at what the Office for Budget Responsibility says in its report about how the Budget supply-side measures will work. It states:

“We also expect smaller positive contributions to potential output growth over the next five years from population growth, while average hours worked are expected to trend down over time.”

With a decrease in average hours, in input and in population growth, where is the productivity increase going to come from? I should like to hear the answer from the Chancellor.