Repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateStephen Twigg
Main Page: Stephen Twigg (Labour (Co-op) - Liverpool, West Derby)Department Debates - View all Stephen Twigg's debates with the Department for Education
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberActually, the power to call a general election is a poisoned chalice for a Prime Minister: if they win it is great, but if they lose they generally get the chop because they made the wrong decision. Under the old system, Conservative campaign headquarters told its candidates that there were only so many Thursdays—which, by convention, we used—and only so many days of the year, because of summer days and autumn, on which we could have a general election. When it comes down to it, there are only four or five dates a Prime Minister can choose from. A Prime Minister has the seals of office from the Queen and the responsibility to discharge a Government programme. If someone has to decide, I would prefer it to be the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
The hon. Gentleman is making a thoughtful speech. He has spoken of the poisoned chalice, but what about Margaret Thatcher in 1983 and 1987, and Tony Blair in 2001 and 2005? Is he suggesting that partisan considerations were not at play in the choice to go after four rather than five years in those four cases?
I am perfectly sure that, in normal politics, some incumbents have a slight advantage. Clearly, both Mrs Thatcher and Tony Blair used it to the maximum. One election was delayed by foot and mouth, so events can intervene and cause a delay, if everyone agrees to it. At the time, there was consensus across the House that it would have been impossible to have a general election. I remember driving through Devon and seeing pyres of the carcases of animals being burned. That showed the British system being flexible to deal with something that emerged very quickly.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) and the other Members on both sides of the House on securing the debate. It is a debate of great constitutional significance, as we have heard. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 repealed an important and long-standing aspect of the royal prerogative which allowed Prime Ministers to dissolve Parliament when they saw fit. I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen). I found myself in agreement with pretty much everything he said this afternoon and I will do my best not to repeat it.
The hon. Gentleman has just referred to the repeal of the prerogative. Does he believe that if the Act were repealed, either under the motion or in 2020 under the provisions of section 7, that the prerogative would revive? I imagine that he has had a chance to look at that issue.
I will return to that issue, which relates directly to a point that the hon. Gentleman made. He referred to the review, and I welcome the fact that there will be a review, but I am certainly not persuaded by anything that I have heard today that it would make sense to do what the motion says and repeal the Act. I would like to set out the reasons why.
The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) suggested that Labour had supported a fixed-term Parliament because of our predicament following the general election in 2010. The problem with that argument is that it was in our manifesto prior to the 2010 general election. Labour was committed to a fixed-term Parliament. Our view was to have a four-year fixed-term Parliament, and we were persuaded by our review of policy in preparing our manifesto of the democratic case for having a four-year fixed-term Parliament.
The fact is that we fought an election in 2010 on a manifesto commitment to move to a fixed-term Parliament. That was a long overdue reform and I am delighted that my party committed to that in 2010.
Will the hon. Gentleman also acknowledge that the commitment was in the Liberal Democrat manifesto, which is why it was in the coalition agreement?
Absolutely. I wonder whether the motion should have been worded, “That this House supports the repeal of the coalition agreement”, because most of the speeches from Conservative Members seem to be more about rehearsing debates about the coalition than the issue before us.
Fundamentally, this debate is about the power of the Executive in Parliament. I believe that the Act enhances the role of the House by removing the ability to dissolve Parliament whenever a Prime Minister saw fit. That seems to be the absolutely central argument in favour of a fixed-term Parliament. The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) talked about voter choice, but the system prior to fixed-term Parliaments did not give voters more choice; it gave choice to the Prime Minister and the leader of the party in government. That is not a democratic argument at all. In a modern democracy we should not accept that form of unaccountable power. The Act imposes constraints that give more power to this House versus the Executive.
It is the pressure exerted at the point we reach a confidence motion that demonstrates what is going on outside as well as inside. Had there been a similar situation over, for example, the Maastricht treaty, I have no doubt that there would have been a resurgence of voter opinion at that time. I think it is democratic, not the other way round.
As the hon. Gentleman said in his speech, the Act retains the ability of the House to pass motions of no confidence in the Government of the day. That safety valve to which he refers still exists.
I do not accept that. However, if the motion were to say that we should review that aspect of the Act, it would have a stronger basis. The motion says that we should repeal the entire Act. I have not heard an argument that persuades me that we should do so.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I will give way one more time but then I need to be able to make my argument.
I am very grateful. If the hon. Gentleman accepts that the two thirds majority could be reviewed, is he not accepting that the Act does not work? As soon as it is a normal majority, the Government of the day have the ability to call an election whenever they want.
I simply do not accept that, because there is still the provision within the Act for confidence motions on the basis of a simple majority. We are only at the tail-end of the first Parliament in which the Act operates. It makes sense to say, “Let this run its course for this Parliament and the next and then have a review.” That is a sensible way of making constitutional reform.
No, I am not going to give way again.
The previous position gave the Prime Minister and the party of the Prime Minister an enormous advantage. Opportunistically timed elections allow Governments to ask voters to assess their performance at the time most favourable for that party. Research shows very clearly that British Prime Ministers from both main parties have made extensive use of this power, to time elections for reasons of partisan advantage. Just under 60% of our post-war elections in this country have been called early by the Prime Minister of the day.
It is inevitable under that previous system that partisan advantage played a part in prime ministerial decisions about when to call an election. When a Government party has been confident of its re-election, the Prime Minister would usually go to the country after four years, rather than five. As I said in an intervention, Margaret Thatcher did so successfully in 1983 and 1987 and Tony Blair did the same in 2001 and 2005. Of course it does not always work, as was pointed out. Harold Wilson went to the country in 1970 expecting he would make use of his lead in the opinion polls and be re-elected, and he was not. Nevertheless, his intention was to go early because he thought he would win.
Parties that are less confident of their electoral position have tended to continue into their fifth year, leaving their reckoning with the electorate until the latest possible date. We saw that happen in 1997 and in 2010. It cannot be right that the governing body, of whatever party, has this massive in-built advantage.
Research from Oxford university suggests that strategically timed elections have allowed governing parties to achieve a bonus in elections over the past 70 years of about 6% in public support. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act creates a more equitable electoral playing field among the parties of Government and those of Opposition, which can only be healthy for our democracy.
It is now nearly 40 years since Lord Hailsham warned of the dangers of an “elected dictatorship”, with powers increasingly centralised with the Executive. Fixed-term Parliaments are one—only one—of the ways we can counteract that, by taking away the Prime Minister’s greatest chip: the ability to threaten a recalcitrant minority coalition partner, their own Back Benchers, or troublesome Opposition parties with the Dissolution of Parliament. That can be done at the behest not even of the party of Government, but of the leader of that party, the Prime Minister.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North that in the longer term there is the possibility— I do not put it any higher than that, as I am a realist—that fixed-term Parliaments can help contribute to a different style of politics. A greater responsibility of the Executive to Parliament demands a more pluralist style of governance. Some, like the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), clearly do not like the idea of pluralism. The idea that not all the knowledge and wisdom lies in his own party is clearly alien to him, but I think there are many in the British public who actually quite like the idea that people can sit down together and work together in the national interest. People get very frustrated with politics when we fall into petty tribal battles, and prefer grown-up debate about the issues.
No, as I have given way to the hon. Gentleman already.
More often in this place, we can work together to try to find more common ground. Fixed-term Parliaments will make that more likely.
There is a legitimate debate to be had on the right length of a fixed-term Parliament. As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell) reminded us, in the 19th century the Chartists wanted annual elections and Parliaments; it was the one Chartist demand that was never implemented. Our manifesto in 2010 committed to four years, and, as my hon. Friend said, the length of time in New Zealand is three years. However, I think there is a good case—my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North made this case very powerfully—that a term of five years can have a stabilising effect on our politics, ensuring that Governments can make some important strategic and long-term decisions in the national interest, so I think it is right that we allow the five-year fixed-term Parliament to bed in. We can review it after two Parliaments, as the legislation allows, but it is far too early for us to consider repeal of the legislation.
So if Labour gets an overall majority, it will not repeal the Act and it will stay in for the full five years.
Absolutely. We supported fixed-term Parliaments in our manifesto in 2010, and our policy remains one of support for fixed-term Parliaments. We are not committed to the repeal of this legislation, which is why I am speaking against this motion, and why I will vote against it if there is a Division.
Yes, let us have the review that is promised. It makes sense to have that review, but I have heard nothing today that persuades me that there is a case to repeal what is actually a very important and long overdue piece of legislation that rebalances our constitution and takes power away from the Prime Minister of the day and gives it to this House. That is a positive reform and I urge the Minister to stick with it.