National Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Stephen McPartland and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that point. I understand that our responsibility is to scrutinise the legislation to make sure that, as the hon. Member for Dundee East made clear, we do not open up a can of worms that can lead to greater and greater unintended consequences, but the reality is that the provision is to be a last resort.

If we are talking practically, counter-terrorism police are responsible for enforcing STPIMs. The amount of resources required to enforce and monitor a TPIM or STPIM is so great and so large that, as Members can imagine, it is not something that any of the agencies or anybody in Government wants to do, so it is not something that we will look to push. First and foremost, this is about prosecution by any means possible.

To give some kind of hope and clarity, I would like to make the point that the number of TPIMS currently in use is less than four. The number of TPIMs that have been used throughout the 10 years of their existence is less than the clause number that we started on today. I hope that gives some reassurance on how limited the measures will be, and on how few occasions they will be used.

We have been looking at the specific time limit, and we are including a specific condition to have a maximum of five years for the duration of an STPIM. Again, that is to mirror what is in the TPIM legislation. Additionally, subsection (4) requires the Secretary of State to publish factors that she considers are appropriate to take into account when deciding whether to restrict a person’s movement in the UK—for example, ensuring that they have access to appropriate medical facilities.

Part 1 to schedule 4 sets out 16 measures. Right hon. and hon. Members will know there are 17 measures in TPIM legislation for differences around drug testing, but we do not believe that is applicable in this case. The measures have to be tailored to the specific threat that an individual poses.

I want to touch on the polygraph measure, as it has been raised by a number of colleagues. It is designed to allow the Secretary of State to require an individual to take a polygraph test at a specific date, time and location. The purpose of the measure is to assist operational partners to assess whether an individual is complying with the other measures under their STPIM. The outcome of the session may be used to make changes to the individual’s suite of measures—for example, removing or adding specific measures to prevent or restrict their involvement in state threat activity. Again, this measure is expected to be used exceedingly rarely.

Let me reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that the polygraph session cannot under any circumstances be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution. I am stating on the record that polygraph measures cannot be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution, and I hope that that provides reassurance.

[Mr Jones]

I am grateful for that clarification, but what happens if someone gets a negative polygraph test and has actually broken their STPIM? Surely it will be used as an evidential test, because they have not complied with their conditions.

[Stephen McPartland]

Under the way the law system works, that might provide some kind of information, but it will not be used as evidence. The operational partners would then have to go off and identify the evidence in order to find out how they could do that, because breaching a notice is a criminal offence, so they would need the evidence in order to then go to court to demonstrate that.

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[Mr Jones]

I understand what the Minister is saying, but I have a real problem with this; I think the Government are opening up an argument for lawyers who want to defend people. Obviously, if somebody is prosecuted for breaking an STPIM, then in discovery, the lawyer is going to ask, “Was a polygraph test done? Does the individual know they have done it?” I am worried about putting this in, because there is a controversy about polygraphs allowing the defence an opportunity to undermine the process. I understand why the Bill is belt and braces, but I am not sure that this part of it is going to be helpful.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his point, and I understand it, but polygraph measures are currently used in the management of sex offenders in this country, and the Bill will operate very much on the same principles. He should remember that in this legislation we are not trying to create new bits and pieces for controlling an individual; operational partners have found these tools effective over the past 10 years, so we are trying to mirror what is already out there. That is the purpose of the legislation.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked about foreign nationals. Our ambition is to prosecute using any means possible, including deportation, so if that is not available, we would look to use one of the measures in the Bill. Because we would look at deportation and everything else as an option, we would expect the measures in the Bill to apply more to British citizens than they would to foreign nationals. As I have stated, counter-terrorism police are responsible for looking after and enforcing the measures. We talked about the number of TPIMs; I am not allowed to give the exact figure, but I have given an indication of how rarely they are used. We imagine that STPIMs will also be used very rarely.

On the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s point about the internet of things and trying to future-proof the legislation, under paragraph 8 of schedule 4 we can restrict access to electronic devices, and as such restrict access to electronic currencies. We talk about cryptocurrency, but cryptocurrency is already becoming a bit old-fashioned. Before I took on this role, I launched an all-party parliamentary group on digital currency and potential bearer currencies run by central banks; cryptocurrency is already becoming something of the past and we are now moving on to bearer currencies managed by digital banks. It is about safeguarding and future-proofing, and under paragraph 6 we can restrict the transfer of property, so we could restrict a transfer of funds in that way.

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[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for highlighting that point; I very much enjoy the suggestions that are made in this Committee. I understand the points he is making, and one of the things I have tried to demonstrate throughout the Bill Committee is my willingness to listen and try to work cross-party to get the legislation through.

[Mr Jones]

I hear what the Minister is saying and I think it is important, but would it be possible for him to write to the Committee when he has given the matter a bit more thought? The point that the right hon. Member for Dundee East has made is pretty important.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am always willing to write to the Committee, as the right hon. Member knows. I am happy to go away, think about this issue and then write to the Committee, so that I can put in writing the safeguard that I do not want a polygraph test to be able to lead to future prosecutions. I think that would work.

[Stephen McPartland]

The hon. Lady makes a very good point. As she knows, I am always prepared to improve legislation so that we are happy with it on a cross-party basis, it goes through the House and we can support our intelligence communities. I am very happy to look at that issue. I did not even know we could still get postal orders and bankers’ drafts.

Let me give some examples of how STPIMs could be used, specifically for the right hon. Member for North Durham—I know that he would like that. If a British national were recruiting, talent spotting and reporting for a foreign intelligence service, and the evidence to prove the foreign power links was too sensitive to be used in court, meaning that a prosecution was not viable, an STPIM that might prevent harm could include a financial order, to prevent the person from accessing funds from the foreign intelligence service; a restriction on contact or association with individuals, to prevent the person from being debriefed by the foreign intelligence service handler; and electronic communications device measures, to ensure full coverage of devices used by the subject. That is one example of how an STPIM could be used.

Another example relates to a British national working in one of our defence companies, and would prevent sensitive technology transfer. Suppose a disgruntled British national employee of an advanced technology company is seeking to market specialised, valuable and unclassified knowledge to foreign companies. The investigation and disruptive conversation means that the individual is moved to less sensitive work and their company computer access is restricted, but they cannot be dismissed. They remain disgruntled, but prosecution is not viable. In that case, we could disrupt travel to prevent an individual from meeting foreign representatives abroad, so that they could not pass the secrets over to them, and we could restrict contact and association with individuals in the UK for the same purposes.

This example relating to the intimidation of dissidents is particularly important. Suppose a senior member of, for example, a cultural organisation from a foreign Government based in the UK is seeking to exert pressure on dissident diaspora through intimidation, harassment and damaging rumours. The individual cannot be expelled or deported, so victims are afraid to make criminal complaints for fear of recrimination in their home country. The STPIM could be imposed, because prosecution is not viable—the victim will not testify or make a statement. We could put measures in place to prevent an individual from associating with the victim or members of their family. We could prevent serious violence by ordering the subject to relocate to an alternative area in the UK. The STPIM could be justified in closed court proceedings, because it would prevent any identification of the victim. I hope the right hon. Member for North Durham enjoyed those examples.

[Mr Jones]

I did, actually—I am very grateful to the Minister. He has set my mind running in terms of the possible uses of the measures. There is open-source evidence of the intimidation of protesters against the Chinese Government at universities, for example, by Chinese nationals here in the UK. Proving that those individuals were working directly for the Chinese Communist party or a people’s front, for example, is difficult. Could the Minister envisage the measures being used to prevent that type of harassment, by individuals who are intimidating or trying to close down legitimate protest against the Chinese Communist party, of legitimate protesters on university campuses?

[Stephen McPartland]

I can genuinely understand and imagine a pathway in which that could be the case. However, as I say, because of the huge amount of resources involved in an STPIM, we will try any other means possible, through normal criminal procedures, to prosecute individuals for harassment under normal criminal law. We will be doing everything we can to not actually use an STPIM. We want to prosecute these people. The Government’s first line is prosecution, and the last resort is an STPIM, when there is no other option available to us.

I will also ensure that we add crypto to the list one way or another, but I have to work out how we define it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 33

Conditions A to E

National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stephen McPartland and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)]

This is the clause that many of us have been looking forward to. I am not going to take interventions during my speech; I will set out the reasons why I believe the clause is correct, then I will listen carefully to speeches from hon. Members and then sum up.

Collaboration with key international partners is a vital part of intelligence and national security work. We cannot maximise our national security capabilities and keep people safe without sharing intelligence and benefiting from the capabilities and expertise of our close and trusted allies. Those individuals who work on behalf of the UK are highly skilled and experienced in ensuring that UK activity is necessary and proportionate. Domestic and international law is applied to all activities and there are robust safeguards in place.

The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates offences when an act is done that is

“capable of encouraging or assisting”

an offence and the person “intends” or believes that their act may encourage or assist an offence. Those offences, which were predominantly introduced to ensure that law enforcement had the tools to tackle those orchestrating serious organised crime, are complex and create an incredibly low threshold for liability. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence that may be encouraged or assisted. The contribution can be small, it can be indirect, and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed.

At present, the UK intelligence community and armed forces are required to apply those complex offences to the many and varied scenarios in which they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. They exercise significant caution in their engagement with partners to prevent SCA thresholds being met and the risk of liability for individuals being realised. The impact of that approach is that vital and otherwise legal intelligence opportunities are currently being delayed or missed as the SCA risks are worked through.

There is also an important point of principle here. The Serious Crime Act offences mean that it is the individuals working within intelligence, security and military organisations who carry the risk of liability, despite operating within all authorisations and in the interests of UK national security.

The Committee heard oral evidence from both Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, and Sir David Omand, the former head of GCHQ, on the fairness and appropriateness of individual officers carrying this risk. They believe that the liability risk sitting with individuals is “not right”, and is “morally wrong”. The Government agree with them and do not think it is right or fair to expect the risk of liability to sit with individuals who are acting on behalf of our intelligence services or armed forces for their authorised purposes. Instead, responsibility should sit with the UK intelligence community and the armed forces at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight.

The clause removes criminal liability for offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces in support of activity taking place overseas. This is not a broad general immunity from prosecution; rather we are amending a targeted piece of legislation in response to specific operational issues that are impacting the ability to keep us safe today.

The clause means that in instances where an individual has operated in good faith and in compliance with proper processes they would not face the risk of liability for the offences under the SCA. The risk I have outlined would be removed for activity that we ask of individuals in the course of their roles in keeping us safe.

I am confident that the SCA amendment is appropriate and proportionate, because the UK has one of the most rigorous intelligence oversight regimes in the world. There are myriad safeguards and processes in place that manage the way that UKIC and the MOD work with and exchange information with international partners to prevent potential wrongdoing.

I also have confidence in those we are providing protection to. They are expert and highly trained men and women undertaking intelligence and security work, whose judgment and skill we should respect and have faith in. Of course, those working with our international partners will still need to comply with all other domestic and international law and be beholden to the statutory frameworks and policies that govern the UK intelligence community and armed forces activity.

The policies include the overseas security and justice assistance guidance and the Fulford principles, the implementation of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner annually and reported to the Prime Minister. That means that clause 23 does not in any way make torture legal, for example. UKIC’s activities also remain under the regular inspection of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen McPartland]

I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.

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[Stephen McPartland]

I wanted to be very clear earlier—I wanted to make a point. I agree that the Government will give the ISC examples.

[Mr Jones]

That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.

The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?

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[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen McPartland]

I do not want to get distracted, because this is very serious. I will give way to you in a minute, Kevin; I want to get this point across. [Interruption.] Sorry—I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham in a moment.

As the law stands, a member of staff acting in the proper exercise of their organisation’s functions would bear the burden of proving that they had acted reasonably when there is no precedence as to what “reasonably” means in those circumstances. The provision would change that position so that the prosecution would need to prove that a member of staff’s actions were not necessary for the proper exercise or function of their organisation, taking into consideration all the information about the legitimate ways in which those functions could be exercised.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister has just said that the reasonableness test has not been used. The Attorney General would also have to get over that bar. Alongside that sits the old consolidated guidance—now the Fulford principles—which is quite clear about what actions officers should take in certain circumstances to avoid what we had before. If it has not been tested, I cannot see what the problem is.

[Stephen McPartland]

The problem is that the UK’s intelligence services are telling us that, every single day, their operatives are second-guessing themselves on operations to keep this nation safe. I believe what they are telling me.

The provisions in section 47 of the Serious Crime Act mean that a person need only believe their activity will encourage or assist such an act, but they might also be reckless as to whether the act is done, with all the necessary elements required for that particular offence to be committed—the offence does not have to be committed. We are talking about the intelligence operative’s state of mind at the time of sharing intelligence. That is what is relevant.

[Mr Jones]

If that is the justification, why do we not just bin the consolidated guidance and the Fulford principles, on which such judgments are based? The rendition inquiry has great examples of where we passed on information knowing that it would be used for rendition and torture. I have been assured by the agencies, and I have no reason to doubt them, that there has been a huge training programme to ensure all officers fully understand the consolidated guidance and the new Fulford principles. This is clutching at straws, frankly.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s point of view.

Clause 23 is primarily aimed at removing the risk and fear of prosecution from individuals within these organisations when undertaking their necessary authorised duties. Sir Alex Younger said:

“Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 14, Q26.]

We have already had a conversation about the difference between theory and practice, and the reality is there is a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanctions for doing their job. I agree with Sir Alex Younger that that risk should not exist.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

The foreign power condition

National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stephen McPartland and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)]

Although the Bill provides a range of offences specifically targeted at state threats activity, it will not always be appropriate or possible for harmful activity to be prosecuted under the Bill. Where offences already exist on the statute book that deal effectively with the relevant state threats activity, there is no need to create a similar offence in the Bill. For example, the offence of murder deals effectively with state-sponsored assassinations.

While the Bill provides a suite of offences and accompanying tools and powers, there remain cases in which it will be difficult to secure prosecution due to the covert nature of the activities and the difficulties involved in presenting admissible evidence to a court to illustrate all the components of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In some cases, however, it might be possible or more appropriate to charge the individual with another offence on the statute book.

The aim of the aggravating factor in clauses 16 to 18 is to ensure that in such scenarios the state threats element is acknowledged in court and offenders are sentenced accordingly. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in cases where the foreign power condition—to which I have referred a number of times in Committee—is satisfied. Currently, if someone is convicted of an offence and it is known that the offence was linked to state threats activity, the judge may take that into account, but there is no formal mechanism to require the judge to factor that in when making a sentencing decision, and there are no clear definitions to enable the court to apply that consistently. This is in contrast to terrorism, where there is already a statutory requirement to acknowledge a terrorist connection when considering the seriousness of certain offences. That has been effective in cases such as those of the murder of Jo Cox MP, and Lee Rigby, where the seriousness of the offences was aggravated by the sentencing judge because of the terrorist connection, so a higher sentence was imposed.

The Government believe that the state threats aggravating factor should be available in relation to any offence. A state threat is a unique national security threat that can take a wide range of forms. We must ensure that our justice system is able to acknowledge all forms that such activity might take, and be able to penalise it accordingly.

Clause 19 ensures that the aggravating factor can apply to those who are convicted of offences in service courts. The service courts system applies to those who are bound by the Armed Forces Act 2006—for example, serving members of the armed forces. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in the same way in service courts as it does in civilian courts, in that if an offender pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence—for example, theft—and the foreign power condition is met, the offender’s sentence will be aggravated accordingly.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I support the proposals. My concern, which is one I will express throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Bill’s relationship with the Official Secrets Act 1989, under which the maximum penalty is two years. The Minister or his officials might not know the answer now, but I am happy for him to write to me. How will the two Acts intersect? Clearly, if someone has committed an offence, they will want to be found guilty under the Official Secrets Act, under which the sentencing powers are limited, as opposed to under the Act that this Bill will become. That will be the problem with the Bill—I still cannot understand why the Government did not do both: what they promised, which was the full reform, and a Bill for a new Official Secrets Act.

[Stephen McPartland]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are reforming the first three Official Secrets Acts, but not the 1989 Act, with the Bill. We will write to him with the information to explain how that is going to work.

In summary, the aggravating factor provides another tool for prosecutors to deploy, and helps to future-proof the Bill by ensuring that our judicial system can respond to any evolving state threats and activity in the future.

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[Stephen McPartland]

Robust investigative tools are crucial to enable the police effectively to counter threats by state actors, which operate using highly sophisticated means and often have access to significant resources and are skilled in tradecraft.

Clause 20 introduces schedule 2, which provides the police with powers of search and seizure when investigating threats posed by state actors to the UK and its interests. These powers replace the power of search in section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

Under the existing powers and those provided in schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed. This threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity.

[Mr Jones]

Can the Minister clarify what he means by “reasonable”? I know what it means in law, but I also know that there is a reasonableness test in the existing section 7 of the Act, which the security services say is not enough? So why is it okay here and it is not okay when it comes to clause 23?

[Stephen McPartland]

The difference is that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, the police need to be able to identify in this situation that a crime has been committed, whereas for this measure the police are trying to intervene earlier, so that they can stop a crime from being committed. Effectively, that is what the difference is.

We will debate clause 23 when we get to it—

[Mr Jones]

rose—

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[The Chair]

The Minister is not taking interventions.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen McPartland]

No. [Laughter.]

As I was saying, clause 20 introduces schedule 2 to the Bill. Under the existing powers and those provided by schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed.

The threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity. General search and seizure powers, such as those provided under PACE, are comparatively restrictive because they do not allow the police to act pre-emptively when there is intelligence to indicate that an offence is about to be committed. So, both the Ministry of Justice in 2014 and the Law Commission in 2020 reviewed the existing power, concluding that it was necessary and that reliance on PACE powers alone would limit the ability of the police to disrupt and investigate state threats.

These powers may only be used to deal with the most serious offences covered by this Bill, as well as where state threats activity involves violence or constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety.

Turning to the powers themselves, part 1 of schedule 2 legislates for powers of search and seizure as they apply in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They provide for the police to gain access to material likely to be evidence of a relevant act, which covers specific offences or certain acts or threats under the Bill.

Where the relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed the powers in part 1 of this schedule are different, depending on the nature of the material sought to reflect the enhanced safeguards that are required to protect confidential material.

Under paragraph 2, for non-confidential material, the police can obtain a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize and retain material. There are two key conditions that a court must be satisfied are met for such a warrant to be granted: first, that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed and, secondly, that the material sought on a premises is likely to be evidence of that act and is not confidential material. Should the police apply for an all-premises warrant, an additional condition applies: it must not be reasonably practicable to set out all the premises that the person of interest occupies or controls, but that may need to be searched. To access confidential material, a production order must be obtained, should this course fail or be unavailable through a warrant.

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[Mr Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I have some sympathy with the amendment as I am always against things that give Ministers or the Executive broad powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the powers seem to be unlimited. We are talking about national security and the confidence that we should have in our agencies to act in our interests, with the best of intentions and proper oversight, so the amendment is important. What does “any site in the UK” mean? My hon. Friend said that that was quite a broad power, and I want to ask about sites in the UK that are not under the control of the UK Government, such as US sites. Could Mildenhall airbase, a US airbase in the UK, be designated as one of these sites? I raise that because it limits UK authorities’ oversight and jurisdiction.

People may ask why that is important, but I am very conscious that we should always ensure that civil servants, Ministers and others have historical knowledge and take into account what happened in the past. I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we did our inquiry into detainee mistreatment and rendition in 2018. I have to say, it did not make for pretty reading. We did not shy away from the facts, and the actions of our agencies and certain Ministers—including some Ministers in the Government I served in—did not come out of that report very well. Guidance and regulations were put in place to ensure that did not happen again. I would like some clarity about whether such bases could be designated under this measure? Some of those sites could potentially have been used for what the ISC report on rendition highlights. They certainly were abroad, but this is about sites that are actually in the UK.

[Stephen McPartland]

I looked at the amendment in a lot of detail, and I discussed it with my officials and challenged them. I think the hon. Member for Halifax makes a very, very important point and has a strong case, and she will be delighted to know that, although I will resist the amendment today, I will commit to consider it and whether the Bill should clarify that only sites located in the UK can be designated as places of detention. I share her concerns about the possibility of rendition and stuff outside the UK. I will go into a bit more detail for her, and hopefully that will help the right hon. Member for North West Durham—

[Mr Jones]

North Durham.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

He hates west Durham.

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[Stephen McPartland]

I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.

My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Stephen McPartland]

I have given the right hon. Gentleman the blink and he still wants to intervene.

[Mr Jones]

I welcome what the Minister says—

[Stephen McPartland]

Say thank you!

[Mr Jones]

It takes a lot to get that in a Bill Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood is right—this needs clarifying in the Bill. When the Minister goes away to think about it, will he look at and ask officials about the issue of those sites that are in the UK, but outside the control of Her Majesty’s Government? I will not say too much, but we occasionally work with organisations and countries in certain places in the UK, but do not control what goes on there. Will he reflect that when doing his work?

[Stephen McPartland]

I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that. As I have said, we will be designating sites and that information will be publicly available. I am not sure that he would want to make the information about the sites he mentions publicly available.

[Mr Jones]

But that is not what the Bill says at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said. It gives sweeping powers to designate things, and I am always against giving such sweeping powers to the Executive—whether it is the present Government or the Government I was a member of—or to anyone. When the Minister comes back, clarification would be welcome, even if that is for the Bill to require publication.

[Stephen McPartland]

I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says. If the hon. Member for Halifax is kind enough to withdraw the amendment, I commit to considering it further. I will look to provide further clarity in the legislation.

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[Stephen McPartland]

Under schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and, if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through the UK border. As part of a schedule 3 examination, counter-terrorism police are able to retain protected materials by following a lengthy authorisation process. Protected materials include confidential business and journalistic material, as well as legally privileged material. The powers are a vital tool for counter-terrorism police and form part of a range of national security checks that enable the determination of whether a person at a UK port or border area has current or previous involvement in hostile state activity.

The use of protected materials in investigations, particularly confidential business material, can be a helpful insight into a person’s involvement in hostile state activity, whether it be espionage or a disinformation campaign. To use protected materials seized during a schedule 3 examination, an examining officer must currently seek authorisation from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a serving or retired High Court judge. In most cases, the material must not be examined or used for investigations until authorisation has been granted. Currently, that can take up to six weeks.

Clause 22 will remove the definition of confidential business material—material defined as acquired in the course of trade—from the definition of protected material under schedule 3. This will remove the requirement for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to authorise the retention of copies of confidential business material. The Bill will replace that authorisation process with a new safeguard: the requirement for a counter-terrorism police officer of at least the rank of superintendent to authorise access to such material.

The clause will bring the schedule 3 safeguards for confidential material into line with those that apply to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It will mean that police do not face lengthy and unnecessary delays to examining material in a schedule 3 stop.

[Mr Jones]

I have some sympathy with this clause; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a big job on their hands anyway. I wonder whether the Minister could say whether he has given any thought to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner not just looking at the material and giving it authorisation but having retrospective powers to dip in and see whether things have been done correctly.

[Stephen McPartland]

I will take that idea away and consider it. We do not want to enable somebody at the border to say that something is confidential material so that the police cannot look at it for up to six weeks. That would just be the easiest defence. We are dealing with incredibly sophisticated experts and they will know what to say to ensure that the material will be held in abeyance.

The Government are only amending the safeguards for confidential business material and will not change the authorisation safeguard for other material within the definition of protected material or confidential journalistic material, for which judicial authorisation is a proportionate safeguard. I am sure Members agree that it is only right that the security services should be able to use critical information in real time during a schedule 3 examination to address live national security risks posed to the UK. I assure Members that this essential amendment to schedule 3 to the 2019 Act will strengthen and streamline state threats investigations to disrupt and deter hostile state activity.

National Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Stephen McPartland and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I appreciate that. We have heard this morning and in previous sittings about that tension in respect of the Government interest and defence. There is case law that defines it. The purpose of the Bill is to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to keep the country safe. They feel that they need these tools to do that. There are safeguards. The idea behind the number of factors is that there are a variety of checks on the Secretary of State, so they would have to demonstrate all the way through that they have considered that multitude of factors and that it was necessary for the defence of the country.

On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, I cannot believe I am going to say this but I cannot tell him what I have been briefed, for national security reasons. The reality is that in these clauses we have moved away from designating places to categories. One of the categories is unavowed sites. That means that some of the sites that he suggested would be covered by the category.

[Mr Jones]

As long as they are covered, that is fine. I do not want the Minister to start referring to any of them.

[Stephen McPartland]

Another query raised was about oil and metal, which I understand are already in the existing provision for use in defence. That is why we refer to those areas. Finally, we are not designating military bases abroad, other than sovereign bordered areas, purely because of difficulties with jurisdiction and making that work.

Amendment 5 agreed to.

Amendments made: 6, in clause 7, page 7, line 4, leave out

“(including a part of a building)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 7.

Amendment 7, in clause 7, page 7, line 24, at end insert—

“‘building’ includes any part of a building;”.

See Amendment 5.

Amendment 8, in clause 7, page 7, line 37, at end insert—

“‘GCHQ’ has the meaning given by section 3(3) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;”—(Stephen McPartland.)

See Amendment 5.

Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Power to designate a cordoned area to secure defence aircraft

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Stephen McPartland and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

My hon. Friend is correct. Three tests must be met for someone to be prosecuted: conducting harmful activity with regard to information that is protected effectively, knowingly prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and acting in a way that benefits a foreign power. Forgive me, but I do not believe that an NGO will accidentally fail all three of those tests.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

But it may, because subsection (1)(b) states that a person commits an offence if

“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial”.

An NGO might think that putting something into the public domain is in the public interest. They may not even take into account that that disclosure may damage UK security. For example, in this morning’s newspapers—

[Mr Jones]

The story of alleged shootings by the SAS has clearly been put into the public domain. I would argue that disclosure is not in the public interest of the UK, but people are arguing that it should be in the public domain.

[Stephen McPartland]

That example demonstrates how important the Bill is, because it sets out that activities that are illegal will still be illegal if actors are acting in a particular manner. The Bill is trying to bring current provisions up to date to provide our intelligence services with the toolkits they need to keep our nation safe and secure. I believe that the three tests are strong enough to help provide those protections.

[Mr Jones]

I accept that, but just take this morning’s example cited on the BBC of the alleged illegal acts by the SAS. Someone has got the information, put it in the public domain and may feel that it is in the public interest for it to be scrutinised. Will that damage our interests? Yes, it will. The Government might think that that disclosure will help a foreign power or damage our interests—and I would argue that possibly it will—but that is not to question the judgment of the individuals who have decided that the allegation should be in the public domain.

[Stephen McPartland]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but I believe that we have three very strong tests that must be applied: the information must benefit a foreign power, the Attorney General must consider the case, and the CPS must decide that it is in the public interest to prosecute. Those three tests and protections run throughout the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

The Minister said that there must be a direct link to a foreign power. May I give an example? Suppose that somebody obtains information and gives or sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation?

[Stephen McPartland]

The legislation takes civil offences and makes some of them criminal. That case would remain a civil offence. What we are doing is providing the intelligence services with the tools they need to prosecute people who hand over trade secrets in the criminal system. For example, MBDA in my constituency builds Brimstone missiles, which are currently being used in action. If some of those secrets were to be removed and handed over, that would be difficult for the people using those missiles and for the country. There are clear examples of how the loss of trade secrets threatens the country and our allies’ lives.

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but is it the case that to prosecute under the Bill there will need to be a causal link from the individual to a foreign power and not necessarily to a competitor in the UK?

[Stephen McPartland]

My understanding is that the action would have to be done on behalf of or for the purposes of a foreign power. If it was done unknowingly, it would be for the lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide how to proceed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, which is that we have to be careful to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to protect our protected sites. I may not agree with the purpose of protest, but I agree with the ability of everybody to protest lawfully. People will start to fall foul of this clause when they try to scale the walls of a restricted site and to impede lawful activity going on at the restricted site—when they start to move from protest towards criminal activity. That will be captured.

[Mr Jones]

I am not sure it will. Let us take the Faslane peace camp as an example. I totally disagree with what those people are arguing for, but if somebody there took a photograph and put it out on social media to make a political point, would they be caught under the Bill? Is not that prohibited under the Bill?

[Stephen McPartland]

No, because they would not be doing something designed to prejudice the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

Yes. The intention is that people have to do something prejudicial to the UK’s interests to fall foul of the clause.

Prohibited places are inherently sensitive sites that are likely to be the target of state threat activity. Unauthorised access to such sites could be a precursor to harmful acts such as espionage or sabotage, and it is important that we have the tools and powers we need to adequately protect those sites.

[Mr Jones]

I think the Minister just said yes to my question and the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood about a person with binoculars. Does that fall under clause 5(1)(a)(i), which refers to an offence being committed if a person

“accesses, enters, inspects or passes over or under a prohibited place”?

Would somebody on a hill several miles away with a pair of binoculars be classed as inspecting an area? Is that why the Minister says that is covered in the Bill?

[Stephen McPartland]

Yes, that is the intention. Remember that the Official Secrets Act 1911 refers to sketches. We are trying to reform that Act and the others to get to a point at which we help our intelligence services to come up with ways of dealing with some stuff that could technically be considered out of scope. The idea behind the clause is that we will be able to give the intelligence community the tools they need to deal with somebody inspecting a site or doing something prejudicial to the UK’s interests.

[Mr Jones]

I come back to the fact that if we looked at the Official Secrets Act 1989 and had one big Bill, it would have been far better than this one. Will the Minister clarify that somebody with binoculars would be classified as “inspection”? My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood asked whether a person looking at a site through binoculars would be captured by this offence, or whether they would have to be writing something down. What is the situation with the old-fashioned sketches mentioned in the 1911 Act? Would they be covered?

[Stephen McPartland]

The purpose is to cover activity that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. For example, if someone were bird watching and they looked at the site through their binoculars, they would not be captured by the offence because they would not be doing anything prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. However, if they were sketching a site to identify how they could break into it or to record activity going on there, that would be prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests, so the clause covers that. It is a case-by-case situation.

The current prohibited places provisions fall under the espionage offence within section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

[Mr Jones]

The Bill is specific about procuring “photographs, videos or other”. I understand why they are included: they are modern. If we pass the Bill, will sketches still be covered? Would it not be better to repeat that bit of the 1911 Act?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

Sketches are included, because a sketch would have to be inspected. The question was: are sketches included? The answer is yes.

[Mr Jones]

Where?

[Stephen McPartland]

Because a sketch would have to be inspected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the very good points she has raised. My understanding is that the powers currently apply only to police officers, not to members of the military. It is very clear throughout the clause that it refers to “a constable”, and it is referenced as “Powers of police officers”.

[Mr Jones]

Is that not a hole in the legislation? We are coming on to Cyprus next, where it is not civilian police that do security there, and I can think of a few others around the world where it is done by the military. Therefore, should those powers not also be given to the military?

[Stephen McPartland]

When we talk about military, MOD police will have those powers.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, but a number of sites are not guarded by MOD police—although there are some—but are the responsibility of the UK armed forces, which are not police.

[Stephen McPartland]

Both the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Halifax made a very good point. We will take that away and look at it. If they want to strengthen the Bill, we are happy to work with them to do that.

[Stephen McPartland]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. We must also bear in mind that it is not our intention to introduce search-and-seize powers under these police powers. This is part of the tiered approach we referred to earlier, with the police being able to warn people to go away before they fall foul of the law. There is the opportunity to give them that warning before any arrest.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the hon. Member for Burnley, but there are also sites that are benign, so it is not a force protection point but a constabulary duty that is carried out by members of the armed forces. Therefore, I think they need these powers if this is a comprehensive suite of powers.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member. As I said, that is certainly something that we will look at and come back to.