National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

Could the Minister say a little more about what the problem is with not having the Minister’s or the Secretary of State’s hands tied? Our amendment simply says that if information comes to light that creates cause for concern, the Secretary of State may, if he or she so wishes, look into it again. It is not an obligation; it simply makes sure that the option is there.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I was going to address that at the end of my remarks, but I will touch on it briefly and hopefully reiterate it at the end. It is about certainty and proportionality. Everything we are doing by legislating in this way has an impact on businesses and the certainty of attracting investment and growing, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, reminded us in her opening speech.

As I was saying, a draft of the statement was published alongside the Bill. Following commencement, if parties involved in trigger events are concerned about them being called in, they will be able to remove any doubt about this by notifying the Secretary of State of their event. They will then be entitled to receive a quick and binding decision on whether the Secretary of State will call in the event.

I will turn briefly to amendment 10, which seeks to extend the Secretary of State’s power to issue a call-in notice in respect of a trigger event that has previously been called in when no new material information becomes available within five years of the trigger event. After a trigger event is called in, the Secretary of State has—

National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am pleased to speak to this group of amendments, which relate to clause 3. This clause provides for a statement to be published by the Secretary of State, setting out how he expects to exercise the call-in power. Clause 1 requires that this statement is published before the power may be used. There are three amendments in this grouping—amendments 1, 2 and 9—and I will speak to each of them in turn.

I advise the Committee that we have interpreted amendment 1, including with regard to the Members’ explanatory statement, as seeking to amend clause 3(1) rather than 3(3). The effect of this amendment, as we believe it was intended, is to require the Secretary of State to publish the statement. As I set out on Second Reading, the Government are committed to providing as much clarity and predictability as possible for business when it comes to the use of the new investment screening regime that is provided for by this Bill. The proposed statement will provide valuable information to businesses and investors, and help them to determine whether they should submit a notification about their trigger event. Indeed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, publish and not withdraw the statement before the call-in power may be used. In effect, this means that the Secretary of State will need to have published a statement to use the call-in power, which is crucial to the regime.

Of course, as the security landscape changes over time, he may wish to publish an updated statement at a future point; this will need to go through the same consultation and parliamentary procedure as the original statement before it can take its place. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State has neither the intention nor the power to run this regime without having first published a statement.

I will now turn briefly to amendment 2, which would allow for the Secretary of State to include a definition of national security in the statement provided for by clause 3. The Secretary of State’s powers under the Bill are expressly predicated on investigating and addressing risks to national security. When exercising these powers, the Secretary of State is required to proceed on the basis that national security is strictly about the security of our nation. That is because what national security means is a question of law, which has already been answered by the highest courts of the land as being the security of our nation.

The Secretary of State will obviously need to comply with the law when exercising the powers in the Bill. There is therefore no need to define what national security means in the Bill. As Dr Ashley Lenihan—a fellow at the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics, who was quoted earlier by the shadow Minister—mentioned in last week’s evidence session:

“What we have seen is that most foreign direct investment regimes of this nature all refer to national security. I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition”.––[Official Report, National Security and Infrastructure Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]

Furthermore, as national security is a term used in the Bill, it would in any event not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to define the scope of the term in the statement; the statement is not legislation and is not subject to approval by Parliament.

Wanting to understand the Government’s aims and expectations for these powers is entirely reasonable—there is no discussion about that. However, I refer the Committee to the comments of Michael Leiter, a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP, who told us that he would consider that

“it is a bit of a fool’s errand”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 49, Q55.]

to define national security. Instead, the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power, and we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I just want to come back on the point the Minister made about other regimes not using a definition of national security. The United States Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act provides a sense of congress on six factors: countries of special concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical materials; history of compliance with US laws; control of US industries that affect US capability and capacity to meet national security requirements; involvement of personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities. In his comments, the Minister said that no other regime includes a definition of national security, but that sounds like a definition of national security to me.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Aberavon for his comments. I was quoting from the evidence that Dr Ashley Lenihan provided. She said:

“I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition,”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38 Q42.]

if that is what he was referring to.

Instead, what I am trying to share with the Committee is that the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power. Within that, we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested. These include certain sectors of the economy and types of acquisitions relating to entities and assets that may raise concern. I think I have said enough on that.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

Let us take the example given by the hon. Member of Nortel collaborating with Huawei or any other entity. They have to satisfy themselves that if they wish to acquire something else in future, they will effectively have to go through the same process of national security clearance. Collaboration between entities or in academia are covered under the separate guidance, including from the agencies, on who they collaborate with, but I think that is a different issue. Once an asset is created that has a national security implication for the United Kingdom, the Bill comes into play.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Notifiable acquisitions

[Stephen Kinnock]

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 6, page 4, line 27, at end insert—

‘(4A) The Secretary of State must have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making regulations under this section.’

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. I congratulate the Minister on his recent appointment as the vaccine tsar. I must say, he is taking multi-tasking to a whole new level, and we wish him well.

I rise to speak in favour of amendment 6, which is closely related to amendments 7 and 8. Sir Graham, should I speak to amendments 7 and 8 as well now, or to amendment 6 alone?

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend. His intervention is telling because it points to a fundamental failing at the heart of Government in terms of being joined up and credible. We cannot condemn aspects of China’s activity and its increasingly assertive behaviour —potential military threats to Taiwan, and sabre-rattling in the South China sea—while opening up our nuclear energy capability to that same hostile foreign actor. Security is about our credibility, resilience and ability to stand strong and united, because we know that the Chinese Communist party will exploit weakness and division. Consistency is vital—consistency and security are two sides of the same coin.

To answer my hon. Friend’s question, I profoundly and sincerely hope that the investment to which he refers would not have passed this test. Frankly, if it had passed this test, the Bill would end up not being worth the paper it is written on. This is about the implementation of the Bill and the Government’s capability to stand up for our national security and critical national infrastructure, which is at the heart of the amendment.

It is worth pointing out that the Intelligence and Security Committee defines our critical national infra- structure as

“certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or comprise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”

I am convinced that no Member present would argue with that definition or against putting those considerations at the heart of what Parliament and the Government stand for.

We must include critical national infrastructure. It would follow best practice—our allies the United States and Canada both include critical national infrastructure in their list of key factors to assess as part of national security, so we would not be reinventing the wheel but simply following best practice. In the expert witness sessions, I asked Sir Richard Dearlove specifically whether he thought that a definition of critical national infrastructure should be included in the Bill. He said:

“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]

As I said the start of my comments, sovereign capability is what this is really about, and our sovereign capability is profoundly undermined by the fact that so much of our critical national infrastructure is not in our own hands. Supply chains are over-extended and often depend on actors that perhaps 10 years ago we did not see as we do now, which has to be taken into account. I urge hon. Members to consider the amendment seriously, because it goes to the heart of what Parliament and Government should be about.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. I welcome the intention of the hon. Member for Aberavon to ensure that the protection of critical national infrastructure is considered by the Secretary of State. Indeed, I take it as a ringing endorsement of the approach the Government have taken in clause 6 to define the specific sectors and activities subject to mandatory notification clearance.

As the hon. Gentleman will know, we intend to introduce regulations under the clause once the Bill has received Royal Assent, and we are currently consulting on the sector definitions, which cover much of the critical national infrastructure that he quite rightly shared with the Committee, including energy, civil, nuclear, transport, communications and defence. We are publicly consulting, in particular with sector experts, the legal profession, business and investment communities, to ensure that those definitions provide clarity and certainty, and are focused on the specific parts of sectors and activities that can pose risks to our national security. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that, in developing any notifiable acquisition regulations, the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors, the advanced technology sectors and the wider economy.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous. Does he not see the advantage of including this point on the face of the Bill? It makes an important statement—it is a political statement, really—about the need to ensure that, whatever the regulations say, critical national infrastructure is embedded in the Bill.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The word that slightly worries businesses is “political” statement. I think that that is a concern. I think his intention is right, and the reason why we have taken the route of mandatory notification for the 17 sectors is precisely the point he makes. I assure him that the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman will recall that the Government introduced a statutory instrument to include health in the Enterprise Act 2002 when the covid pandemic hit.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to you, Sir Graham, for refocusing our attention on the amendment. Suffice it to say that national security is always taken into account when it comes to nuclear or energy, as it was at the time of those agreements. The point I am trying to make is that we must be flexible to ensure that the new regime can adapt to the threats of tomorrow. That is the right approach to ensure that we can keep this country safe. Of course, any such regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval through the draft affirmative procedure, giving Members of this House and the other place the opportunity to ensure that the mandatory notification and clearance regime works effectively. As such, I cannot accept the amendment and I hope that the hon. Member for Aberavon will seek leave to withdraw it.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister, but I am afraid that we will have to push the amendment to a Division, because it is so fundamental to how we see the purpose of the Bill. We have heard lots of assurances today along the lines of, “Trust us. We are on the right track. We get it.” I hope the Minister will forgive us, but we prefer the “trust but verify” model. Therefore, we think that this provision should be in the Bill, and I will have to press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I am very happy to have the opportunity to set out what we are trying to achieve with this amendment. While the previous amendment was very much about protecting our assets, this one focuses on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is absolutely clear that any successful screening regime has to be based on a solid understanding of both aspects—both the asset and the acquirer—and that both are equally vital to the successful implementation of the regime.

Harking back to the debate we had about an earlier amendment, the objective here has to be smart regulation. What do we mean by that? If we try to catch everything, we end up catching nothing. We have to prioritise. We have to have a screening system that has a smart, nuanced and well-informed understanding of risk, both in terms of the prioritisation of our assets and the prioritisation of understanding the characteristics of the acquirer. It is on that basis that we prioritise action, and when our investment security unit needs to intervene.

The amendment is focused very much on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is about ensuring that we guard ourselves against the influence of foreign powers that wish to do harm to our country—those that have an agenda. The Minister said earlier that companies get a bit worried when we use the term “political”, but national security is a fundamentally political consideration, because it is about our political analysis of the threat from hostile foreign actors and our understanding of what the national interest is in a holistic sense. We have to give that political leadership. We cannot expect the business community to take that decision for us; we have to give a lead on understanding where the investment is coming from and what the characteristics of the company or investment vehicle are. Fundamentally, going by the old adage that he who pays the piper chooses the tune, where there are state-owned and state-backed entities, it is absolutely clear who is paying the piper and who is choosing to the tune.

The amendment we have tabled would mean that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security—a fundamentally political calculation—and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. By including state-owned enterprises explicitly on the face of the Bill, we would be ensuring particular regard to the issue even where shareholding levels are low.

We understand the thresholds for trigger events, but what we are saying is that when the characteristics of the acquirer ring particular alarm bells, that should apply regardless of the shareholding level that is being considered by the acquirer. We know the threat from state-owned enterprises is disproportionate; that is why we are recommending a kind of disproportionate action in this amendment, to address the reality of the characteristics and to ensure that we are carefully guarding against potentially malign actors.

Again, this is not a new concept. Other countries use it in their regimes, and we are simply proposing that we follow suit and have a smarter strategy and approach to regulation at the moment. The clarity that we need, of course, is from understanding that where allied states are involved and the transactions are efficiently screened for approval there is little cause for concern, but with this amendment, even small and discrete investments from hostile states and from state-backed entities within those states would be fully captured.

Let us turn to the expert evidence that we received, particularly from Michael Leiter, the legal expert and lawyer, who said:

“With respect to sovereign wealth funds or state-controlled investments, there is a perfectly good argument that yes, the standard of review might be…more rigorous.”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 48, Q54.]

Let us be absolutely clear: we do sometimes see so-called private takeovers, where often the state-backed entity is rather obscured within the ownership structure. They are carried out by companies and investment vehicles that are in fact a front for authoritarian state actors, who have wider political, national security and geopolitical agendas and whose values are frequently at odds with ours.

A recent obvious example is the attempt by an investment vehicle backed by the Chinese state to take over Imagination Technologies. The company was the target of a hostile foreign takeover attempt, and that investment vehicle had direct links to the Chinese state. Then there are even more obvious examples, to which my hon. Friends the Members for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and for Southampton, Test have referred, particularly around Hinkley and Bradwell, where there is a clear ownership structure coming directly from the Chinese state.

We must also recognise the broader agenda with things such as China’s belt and road initiative, which is about creating debt-trap diplomacy. It is about building influence by entering other economies in such a major way that those economies effectively become dependent on the Chinese state. Of course, that comes with lots of strings attached, and it is part of the deal that those countries are not able or permitted to speak out when the Chinese state behaves in ways that we would not find acceptable. I hope that the Government and the Minister will seriously consider the amendment, because the characteristics of the acquirer must be taken into account if we are to have a smart regulation system that prioritises and does what the Bill sets out to do.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

This group of amendments would provide for certain cases to count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. The amendments are to clause 8, which defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity for the purpose of the Bill.

Amendment 7 would ensure, as the hon. Member for Aberavon mentioned, that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intention to ensure that national security is comprehensively protected. I reassure him that the Bill provides no carve-out or special treatment for state-owned entities or overseas investors where they acquire control of a qualifying entity or asset. They will be subject to the mandatory notification requirements in the same way as any other acquirer, and the Secretary of State will have the power to scrutinise any acquisition of control by such parties where the legal test for call-in is met. That includes the acquisition of material influence over the policy of the entity.

However, the Government have been clear that the regime is nationally agnostic, and that each acquisition will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The draft statement of policy published alongside the Bill simply states that the regime will not

“regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”

I strongly believe that this is the right approach. We must recognise that many such organisations have full operational independence in pursuing long-term investment strategies with the objective of economic return, raising no national security risks.

Moreover, the clause already sets out the circumstances that constitute control of an entity based on levels of shareholding and voting rights and material influence. Amendments such as this could, for example, capture increases of equity stakes at any level, even though many could not realistically be expected to give rise to a national security risk. Developing a list of countries of risk would likely be a moving feast that would quickly become out of date in response to changing geopolitics and would most likely harm Britain’s diplomatic relations and place in the world, giving rise to a chilling effect on investment in these shores.

Amendment 8 would create a new case of a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for “changes to material influence” in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security. Once more, I welcome the emerging cross-party consensus that the Bill must capture more subjective acquisitions of control, rather than solely levels of shares and voting rights. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that acquisitions of material influence over the policy of an entity are very much in the scope of the Bill. That applies within the 17 sectors but also to the wider economy. Parties can notify the Secretary of State of a trigger event concerning the acquisition of a material influence, and he will have the power to proactively call in such a case if the legal test is met.

I should clarify that material influence is not a scale. It is the lowest level of control that can be acquired over a qualifying entity, which captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation rights. As such, it is not immediately clear to me what circumstances such an amendment would bring into the scope of the Bill, given that it would capture changes to material influence. None the less, I admire the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman’s seeking, at least in part, to define national security through the amendment and its explicit reference to economic security. As he will know, the Bill does not define national security, and, as I said on Second Reading, I think that is a real strength, not a weakness.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I think that the Bill is proportionate and I think that national security is not dependent on a particular country. Malignant actors come from different nationalities. The Committee heard from a number of experts last week the reasons for not defining national security, not least because it might limit the Secretary of State from being able to respond to new and emerging threats that did not fall within the definitions set out in statute. For these reasons I cannot accept these amendments, and I would gently encourage the hon. Member for Aberavon to withdraw them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

rose—

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment in his intervention.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister for giving way—sort of. One of the key sentences in the Government’s statement of policy intent is in the section on acquirers, which says:

“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”

I recognise that the statement of policy intent is a draft, but clearly somebody in government thought it a good idea to put that sentence in there, and I absolutely agree with it. It is therefore very difficult to understand the disconnect that appears to exist between the Bill, which is agnostic on different national actors, and the statement of policy intent, which explicitly talks about when acquirers

“owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”

On that basis, the amendment touches on a crucial issue and we shall be pushing it to a Division.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

I do not wish to keep repeating myself, but I have set out the reasons why I cannot accept these amendments. I would again gently encourage the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but I suspect we will be heading to a Division.

[Stephen Kinnock]

We are moving back and forth here. As I set out, the issues around the characteristics of the acquirer are so important to ensuring that we have a smart approach and the sentence within the statement of policy intent is so absolutely spot on that we will push the amendment to a Division to show our support for that section of the statement.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

National Security and Investment Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 26th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Nadhim Zahawi]

We lost you while you were talking about a “degree of unpredictability”, Lisa.

Lisa Wright: Okay. In my view, if you were to broaden the regime out from national security to take into account other considerations, that would introduce quite a degree of unpredictability and would, I think, potentially impact negatively on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK—I am sorry if I am repeating myself. However, my understanding is that the existing intervention regime will remain, so national security will come out of it, but the Government will still be able to intervene in transactions on other public interest grounds under the Enterprise Act. That regime has some limitations, but those powers will still be there.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

Q Thank you very much for the really excellent evidence you have already given us. I want to go back to what Mr Boney said about de minimis thresholds and whether you might look at introducing de minimis thresholds for particular areas, sectors or industries that I guess you would say are considered to be low risk from a security point of view and highly beneficial to the UK economy, which should therefore affect our thinking about how you might filter this whole process. But are there not other considerations on filtering as well? In essence, this is a risk management process and you have to identify the highest risks. Surely issues of critical national infrastructure would place a type of acquisition into the high-risk quadrant. If the acquirer is close to a state or Government—particularly a hostile Government—that would place it in the high-risk quadrant. Therefore, on having a more filtered process, is the de minimis threshold the right way to go, or would it not be better to have a strategic approach based on a hierarchy of risks?

Christian Boney: I think the de minimis concept is potentially relevant and helpful in the context of thinking about what needs to be subject to mandatory notification. If you are not within the mandatory notification regime, that does not mean that the Government cannot exercise the call-in power so long as the relevant tests in the legislation are satisfied; it just means that the relevant company does not have to make a notification. There are elements of the mandatory sectors where some form of de minimis has already been included. Energy is a good example of that, and that makes sense in the context of energy.

I think it is worth exploring whether, within any of the other sectors, where we are more likely to see start-up, early-stage companies operating, there is benefit in introducing some form of de minimis regime solely in respect of the mandatory notification requirement. As I say, if a small-scale company operating in critical artificial intelligence is receiving investment from somebody who we view as a hostile actor, that transaction might escape mandatory notification, but that does not mean it escapes voluntary call-in by the Government at the point they become aware of it. That is something that might be worth exploring.

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[Nadhim Zahawi]

Q Professor, that was excellent and I am very grateful for it. I will follow on from that thought and ask about the proposed powers within the regime for the Secretary of State to gather that information, which, as you quite rightly remind us, is not necessarily secret but about understanding the technology, or a particular piece of the technology, within the sector. What are your thoughts on the regime for the Secretary of State to be able to gather that information to inform a decision or to call in witnesses, so that they are able to really understand that particular issue and therefore make a decision on it?

Professor Martin: I suppose the mantra, if I had one, would be, “Broad powers, sparingly used, with accountability mechanisms”. It is incredibly hard to be specific about this, for two reasons: one is that new areas of technology crop up, as they invariably do, and the other is that sweeping categorisations are needed on the face of legislation.

I am not a deep technical expert—although others are available from my former organisation—but if you take sweeping, umbrella titles like “quantum” or “artificial intelligence”, there are huge swathes of that where, actually, not a lot of these powers in the Bill will be used. There will be companies that will be doing very interesting things—10 interesting things—of which only one would be caught by this Bill.

If you take areas like specialist quantum computing and so forth, I think the community of interest and expertise is actually relatively small and has relatively good relations with Government—not least because, again, while it is not perfect, the whole system of research council funding and Government investment in funding technological research is pretty good, by international standards—so you end up knowing these people. One of the reasons that this sort of policy evolution came about, which has led to the publication of the Bill before you—I remember this from discussions within Government—is that people were volunteering to come to us. World-leading experts, people who had been funded by the Government—I will not go into individual cases because it is commercially sensitive and possibly security sensitive—would come to Government and say, “Look, we’ve had this inquiry from a Chinese behemoth,” or even, “We’ve had this inquiry from a US company,” and so forth: “What do you guys think about this?” and, invariably, we would have to have an informal influencing discussion.

I do not think that some of the businesses to which this will apply will be screaming that this is horrible Government regulation and intervention in areas where that should not be made. There was already a dialogue; there was just no legislative framework. Of course, that meant that companies that felt a loyalty to the UK and so forth but that also had to look after their commercial interests were sometimes in a real bind.

To try to answer your question, I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Q This is very interesting evidence. I want to ask you a little bit more about China. As you rightly pointed out, much of this is in the public domain, and the Made in China 2025 strategy is very clear about the objective, which is to achieve global technological dominance. Given your experience at the National Cyber Security Centre, can you share with us a little bit more about how that would manifest itself in practice? What do you see as China’s next moves, in terms of rewriting the rules on technology and on creating that dominant position that you have talked about? How do you see that manifesting itself?

Professor Martin: I think there are broadly two or three areas in which China is very interested in doing that. I can make some comments on motivations, because I think they are very important, and then I will finish with how that manifests itself in UK casework.

Clearly, China has set out a stall, which it published in Made in China 2025, in which it said it wants to be the world’s pre-eminent leader in a number of key areas of technology. It mentioned artificial intelligence and quantum, and it is throwing vast sums of state money and long-term strategies at them, unencumbered by the need to seek re-election and popular consent, so it is a very powerful movement. That is the first thing: it is trying to build up its capability.

China is also trying to change, at least for itself—we will come to that in a minute—the way the internet works. It was reported earlier this year that Huawei and other major companies in these international standards bodies are looking at something called new IP protocols, among many other things. To give you a sense of what the motivations behind that are, at the minute when traffic flows around the internet, despite some popular impressions to the contrary, it is actually pretty hard to work out what is going through it. Therefore, it is relatively difficult to censor, although China has managed it in some ways. The new IP protocol will make it much easier to work out what sort of traffic is going through and being rerouted, so it makes it much easier to control. China is trying to dominate and essentially get a lead in the strategic technology, and also to change the character and culture of the technological age from one that started off fairly anarchic to one that is much easier to control. That is what it is trying to do.

Why is China trying to do that? A lot of this is about the assertion of its own power for itself—the regime, power, Chinese nationalism and so forth. I think it does intend to extend its sphere of influence, but I have never seen that as the primary motivation. One of the interesting things, post the pushback from the Trump Administration and the US sanctions on Huawei, is the extent to which China will now accelerate its desire for self-sufficiency, and the extent to which that leads to a separate pole of technological influence that may become less interested in countries such as the UK, European Union countries and North America.

To date, how has that manifested itself in cases in the UK? Ms Onwurah has already mentioned the Huawei controversy. If you take Huawei as a company, I think it shows the different ways in which this can manifest. The Huawei 5G controversy is going to be dealt with by a Bill that I believe is coming to the House next week, not this one. The 5G controversy was not about investment; it was about selling to British companies to build stuff. Obviously, that case has been very heavily analysed.

I think that the more interesting case in the last 10 years involving Huawei was its acquisition in 2012 of the Centre for Integrated Photonics—a world-leading British firm in a really key area of technology. That, in my view, was pretty strategically damaging. If we had our time over again, that is the sort of thing that the Bill might well notify. I know you have taken evidence from the likes of Charles Parton and people with huge China expertise. The fact that the acquisition of the Centre for Integrated Photonics did down Britain’s technological development was probably a by-product. The point is that Huawei could buy world-leading research, which China could then take and appropriate for itself very cheaply. That is what it will continue to do to build up its own capabilities.

National Security and Investment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 26th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)]

Q I was going to ask you about whether the Bill is proportionate between being very focused on national security—albeit, as you quite rightly point out, there is a spectrum of that—versus public interest, but I think that you have answered that issue in saying that you would very much guard against expanding it.

James Palmer: I will just explain why. I remember working when the public interest regime still applied. The move away from the public interest regime started in the 1980s. Pre the 1980s, this country was not an international investment destination; it really was not. We have earned that position. Whatever one’s politics—I am not party political—this is something that the UK has earned. We have done that by moving to being pretty open-minded in foreign investment. We have actually not worried that much about national security considerations being controlled through ownership, because again this debate has been—sorry, let me first come back to the Minister’s point.

I am very nervous that if you open it up to public interest, you vest that authority in a politician; forgive me, but that is what leads to lobbying, to short-termism, and to completely inconsistent decision taking. I am afraid that whatever Ministers at the time may say about these decisions, there is no external credibility on the predictability of those. It does not matter whether Ministers think they are doing it in good faith or on security grounds. It does not come over that way.

On broadening it to public interest, I completely agree. I am very grateful—because I know that there was a debate about this—that it has been rightly focused just on national security, albeit with a broad ability to intervene to protect the national interest.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

Q Thank you very much indeed for your useful and interesting evidence. I want to ask about some tangible examples, just to get a sense of where you stand on this spectrum—in this debate between economic openness and national security. You have made your position on it quite clear, which is that we should not sacrifice one to the other. Do you think that the Arm-SoftBank transaction would have gone through under this regime?

James Palmer: My own view is that I actually hope so, because I think that there is a debate here. We all identify a business that has been established in the UK, and we regard it with pride as a national asset. I completely understand that. I am not just interested in global M and A; I am interested in investment in the UK. My goal is not just M and A. It is the investment, which we will not get without M and A at the end, because investors want to know that they have the ability to realise.

My own judgment—I am not an economist, but most of the economic evidence that I have seen supports this—is that you do better by allowing people to come in, allowing them to sell, not necessarily completely untrammelled, but on a broadly liberal perspective, giving them the certainty and confidence to do that.

I think what we are debating here is about those things that are generated solely in the UK—for example, research, work and ideas that are funded by the UK Government. I can see why the UK Government might want to keep control over those things and link their funding to a level of control. If someone takes funding on that basis, I can see that. I do not know enough about the history of Arm, but it was acquired by a Japanese parent, not by a so-called hostile actor. If we are not going to allow Japanese businesses to buy into our technology businesses, I think we look like a less interesting technology investment and growth destination. We might hold on to a business for another five years, but what businesses are we losing for our children and grandchildren in 10, 20 and 30 years’ time? That is how I look at the question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Q Welcome, Mr Butler, and thank you very much for your attendance. Reflecting on the changing nature of the national security threats that we are now facing, which you alluded to in your answer to my colleague, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, how do you think the Bill builds on the Enterprise Act 2002? It has been 18 years since that legislation was introduced, so it would be great to get your take on that. Given your CV, it is worth getting your reflection on that while we have you here.

Creon Butler: I think—I am sure many people have said this—it is very clear that the previous legislation needed updating and was not fit for purpose, given both the way in which the global economy as a whole has evolved and the way in which the threats have evolved. It is both necessary and urgent to update that, and the way the Bill has done that, in terms of this first phase of creating the powers both to collect information and to intervene, makes a lot of sense. We have to fine-tune it and make sure it works properly, but this is a good first step. As I said, though, it is really important, if you are going to have such broad powers, to define exactly how you will use them—and much more precisely than the Government has done hitherto.

The further point is that this piece of legislation does not do everything. Alongside it, we need to strengthen our ability to collect the information we need about those threats. There are a number of elements. One that I have some experience of and that is really important is the question of who actually owns and controls companies that are operating in the UK—the question of beneficial ownership transparency. If you do not know that a hostile power is influencing a company that might be registered in an overseas territory or something of that kind, you will not be able to take the steps that you need to take.

A further area—it is a step in the right direction, because it gives us the powers to engage with this issue —is through international co-operation. Looking forwards, we need to strengthen and enhance our international co-operation with like-minded partners by going beyond the Five Eyes and including other really key partners, such as Japan, the EU and so on. That will enable us to do two things. First, it will enable us to share information about the things that can happen, such as the techniques that hostile powers are using. You may see it come up first in one country, and if we can share that information, we know that we can be prepared for that. Even more importantly, you may have a hostile power that does a number of things in different parts of the world, and it is only when you see the entire picture that you can see what the threat is.

Having that kind of international co-operation to do that is really important. These powers are necessary to get us in the same place as some of our key allies, in terms of what we can do. I do not think we are ever going to be able to standardise the areas of intervention or the nature of powers, but we should push very hard to enhance the sharing of information in the way I described.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Q Thank you very much for the very interesting evidence that you are providing. I want to focus on the acquirer risk element of the Bill. The statement of political intent states that

“the National Security and Investment regime does not regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”

Do you agree with that assessment? Logic would seem to suggest that the closer an entity is to a foreign Government, the more likely it is to pose a risk to our national security.

Creon Butler: Clearly, some state-owned enterprises can be a significant risk, but some clearly are not. VW has a significant state element in it through North Rhine-Westphalia, but that does not make it a national security risk. At the same time—this goes back to the point I was making about who actually controls companies —you could well have a company that is registered in another country and, particularly if that country does not have very beneficial ownership transparency laws, as even some very close allies such as the US do not, the company emanating from it could have ill intent towards us.

For that reason, I think the Bill is right not to make a special regime for companies that are state owned, because that could go wrong in two ways: either you could be looking at only one set of companies when there are others that are potential threats, even though they come from close allies, or you may end up spending a lot of time looking at companies with state shareholdings that are really no threat at all. Clearly, when you come to do the analysis, whether there is a stake from a hostile state will be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing that threat. I think the Bill gets it right in not creating a special regime, but that does not mean that this will not be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing the threats.

National Security and Investment Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to you, Mr Parton. I do not want to hog the floor, as I am sure many colleagues want to ask questions. Thank you very much.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

Q It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I do not know whether you can see me, Charlie, but I am here. I am sitting at the back due to social distancing, but it is good to see you.

Going back to your point about resourcing the investment security unit, can you give a bit more detail about what would be an ideal outcome from your point of view? Would it be that we need specificity in the Bill that key representatives and experts of the intelligence services, of the Ministry of Defence, of the diplomatic corps and of other agencies be formally named in the legislation, so we would have that reassurance that the body doing the screening had all the necessary breadth across the spectrum of both the economy and national security?

Charles Parton: That is a good question; it is not necessarily for me and I do not necessarily have the experience to lay down precisely how it works. For me, I think, first, that all those organisations you have mentioned—although others also on the economic side, such as the Treasury and BEIS—perhaps should be there to set the parameters of what needs to be referred. I think that, as a sort of preliminary filter, one would hope that there was an ability for most companies, and most universities as well, very quickly to put forward the deals or the pieces of work that they felt might be coming up against the parameters set by such a Government body.

For a quick decision, is the topic one that is suitable, or does it need a little more investigation? Should we be working with this organisation, or in some cases this particular Chinese academic or company, which may have links to the military or to the repressive regime? The experts, as it were, which means the SAGE-type committee, surely should be very quickly—companies and academics need to move quite quickly—making a preliminary estimation of whether this needs to be referred upwards to a Government Committee that wants to look at it in more detail.

I do agree with you that the range of interests needs to be representative if the decision is to be perceived by all sides as acceptable when it is eventually made.

UK Steel Industry

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Nadhim Zahawi

Monday 14th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Nadhim Zahawi]

It certainly is and I hope that I can cover that in the time that I have left to me.

Both officials and Ministers invested considerable time and effort in closing the deal with Jingye and the planned £1.2 billion investment that will go into the operations of British Steel. I hope the hon. Lady agrees that this represents a huge vote of confidence in the UK steel industry and the high-quality steel produced here in the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this positive outcome for British Steel prior to the pandemic, the global steel industry was already facing significant headwinds. This included demand slowing across developed economies and persistent global excess production capacity, which depresses prices and harms the profitability of UK steel producers.

In the past few days, Tata Steel has published its accounts, which show a challenging position across its UK and European operations. While it is not appropriate for Ministers to comment on the performance of individual companies, I wish to reassure the hon. Lady that we continue to work very closely with the entire UK steel sector and the trade unions, and that we understand the challenges facing the industry in the UK.

While the coronavirus has come at a challenging time for the industry, we have been working intensively over this period to ensure that the UK steel industry has been able to access the support that it needs since the start of the covid-19 pandemic The Government have set out a far-reaching package of support to protect jobs, incomes and businesses across every part of the economy. Those working in the steel industry have been among the 9.6 million individuals across the country who have been able to access the job retention scheme. The scheme has protected people’s livelihoods in the industry and ensured that steel manufacturers have been able to retain high-skilled staff while managing the impact of reduced demand caused by the pandemic.

Importantly, we have worked closely with the steel industry representatives over this period to ensure that the furlough scheme—the job retention scheme—was sufficiently flexible to accommodate some of the real key asks from the industry and from the unions to meet the changing requirements of the industry as the wider situation evolved. I have been engaging personally on a regular basis with companies, trade associations, and, of course, the trade unions to gather their feedback. Direct input from the steel sector has helped to shape a number of our covid-19 support schemes. The coronavirus large business loan interruption scheme, the tax deferrals and the trade credit reinsurance scheme, which we launched with £10 billion, clearly came through as a result of that particular engagement with the industry. They were developed rapidly in response to that particular challenge faced by companies in the industry.

In addition to those far-reaching economy-wide schemes, we have committed to consider bespoke support on a last-resort basis where a viable company of strategic importance has exhausted all other options available to it. The House will be aware—the hon. Member for Newport East mentioned it—that such circumstances apply to Celsa Steel, which is a critical supplier to our construction industry. Government support in that case secured over 1,000 jobs, including 800 positions at the company’s principal site in south Wales. Commercial confidentiality prevents me from setting out further details on that case, or indeed from commenting on any discussions we have had with individual steel companies over this period. However, I hope that hon. Members agree that that is a clear signal from the Government of our continued commitment to the UK steel industry and the 30,000 individuals who are employed in the sector.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The support to Celsa was absolutely welcome and we certainly appreciate that, but what about Tata Steel? The Minister says he is looking for strategic importance and a viable business that will play a critical role in the future of our manufacturing sector. Surely, Tata Steel qualifies on all three counts?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

The hon. Gentleman will know, because he is deeply involved with Tata Steel in his constituency, that that is absolutely right with regard to the strategic importance of Tata Steel. I hope he will forgive the fact that I will be unable to go any further at this stage because of the need to protect commercial confidentiality. Suffice to say that he is absolutely right that it ticks all those boxes.

As we transition from managing the immediate challenges presented by covid-19 to securing the long-term recovery of the UK economy, we will continue to work with representatives of the steel industry, the unions and the devolved Administrations to address the strategic challenges faced by the sector. We are committed to working collectively with those partners to shape a steel industry that is sustainable, productive and innovative. To that end, we are taking action in key areas. I want to outline a few of the priorities for UK steel companies, including on energy prices, procurement, research and innovation, and international trade.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I will come back to anti-dumping at the end of my remarks.

To finish my point on innovation, another £250 million —a quarter of a billion pounds—of clean steel fund will support the sector’s transition to new low-carbon technologies and processes. A £100-million low-carbon hydrogen production fund will support the deployment of low-carbon hydrogen in industry to help decarbonise a range of sectors, including steel.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will the Minister give way?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I want to make some headway. If there is time at the end, I will come back to the hon. Gentleman.

The hon. Member for Newport East rightly mentioned procurement. It is a priority for the Government to ensure that UK steel producers have the best possible chance of competing for and winning the contracts associated with our domestic infrastructure investment. We have published a steel pipeline on national infrastructure projects worth about £500 million over the next decade. For the first time, we have also published data on public sector steel procurement, which will be refreshed in the coming weeks and on an annual basis thereafter. That information serves as a testament to our ambitious plans for UK-sourced steel within our pipeline of major infrastructure projects. It will also serve as an accountability mechanism. We will work with the sector to achieve this shared aim.

We recently welcomed the commencement of construction work on the largest of these infrastructure projects, which the hon. Lady mentioned—HS2. We are keenly aware of the opportunity it represents for our domestic steel sector. The Department’s steel pipeline update from last year indicated that HS2 will require more than 2 million tonnes of steel over phases 1 and 2.

We are mindful that there are mechanisms by which we can actively support the sector to realise this opportunity and future ones within the parameters of our legal framework. To take just one example, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has signed up to the UK steel charter, which has been mentioned several times tonight. We recognise it as an important initiative, developed by industry, and we are actively encouraging other Departments to sign up. We look forward to making continued progress on the issue of procurement over the coming months.

International trade and EU exit, which were both mentioned in the debate, are huge areas of strategic significance for the UK steel industry. Overcapacity in steel production remains a global systemic challenge for the sector. We continue to work as part of the G20 global forum on steel excess capacity to address this problem. Unfair market-distorting practices have been partly to blame for the situation. We want all countries to act on and implement the recommendations agreed by G20 Ministers, and we will maintain pressure on them to do so.

In preparation for the end of the transition period, the Government have legislated for the full suite of tools permitted under the WTO to address unfair trading practices. We are working closely with the Department for International Trade to ensure that the UK has a suitable trade remedies system in place for the future to maintain the protection of our steel industry. We are also engaging with our European Commission colleagues to discuss how the steel safeguards should operate after the transition period, with the aim of preserving traditional trade flows and providing as much continuity to the industry as possible. We are committed to transitioning the definitive safeguard measures on those steel products and categories where there is a UK interest. We continue to make a strong case to the EU on behalf of the UK steel sector to ensure that appropriate tariff rate quotas are provided to UK exporters as soon as is practicably possible following the end of the transition period.

These are unprecedented times and the challenge for the UK steel industry is big. I have half a minute left, but I will take the hon. Gentleman’s intervention.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will the Minister underline our commitment to blast furnaces as a central part of the steel-making process? With the right investment, we can make the transition to hydrogen and so on, but blast furnace production is absolutely central.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we have to make sure that, as a foundation industry, steel continues to innovate. Whether it is electric arc or other emerging technologies, such as hydrogen, which we are seeing the adoption of, we are absolutely committed to that.