Stephen Hammond
Main Page: Stephen Hammond (Conservative - Wimbledon)(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 48, in clause 28, page 40, line 39, at end insert—
“3RF Requirement to publish specified information
(1) The Treasury may at any time, by notice in writing, direct a regulator to measure its performance against specified metrics and to publish such information if—
(a) the regulator does not already publish such information, or
(b) the Treasury consider the information published is insufficient for the purposes of holding the regulator to account.
(2) A direction under subsection (1) may—
(a) specify the element of the regulator’s performance to be measured;
(b) specify the appropriate metrics to be used;
(c) specify the period for which performance must be measured; and
(d) specify the date by which the performance information must be published.
(3) As soon as practicable after giving the direction under subsection (1) the Treasury must—
(a) lay before Parliament a copy of the direction, and
(b) publish the direction in such manner as the Treasury considers appropriate.
(4) A direction under subsection (1) may be varied or revoked by the giving of a further direction.”
I again guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Clause 28 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It gives the Treasury the power to make or to direct rules. A key element of our discussions has been transparency and accountability, and the amendment is designed to make things a little clearer by ensuring that regulators report regularly and transparently on key metrics. The regulators are already mandated to report to His Majesty’s Treasury in their annual reports, which have to contain some performance metrics; the issue is that those metrics are selected by the regulator themselves. At the moment, an oversight body has the power to send for “persons, papers and records”, but it does not have the power to mandate regulators to report on specific performance metrics over time. I think that that leaves a hole in terms of both accountability to Parliament and transparency of regulators.
I accept the evidence that Martin Taylor gave the Committee that Parliament and the Government have a huge amount of influence. Equally, though, the chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, when asked elsewhere for his thoughts on the competitiveness objective, described a lot of it as a “red herring”. When asked how he would report on the competitiveness objective, he said that he had “no convincing answer”. It is important that there is a convincing answer, and that is, in effect, what my proposed new section 3RF of the 2000 Act would provide.
As I have stated quite clearly, I do not believe that this is about a race to the bottom. We need a well-regulated, tough regulated, transparently regulated jurisdiction. Regular accountability on performance is in no way an infringement of a regulator’s independence; I think that it would enhance the regulator’s reputation. The amendment therefore sets out a number of metrics on which a regulator might be asked to report. That could work relatively easily. For instance, the Treasury could use its powers to set out more clearly the elements on which the regulator should measure and report its performance. It could also set out definitions that are relevant to the measures themselves. I think that the direction potentially should be able to be scrutinised by the public, and particularly by Parliament and the Treasury Committee, and that the information should be published, and published more frequently.
My amendment is designed to ensure that the regulator not only has the objective, but has to report on it on a very clear set of metrics, which would then allow us in Parliament and the public to ensure that it is meeting the objective.
I thank the hon. Member for tabling the amendment. In principle, Opposition Members are supportive of providing regulators with clearly defined metrics to assess their performance. We would need further information about how it would work in practice before we could lend our support to the amendment, but in principle we are in agreement with the views that the hon. Member has outlined.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon for raising this important issue, and I note the potential, in-principle support of the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn, speaking for the Opposition.
The Government agree that it is vital to have appropriate public metrics for holding regulators to account on their performance. FSMA already requires regulators to report annually on how they have discharged their functions, advanced their objectives and complied with their other duties. In addition, schedules 1ZA and 1ZB to FSMA provide that the Treasury may direct a regulator to include such other matters as it deems appropriate in the regulator’s annual report.
As part of their annual reports, both the Financial Conduct Authority and the PRA publish data on operational performance. The FCA annually publishes operating service metrics relating to authorisations, timeliness of responses to stakeholders, and regulatory permission requests, among other things. In April 2022, the FCA also published a comprehensive set of outcomes and metrics that it will use to measure and publicly report on its performance. The PRA annually publishes data on its performance of authorisation processes.
Amendment 48 seeks to allow the Treasury, in addition, to determine what metrics the FCA and the PRA should use to measure their performance and over what period, and other technical aspects of the measurement and publication of metrics. Let me reassure my hon. Friend of the importance that I attach to the matter he has raised. I have discussed it with the CEOs of the PRA and the FCA since taking up my role, and I will continue to do so. I am open to discussing the matter with my hon. Friend outside the Committee to see what further reassurance the Government could give, or what further measures we could take. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for his response, and I thank the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn for hers. Clearly, there is a willingness across the House to look at this matter again, so I am going to take the Minister at his word—as I always do—and accept his kind reassurance. Perhaps he might ask the hon. Lady to join us in that discussion, because it would be beneficial. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28 enhances FSMA by enabling the Treasury to place an obligation on the FCA or the PRA to make rules in a certain area of regulation. Equivalent provision for the Bank of England and the Payment Systems Regulator is made in clause 44 and in paragraph 7 of schedule 7.
FSMA requires that regulators advance their objectives when they make rules, set technical standards and issue guidance. The regulators must also take into account eight regulatory principles when discharging their functions. It is generally up to the regulators to determine what rules are necessary, but as set out in the future regulatory framework review consultation in November last year, that approach may not always be sufficient. There must be a means for the Government and Parliament to require the regulators to make rules covering certain matters, in order to ensure that important wider public policy concerns are addressed. That approach has already been established in legislation through the Financial Services Act 2021, which required the FCA to make rules that applied to FCA-regulated investment firms.
Clause 28 enables the Treasury to make similar regulations and place an obligation on the regulators to make rules in a certain area. The clause aims to strike a balance between the responsibilities of the regulator, the Treasury and Parliament now that we are outside the EU. It does not enable the Government to tell a regulator what its rules should be; it simply enables the Government, with the agreement of Parliament, to say that there must be rules relating to a particular area. The FCA and the PRA must continue to act to advance their objectives and take into account their regulatory principles when complying with the requirements set under this power. The Treasury cannot require the regulators to make rules that they would not otherwise have the ability to make.
I assure the Committee that this power will always be subject to the affirmative procedure. That is the most appropriate procedure, as it means that Parliament will be able to consider and debate any requirements set in this way. It also ensures that the Government are able to act to ensure that these requirements stay up to date with changing markets, rather than setting them out in primary legislation, where they could quickly become out of date. The clause enhances the FSMA model, enabling the Treasury to ensure that key areas of financial services continue to be regulated following the repeal of retained EU law and in the future. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Matters to consider when making rules
That is, of course, possible, but it would be unusual. There is regular discourse between His Majesty’s Treasury and regulators, and I consider the risk that the hon. Lady raises relatively small. The regulatory bodies would consult on that change if required.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Public consultation requirements
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 34, page 47, line 38, at end insert—
“(2B) The FCA must publish a list of all of the consultees.”
Again, I guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. The amendment is very simple. I welcome clause 34. It sets out public consultation requirements and, after proposed new section 1RA of FSMA 2000, inserts proposed new section 1RB, concerning requirements in connection with public consultation. The key word here is “public”. Proposed new section 1RB(2) states:
“The FCA must include information in the consultation about any engagement by the FCA with…statutory panels”.
That is a public consultation, or it should be. Therefore it seems only appropriate that the FCA and the PRA list all the consultees to the public consultation. That is what amendment 49, for the FCA, and consequential amendment 55, for the PRA, provide. That is a very simple request. If the Government cannot agree to it today, I hope that they will take it away about think about it very carefully.
Amendment 49 seeks to require the FCA to publish a list of all respondents to any public consultation. I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon intended for the requirement in amendment 49 also to apply to the PRA, where the same issues would arise.
The Government believe that policy making is at its most effective when it draws on the views, experience and expertise of those who may be impacted by regulation. Meaningful stakeholder engagement makes it more likely that final proposals will be effective, understood and accepted as fair and reasonable. The Government also recognise the importance of transparency in supporting the effective scrutiny of the regulators, and are bringing forward a number of measures in the Bill to support that.
I remind my hon. Friend that FSMA already requires the FCA to publish information regarding responses to their public consultations. In particular, section 138I of FSMA requires the FCA to publish an account, in general terms—I accept that that is different from what my hon. Friend proposes—of representations made in response to consultation, and of the regulator’s response to them.
Although I therefore support the ambition behind the amendment, there is a risk that the additional requirement on the FCA to publish a list of all consultees to every consultation could deter stakeholders that want to respond confidentially from engaging fully with the regulators’ consultations.
The Government sympathise with my hon. Friend’s point, but I ask him to withdraw his amendment. I am happy to meet with him, with officials, to see whether there is a different way in which he can obtain the comfort he desires, or in which we can take the matter forward.
I am very pleased to hear what the Minister said, because he has broadly accepted the thrust of what I said. I think he is offering me the chance to explore with him the circumstances in which a body does not wish for its name to be published in respect of a consultation. I am prepared to have that conversation with him so that I understand why he thinks that that might constrain the FCA and PRA. With that reassurance from the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Again, I direct the Committee to my entry on the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I warmly welcome the creation of cost-benefit panels. In my view, the greater the understanding of the cost and benefit of a regulation, the greater the understanding of the impact, and therefore the effectiveness, of the regulation, and the greater the transparency of that process.
I am pleased that the Bill includes this clause because it sets out the agenda, membership, metrics and outputs that each of these panels should make. I guess the real answer I am trying to get from the Minister—I have listened carefully and I think we have had most of the response, but I want to test him a little more—is that, if we are to get all the desirable outcomes from setting up these panels, we must know how much they are a creature of the regulator and how much they are independent of the regulator.
The Minister clearly said that there is an implicit assumption that the regulator would follow an independent line for these panels. If the purpose of the panels is purely to provide evidence and they are controlled by the regulator, those recommendations will be accepted, but it is key that there is an independent panel.
I agree that regulators are not in ivory towers, as Martin Taylor said in his evidence to us. I do not think there is substantial implicit control, nor do I think there is not an implicit desire to see independence, nor do I think that there is not implicit influence by His Majesty’s Treasury. However, if we want to build the world’s leading regulatory regime, it must be seen to be tough and proportionate, and that is why these panels are very helpful. I therefore support the aim of clause 40.
My amendments seek to address the concern that the panel has marked its own homework—the excuse that “the dog ate my homework”—and the point about independence. I understand that members of the panel could already be external, but I want to make it clear that “could” is not enough; there should and must be external members. I hope that the Minister will be able to give me that further reassurance that that is very much the intention of the Bill.
I take on board exactly what the Minister said about my amendment 52, in that the FCA already has to consider the representations and place them on record. However, I am quite concerned by the wording. I think the Minister got my point, which is about the wording “from time to time”. Those of us who have had the honour to stand at the Dispatch Box will have been asked questions such as, “When is that happening, Minister?”, to which the response is often, “Soon,” or, indeed, as we heard the Minister say this morning, “In due course.”
The regulator might say to us that it is going to publish the responses “from time to time”. I take the point that the Minister does not want to fetter the regulator, but I am concerned that, if there is not something either in implicit guidance to the regulator or potentially set out, “from time to time” could be whenever the regulator chooses and potentially not annually. Therefore, if it were to say “annually or more frequently” I would be a lot happier. I listened to the Minister’s comments and I think he probably has sympathy with what I am saying, but I will listen to his response to my remarks.
Before I bring in the next speaker, I apologise to the hon. Member for Wimbledon, who I probably should have brought in first. I apologise for that; it is a bit awkward.
Indeed. We ask the FCA to produce an annual report as well, so this is not out of line with other expectations.
My hon. Friend has finished my point for me. This is not uncommon in statute, so while the Government do not accept the amendment and will vote against it, I have committed—and I do so again—to meet my hon. Friend and consider these matters further before Report.
Having listened to the Minister, I think amendment 51 might already be included in the Bill, amendment 52 appears to be fettering, and 53 and 54 —it looks like I am going to enjoy substantial tea and biscuits at the Treasury next week. As such, I do not intend to press my amendments to a Division.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 39 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Exercise of FMI regulatory powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.