Investigatory Powers Bill

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

The Home Secretary has said times without number—the same point has been made by Ministers today—that at the end of this process she wants a world-leading piece of legislation. I very much hope that that is possible, but it is not what we have at the moment. The Bill lags far behind several jurisdictions with regard to the protection of the rights of the individual. It has come some way on the protection of privacy, but as others have said, there is still a great deal of distance to go. We are testing the bona fides of the Government in their statements of general application on meaningful protections—protections such as those proposed in new clause 1. I wait to hear with interest what the Minister has to say.

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I understand that you would like Members to be brief, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am not a lawyer and I was not a member of the Bill Committee, so I will be brief.

On Second Reading, I spoke about an issue that has not yet been discussed today: economic cybercrime, which I have spoken about frequently in this House. The Government’s amendments enhance our ability to attack it. Constituents write to us as Members of Parliament; my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) has mentioned the huge number of privacy-related issues that have been raised, including the need to ensure that, if the Government were to interfere with the right to privacy, there would be proper oversight, safeguards and transparency. I do not need to re-rehearse her arguments, but I say to the Government and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security that while new clause 5 may not be as perfect as those lawyers present would like it to be, it goes a long way towards satisfying the public.

I want to address two aspects of new clause 5. First, our constituents are interested in the issues covered by subsections (2)(a) and (4)(c). The onus is now on the need to consider less intrusive means and proportionality. That is an obligation. Notwithstanding my hon. and learned Friend’s comments about the need to understand the exact penalties for misuse, those two particular subsections go a long way to putting in place some protection.

Secondly, on economic cybercrime, we often talk about huge attacks on bank systems. New clause 5(2)(b) and (4)(b) relate to not just the public interest in detecting serious crimes, but the integrity and security of telecommunication systems and postal services. The reality is that there is a huge amount of low-level cybercrime that then moves into more serious economic cybercrime. By addressing the issue in the Bill, we are making a statement of intent. Given that there are so many e-commerce transactions today, it is hugely important that we protect and maintain the integrity of telecommunication systems, in the widest sense of the term, and postal services.

Whatever else may be, those of us who are not lawyers —we are not entirely sure what the difference is between new clause 21(2)(a) and (b), and new clause 5(4)(d) and (e), but I am looking forward to my right hon. and learned Friend explaining it—say “Well done” to the Government. New clause 5(2)(b) and 5(4)(b) protect all e-commerce, and putting the emphasis on maintaining the integrity of services, particularly telecoms services, will take away some of the public’s criticisms about the snoopers’ charter. The key points about subsections (2)(b) and (4)(b) are extraordinarily important, and I am pleased to see them in the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is a great pleasure to speak on Report, particularly as the heirs of Walsingham and Egerton are on the Treasury Bench sitting in judgment over a Bill that will shape our civil liberties. In their day, Walsingham broke the code, and Egerton tried Mary, Queen of Scots. The techniques that they used are still in active use today, but they have been updated. It is a question no longer of codes on paper, smuggled out in brandy bottles, but of codes hidden in computer messages, apps and other forms of communication. That is why I welcome the Bill, which updates historical practice for the present day. It is essential that we put this into statute, because for the first time we are putting into a Bill what we actually mean. For years, the state has used interpretations of legal practice rather than setting out, and debating properly, what it should do. That is why I particularly welcome the joint approach to the Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has been instrumental in bringing a co-operative mood to the House, and I am grateful to him for doing so.

The Bill balances privacy against other considerations. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) pointed out, privacy is a fundamental right of all British citizens, and one that we have enjoyed for many years. But that privacy is only worth anything if we can live in safety, not just from the obvious risk of terrorism but from the risks of child abuse, drug smuggling and other forms of violence against the people of this country. I am grateful for the fact that the Government have balanced that privacy against those threats.

I will leave it there, because there are many more amendments to come. I could address some of them in detail, and perhaps I will be called to speak again.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

In conclusion, the terrorists, the paedophiles and the serious fraudsters all scheme in cyberspace these days. Technology that empowers us also, sadly, empowers them. Yes, we want world-class encryption and privacy, but we also want world-class security. We should trust the skill and restraint of those unsung heroes—the analysts, the cryptographers, the mathematicians and the codebreakers—who have used their genius to safeguard our security and who have maintained confidence and discretion in relation to the secrets they have seen. We, as elected Members, have a duty to explain their role to the public, but we must also trust their judgment, which is subject to weighty safeguards, checks and balances. These people have proved their heroism in our moments of need throughout history. Let us not further tie their hands and just hope that our enemies, who are plotting night and day to destroy our societies, do not, by chance, hit us; instead, let us empower our agencies. That is why I will be voting against the amendments.

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

Like yesterday, I want to make my usual declaration that I am not a lawyer. It is always dangerous to follow lawyers, particularly the excellent contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes).

The amendments are clear, and I approach them from the same point of view of economic cybercrime and the importance of bulk data which I took in my comments on Second Reading and yesterday.

Understandably, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) raised concerns. I understand the resolve of her and her party on the central point about potentially using less targeted and less intrusive means, rather than bulk data. However, the Minister rightly made the point that there is a review, and he mentioned not only the necessity of the review, but that it would look at the necessity of these powers. If we consider the bulk powers in relation to economic cybercrime, their necessity becomes increasingly clear.

Over the past few years, our economy has been transformed by advances in technology, backed by encryption, with huge changes in how business is conducted. E-commerce is a reality not for the few but for the many. Given the parcels that arrive on my doorstep from my daughter every day, it is a huge thing that has reached everybody. More than that, there are new business opportunities for the growing IT sector. The use of big data, which my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham discussed in an historical context, is becoming increasingly evident in the context of the internet economy in looking at patterns of behaviour to determine new product design and identify new customer opportunities.

Equally, those opportunities are extended to economic cyber-criminals and terrorists. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) spoke about 95 cyber-attacks that have been identified through the use of bulk data. To choose one specific example, Apple has publicly accepted that the existing bulk data powers detected a vulnerability in its operating systems that, had it been exploited, would have affected the modification of the software being used on iPads and iPhones. It might have been used for all sorts of purposes, but one purpose could well have been the removal of data about bank accounts and other personal data. In the open world that we see at the moment, there are myriad threats, particularly in the dark web through password-protected information. Much of what happens is valid. The existence of encryption and anonymity protocols is a huge benefit to people, but criminals and terrorists have embraced this dark world as well. The power to acquire and analyse bulk data is therefore essential. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) said that we have to trust our security services. Those who have some experience have very clearly made the case that we should look at the whole issue of the existence of data harvesting.

I believe that the bulk data powers are essential because they allow for intelligence-gathering on overseas subjects of interest. They identify the “needle in the haystack” threats that my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) talked about by identifying small displaced fragments of information, establishing the investigation of links between subjects of interest, understanding patterns of behaviour and communication methods, and looking at pieces of information that are acquired through new and varying sources. Bulk interception focuses on foreign intelligence. Criminality and terrorism is international, and it is therefore only right that we should have access to the data so that we can detect aspects of that criminality. The importance of bulk data acquisition is clear. Detailed and directed searches of bulk data communications can establish the fact that there is communications content between subjects of interest and reveal where attacks are planned. Bulk acquisition can help to direct where a warrant for more individual targeted data, such as interception, is essential and complementary. It also allows for searches of traces of activity where previously unknown suspects may be taking part in patterns of behaviour that are well known but not yet identified.

The Bill codifies and pulls together the powers that are already in place and puts in place some consistent safeguards. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, none of these powers is unnecessary or disproportionate. Through the safeguards that they are putting in place in their amendments, the Government will ensure the review of valid lines of operation by Mr David Anderson. More importantly, a number of cases will involve not just the Secretary of State but the judicial commissioner—the double lock that several Members have spoken about. In terms of the content acquired under the warrant that was initially going to look out for people internationally, if those data then pertain to people in the UK, another, more targeted examination warrant is needed. That is another protection and additional safeguard that was not there before. The statutory code of practice that is being put in place secures the safeguards that we need.

Particularly with regard to economic cybercrime, I hope that when the House considers the amendments on bulk data powers proposed by the SNP, it will conclude that Mr Anderson’s review is appropriate. Many Government Members are making an overwhelming case that these powers are necessary. I hope that the vast majority of colleagues will join us in rejecting the amendments.

[Kevin Foster]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. On Second Reading, I said that much of this can be dealt with in two ways: first, by making quite a sensationalist argument; and secondly, by looking at what is actually being proposed. Many of these powers, particularly on bulk data, are already being used, but they are now being avowed, put into legislation, and given a consistent framework. The legislation that already regulates much of this activity is from an era well before smartphones and the idea that a phone could do anything other than take a phone call. This Bill provides a much more modern piece of legislation, subject to clear safeguards.

While I appreciate the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Tom Elliott), I would always be tentative about using the argument, “If you have nothing to hide, you should have nothing to worry about.” I understand his point of view, certainly in terms of the bulk data powers, but we should always be rather careful about that being an argument for absolutely anyone being under surveillance at any time. That is not what is proposed in this Bill or these powers, given that there would need to be a warrant concerning how information is gathered.

It has been a pleasure to sit through the debate this afternoon, which has convinced me that the amendments are not justified and should be opposed. The speech given by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) was thoughtful. He adopted a responsible position, as a member of the Opposition, in teasing out some of the legitimate concerns about the Bill and making some genuine progress in getting reassurances from the Minister. It was encouraging to see that level of exchange on things that genuinely cause some concern.