Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Stephen Farry Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Brandon Lewis]

My right hon. Friend makes the same point, and I will deal with that issue specifically in a few moments.

My message to victims and survivors, many of whom have engaged with us since we published the Command Paper last year, is that we have listened, and carefully. We understand that, no matter how small the prospect of a successful criminal justice outcome, that possibility is something that they do not want to see removed entirely, and I know that, despite the changes we have made, this legislation will none the less remain challenging for some.

I want to say directly to all those individuals and their families that I, and we as a Government, respect the personal tragedies that drive their determination to seek the truth and accountability for the losses that they have suffered. I share that determination. The Government are not asking and would never ask them to forget what they have been through in the name of reconciliation. This is about finding a way to obtain information and provide accountability more quickly and comprehensively than the current system can and in a way that aids reconciliation both for them and for the whole of Northern Ireland.

I am immensely grateful to the many people who have engaged with us, sharing their deeply moving experiences and helping us to understand the sheer frustration and hurt that they feel over the loss of loved ones. Every tragedy remains raw, as we have seen even this afternoon in this Chamber, with the pain of many as strong today as it was on the day it happened.

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

I have a question about engagement with the Command Paper. The Secretary of State will know that virtually every victims group and every political party had major concerns about that. With whom have the Secretary of State and his officials engaged on the details of the revised legislation? As far as I can see, not a single victims group in Northern Ireland has been engaged with on the details, never mind supports it. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, which the Government have a statutory duty to consult, have not been engaged with. The political parties in Northern Ireland have not been engaged with. So who exactly have the Government engaged with on the Bill before us today specifically?

[Brandon Lewis]

I do not recognise that description of events from the hon. Gentleman. There has been wide engagement on this, both with the political parties, including his own just last week, and with parties more widely.

The first part of the Bill provides that, for the purposes of this legislation, the period of the troubles is defined as beginning on 1 January 1966 and ending on 10 April 1998—the date of the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. Part 2 provides for the establishment of a new independent commission for information recovery, tasked with carrying out robust, effective and thorough investigations into the deaths and injuries that occurred during the troubles, for the primary purpose of information recovery.

We recognise the importance of the new commission being able to deliver its functions with absolute independence. This will be crucial to gaining the trust of families, survivors and individuals who decide to engage in the information recovery process. That is why the UK Government will have absolutely no involvement in the commission’s decision-making process. The new commission will have all the necessary policing powers to conduct its own thorough investigations, including the ability to compel witnesses and test forensics. The body will be supported for the first time by a legal requirement for full disclosure from UK Government Departments, security services and arm’s length bodies to make sure that it can gather all the evidence that it needs to establish what happened in each case.

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[Brandon Lewis]

My hon. Friend, as ever, makes insightful points. We are cognisant of those things and will go through them in Committee and in the guidance that we will issue. That is why it is important, referring to his earlier point, that this is a judge-led commission, which involves very highly respected investigative individuals in the process.

While addressing the legacy of the past rightly focuses on those most directly affected, it is a sad fact that the troubles have touched the lives of everyone in Northern Ireland, and across the rest of these islands in different ways, including many of those born after the Belfast/Good Friday agreement was signed. It is therefore important that we think of reconciliation and remembering in a societal as well as in an individual context. That is why, under part 4 of the Bill, an expert-led memorialisation strategy will lay the groundwork for inclusive new structures and initiatives to commemorate the tragic events of the past—to help us all collectively remember those lost and ensure that the lessons of the past are not forgotten.

[Stephen Farry]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Brandon Lewis]

No, I will make some progress.

A major new oral history initiative will be launched. We will want to make this one of the most ambitious and comprehensive approaches to oral history that has ever been attempted, drawing on international models and concentrating on collating lived experiences and testimony and setting them within their appropriate historical context. The public, including academics and historians, will have access to more information than ever before. As well as opening up archives in a major digitisation project, rigorous new academic research commissions will allow for a fuller examination of the conflict than has ever been possible. This will be supported by a new official history, led by independent historians with unprecedented access to the UK documentary record. Consistent with the Stormont House agreement, these provisions will create opportunities for people from all backgrounds, particularly those who may not have been heard before, to share their experiences and perspectives relating to the troubles and to learn about those of others.

The legislation we are bringing forward will implement a legally robust and effective information recovery process that will provide answers to families, uphold our commitment to those who serve in Northern Ireland, and help society to look forward, while, importantly, also recognising that those who chose, or do choose, not to reveal what they know should remain indefinitely liable to the threat of prosecution. We must recognise that, notwithstanding the important changes that we have made to the proposals as set out in July last year, this legislation, I accept, will be very challenging for many.

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[Dr Lewis]

That is exactly the central point. There are perhaps two ways of getting the knowledge. One way is to go on as we have been in trying to investigate these things piecemeal, with everybody trying to hide everything to the maximum because they feel that they will be prosecuted. The other way is to bring in a truth recovery mechanism which, in return for the granting of immunity, maximises the possibility that the truth may come out.

[Stephen Farry]

Does the right hon. Member concede that a middle path is to have investigations, rather than reviews? That is what a lot of the commentary in Northern Ireland is focusing on. The prospect of prosecutions actually happening is very limited, but victims are looking for the interrogation of evidence and the challenge that happens through a proper investigation rather than, simply, a desk-top review.

[Dr Lewis]

That is precisely what the truth recovery process is meant to achieve.

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[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

At the outset, may I put on record that I think we can all be here in support of UK armed forces but have a different opinion on what is the right thing to do in terms of the legislation? I stand here as someone who wants to restate my support for the work that the armed forces have done in Northern Ireland in the past, where they served with great honour, distinction, integrity and sacrifice, and for the work they are doing in places right around the world at present. All of us are very clearly aware of the huge threats that exist in the international space at present. I want to pass on my thanks and appreciation personally to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson) and his colleagues for their service.

Our difficulty is that this debate is based around a false narrative of vexatious investigations and prosecutions that simply does not stack up under scrutiny. As a consequence, we are seeing the production of bad law—indeed, law that will prove to be utterly unworkable in the situation of Northern Ireland. Legacy is by far the most sensitive issue in our political space. There is a real prospect that what is happening with this Bill, including the manner in which it has been handled, will end up retraumatising victims, because no preparation has been done for what is coming down the tracks. People are seeing the potential prospect—slim though that may be—of justice being snuffed out over their heads. That cuts really deep, to their very sense of being and the slim hope that they have been holding on to.

Of course, the legacy process in Northern Ireland is fragmented and piecemeal. Outcomes are poor, in terms of justice and reconciliation. There have been some notable exceptions where results have been delivered, not least in some of the recent inquests. However, we have the legacy investigations branch of the PSNI, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, inquests and civil cases, so the need for a comprehensive approach to legacy is clear. The Bill does not represent that solution. It is unworkable and incompatible with the principles of justice, the rule of law and reconciliation, and it is not compatible with international human rights standards either.

The Stormont House agreement of 2014 represented an agreement between the UK and Irish Governments and most of the Northern Ireland parties. It also has the support of most victims’ groups and other stakeholders, but it has never been implemented. It was never even given a chance. When people ask us, “What is the alternative?”, the answer is clearly “Stormont House—return to it and give it a chance before you move on to something else.”

The Bill is not even consistent with the principles of the Stormont House agreement. Furthermore, it is even a breach of the New Decade, New Approach agreement from as recently as January 2020 under the current Prime Minister. That agreement recommitted the Government to Stormont House—not to a different process. It is there in black and white.

The Bill is not compatible with the UK’s obligations under article 2 of the European convention on human rights. There is already very significant case law on requirements around the nature of investigations. The processes set out in the Bill do not, and cannot, provide the necessary independence, effectiveness or rigour, in terms of the interrogation of evidence, to be compliant with article 2. We have had an interesting debate about how that can potentially be addressed. We would have to recognise that a whole range of references to “review” in the Bill need to be stripped out and replaced with “investigation.” We are talking about surgery in which, essentially, we would have to select all and replace all, with “review” coming out for “investigation”.

I want to reiterate the following point: although we have to keep on the table the prospect of prosecutions happening in what may well be a small minority of cases—people will cling on to that hope—the important point about investigations relates to the rigour of the investigation, the interrogation of evidence and the challenge that actually provides answers for people. That is what they have been looking for, and that is the type of process that has reached results in limited cases so far. That is what an inquest does, for example. However, on paper in this Bill, we do not have that interrogative approach—it is very far away from that. Indeed, given the Bill’s failure to uphold the European convention on human rights, we could argue that it breaches the Good Friday agreement.

The Operation Kenova model negates the Government’s argument that investigations with full investigatory powers are not viable. Although there have not been any prosecutions, my understanding is that substantial files have been referred to the Public Prosecution Service in relation to that. Again, what is in the Bill is nothing close to what was included in Operation Kenova.

The process around the Bill has been flawed. It is a top-down imposition that does not reflect co-design with the key stakeholders. Indeed, there was no meaningful engagement with Northern Ireland political parties or other stakeholders on the Bill. That includes the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

The Bill is driven by a narrative from the Government, and the Conservative party more widely, based on vexatious claims and investigations against veterans. That does not stack up. Ministers cannot, and will not, cite examples of what they mean by “vexatious”; they have had plenty of opportunity to do so but they have never taken that up. Indeed, the Northern Ireland criminal justice system is rigorous. It has a high bar for what is pursued through the courts and it self-polices any vexatious cases. Anyone who claims that there are vexatious claims in the system is attacking and undermining the existing criminal justice system.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the Bill is opposed by virtually every victims’ group in Northern Ireland, which raises the question: on whose behalf is it being passed? The groups opposing the Bill include Amnesty International, the Committee on the Administration of Justice, Relatives for Justice, South East Fermanagh Foundation, the Pat Finucane Centre, WAVE and the Commission for Victims and Survivors for Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission says that

“this Bill is substantially, in fact almost certainly fatally, flawed.”

The Irish Government are supposed to be a partner in the process and in managing the Good Friday agreement, but have not been part of this phase of the legacy deliberations. They, too, see the Bill as unworkable and as incompatible with article 2 of the convention.

Furthermore, much of the Bill relates to matters that are essentially in the devolved space of Northern Ireland. The original understanding behind Stormont House was that the UK Parliament would pass legislation covering both UK responsibilities and Northern Ireland responsibilities on a hybrid basis, with the active consent of the Assembly; that was the only tactical way of getting the comprehensive package through. As things stand, however, the Government are openly working outside the Sewel convention on this most sensitive area.

Contrary to the dominant narrative that veterans support the Bill, it is important that we recognise that views are at least mixed, particularly among former Army and police personnel based in Northern Ireland. The vast majority believe in the primacy of the rule of law; they believe that the very small minority of their colleagues who have potentially broken the law should be held accountable. The Bill risks drawing a false equivalence between them and the terrorists, with special measures having to be put in place when there is no need for any protection to be given that sullies anyone’s service. For someone who may have invested 30 or 40 years of their life in protecting the community, that twisting of the narrative behind the nature of their service will cut very deep.

The Bill will grant the Secretary of State direct control over the establishment and operation of all the proposed mechanisms, undermining the independence of actors. That is particularly problematic when the state is one of those actors. The powers to compel testimony are weak, suggesting that there will not be the capacity to conduct effective investigations. The functions are weighted towards reviews rather than investigations, the bar for re-examining previous investigations is high, and the conditional immunity approach amounts to a de facto amnesty.

A false equivalence has been drawn with what happened with the early release of prisoners, with decommissioning and with victims’ remains. I was deeply uncomfortable with the early release of prisoners, which was a part of the agreement that I did not find particularly tasteful, but it is important to recognise that anyone subject to early release was out on licence and could be recalled in the event of another offence. With victims’ remains and decommissioning, there was immunity only where evidence led to the discovery of remains or the handover of guns; there was no broad immunity for the people responsible. It is important to set out that context.

In the rare cases where immunity is not granted—I stress that it is a very subjective process—there is still only a technical risk of prosecution, because who else will do the investigation? All other routes are being shut down. There is a very real danger that people will simply choose to wait out the conclusion of the new body’s work, so there will be a blanket amnesty by default.

Amnesties are increasingly regarded as problematic in post-conflict situations around the world, so the Government are going against the trend. Amnesties are particularly problematic in the context of the ECHR framework; the Marguš v. Croatia case is especially relevant in that regard. The lessons are very clear: for any amnesty to be even remotely tenable, it would need either to be part of the peace agreement itself or to be agreed across the political parties. Neither of those tests has been met.

I am conscious that I am running out of time, but I make a couple more comments in conclusion. There are major concerns about shutting down civil cases and inquests, particularly as the last Lord Chief Justice and the present Lady Chief Justice have been working through a programme in which different inquests have been scheduled in a different order, so there is a risk that inquests will be completed for certain families but snuffed out for others.

The proposals relating to oral history, memorials and academic research are also centrally controlled, and are being used to give a reconciliation veneer to what is actually being done. Reconciliation is at the heart of the DNA of my party, but it cannot be done from the top down: people cannot be told to reconcile. It has to be done in an organic way, but that is not going to happen.

Let me make a final comment about process. I believe that the Bill is irredeemable and fatally flawed, which is why I will be opposing it. However, even if the Government offer to amend it, a Committee of the whole House over two days will not give us enough space for proper consideration of any amendments. That belies any genuine attempt to fix any of the problems.

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[Conor Burns]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but the timetabling of today’s Second Reading debate was agreed through the usual channels. I must say to him candidly that I do not agree with his points about a lack of engagement. There has been considerable engagement, much of which has been undertaken directly by the Secretary of State and me, often with groups who did not welcome that engagement being publicised. Much of it, of necessity, took place in private, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that in some of the meetings that I attended, the emotion was heard, and heard very clearly, by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and me.

We are tackling this, and I think that my right hon. Friend deserves a measure of credit, because it is an intensely difficult and controversial area for any Government to get involved in. That is why successive Governments have left it alone. The fact that my right hon. Friend worked so diligently on these proposals—and, indeed, the flak that has been taken when we have missed deadlines in order to take the time to try to refine and improve the Bill that we were going to bring to the House today—show, I think, that we were listening. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister: the Government he leads will deliver shortly on the language and cultural commitments that they have undertaken.

[Stephen Farry]

I noted the Minister’s claim that the Government had engaged with various victims groups on a private basis. Indeed, there have been media reports that some, allegedly, said something privately that was different from what they have said in public. We all know the main victims groups in Northern Ireland, as do the Government. All of them have made their opposition to these proposals clear in public. Furthermore, they have made it very clear that what they say in public is exactly the same as what they say in private. How does the Minister explain this clear disjoint?

[Conor Burns]

I would describe the “clear disjoint” as not being a clear disjoint, because that was a journalist’s quote which does not reflect what was actually said. Let me also correct a little nuance. I did not say that we were engaging privately; I said that we were engaging in private. We were meeting people who had been victims of terrorism. I myself met victims from republican families in West Belfast—I do not think many Ministers have done this over the years—hosted by the Sinn Féin Member, the hon. Member for Belfast West (Paul Maskey), so it is not true to say that the Secretary of State and I and the member of our ministerial team in the other place—and, indeed, our officials, who have worked so hard on developing these proposals and to whom I pay tribute—have not been listening.

I just want to correct a few points of fact as we begin the closure of this debate. I say gently to the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle), on his point about sexual offences that we are very clear that any offences from 1 January 1966 to 10 April 1998 that are not troubles-related can still be investigated by the PSNI and police forces in Great Britain. Troubles-related offences that are not linked to a death or serious injury will not be investigated by this body and will not be subject to the immunity provisions. Only serious and connected troubles-related offences that took place between those dates and that are related to a death or serious injury will be eligible for immunity.