Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Thursday 29th August 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I think my right hon. Friend is referring, by way of inference, to the suggestion that there has been briefing that those who voted for the Government motion would be endorsing in-principle military action. Most of us have been around here long enough to know how often briefing is a long way from the truth. Anyone who is in any doubt about that should read the precise terms of the Government’s motion.

The effort to achieve a resolution under chapter VII is a vital component of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, because if no such resolution is achieved—here, I agree with the Attorney-General—we turn to what was once called humanitarian intervention and now is called responsibility to protect. It is a fundamental of that doctrine that every possible political and diplomatic alternative will have been explored and found not to be capable.

I want to applaud, if I may, Mr Speaker, the House for taking the unusual step—in my view wholly justified—of publishing the Attorney-General’s advice. Those of us with long memories will remember that 10 years ago we were not favoured with anything like as much detail. It is also worth pointing out that there was no second vote 10 years ago. Within 24 hours of the motion being passed by the House endorsing the Labour Government’s proposals, the Tomahawk cruise missiles began to rain down on Baghdad.

It respectfully seems to me that we need to examine the matter not in response to the emotion that it undoubtedly engenders in all of us. Emotion is no substitute for judgment in matters of this kind. We must look beyond what might be achieved in the short term, to the medium term and the long term.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke a moment ago of the responsibility to protect. One of the criteria is the prospect of success. Is he satisfied with the objectives of this action and the prospect of success in those objectives?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

We cannot arrive at a conclusion on the prospect of success until we have more information than is currently available. The hon. Gentleman is right. I should have mentioned that the prospect of success is a part of that evolving doctrine. We should also remember that the doctrine is not universally accepted, and that the mere use of it is, on occasion, regarded as highly controversial. I rather fancy that at the G20 summit in St Petersburg next week the doctrine of the responsibility to protect may not get considerable support.

My questions, which I do not expect to be answered but I hope will lie on the table, are these. Will military action bring the Geneva conference any closer? Is it more likely to produce the political settlement that everyone believes is necessary? Although a strategic objective is set out, I hope I might be forgiven for thinking that military action is more of a tactic than a strategic imperative. That is why we must give consideration to the endgame, to use a colloquialism, and in particular to the whole issue of regional stability—what the consequences might be in an already very unstable region.

What would happen were the next horror to be carried out by some conventional means? What would our response be in the light of the fact that, for two years or so, a number of horrors have been brought about by the use of conventional weapons? My concern is that if we open the gate once, it will be difficult to close it.

I have read the motion and Opposition amendment and I believe that both are motivated by the same determination to do what is right and to see that the House endorses everything that is right. However, I have to confess that, even following the most narrow textual analysis, I can find no difference of substance or principle anywhere in the two offerings. That is why I shall support the Government in the Lobby this evening. I very much hope that the Opposition will, too.