UK Sanctions Regime: Russia and Belarus

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Andrew Mitchell

Thursday 9th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs if he will make a statement on the effectiveness of the implementation of the UK sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Mr Andrew Mitchell)]

The sanctions regime is dealt with by the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan), but I shall do my best to answer this most important question posed by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty).

Sanctions are an important tool that we use to weaken Putin’s war effort and to underline our unyielding support for Ukraine. Britain alone has sanctioned more than 1,800 individuals and entities under the Russia sanctions regime, more than 1,600 of which have been sanctioned since Putin’s full-scale invasion. Although I cannot comment on individual cases, we are pleased that the High Court has in recent weeks recognised the Foreign Office’s expertise on deciding which persons should be sanctioned to ensure maximum effect.

We have frozen over £18 billion-worth of Russian assets through designations and over 60% of Russia’s central bank foreign reserves—assets that can no longer be funnelled back to Russia to fund its war machine. Rather than the surplus that the Russian Government predicted for 2022, Russia suffered an annual deficit of £47 billion—the second highest of the post-Soviet era. Its budget remains in deficit in 2023, despite tax increases. We have also targeted those who have enabled sanctioned persons to hide their assets in obscure and complex financial networks, and we are working to crack down on phoenix companies, which continue to operate after sanctions are imposed or which are developing fronts to avoid sanctions.

Just yesterday, we imposed 29 further sanctions targeting individuals and entities operating in and supporting Russia’s gold, oil and strategic sectors—critical sources of revenue for the Russian war machine. Those sanctions include Russia’s largest gold refiner, as well as international networks propping up Russia’s gold, oil and finance industries.

Our co-ordinated sanctions, working in line with our G7 partners, are having an impact. Without our sanctions and those of our partners, we estimate that Russia would have over $400 billion more to fund its war machine. We are starving Putin of the resources he needs to fund his illegal war on Ukraine. Sanctions are thwarting Russian access to western components and technology. Russia’s budget remains in deficit. Our oil price cap has contributed to a fall of 25% in Russian oil revenues between January and September 2023, compared with the same period in 2022, and our export bans have starved Russia of thousands of products needed for the battlefield.

His Majesty’s Government are fully aware, as Members will be, that sanctions are not static. We are constantly monitoring to see where and if they are being circumvented. Alongside our international partners, we are closing loopholes and tackling sanctions evasion, as Putin desperately scrambles to restructure the Russian economy and smuggle goods in through back channels. We will continue to isolate Russia’s financial system and support businesses that are seeking to divest from their links with Russia. We will bring forward further legislation in the coming weeks to deliver on our G7 commitments and further deprive Russia of lucrative remaining revenue sources, including banning imports of Russian diamonds and ending all imports of Russian copper, aluminium and nickel—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for his response. He will know that there is unity across the House in standing with Ukraine, but there are serious concerns about the effectiveness of our sanctions regime. Almost two years have passed since Putin began this phase of his illegal and barbaric invasion of Ukraine, but on Monday, it was revealed by The Times that a British company has allegedly continued to ship semiconductors to Russia since Putin’s war began and that these have been identified within at least one Russian tank deployed in the conflict against Ukraine. It also reported that the company only stopped shipping to its Russian distributor after the bank refused to process payments for these exports. There are clearly serious deficiencies in the implementation of our regime that must be addressed. I had these raised with me on my recent visit to Kyiv, and I draw attention to my declaration of interests.

I would like clarity from the Minister on a number of key points. Can he confirm whether there are loopholes within our regime that continue to allow for materials to be exported to Russia and Belarus that could be used in the production of military items? Why do those omissions still exist, and what steps are being taken to deal with them?

Secondly, can he set out what assessment has been made by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Treasury of the existence of alleged loopholes that allow indirect imports into UK markets of Russian or Belarusian origin steel, or indeed Russian origin crude oil that has been refined in third countries? These are very serious allegations.

Thirdly, City AM revealed this week that nearly 130 UK companies have admitted breaching Russia-related sanctions as a result of a freedom of information request by the law firm Pinsent Masons. It is good that those companies have come forward voluntarily, but it shows the scale of the problem.

Finally, according to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, only one financial penalty has been issued regarding a sanctions breach within the Russia and Belarus sanctions regimes since February 2022, and only three penalties have been published across all UK sanctions regimes since June 2021. That compares very unfavourably with the United States and other allies, which have been issuing fines and dealing with this issue. Labour stands unshakeably with our allies in providing military, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in the face of Putin’s illegal invasion, but that must include a robust sanctions regime.

[Mr Mitchell]

I thank the hon. Gentleman very much for his comments—I know the revelations in the British media to which he referred at the beginning of his remarks. I will write to him today on some of the technical points he has raised, giving him a very specific answer. On the general point he has made, I can tell him that Britain has prohibited the export to Russia of thousands of products, including semiconductors, and our trade with Russia is down over 96% from pre-invasion levels. We are also providing advice to UK businesses on how to identify methods of circumvention and have shared a list of products of particular concern that could end up on the battlefield.

NATO Summit: Vilnius

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Andrew Mitchell

Thursday 6th July 2023 Westminster Hall

[Mr Mitchell]

In all these situations, we always want a seamless and effective arrangement for any transfers of chairmanships, and I obviously understand the point the right hon. Lady makes.

Turning to the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, who speaks for the Opposition, I want to acknowledge, at this critical moment, the rock-solid unity of view that he expressed on behalf of the Opposition. It is important, particularly now, that our absolute identity of interest in the current situation in Ukraine is so clearly expressed, and he did that with great eloquence.

There were a number of comments about what the Defence Secretary might say about the armed forces as they stand today, and I did take the trouble to find out what he would say in these circumstances. His past response was:

“The Government have injected more than £29 billion of additional funding into defence since 2020, investing in Army modernisation, major platforms such as Type 26, Type 31, Challenger 3 and F-35, and restocking of ammunition”—[Official Report, 26 June 2023; Vol. 735, c. 4.]

to ensure that we have some of the finest armed forces in the world. I would echo my right hon. Friend’s comments in that respect.

NATO remains the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s defence and security policy. Our unwavering commitment to the alliance was confirmed in the “Integrated Review Refresh”, which we published earlier this year. NATO leaders, at their summit in Vilnius next week, will be ensuring that it is a key and important moment as the alliance transforms to meet the changing threat from Russia.

Putin’s illegal war poses an historic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. It is also doing huge damage to many of the nations in the global south, which are seeing a deterioration in food supplies and nutritional support, as well as rising inflation at a time when 70 million people are being pushed back into extreme poverty and 50 million are in serious danger of entering famine crisis conditions.

NATO is responding with iron-clad unity in support of Ukraine and by bolstering every flank of its operations. At last year’s NATO summit in Madrid, alliance members coalesced around the need to stand with Ukraine and to stand up to Russian aggression. We also agreed to accelerate work to transform the ability of the alliance to meet evolving threats.

The Vilnius summit will further bolster NATO’s support for Ukraine and will mark a major milestone for the alliance’s once-in-a-generation enhancement of its war-fighting plans and capabilities. Putin’s illegal war will, of course, naturally dominate talks in Vilnius, and, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear in his speech at the Munich security conference, our priority is to ensure that NATO shows Russia and the Ukrainian people that it will stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine in the short, medium and long term.

Alliance members will demonstrate that commitment in Vilnius by convening the first NATO-Ukraine council, which will provide an ongoing mechanism to strengthen political and military ties with Ukraine. We will increase NATO’s practical support through the comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, which will continue to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs, in addition to facilitating longer-term interoperability with NATO, with projects including medical rehabilitation and military interoperability. We will also send a clear political signal that Ukraine has a future place in the alliance.

NATO has undertaken a once-in-a-generation military transformation to enhance its deterrence and defence. It has transformed itself in response to the evolving threats across the Euro-Atlantic, meaning that we are better prepared for the security challenges of today and tomorrow. The alliance has developed a new generation of war-fighting plans, supported by more high-readiness forces, more pre-positioned equipment and upgraded systems, which will allow us to respond faster to all threats.

I was asked about the number of British troops who may form part of that newly announced force. We do not comment on numbers, but hon. and right hon. Members may rest assured that Britain will be fully playing its role at this vital time. Political leaders will sign off on those new plans in Vilnius and make a new defence investment pledge to make spending 2% of GDP on defence an immediate and hard floor, rather than a ceiling. Members will also agree a defence production action plan, which will increase industrial co-operation between allies and reduce barriers to interoperability in key munitions.

NATO allies will also use the summit to address NATO’s wider transformation. Allies will agree new resilience objectives, which will strengthen national military and defence capabilities across the membership. We will recommit to the cyber-defence pledge that is raising cyber-security standards across the membership. We will also agree to enhance our co-operation to secure our undersea infrastructure, including through the new maritime security centre for critical undersea infrastructure, which NATO recently agreed to establish at Northwood in the UK.

[Stephen Doughty]

I was glad to hear the Minister mention cyber and other related capabilities. We obviously have leading capability in that area and work closely with our allies. Will he be able to say a little about what we will do with our allies on artificial intelligence, in terms of both the potential benefits and our resilience and defence? If he cannot say anything today, perhaps he could write to us.

[Mr Mitchell]

I will come to that in a moment, because I am conscious of time.

Although Russia is the most significant and direct threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, it is one of myriad evolving threats on the horizon, which is partly why the hon. Gentleman just made those comments. In response to those threats, NATO has committed to a joined-up, 360-degree approach, building on the combined strength of alliance members. We remain fully committed to supporting Sweden’s NATO accession. While we may not get it over the line in the very near future, its membership will make allies safer, NATO stronger and the Euro-Atlantic more secure.

On NATO’s eastern flank, we are working to enhance support to Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to equip them to tackle Russia’s malign interference. To the south, we are working with partners to understand and respond to evolving challenges, such as terrorism, co-operation on migration and increasing strategic competition. On both the eastern and southern flanks, NATO is reaching out to non-alliance members to enhance our co-operation in areas where it can bolster our mutual security. NATO also takes that approach to the Indo-Pacific, whose security is inextricably linked to that of the Euro-Atlantic.

I am pleased to report that the leaders of Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand will join talks in Vilnius, and the UK Government will continue to champion such co-operation. We will also push NATO to engage more with international and regional organisations. A top priority is our work to ensure that NATO and the EU are leveraging their complementary tools, and working together effectively. We have certainly been encouraged by progress this year on joint NATO-EU work on the resilience of our critical infrastructure.

The NATO summit in Vilnius will be a shot in the arm for Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity. It will demonstrate to Russians and Ukrainians that NATO will support Ukraine in the short, medium and long term. The summit will be the culmination of years of work to ensure that NATO’s deterrence effect is fit for the threats that we face today, and those on the horizon. It will also provide impetus to NATO’s partnerships around the world, ensuring that the alliance and those who work with it are stronger together.

Vladimir Kara-Murza

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Andrew Mitchell

Monday 17th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee for submitting this urgent question and you, Mr Speaker, for granting it.

We are deeply disturbed and horrified by the sentencing today of Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in prison. His only fault appears to be having had the bravery and courage to speak the truth about Putin’s criminal regime and the illegal and barbarous war against the people of Ukraine. The actions we have seen today are simply those of a regime that fears that its own people will come to learn the truth about their Government’s actions.

I too met Evgenia Kara-Murza recently and was overwhelmed by the incredible resolve of both her and her husband. She told The Sunday Times this weekend that she was “baffled” by the UK Government’s apparent lack of support. My greatest sympathies are with her and her brave family today. We have particular responsibilities to Vladimir, as a dual British citizen, yet his family apparently do not feel that has been provided. Indeed, Bill Browder described the Government as “negligent” in dealing with his situation. Vladimir is a patriot who has worked relentlessly, at great personal risk, for a democratic Russia free of the tyranny extolled by Putin and his regime of criminals. The actions of the Government in the coming days will be critical in securing his safety and wellbeing.

I have three questions. First, at least 31 Russian officials have been directly involved in the false prosecution and imprisonment of Vladimir. Can the Minister tell the House or publish a full list of how many of them have actually been sanctioned? The Canadians and the Americans appear to have sanctioned all those responsible. Have we done so? If not, why not? Secondly, he spoke about Vladimir’s wellbeing. There have been attempts to poison him twice. Those involved in his incarceration have a dark record and there is a real risk to his health. What assurances have we received? Lastly, how many times did Ministers raise the case publicly or privately? I was deeply concerned that, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, the hon. Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley), did not even appear to be briefed on the case when answering questions from the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns). What consular support has Vladimir been permitted or provided with? Have the Foreign Secretary or Ministers spoken to his family today or in the last week?

We stand firmly alongside Vladimir and all those who seek a free and democratic Russia, and who expose the truth of Putin’s barbarous regime.

[Mr Mitchell]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I believe the Government have been extremely strongly supportive during this appalling trial and the events that have taken place. He asks me about the 31 officials involved in the trial and what steps the Government are going to take, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns). As I have told him, I have instructed officials to investigate the possibility of sanctioning everyone involved in the trial. We will report back on that in due time.

The hon. Gentleman asks for an assurance on Vladimir Kara-Murza’s health and mentions the two previous poisonings, in 2015 and 2017. The ambassador has been summoned—he should be arriving at the Foreign Office any moment—and the issue of Vladimir Kara-Murza’s health will be right at the top of the agenda.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield, and his appearance in front of the FAC. I should make it clear that he is not the Minister responsible for this specific matter. The Minister responsible, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty), is very much seized of all the issues raised by the hon. Gentleman.

International Development

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Andrew Mitchell

Thursday 18th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I welcome these orders and agree that they should be taken together. We will not be opposing them. I welcome the support that they indicate for tackling poverty and disease and removing the burden of debt in Africa and elsewhere across the world.

However, in the context of the Prime Minister’s announcement earlier this week and the urgent question answered by the Foreign Secretary today, it is very important that we recognise that the decision taken will have an impact on our relationship with the African Development Bank and the World Bank institutions, including IDA. It is sad to have to contrast the positive impact of these orders with some of the ill-informed rhetoric that we heard from the Prime Minister on Tuesday on a decision that fundamentally risks undermining our relationship and influence with IDA and the African Development Bank in terms of the impact and oversight of these replenishments, and the debt relief. This decision has been criticised from many quarters, including by Members on both sides of the House and by some of the world’s leading experts. One of those, of course, is the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, who said that it

“will mean less expertise, less voice for development at the top table”—

that is, the top table of these institutions. Gayle Smith, the former administrator of USAID, also said that it was a dangerous step backwards. Does the Minister agree that in fact, and in contrast to what the Prime Minister said earlier this week, in the majority of contexts there has always been close co-operation and co-ordination between the different arms of UK international policy, including in Africa, and in relation to the IDA part of the World Bank and its other institutions, as well as the African Development Bank?

It has been particularly concerning, given that we are focusing so much on Africa in these orders, to see the false dichotomy that was set up by the Prime Minister’s comments. He spoke about Zambia and Tanzania, for example, and contrasted them with priorities in places like Ukraine and the Balkans. This is particularly concerning because Zambia and Tanzania have been supported by funds from the African Development Bank and IDA in the past, and of course by DFID’s bilateral programmes. They are both long-standing members of the Commonwealth and countries with which we have had very constructive partnerships over many decades.

This is particularly relevant in relation to the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on Africa and elsewhere, which the Minister spoke about. He and I have discussed that issue outside the House. I want to thank him for the courtesy that he has shown me since my taking on this role in discussing a number of matters on which there is no division across this House. For example, the African Development Bank has been supporting the One WASH programme in Ethiopia. The bank and other partners’ funding has been supporting that ambitious national programme to serve 110 million people in Africa’s second most populous country. As well as the ADB, key partners include the World Bank, the Department for International Development, the Government of Finland, and UNICEF. The programme has been embracing safe water development systems, including boreholes, hand pumps, diesel pumps, gravity pumps and electric grid power to bring safe, potable water to Ethiopians. Water development commissioner Mogesse said recently:

“The One WASH National Program did not plan for the COVID-19 pandemic. But it has prepared us to fight the pandemic better than we would have been without the program, especially in the unserved rural communities.”

That example highlights the sort of impact that the ADB and other funding the UK has provided to the multilaterals has had, not only on tackling covid but on tackling wider water and sanitation issues.

[Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

rose—

[Stephen Doughty]

I happily give way to the former Secretary of State.

[Mr Mitchell]

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. May I take him back to his point about Zambia and Tanzania, and the Prime Minister’s point about how he would rather spend money in Ukraine? Did it not strike him as rather odd that the Prime Minister—he is, after all, the Prime Minister—needs to abolish the Department for International Development to achieve that? Surely he simply needs to pick up the phone to the Secretary of State for International Development, hold a meeting of the National Security Council and say he has decided that those are to be the priorities.

[Stephen Doughty]

Indeed, and it did strike me as very odd and very concerning, and it will no doubt have been noted with concern in the capitals of many of those countries that we have enjoyed strong partnerships with for many years.

On that note, can the Minister assure our partners in countries across Africa, and indeed across the developing world, including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia, that we will continue to partner with them and their citizens, to tackle the coronavirus pandemic and continue our long-term work to tackle poverty, disease and inequality, tackle gender injustice and urgently deal with the climate change crisis?

The UK role on the boards of the multilateral financial institutions has often been such that we have been able to influence the direction of those institutions, which have not always had the right focus or agenda, for the better. The former Secretary of State will know that well; I know he took a keen interest in these matters, and I am sure the Minister does, too, and I too have seen that at first hand.

I want pay tribute to the officials and successive Ministers across the parties that have seen Britain’s role as one for global good in these institutions, contributing to multilateral action, so that we can achieve a bigger impact than the mere sum of our parts. That very much, for me, was global Britain in action, and not the Britain that I fear we now seem to be heading towards. So can the Minister confirm: who will determine the future role of executive directors at the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and who will they take their orders and policy steer from in future? Will they still have the same mandate to focus efforts on poverty reduction, or do we risk seeing them go the way of, for example, the badly run Newton Fund, overseen by a non-DFID Department, which was recently criticised heavily by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact and the Sub-Committee on the Work of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact—and indeed the Chair of that Sub-Committee, the hon. Member for Stafford (Theo Clarke), who is not in the Chamber at the moment, but I know takes a keen interest in these matters?

Turning to the two specific institutions and the replenishments, the record of global Britain in action is reflected in a history of partnership with the African Development Bank, and we have contributed over many years to programmes and initiatives such as the African water facility, the Congo Basin forest fund, the sustainable energy fund for Africa and, indeed, the actions on covid that I have just described in Ethiopia. The Minister spoke about the “high five” focus points of the African Development Bank—power Africa, integrate Africa, feed Africa, industrialise Africa and improve the quality of life in Africa, and I hope that he, in his remarks, can confirm that that will continue to be a UK priority for our role in those funds.

On development for women and girls, we were very happy to see that 80% of the new African Development Bank operations were categorised as having gender-informed design; of course, developments cannot succeed without economic development, health and education for women and girls. So will the Minister and his Department continue to negotiate with the African Development Bank and ADF to ensure that funds go to women-led and women-and-girl-directed programmes? I also understand that the pledge rightly includes an element of performance-based funding dependent on positive results reported at the mid-term review, so will he clarify how much was disbursed or held back at the same point in the last replenishment round? It is important that we hold these institutions fully to account.

On the IDA part of the World Bank—a crucial institution, in which we have played a key role in over many decades—for every £1 of grant finance that the United Kingdom and other donors put in, IDA is expected to deliver more than £3 in development commitments for its clients, and we remain one of the largest donors—in fact, the largest donor in 2019. with an appropriate share of the budget. Could the Minister outline how we will seek to ensure that IDA programmes focus on issues like climate change, public health and education, and women and girls. Given some of the discussions that the Minister and I have had about fragile states, what focus will the new funding round have on investment in those? What performance-related measures will be taken in relation to the replenishment?

I want to ask a specific question about the World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, because that has delivered a proportionate share of its profits as grants to IDA in the past, but in the past few years we have seen the pattern reverse, with IDA now effectively helping to fund IFC shortfalls. I understand that in 2020 it will be a net recipient of $2 billion-worth of IDA-financing-supported investments. How does he expect IFC returns to be further affected by the global economic crisis relating to the pandemic, and does he expect them therefore to be a greater draw on IDA resources even than was perhaps expected for the year ahead?

I have already mentioned one example of a programme that helps Ethiopia prepare for and mitigate the impacts of covid 19. Over the past few weeks, my Labour colleagues and I have met and been listening to senior experts and African voices from the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organisation and other national agencies and Governments and, indeed, workers on the frontline in countries from Sierra Leone to Zimbabwe. Some of the stories that they have shared with me have obviously been of great concern, and I have discussed those with the Minister. The effects of covid-19 are already having a significant impact on the continent. That impact is on health—whether directly or indirectly—but also on the economic prospects and stability of many countries and regions, although it appears to be diverse and heterogeneous across the continent. That is also the case when we look at who is affected within countries because, like in this country, covid-19 is often a disease of poverty and disadvantage. The worst affected are likely to be: the low paid; the marginalised; women and girls; those in conditions exposing them to greater risk, such as care workers, workers in health services, people who provide security, food processing and transport, and those who work in places with low ambient temperatures and poor ventilation such as ships, and prisons; and, of course, people who live in the slums and dense settlements that we see in many locations across the global south.

I have been impressed and inspired by the clear and growing African solidarity and leadership on tackling the virus, as in so many other things. We could learn much from that, but it is also clear that there are going to be substantial short, medium and long-term challenges. Global solidarity and support—for example, through this funding and replenishment—is not only a moral duty, but in our common global interests. Would the Minister say a little bit about what he understands about how both IDA and the African Development Bank will seek to focus their programming to deal not only with the immediate short-term needs—obviously there have been substantial changes, which he mentioned, particularly in relation to IDA—but with long-term needs? Has he had discussions with them about how they might facilitate investments that support the roll-out of any vaccine treatments and critical medical supplies on an equitable basis?

Reform is crucial with these institutions, so it is crucial that we continue to seek these reforms. The multilateral aid review rated the African Development Bank and IDA as good—very good, in some cases—but there are areas where they were ranked as weak. Will the Minister say a little bit about how he is going to use our position on the boards of both those institutions to continue to push a reform agenda?

On debt relief, it is almost 15 years ago to the week that I helped to co-ordinate the historic march of a quarter of million people around the streets of Edinburgh in a white band as part of the Make Poverty History movement, which called for life-changing aid, debt cancellation and justice. I know that the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) was a strong supporter of that campaign, which happened in the run-up to the historic Gleneagles G8 summit. It was a true example of what global leadership can achieve both for our country and for our fellow human beings.

The multilateral debt relief initiative was one of the proudest achievements of the last Labour Government, and has enabled us to make substantial progress towards the global goals—both the millennium development goals and their successor, the sustainable development goals. Will the Minister tell us how much debt UK support has enabled IDA and the African Development Bank to cancel over the recent accounting period, and what expectations he has in relation to these orders, given the changed global economic output?

We will not oppose these orders today, but I reiterate that the speech that I had hoped to make, which would have been full of positivity and support for the measures, has unfortunately been tempered by the announcement by the Prime Minister earlier this week and the many unanswered questions, particularly in relation to our influence and role in institutions such as the African Development Bank, IDA and the World Bank. I fear that the past global leadership that we have shown—for example, on debt relief—may now be in jeopardy.