Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Stella Creasy and Jeremy Wright

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend knows that the Attorney General is consulted on a variety of different legal questions, both domestic and international. He would not expect me to disclose any of the advice I have previously given, but I can tell him that the Attorney General does give advice on whether the Government’s actions may or may not be in compliance with international law, but neither the Attorney General, nor, I think the Government, expects to be the ultimate arbiter of that question. The advice is given as to whether it is likely that that action would be in compliance with the law. I will come in a moment to what I think the Bill and the Government can properly do in relation to international law responsibilities, but it seems to me that what they cannot properly do is set themselves up as judge in their own cause on questions of international law. This House would be wrong to pass a Bill that suggested that they could. That is really where my amendments are focused.

As I say, there is a good practical reason why we should be nervous about this: because we do sometimes rely on international law to discharge our own policy intents and purposes. Not more than 48 hours ago in this place, we were doing exactly that. We were saying that it is important to criticise the actions of the Houthis in the Red sea because they contravene principles of international law. We were saying too that we justify our own response to that because it is in accordance with the principles of international law, and quite right, too. We would not have accepted the Houthis’ unilateral declaration that they were in compliance with international law when they did what they did, nor should we have, and we would not of course accept a Russian legislative Act to say that the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was in compliance with Russia’s international law responsibilities.

Let me make it clear that I am not, of course, suggesting that what the Government have in mind here is in any way comparable to those two examples, but it seems that the point here is that to arrogate to oneself the right to declare one’s own compliance with international law runs the risk of, first, other states finding comfort in our example and, secondly, undermining our own messages in other situations. That makes this not just bad law, but bad foreign policy.

[Stella Creasy]

I am pleased to hear what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has to say on the question of international law. Does he share my concern—and I fully accept that I am not as legally qualified as him—that the Government’s own legal advice says that by stating that the Bill is incompatible, it makes it compatible? Is that not worthy of the mad March Hare when it comes to consistency in standing up for the rule of law?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I suspect that what the hon. Lady is referring to is the statement of incompatibility with the convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 at the beginning of the Bill. Of course, that provision is there for a reason: to allow the Government, if they so choose, to act in defiance of those responsibilities. That is perfectly proper, and I will come on to explain why I think that is something the Government can properly do.

I am concerned about something a little different. Instead of saying, “We don’t think this is in compliance with international law, but we’re going to do it anyway.”, the Bill is saying, “We think this is in compliance with international law; it is down to us to decide that, and we have so decided.” That feels to me like something that we could not and should not do. It would be concerning enough, in my judgment, if this Bill only tried to deem the UK’s compliance with international law, but it also seems to say that we can deem Rwanda’s compliance with international law.

That is set out in clause 1(5)(b), which goes on to say that, for the purposes of this Act, a safe country includes, in particular, a country

“from which a person removed to that country will not be removed or sent to another country”.

So far so good; that is essential, to me, to doing what the Bill seeks to achieve. However, it goes on to say,

“in contravention of any international law”.

Again, it cannot lie in the hands of this Parliament to decide whether or not a person may be removed to another country in contravention of any international law. It goes on in sub-paragraph (b)(ii) to say that a country would be a safe country

“in which any person who is seeking asylum or who has had an asylum determination will both have their claim determined and be treated in accordance with that country’s obligations under international law.”

It seems to me that the Bill is seeking to say that, if we deem it so, not only is the UK in compliance with its international law responsibilities, but Rwanda is going to be as well. That feels to me not valid and somewhat over-ambitious.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Stella Creasy and Jeremy Wright

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Stella Creasy]

Obviously, we already have Joint Committees and models of how a Joint Committee could work. We have the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, so we have a model for that way of working. However, is the right hon. and learned Member not making the argument that we in this Chamber need to signal our agreement about what is missing from this process? I notice he is making an argument about the lack of scrutiny from Europe, and we may disagree on that, but surely two wrongs do not make a right. The argument we are making today is that we need to improve this process, and that when there are changes—and we must set out more clearly what “substantial” means—this Chamber wishes to work with the other Chamber in bringing back parliamentary sovereignty to this process.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the points the hon. Lady is making, and I will take them in reverse order. On the point I made about the difference in the scrutiny that these laws may have on the way out, as it were, compared with the scrutiny they would have on the way in, I accept that two wrongs do not make a right. However, it would be odd, if nothing else, to take the view that we should give the vast bulk of laws—some of which, as I think we have agreed across this Chamber, do not require a huge amount of scrutiny, because they are technical and somewhat inevitable changes as a result of leaving the European Union—a process involving greater scrutiny and greater friction, as I would choose to describe it, than the process that was used to bring them in in the first place.

On the hon. Lady’s point about a Joint Committee, I accept that there are Joint Committees, but the role of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, for example, is very different from the role that Lords amendment 1 sets out for a Joint Committee in this context. If we set up Joint Committees as scrutiny bodies, that is one thing, but if we are devolving authority to a Joint Committee to make judgments about what is and is not a substantial change to UK law, it seems to me that we ought at the very least to understand what substantial means in that context. Again, I am afraid that we can only decide on the basis of the wording we have in front of us, but the wording we have in front of us seems to me to require some greater clarification before anyone ought to support it.