Members of Parliament: Risk-based Exclusion

Debate between Stella Creasy and James Sunderland

Monday 12th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Sunderland]

The hon. Lady is not wrong and I concur with her point of view, but of course it is entirely possible that when a charge is brought an individual may be found not guilty in a court of law. A charge does not itself define guilt. By that same token, if someone is arrested on a charge, ultimately they have to allow that process to play out until the point at which they are castigated and removed from the estate voluntarily or otherwise. I take her point, but, for me, the Commission has work to do to draw a distinction between the point at which someone is arrested and the point at which a charge is made.

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

The hon. Gentleman has just said that somebody can be charged but still be found not guilty, in the same way that somebody could be arrested and not charged. It is about the evidence that is presented. As he said at the start of his speech, we have a duty of care. We are talking about a risk-based exclusion process. It is not actually about the perpetrator, alleged or otherwise. It is about the evidence presented at that time of risk to those who remain. Can he say a little about what he proposes to do to tackle that risk if he wants to wait until charge, based on the evidence presented to the House by the police at that moment?

[James Sunderland]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention and, again, she is not wrong. I do not have an answer, but this is the key thing for me: evidence is what is used in a court of law. Are we judge and jury? Is a staff panel judge and jury? Is the evidence presented to a quango body of individuals here enough, without a charge being brought, to exclude a Member from the Estate? As I said, I think there is work to be done between the point of arrest and the point of a charge being brought.

[Stella Creasy]

By the hon. Gentleman’s logic, there is no evidence of risk that could be presented by the police to this place on which we could act. Is he really saying that, or do we need a process that could assess the evidence being presented? Is he that specific about it: there is nothing that he could be told about the risk posed by somebody to people in this place that would cause him to act?

[James Sunderland]

Once again, I find myself concurring with a lot of what the hon. Lady is saying, but my view on this question is that because we are debating it now, the answer is not clear. Ultimately, we have to allow the Commission to make further findings in respect of what the evidence does. My personal feeling is that we have to wait for the charge to be brought before we give enough credence to the evidence. Arrest, in my view, is not enough.

The second issue is how we as a House manage complaints that may be vexatious. We discussed that question earlier, but I would like the Commission to do a bit more work on it. If a complaint has been made and it is entirely vexatious, we have to be able to spot that very early on and deal with it. For example, another Member said during the consultation that

“I am concerned about malicious claims towards MPs, which are constantly on the rise and members being excluded without it being a charge, often these are politically motivated.”

If we follow that logic through, it basically means that any Member can be asked to leave the estate for any reason. Therefore, we have to put in place a process whereby credence is given to an allegation. An arrest may or may not be made, and in my view, it is the point at which the charge is brought that gives that credence to the process. As such, we have to make sure that we can properly define the gap that is in the middle.

I would like to make a further point about management of risk. For me, the important thing in this debate is how we manage the risk-based exclusion, which again is not clear from the Commission. Basically, I want to better understand how we manage the risk: who is responsible for managing that risk? Who is responsible for determining the evidence, if it exists, and who is judge and jury? How do we manage that risk? Who decides, and what factors are involved? In my view, those questions need more work before we can go firm on any vote or otherwise.

The last issue I will address is that of the proxy vote. In my view, a proxy vote has to happen. MPs are elected to do a job, and they must do that job until the point at which they are no longer able to do it—again, innocent until proven guilty. There is a requirement for MPs to exercise their judgment and represent the interests of their constituents throughout the process. Therefore, unlike the earlier recommendation from the Procedure Committee, I am completely happy with the extension of the proxy vote in this case. MPs are still MPs; they are still part of the team and need support. They must not be left on the scrapheap, either. It is important for them—for their own peace of mind and their own validation—to be able to exercise that vote via a proxy. Again, I am not comfortable with the idea that the names of those who have a proxy vote would somehow be published. Those who have a proxy vote should not necessarily be identified as having one, for all the reasons of confidentiality that we have already discussed.

I also welcome the fact that the Commission is now actively considering extending the proxy vote scheme for other reasons. Historically and currently, it has been for maternity and paternity leave, but it should be extended beyond that, to illness and those who may be excluded from the estate.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Stella Creasy and James Sunderland

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stella Creasy]

I recognise what the Minister says. The challenge is that we already know of children and vulnerable young people who have been in this position under that legislation, but the paramount needs of the child or vulnerable person have not always been at the forefront of the minds of those involved in these investigations.

What am I talking about? I am talking, for example, about a 17-year-old girl who was in a relationship where she was sexually exploited, but she continued in that relationship because it was beneficial to the police investigating the person she was in a relationship with. She ended up witnessing a murder and being party to destroying evidence about that murder. We would be responsible for the situation that she was in.

New clause 8 does not say that there will never be a circumstance in which we might work with children, but it does say that it is right to see them as children first and to have a second pair of eyes to uphold that principle. The Minister will tell me that that is written into the guidance, but the new clause puts it in the Bill so that it is beyond doubt that somebody would take responsibility for a vulnerable person’s welfare. It also extends to vulnerable people who might have been trafficked, for example—people who may not see themselves as vulnerable but who, we would recognise, could be exploited. It is right that we have that check and balance of the appropriate adult—somebody who looks at that vulnerable person and gives an alternative perspective on what is happening to them, independent of the investigation.

The Minister may say that he cannot accept the new clause in this format, but I ask him to look seriously at this issue and to ensure that when we pass necessary legislation to formalise such powers, we take a step back and see the person we might be drawing into criminality. These people are not all James Bond and can consent freely to being involved in criminal activity and then be held accountable by RIPA. Some of them will be very vulnerable people who need us in this place to stand beside them and ensure that their interests are protected and that they have an appropriate adult to act for them.

I hope the Minister will listen to the concern that has been expressed across the House—the new clause is signed by Members from across the House—and introduce that protection into the Bill so that we put it beyond doubt. The reality is that if it is just in a code of guidance, it will not always be followed. Let us send the message that children should be children, not child spies.

[James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)]

I am grateful to be called so early in this key debate, having been unable to speak on Second Reading. I therefore wish, if I may, to speak in general terms.

The first duty of any Government is to protect their people from harm. It is called defence of the realm. Given that that overrides all other considerations, we need to see the Bill in the context of the many existential threats that we face on a daily basis, many of which are hidden in the shadows and may never reveal themselves until it is too late. We also need to consider those we trust to keep us safe by empowering, not inhibiting, what they do. Our security services are only ever as good as the tools that their operators are given and the legal framework in which they work. Not only is the Bill a necessary piece of legislation in its own right; it provides a further insurance policy against those who seek to destroy the freedoms and the democracy that we take for granted.

Having personally served in uniform, I am comfortable that the Government continue to do what they must to give our intelligence services what they need to do their job. By allowing criminal conduct authorisations in the pursuit of covert human intelligence sources, the Bill rightly maintains the services’ operating freedoms, allowing them to close on those who threaten us and bring them to justice. But let us be clear: these powers are to be used only in extremis, when the operational circumstances necessitate, when quick decisions are needed or when there is no other way to avoid compromise.

To think that our operators are naturally predisposed to committing murder, torture or sex crimes, or that the Bill somehow encourages them to do so, is just wrong. The need to exercise discretion and judgment lies at the heart of what we ask our services to perform. Not only are these people good at what they do, they intuitively know the difference between right and wrong, so it is right that a CCA may be granted where necessary for one of three purposes: national security, the prevention or detection of crime, and in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK. I am happy, too, that under clause 2 only responsible bodies, such as the police, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office or the security services, will be entrusted to do so, albeit with further work needed beyond the scope of the Bill on appropriate operating procedures.

I also agree with my friends on the Opposition Benches that, for example, rules of engagement might be provided in each particular case, and that there is further work to do. Under clause 4, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will exercise oversight of all authorising bodies, not least to ensure that unlimited powers to commit any crimes are never granted and to rightly prosecute where criminality occurs.

I noted on Second Reading that the Secretary of State was continually pressed on which practices might be exempt or otherwise. His stance that it would not be appropriate to draw up a list of specific crimes is right, for to do so would place in the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of identifying our agents and sources, creating a potential checklist for suspected operators to be tested against. The Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee also recognised how easy it would be for groups to flush out agents if they were aware of human intelligence being prohibited from certain acts, calling it “ dangerously counterproductive”. Although my own knowledge of covert operations is limited, I can tell Members that the work is difficult and dangerous.