Investigatory Powers Bill

John Bercow Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 6—Civil liability for certain unlawful interceptions.

New clause 4—Offence of unlawful use of investigatory powers—

“(1) A relevant person is guilty of an offence if—

(a) by way of conduct described in this Act, he knowingly or recklessly obtains the communications, communications data, secondary data, equipment data or personal information of an individual, and

(b) the person does not have lawful authority to make use of the investigatory power concerned.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a relevant person who shows that the person acted in the reasonable belief that the person had lawful authority to obtain the information referred to in subsection (1)(a).

(3) In this section “relevant person” means a person who holds an office, rank or position with a relevant public authority (within the meaning of Part 3).

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales—

(i) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or 6 months, if the offence was committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003), or

(ii) to a fine, or to both;

(b) on summary conviction in Scotland—

(i) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or

(ii) to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland—

(i) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or

(ii) to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(d) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to a fine, or to both.

(5) The offence in this section shall have precedence over any other relevant offences in the Data Protection Act 1998, Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, Computer Misuse Act 1990, and the common law offence of misfeasance in public office.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to provide for a unified offence for the misuse of intrusive investigatory powers at the beginning of the Bill, in Part 1, rather than having each offence scattered throughout the Bill or in other legislation.

New clause 21—General duties in relation to privacy—

“(1) Subsection (2) applies where a public authority is deciding whether—

(a) to issue, renew or cancel a warrant under Part 2, 5, 6 or 7,

(b) to modify such a warrant,

(c) to approve a decision to issue, renew or modify such a warrant,

(d) to grant, approve or cancel an authorisation under Part 3,

(e) to give a notice in pursuance of such an authorisation or under Part 4 or section 216, 217 or 220,

(f) to vary or revoke such a notice,

(g) to approve a decision to give a notice under section 216 or 217, or

(h) to apply for or otherwise seek any issue, grant, giving, modification, variation or renewal of a kind falling within paragraph (a), (b), (d), (e) or (f).

(2) The public authority must give effect to—

(a) the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998, and

(b) other requirements of public law.

(3) The public authority must also have regard to—

(a) whether what is sought to be achieved by the warrant, authorisation or notice could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means,

(b) the public interest in the integrity and security of telecommunication systems and postal services, and

(c) any other aspects of the public interest in the protection of privacy.

(4) The duties under subsection (3)—

(a) apply so far as they are relevant in the particular context, and

(b) are subject to the need to have regard to other considerations that are also relevant in that context.

(5) The other considerations may, in particular, include—

(a) the interests of national security or of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom,

(b) the public interest in preventing or detecting serious crime,

(c) other considerations which are relevant to—

(i) whether the conduct authorised or required by the warrant, authorisation or notice is proportionate, or

(ii) whether it is necessary to act for a purpose provided for by this Act.

(6) In this section “public authority” includes the relevant judicial authority (within the meaning of section 66) where the relevant judicial authority is deciding whether to approve under that section an authorisation under Part 3.”

This new clause sets out general duties in relation to privacy.

Amendment 14, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, at end insert—

“( ) This Act sets out the extent to which certain investigatory powers may be used to interfere with an individual’s privacy.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to place privacy at the forefront of the legislation.

Government amendments 26 to 34.

New clause 1—Notification by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is to notify the subject or subjects of investigatory powers relating to the statutory functions identified in section 196, subsections (1), (2) and (3), including—

(a) the interception or examination of communications,

(b) the retention, accessing or examination of communications data or secondary data,

(c) equipment interference,

(d) access or examination of data retrieved from a bulk personal dataset,

(e) covert human intelligence sources,

(f) entry or interference with property.

(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must only notify subjects of investigatory powers under subsection (1) upon completion of the relevant conduct or the cancellation of the authorisation or warrant.

(3) The notification under subsection (1) must be sent by writing within thirty days of the completion of the relevant conduct or cancellation of the authorisation or warrant.

(4) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must issue the notification under subsection (1) in writing, including details of—

(a) the conduct that has taken place, and

(b) the provisions under which the conduct has taken place, and

(c) any known errors that took place within the course of the conduct.

(5) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner may postpone the notification under subsection (1) beyond the time limit under subsection (3) if the Commissioner assesses that notification may defeat the purposes of an on-going serious crime or national security operation or investigation.

(6) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must consult with the person to whom the warrant is addressed in order to fulfil an assessment under subsection (5).”

New clause 2—Referrals by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament—

“(1) Subsection (2) applies if the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament refers a matter to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must inform the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament of the outcome of any investigation, inspection or audit arising from such a referral.”

To allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to refer matters, on behalf of Parliament, to the Commissioner and to provide a mechanism for the Committee to be informed of the outcome.

New clause 16—Investigatory Powers Commissioner: obligation to notify—

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is to notify the subject or subjects of investigatory powers relating to the statutory functions identified in section 196, subsections (1), (2) and (3), including—

(a) the interception or examination of communications,

(b) the retention, accessing or examination of communications data or secondary data,

(a) equipment interference,

(b) access or examination of data retrieved from a bulk personal dataset.

(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must only notify subjects of investigatory powers under subsection (1) upon completion of the relevant conduct or the cancellation of the authorisation or warrant.

(3) The notification under subsection (1) must be sent by writing within ninety days of the completion of the relevant conduct or cancellation of the authorisation or warrant.

(4) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must issue the notification under subsection (1) in writing, including details of the provisions under which the conduct has taken place.

(5) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner may postpone the notification under subsection (1) beyond the time limit under subsection (3) if the Commissioner assesses that notification may defeat the purposes of the on-going serious crime or national security operation or investigation.

(6) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must consult with the person to whom the warrant is addressed in order to fulfil an assessment under subsection (5).”

This new Clause would ensure that individuals are informed after the event that they have been a subject of investigatory powers.

Amendment 465, in clause 194, page 149, line 7, at end insert—

“( ) There shall be a body corporate known as the Investigatory Powers Commission.

( ) The Investigatory Powers Commission shall have such powers and duties as shall be specified in this Act.”

See amendment 469.

Amendment 466, page 149, line 12, at end insert—

“(1A) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must appoint—

(a) the Chief Inspector, and

(b) such number of Inspectors as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner considers necessary for the carrying out of the functions of the Investigatory Powers Commission.

(1B) In appointing Investigators the Investigatory Powers Commissioner shall—

(a) appoint an individual only if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner thinks that the individual—

(i) has experience or knowledge relating to a relevant matter, and

(ii) is suitable for appointment,

(b) have regard to the desirability of the Investigators together having experience and knowledge relating to the relevant matters.

(1C) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) the relevant matters are those matters in respect of which the Investigatory Powers Commission has functions including, in particular—

(a) national security;

(b) the prevention and detection of serious crime;

(c) the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data;

(d) the security and integrity of computer systems and networks;

(e) the law, in particular, as it relates to the matters in subsections (-)(a) – (b);

(f) human rights as defined in Section 9(2) of the Equality Act 2006.”

See amendment 469.

Amendment 295, page 149, line 19, leave out paragraph (a).

A paving amendment for the proposed requirement on the Prime Minister to act on the recommendation of the relevant chief justice when appointing Judicial Commissioners.

Amendment 296, page 149, line 20, leave out paragraph (b).

A paving amendment for the proposed requirement on the Prime Minister to act on the recommendation of the relevant chief justice when appointing Judicial Commissioners.

Amendment 297, page 149, line 21, leave out paragraph (c).

A paving amendment for the proposed requirement on the Prime Minister to act on the recommendation of the relevant chief justice when appointing Judicial Commissioners.

Amendment 7, page 149, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The term of office of a person appointed under subsection (1)(a) as Investigatory Powers Commissioner must not begin before the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has consented to the proposed appointee.”

This amendment would require the appointment of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be agreed by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Amendment 298, page 149, line 28, at end insert—

“(5A) When appointing any person under subsection (1), the Prime Minister must act on the recommendation of—

(a) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in relation to Judicial Commissioners appointed from England and Wales,

(b) the Lord President of the Court of Session, in relation to Judicial Commissioners appointed from Scotland, and

(c) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in relation to Judicial Commissioners appointed from Northern Ireland.”

An amendment to require the Prime Minister to act on the recommendation of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Lord President of the court of Session, or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, when appointing Judicial Commissioners.

Amendment 146, page 149, line 35, at end insert—

“(7A) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner shall ensure that all judicial authorisation functions under this Act are carried out by different Commissioners from those who carry out the audit and inspection functions set out in this Part.”

This amendment requires the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to ensure the separation of the judicial authorisation function from the ex post audit and inspection function..

Amendment 467, page 149, line 35, at end insert—

“(7A) The Prime Minister may make an appointment under subsection (1) only following a recommendation by—

(a) The Judicial Appointments Commission;

(b) The Judicial Appointments Board of Scotland; or

(c) The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission.”

See amendment 469.

Amendment 468, page 149, line 35, at end insert—

“(7A) The Chief Inspector is an Inspector and the Chief Inspector and the other Inspector are to be known, collectively, as the Inspectors.”

See amendment 469.

Amendment 469, page 150, line 2, at end insert—

“(c) to the Investigatory Powers Commission are to be read as appropriate to refer to the body corporate, the Investigatory Powers Commission, and in so far as it will refer to the conduct of powers, duties and functions, those shall be conducted by either the Judicial Commissioners or the Inspectors as determined by this Act or by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, consistent with the provisions of this Act.”

The purpose of these amendments is to replace the proposal to create an Investigatory Powers Commissioner with provisions to create a new Investigatory Powers Commission. They would provide that no appointment can be made except pursuant to a recommendation by the independent bodies in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland tasked with making judicial appointments in those jurisdictions.

Government amendment 35.

Amendment 8, in clause 196, page 152, line 9, at end insert—

“(4A) In keeping matters under review in accordance with this section, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must, in particular, keep under review the operation of safeguards to protect privacy.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to make explicit that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is required to scrutinise the underlying safeguards, procedures and processes relating to bulk powers, including the arrangements for the protection of, and control of access to, material obtained through their use.

Amendment 18, in clause 197, page 153, line 8, after “Commissioner”, insert

“or the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to allow the Prime Minister to issue directions at the request of the ISC (in addition to the Commissioner).

Amendment 189, in clause 198, page 153, line 21, leave out

“if the Commissioner considers that—”.

See amendment 195.

Amendment 472, page 153, line 21, leave out from “aware” to end of line 24.

See amendment 477.

Amendment 190, page 153, leave out line 23.

See amendment 195.

Amendment 191, page 153, leave out line 24.

See amendment 195.

Amendment 473, page 153, line 25, leave out subsections (2) to (5) and insert—

“(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner may decide not to inform a person of an error in exceptional circumstances.

(1) Exceptional circumstances under subsection (1) will arise if the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by a significant prejudice to—

(a) national security, or

(b) the prevention and detection of serious crime.”

See amendment 477.

Amendment 192, page 153, line 25, leave out subsection (2).

See amendment 195.

Amendment 193, page 153, line 29, leave out subsection (3).

See amendment 195.

Amendment 194, page 153, line 32, leave out subsection (4).

See amendment 195.

Amendment 474, page 153, line 44, at end insert—

“(5A) Provide the person with such details of the submissions made by the public authority on the error and on the matters concerned pursuant to subsection (5) as are necessary to inform a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.”

See amendment 477.

Amendment 195, page 154, line 6, leave out from “having” to end of line 9.

These amendments will remove excessive restrictions on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to instruct and inform individuals who have been subject to surveillance and will ensure that they are always notified of that fact when unlawful errors occur.

Amendment 2, page 154, line 10, leave out subsection (7).

Amendment 476, page 154, line 16, leave out paragraph (b).

See amendment 477.

Amendment 477, page 154, line 23, leave out paragraph (b).

These amendments would amend the Bill to provide for the Commissioner to notify any relevant person of any error made pursuant to the activities in the Bill, in order to allow those individuals to consider whether a claim may lie to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for redress. It makes provision for non-disclosure in circumstances where the public interest in disclosure would be outweighed by a significant risk of prejudice to national security or the prevention and detection of crime.

Amendment 479, in clause 199, page 154, line 28, leave out “Judicial Commissioner” and insert “Investigatory Powers Commission”.

See amendment 481.

Amendment 478, page 154, line 34, at end insert—

“(1A) A Judicial Commissioner may refer to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal any matter the Commissioner considers may have involved the unlawful use of investigatory powers.”

See amendment 481.

Amendment 480, page 154, line 35, leave out “Judicial Commissioner” and insert “Investigatory Powers Commission”.

See amendment 481.

Amendment 481, page 154, line 38, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—

“(3) In any circumstances where the Commission has identified a relevant error pursuant to section 198, the Commission must give such documents, information or other material as may be relevant to the investigation of the error to the Tribunal.

(4) The duty in subsection (3) shall be exercised without request from the Tribunal.”

These amendments would remove the requirement to consult the Secretary of State and would make clear that in circumstances where a relevant error has been identified, material should be provided to the Tribunal by the Commission. It would make clear that any potentially unlawful use of the powers in this Act may be referred to the Tribunal by the Commissioners. These amendments would remove the requirement to consult the Secretary of State before giving assistance direct to other public authorities.

Amendment 482, in clause 203, page 159, line 2, at end insert—

“(1A) A disclosure pursuant to subsection (1) will not constitute a criminal offence for any purposes in this Act or in any other enactment.

(1B) In subsection (1), a disclosure for the purposes of any function of the Commissioner may be made at the initiative of the person making the disclosure and without need for request by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.”

This amendment would make it clear that voluntary, unsolicited disclosures are protected, and that any whistle-blower is also protected from criminal prosecution.

Amendment 483, in clause 208, page 160, line 29, after “determination” insert

“or ruling or decision, including relating to a procedural matter.”

See amendment 486.

Amendment 484, page 160, line 29, leave out from “Tribunal” to the end of line 30.

See amendment 486.

Amendment 485, page 161, line 8, leave out subsection (6).

See amendment 486.

Amendment 486, page 162, line 38, at end insert—

“(6) After section 68(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, insert—

(1A) Any hearing conducted by the Tribunal must be conducted in public, except where a special proceeding is justified in the public interest.

(1B) Any determination by the Tribunal must be made public, except where a special proceeding may be justified in the public interest.

(1C) A special proceeding will be in the public interest only where there is no alternative means to protect sensitive material from disclosure.

(1D) Material will be sensitive material for the purposes of this Section if its disclosure would seriously prejudice (a) national security or (b) the prevention and detection of crime.

(1E) Publication for the purposes of this Section will be seriously prejudicial if it would lead to a significant threat to life or of a serious physical injury to a person.

(1F) The Tribunal shall appoint a person to represent the interests of a party in any special proceedings from which the party (and any legal representative of the party) is excluded.

(1G) Such a person will be known as a Special Advocate.”

These amendments make clear that all decisions, determinations and rulings can be appealed on a point of law.

Amendment 487, page 162, line 38, at end insert—

“(6) After Section 4(5)(f) of the Human Rights Act 1998 insert—

‘(g) the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.’”

This amendment makes clear that all decisions, determinations and rulings can be appealed on a point of law.

Government amendments 36 to 43 and 48.

[Mr Speaker]

The Minister now has a second opportunity to practise his oratory.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 8—Further provision about modifications.

Government new clause 9—Notification of major modifications.

New clause 20—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—

“(1) The Secretary of State may certify an application for a warrant in those cases where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that an application is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and involves—

(a) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or

(b) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.

(2) A warrant may be certified by the Secretary of State if—

(a) the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within section 18; and

(b) the Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.

(3) Any warrant certified by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.

(4) In deciding to approve a warrant pursuant to this section, the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—

(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1);

(b) the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds subject to section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b); and

(c) the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.

(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the person’s decision to approve a warrant under this section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for the refusal.

(6) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, approves or refuses to approve a warrant under this Section, the person, or any Special Advocate appointed, may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to issue the warrant.”

Amendment 267, in clause 15, page 12, line 3, leave out “or organisation”.

These amendments would retain the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals but would require an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided. This narrows the current provisions which would effectively permit a limitless number of unidentified individuals to have their communications intercepted.

Amendment 25, page 12, line 7, leave out “or” and insert “and”.

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to limit the potentially broad scope of thematic warrants involving people who “share a common purpose” by ensuring that they also must be engaged in a particular activity.

Amendment 131, page 12, line 8, after “activity” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

These amendments seek to make more specific the currently very broadly worded thematic warrants in the Bill, to make it more likely that such thematic warrants will be compatible with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.

Amendment 268, page 12, line 9, leave out “or organisation”.

See amendment 267

Amendment 132, page 12, line 11, after “operation” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

See amendment 131.

Amendment 272, page 12, line 12, leave out paragraph (c).

See amendment 267.

Amendment 306, page 12, line 13, leave out subsection (3).

See amendment 267.

Amendment 218, in clause 17, page 13, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 219, page 13, line 10, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 220, page 13, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 221, page 13, line 16, leave out subsection (1)(d).

Amendment 222, page 13, line 20, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 223, page 13, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 224, page 13, line 24, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 225, page 13, line 27, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 226, page 13, line 3, leave out subsection (2)(d).

Amendment 227, page 13, line 35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 228, page 13, line 37, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 229, page 13, line 39, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 230, page 13, line 42, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 231, page 13, line 45, leave out subsection (3)(d).

Amendment 232, page 14, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 233, page 14, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 234, page 14, leave out lines 11 and 12.

Amendment 235, page 14, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 312, in clause 18, page 14, line 22, leave out paragraph (c).

See amendment 313.

Amendment 313, page 14, line 24, at end insert—

‘(2A) A warrant may be considered necessary as mentioned in subsection (2)(b) and (3) only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed.”

These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising interception and delete the separate subsection relating to economic well-being of the UK.

Amendment 236, page 14, line 30, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 237, page 14, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 262, page 14, line 38, at end insert—

‘(6) The fact that the information which would be obtained under a warrant relates to the activities in the British Islands of a trade union is not, of itself, sufficient to establish that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within this section.”

This amendment restricts the application of warrants in relation to trade union activity.

Amendment 238, page 14, line 39, leave out clause 19.

Amendment 208, in clause 21, page 17, line 4, leave out

“review the person’s conclusions as to the following matters”

and insert “determine”.

Amendment 209, page 17, line 10, leave out subsection (2).

Government manuscript amendment 497.

Amendment 265, page 17, line 10, leave out from “must” to end of line 11, and insert

“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.

An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 208 and 209 (which are a package).

Government manuscript amendment 498.

Amendment 314, in clause 24, page 18, line 39, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 316.

Amendment 315, page 18, line 41, leave out subsection (b) and insert—

“(b) the warrant involves a member of a relevant legislature.”

See amendment 316.

Government amendment 53.

Amendment 316, page 19, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Further to the requirements set out elsewhere in this Part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant if—

(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed,

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection to the offence at (a),

(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail,

(d) it is in the public interest having regard to the democratic interest in the confidentiality of correspondence with members of a relevant legislature.”

These amendments would ensure that applications for warrants to intercept the communications of elected politicians would be made to the Judicial Commissioner rather than to the Secretary of State via the Prime Minister. They would also set out additional requirements that the Judicial Commissioner must take into account before granting a warrant.

Amendment 1, page 19, line 8, at end insert

“and where the member is a member of the House of Commons he must also consult the Speaker of the House of Commons.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult the Speaker before deciding to issue a warrant that applied to an MP’s communications.

Amendment 137, page 19, line 8, after “Minister” insert

“and give sufficient notice to the relevant Presiding Officer of the relevant legislature to enable the relevant Presiding Officer to be heard at the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner.”

Amendment 138, page 19, line 14, at end insert—

“(4) In this section “the relevant Presiding Officer” means—

(a) the Speaker of the House of Commons,

(b) the Lord Speaker of the House of Lords,

(c) the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament,

(d) the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales,

(e) the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly,

(f) the President of the European Parliament.”

This amendment adds the safeguard of giving the Speaker, or other Presiding Officer, of the relevant legislature, sufficient notice before the Secretary of State decides whether to issue a warrant for targeted interception or examination of members’ communications, to enable the Speaker or Presiding Officer to be heard at the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner.

Amendment 139, in clause 25, page 19, line 16, leave out subsections (1) to (3).

This amendment removes the power to apply for a warrant the purpose of which is to authorise the interception, or selection for examination, of items subject to legal privilege.

Amendment 140, page 19, line 44, leave out subsection (4)(c).

See amendment 141.

Amendment 141, page 20, line 7, after “considers” insert—

“(a) that there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the interception, or (in the case of a targeted examination warrant) the selection for examination, of items subject to legal privilege, and

(b) ”.

These amendments introduce a threshold test for the interception or examination of communications likely to include items subject to legal privilege, reflecting the strong presumption against interference with lawyer-client confidentiality.

Amendment 307, in clause 27, page 21, line 7, leave out “or organisation”.

See amendment 267.

Amendment 308, page 21, line 8, leave out “or organisation”.

See amendment 267.

Amendment 309, page 21, line 13, leave out

“or describe as many of those persons as is reasonably practicable to name or describe”

and insert

“or specifically identify all of those persons using unique identifiers.”

See amendment 267.

Amendment 310, page 21, line 15, leave out “or organisation”.

See amendment 267.

Amendment 311, page 21, line 19, leave out

“or describe as many of those persons or organisations or as many of those sets of premises, as it is reasonably practicable to name or describe”

and insert

“all of those persons or sets of premises.”

See amendment 267.

Amendment 19, in clause 29, page 22, line 25, leave out

“before the end of the relevant”

and insert “during the renewal”.

See amendment 20.

Amendment 20, page 23, line 4, at end insert—

“(4A) ‘The renewal period’ means—

(a) in the case of an urgent warrant which has not been renewed, the relevant period;

(b) in any other case, the period of 30 days ending with the relevant period.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to prohibit the possibility of a warrant being renewed immediately. Clauses 28 and 29 would currently theoretically allow for warrants of 12 months duration rather than the intended six.

Amendment 21, page 23, line 16, at end insert—

“(8A) In this section ‘urgent warrant’ has the same meaning as in section 28.”

See amendment 20.

Amendment 147, page 23, line 19, leave out clause 30.

Government amendments 54 to 57.

Amendment 142, in clause 30, page 24, line 45, at end insert—

“(10A) Section 21 (Approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners) applies in relation to a decision to make a major modification of a warrant by adding a name or description as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) as it applies in relation to a decision to issue a warrant; and accordingly where section 21 applies a Judicial Commissioner must approve the modification.”

This amendment seeks to ensure that major modifications of warrants require judicial approval.

Government amendment 58.

Amendment 148, page 25, line 22, leave out clause 31.

Government amendments 59 to 73.

Amendment 317, page 34, line 21, leave out clause 44.

This amendment would delete a Clause which permits the creation of additional interception powers immigration detention facilities.

Amendment 15, in clause 45, page 34, line 42, leave out “C” and insert “D”.

Consequential upon amendment 16.

Amendment 16, page 35, line 7, at end insert—

“(3A) Condition C is that the interception is carried out for the purpose of obtaining information about the communications of an individual who, both the interceptor and the person making the request have reasonable grounds for believing, is outside the United Kingdom.”

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to reinstate the current safeguard in RIPA that the person being intercepted must be outside the UK.

Amendment 17, page 35, line 8, leave out “C” and insert “D”.

Consequential upon amendment 16.

Government amendments 75 to 77.

Amendment 299, in clause 51, page 41, line 18, at end insert—

“(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”

An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for interception disclosures.

Government amendment 74.

Government new clause 11—Persons who may make modifications under section 104.

Government new clause 12—Further provision about modifications under section 104.

Government new clause 13—Notification of modifications.

New clause 23—Members of Parliament—

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) an application is made to the Judicial Commissioner for a targeted equipment interference warrant, and

(b) the warrant relates to a member of a relevant legislature.

(2) This section also applies where—

(a) an application is made to the Judicial Commissioner for a targeted examination warrant, and

(b) the warrant relates to a member of a relevant legislature.

(3) Where any conduct under this Part is likely to cover material described above, the application must contain—

(a) a statement that the conduct will cover or is likely to cover such material,

(b) An assessment of how likely it is that the material is likely to cover such material.

(4) Further to the requirements set out elsewhere in this part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant if—

(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed, and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection to the offence at (a), and

(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and

(d) it is in the public interest having regard to:

(i) the public interest in the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data,

(ii) the public interest in the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and,

(iii) the democratic interest in the confidentiality of correspondence with members of a relevant legislature.”

This new clause would ensure that applications for a targeted equipment interference warrant or targeted examination warrant in relation to Parliamentarians are granted on application only to a Judicial Commissioner, removing the role of Secretary of State and applies additional safeguards to the correspondence of parliamentarians when a warrant for hacking is sought.

New clause 24—Audit trail of equipment interference—

“Any conduct authorised under a warrant issued under this Part must be conducted in a verifiable manner, so as to produce a chronological record of documentary evidence detailing the sequence of activities (referred to hereafter as ‘the audit trail’).”

See amendment 387.

Amendment 178, in clause 90, page 68, line 24, leave out subsection (1)(b).

See amendment 186.

Amendment 133, page 68, line 26, after “activity” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

See amendment 131.

Amendment 134, page 68, line 29, after “operation” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

See amendment 131.

Amendment 179, page 68, line 31, leave out subsection (1)(e).

See amendment 186.

Amendment 180, page 68, line 33, leave out subsection (1)(f).

See amendment 186.

Amendment 181, page 68, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(g).

See amendment 186.

Amendment 182, page 68, line 38, leave out subsection (1)(h).

See amendment 186.

Amendment 187, page 68, line 40, at end insert—

“(1A) A targeted equipment interference warrant may only be issued in relation to any of the matters that fall under subsection (1) if the persons, equipment, or location to which the warrant relates are named or specifically identified using a unique identifier.”

This amendment would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or otherwise identified.

Amendment 352, page 68, line 44, leave out paragraph (b).

See amendment 357.

Amendment 135, page 68, line 45, after “activity” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

See amendment 131.

Amendment 136, page 68, line 47, after “operation” insert

“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.

See amendment 131.

Amendment 353, page 69, line 1, leave out paragraph (d).

See amendment 357.

Amendment 354, page 69, line 3, leave out paragraph (e).

See amendment 357.

Amendment 188, page 69, line 4, at end insert—

“(2A) A targeted examination warrant may only be issued in relation to any of the matters that fall under subsection (2) if the persons, equipment, or location to which the warrant relates are named or specifically identified using a unique identifier.”

This amendment would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or specifically identified.

Amendment 239, in clause 91, page 69, line 9, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 240, page 69, line 11, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 241, page 69, line 14, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 242, page 69, line 17, leave out subsection (3)(d).

Amendment 358, page 69, line 17, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—

“(d) the Judicial Commissioner has reasonable grounds for believing that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation or operation to which the warrant relates.”

See amendment 361.

Amendment 243, page 69, line 20, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 244, page 69, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 245, page 69, line 24, leave out “and”.

Amendment 246, page 69, line 25, leave out subsection (2)(b).

Amendment 247, page 69, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 248, page 69, line 33, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 249, page 69, line 35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 250, page 69, line 38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 251, page 69, line 43, leave out subsection (3)(d).

Amendment 252, page 69, line 46, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment 359, page 70, line 8, after “crime” insert

“where there is reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”.

See amendment 361.

Amendment 360, page 70, line 11, at end insert—

‘(5A) A warrant may be considered necessary only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed in relation to the grounds falling within this section.”

See amendment 361.

Amendment 361, page 70, line 25, at end insert—

“(10) A warrant may only authorise targeted equipment interference or targeted examination as far as the conduct authorised relates—

(a) to the offence as specified under (5)(b), or

(b) to some other indictable offence which is connected with or similar to the offence as specified under (5)(b)”.

These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising equipment interference to be issued. These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information. This amendment would require that a warrant only authorises conduct in relation to the offence for which the warrant was sought, or other similar offences.

Amendment 258, page 70, line 26, leave out Clause 92.

Amendment 253, in clause 93, page 71, line 21, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 254, page 71, line 23, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 255, page 71, line 25, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 256, page 71, line 28, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

Amendment 257, page 71, line 31, leave out subsection (1)(d).

Amendment 382, page 71, line 31, leave out subsection (d) and insert—

“(d) the Judicial Commissioner has reasonable grounds for believing that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation or operation to which the warrant relates.”

See amendment 362.

Amendment 362, page 71, line 35, leave out from “include” to the end of line 36 and insert—

“(a) the requirement that other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and

(b) the requirement that a “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment” has been conducted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s technical advisors with regard to the specific equipment interference proposed, accounting for—

(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and

(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and

the risk to public cybersecurity.”

These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered. These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information.

Amendment 363, page 71, line 40, leave out Clause 94.

Government amendments 88 to 91.

Amendment 259, page 72, line 18, leave out Clause 95.

Amendment 364, in clause 96, page 72, line 37, leave out

“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 or 2 of the table in Schedule 6”

and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 365, page 72, line 38, leave out

“person who is an appropriate law enforcement officer in relation to the chief”

and insert

“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 366, page 72, line 41, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 367, page 73, line 1, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 368, page 73, line 4, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 369, page 73, line 7, leave out paragraph (d).

See amendment 383.

Amendment 370, page 73, line 10, leave out

“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”

and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 371, page 73, line 11, leave out

“person who is an appropriate law enforcement officer in relation to the chief”

and insert

“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”

See amendment 383.

Amendment 372, page 73, line 13, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 373, page 73, line 17, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 374, page 73, line 20, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 375, page 73, line 23, leave out paragraph (d).

See amendment 383.

Amendment 376, page 73, line 26, leave out subsection (3).

See amendment 383.

Amendment 261, page 73, line 26, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.

Amendment 377, page 73, line 32, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).

Amendment 378, page 73, line 38, after “Where” insert

“an application for an equipment interference warrant is made by a law enforcement chief and”.

See amendment 383.

Amendment 379, page 73, line 42, leave out subsections (6) to (10).

See amendment 383.

Government amendment 92.

Amendment 380, page 74, line 15, leave out

“whether what is sought to be achieved by the warrant could reasonably be achieved by other means”

and insert—

“(a) the requirement that other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and

(b) the requirement that a “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment” has been conducted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s technical advisors with regard to the specific equipment interference proposed, accounting for—

(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and

(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and

the risk to public cybersecurity.”

See amendment 383.

Amendment 381, in clause 96, page 74, line 18, leave out subsections (12) and (13)

See amendment 383.

Amendment 210, in clause 97, page 74, line 40, leave out

“review the person’s conclusions as to the following matters”

and insert “determine”.

Amendment 211, page 75, line 1, leave out subsection (2).

Amendment 270, page 75, line 1, leave out from “must” to end of line 2, and insert

“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.

An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 210 and 211 (which are a package).

Amendment 183, in clause 101, page 78, leave out lines 21 to 27.

See amendment 186.

Amendment 184, page 79, leave out lines 3 to 7.

See amendment 186.

Amendment 185, page 79, leave out lines 8 to 12.

See amendment 186.

Amendment 186, page 79, leave out lines 13 to 18.

These amendments refine the matters to which targeted equipment interference warrants may relate by removing vague and overly broad categories including equipment interference for training purposes.

Amendment 386, page 79, line 21, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

“(b) precisely and explicitly the method and extent of the proposed intrusion and measures taken to minimise access to irrelevant and immaterial information, and

(c) in a separate “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment”,

(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and

(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and

(iii) the risk to public cybersecurity, and how those risks and damage will be eliminated or corrected.”

See amendment 387.

Amendment 387, page 79, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) the basis for the suspicion that the target is connected to a serious crime or a specific threat to national security, and

(d) in declaration with supporting evidence,

(i) the high probability that evidence of the serious crime or specific threat to national security will be obtained by the operation authorised, and

(ii) how all less intrusive methods of obtaining the information sought have been exhausted or would be futile.”

These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered. They would introduce a requirement that all equipment interference produces a verifiable audit trail. These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information.

Amendment 355, page 79, leave out lines 31 to 36.

See amendment 357.

Amendment 356, page 79, leave out lines 37 to 44.

See amendment 357.

Amendment 357, page 80, leave out lines 8 to 12.

These amendments would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or specifically identified. Warrants may still be granted where the equipment in question belongs to or is in the possession of an individual or more than one person where the warrant is for the purpose of a single investigation or operation; or for equipment in a particular location or equipment in more than one location where for the purpose of a single investigation or operation.

Amendment 388, in clause 102, page 80, line 23, leave out “6” and insert “1”.

This specifies that hacking warrants may only last for one month.

Government amendments 93 to 96.

Amendment 149, page 82, line 1, leave out clause 104.

Government amendments 97 to 100.

Amendment 150, page 83, line 36, leave out clause 105.

Government amendments 101 to 113.

Amendment 151, page 84, line 34, leave out clause 106.

Government amendments 114 to 120.

Amendment 152, page 85, line 40, leave out clause 107.

Amendment 173, page 87, line 26, leave out clause 109.

Amendment 174, page 88, line 7, leave out clause 110.

Government amendments 121 and 122.

Amendment 175, page 88, line 35, leave out clause 111.

Amendment 176, in clause 114, page 92, line 6, leave out subsection (3)(e).

Amendment 177, page 92, line 8, leave out subsection (3)(f).

Government amendment 123.

Amendment 302, in clause 116, page 93, line 39, at end insert—

‘(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”

An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for equipment interference disclosures.

Government amendment 124.

Amendment 383, in schedule 6, page 214, line 7, leave out part 2.

These amendments remove the power for law enforcement chiefs to issue equipment interference warrants on application from law enforcement officers and replace it with the power for Judicial Commissioners to issue equipment interference warrants on application from law enforcement chiefs. They also remove the power to issue equipment interference warrants from other officers listed in Part 2, Schedule 6. These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered.

Government amendments 125 and 126.

Government new clause 10.

Amendment 488, page 167, line 9, leave out clause 216.

This amendment would remove the provision for national security notices.

Government amendment 78.

Amendment 196, in clause 216, page 167, line 14, after “State”, insert

“and Investigatory Powers Commissioner consider”.

See amendment 205.

Amendment 197, page 167, line 32, after “State”, insert

“and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Government amendment 79.

Amendment 489, page 167, line 35, leave out clause 217.

This amendment would remove the provision for technical capability notices.

Government amendments 80 and 81.

Amendment 198, page 168, line 9 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner consider”.

See amendment 205.

Government amendment 82.

Amendment 199, page 168, line 27 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Government amendment 83.

Amendment 200, page 168, line 36 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Amendment 201, page 168, line 40 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Government amendments 84 and 85.

Amendment 490, page 169, line 2, leave out clause 218.

Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.

Amendment 202, page 169, line 6 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Amendment 203, page 169, line 8 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Government amendment 86.

Amendment 204, page 169, line 20 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

See amendment 205.

Amendment 205, page 169, line 34 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

National Security and Technical Capability Notices should be subject to a double lock authorisation by the Secretary of State and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Government amendment 87.

Amendment 491, page 170, line 10, leave out clause 219.

Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.

Amendment 492, page 170, line 38, leave out clause 220.

Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I wish to listen to the mellifluous tones of the right hon. Gentleman, as some Members do, and people listening elsewhere might conceivably wish to hear his sonorous tones. We would be assisted if he faced the House.

[Mr Hayes]

I think this is about proportionality. The answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) is that yes, of course, in establishing the character of the proportionality and therefore the range he described, we may need to think about the sort of protocol he set out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

I will call Mr Cox briefly, but I wish to call the Minister no later than 10.50 pm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Hayes]

I only hope that your earlier remarks about my style, Mr Speaker, can be matched by my substance.

Let me deal with the last contribution first. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General made it clear that these are matters of continuing consideration, and further discussions are to be held. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) is right to say that we have not yet got to where we want to be, but I understand the weight and significance of his remark about limits on privilege, which will certainly be included in any consideration that we make following those discussions. I do not want to anticipate those discussions tonight, but, as the shadow Secretary of State recommended, we will engage in them without delay, and conclude them on the basis of adding to the Bill in a way that is sufficient to protect legal privilege.

A number of Members on both sides of the House emphasised the importance of the Bill per se. It is important because it provides law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies with the powers they need to keep us safe, and it does so in a way that makes those powers transparent, while also adding to the checks and balances that are vital in the defence of private interest. It therefore radically overhauls the way in which such powers are authorised and overseen, in particular through the introduction of the double lock for the most sensitive powers. This is a radical change—perhaps the most radical change of modern times in these matters.

The Bill also ensures that these powers are fit for the digital age. As the Chair of the ISC, and others, have said, much of what is done now arises as a result of a series of pieces of legislation that I suppose one could call reactive. They were consequent on the need to provide those who are missioned to protect us with what they require to do so. The Bill draws those powers together and makes them more comprehensible and transparent, which adds to the oversight and safeguards that make up the checks and balances I have described. This is an important Bill, and it is therefore important that we get it right.

That brings me to my second substantial point, which is about the spirit of our consideration. This debate has been conducted in a way that I think does credit to this House, and that is largely—it is unusual to hear a Minister say this, so I wish to emphasise it in the style that you recommended earlier, Mr Speaker—due to the Opposition. The Opposition make choices about how they scrutinise the Government, how they hold the Government to account, and how they deal with legislation on the Floor of the House and in Committee. Those judgments are fundamentally important, not only for the health of the House and our democracy, but for the interests of our people. The Opposition and the Government have worked together on the Bill. If that causes pain to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), so be it, because if we end up with a Bill that is better than it started—and I believe we will end up with a Bill that is considerably better—I take the view that we have done our job as well as we could reasonably be expected to do it.

To that end, as we have said a number of times this evening, we continue to look at these matters. Clearly, the House of Lords will want its say—it is right that it should—and will contribute to further scrutiny, but the spirit that has imbued all we have done until now is important in a Bill that, frankly, any Government of any colour would have introduced, not just because there is a sunset clause on previous legislation, but because the Government know that it is necessary for the powers to be updated so that they are fit for purpose, and for the safeguards to be updated in accordance with that.

Let me deal with some of the specifics—I want to save sufficient time to deal with the salient issue of trade unions, which the shadow Secretary of State spoke about with such passion. Modifications were mentioned by both Opposition and Government Members. It is important to emphasise that the Government have considered the concerns raised in Committee—that point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), Opposition Front Benchers and others.

As a result, we have introduced a number of significant amendments to make it clear that a warrant against a single person cannot be modified into a thematic warrant; to require all major modifications to be notified to a judicial commissioner; and to ensure that the Wilson doctrine and legal professional practice safeguards apply to urgent modifications, so that the double lock, with all that that suggests, applies too.

Those amendments are responses to matters raised in Committee, to ensure that the warranting system is consistent. I entirely accept the point that it would be completely unacceptable to have a robust system for issuing warrants and a less robust system for modifying them. Warranting has to be consistent throughout, and there can be no back-door way of weakening the process. That is not what the Government intend and not what we would allow. We have made those changes but, as I have said, we are happy to consider those matters carefully—I have heard what has been said tonight by Members on both sides of the House about what more might be done.

The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and others have made the argument repeatedly that more should be stated in the Bill. That is what the manuscript amendment does. On that basis, I am grateful for the comments made by the shadow Secretary of State and the shadow Minister in welcoming the amendment.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) tabled amendments on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Amendments 15 to 17 would add another condition to clause 45, which provides for circumstances in which a telecommunications operator may intercept communications in response to a request made by the international agreement. The additional condition would require that interception must be for the purpose of obtaining information about the communications of people who are known or believed to be outside the United Kingdom. That amendment would replicate the current position in RIPA and, I agree, would provide valuable assurances. As drafted, the amendment contains minor, technical deficiencies, and for that reason, as my right hon. and learned Friend will understand, we will not accept it.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I know the Minister of State is greatly enjoying his oration, but I am conscious of the fact that the clock in front of him is not functioning, and I want him to know two things: first, that he should face the House, as we continually exhort him to do; and, secondly, that he has a further seven minutes in which to excite the House.

[Mr Hayes]

Seven minutes of pure joy, Mr Speaker.

The Government will bring back further amendments to do what my right hon. and learned Friend intends.

Amendments 19 to 23, also tabled on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, seek to prohibit a targeted or bulk interception warrant being renewed for more than 30 days. I do not foresee any circumstance where such a renewal application would be approved by the Secretary of State or judicial commissioner, but this is another matter that I agree could be clearer in the Bill. As with the previous amendment, we will revisit this and table an amendment in the other place.

I am less convinced by the argument my right hon. and learned Friend makes on amendment 25. The amendment would prohibit warrants being sought against suspects who are carrying out the same activity but who may not share a common purpose. In my judgment, a restriction of this kind would have a material impact on current operations. It would, for example, prohibit the targeting of an online forum that is used predominantly—but not exclusively—by child abusers, because the agency could not be certain that everyone accessing the forum was doing so for a common purpose. I have profound reservations about that amendment. I understand the sense of it and I understand why it has been tabled, but I do not think the Government can accept it. I do not want to give the impression that the Government accept any amendment, regardless of what we think about it. That is not our style, however conciliatory we might be.