(2 days, 5 hours ago)
Commons Chamber
Phil Brickell
I am going to make some progress, if that is okay—[Interruption.] I am in the flow of things and I am not halfway through yet, so I have a long way to go.
The PM’s PPS flagged that the relationship between Mandelson and Epstein would be gone over with the Prime Minister by his private office, and the principal private secretary noted that after a decision to proceed was made, only then would a decision be made as to when to make any appointment and announce it, and when the new ambassador would take up post, subject to a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, followed by approval by the King and then agrément being obtained from the US Administration.
Correspondence from No. 10 to the permanent under-secretary at the FCDO, and from the FCDO PUS at the time, Sir Philip Barton, to the King’s private secretary, was disclosed in the first volume of material published following the Humble Address, which testifies to this sequence of events having taken place. On 20 December 2024, the private secretary to the permanent under-secretary at the FCDO emailed Mandelson congratulating him on his appointment and noting his onboarding, including regarding his “clearance”, which the head of the US and Canada Department of the FCDO noted on 23 December 2024 was an important “first step”.
When Sir Olly Robbins came before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 November last year, he said in response to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson):
“as is normally the case with external appointments to my Department and the wider civil service, the appointment was made subject to obtaining security clearance.”
Moreover, Sir Olly confirmed in that very session:
“we also went through the standard UK national security vetting process for DV… I am absolutely confident that UKSV undertook the process in precisely its standard way, doing all the checks it would expect to do, and we had ample time to assess and decide on the basis of its work.”
In reference to the remarks by the hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sorcha Eastwood), it was worth noting for the record that it was confirmed to the Foreign Affairs Committee that the high-risk concerns in SV were not Epstein-related.
Phil Brickell
I am correcting the hon. Member on the points mentioned here; I am not here to talk about the process—we will come on to that shortly.
Chris Wormald, the former Cabinet Secretary, noted at the same session on 3 November that
“the normal thing is for the security clearance to happen after appointment but before the person signs a contract”
—as my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) mentioned—and
“takes up post. If we are recruiting a permanent secretary or similar from outside the civil service, that is normally what would happen: the security clearance process would happen after the announcement of the appointment but before the person takes up post, and the appointment would be subject to the security clearance being granted.”
Mandelson was issued an FCDO employment contract with a start date of 3 February 2025. Section 17 of that contract, entitled “Security Clearance”, was explicit:
“You must obtain the required level of security clearance as soon as possible and maintain the required level of security clearance throughout your employment.”
Dated 30 January 2025, Mandelson’s offer of fixed-term employment with the FCDO confirmed his
“security clearance has been confirmed by Vetting Unit and is valid until 29 January 2030.”
I will not be selective in referring to evidence given to this House that favours one view or another, so let me be clear: Olly Robbins mentioned in his letter of 21 April to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the then Cabinet Secretary at the time of Mandelson’s appointment being proposed, Simon Case, recommended—the operative word—in November 2024 that vetting should have been completed before an announcement was made. But in the very same letter of 21 April, Robbins was also explicit in confirming that:
“When the Prime Minister informed the House that the proper process had been followed in respect of NSV, he was correct.”
Moreover, on the topic of vetting, Robbins stood by the letter he wrote with the Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 September 2025, in which he confirmed:
“Ministers…are not informed of any findings other than the final outcome.”
He went on to state in his letter on 21 April:
“This position reflected long-standing practice and guidance, and correctly constrained our ability to share information beyond the vetting process then or later.”
He noted that the FCDO
“completed DV to the normal high standard”;
that he, Robbins, met the director for the estates, security and network directorate and was briefed orally that Mandelson was
“a ‘borderline’ case, leaning towards recommending that clearance be denied”;
that the highest risks “could be managed and mitigated”, as recommended by ESND; and that UKSV acknowledged that the FCDO may wish to grant clearance. Robbins also confirmed that UK Security Vetting
“did not ‘fail’ Mandelson and FCDO did not ‘overrule’ their decision”;
that a risk-based decision was arrived at by the FCDO, taking into account the feedback from UKSV as a result of the full vetting process having been gone through; and that
“DV clearance is a risk judgement.”
Sir Olly was clear in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee recently that no direct communication took place between anyone in No. 10 and himself, that the interaction between UK Security Vetting and the Foreign Office was “entirely standard”, and that clearance was granted subject to mitigations agreed following an FCDO security department assessment that could address the highest risks associated with Mandelson.
Take the remarks from Cat Little, civil service chief operating officer and permanent secretary to the Cabinet Office, in her oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. She was clear in her remarks last week:
“My view is that due process was followed, and if I might explain why I believe that, it is because the process, as I have outlined to the Committee, is that UKSV makes a recommendation and the Foreign Office makes a decision as to whether to grant DV. That is the process, and that is the process that is agreed with the Foreign Office.”
Furthermore, Cat Little was clear about vetting in her oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee:
“I do have access to a number of emails that have been disclosed recently to me… What I can see is that there is a senior official from the Government Security Group who goes back to the Foreign Office security team and advises two things: one, that this is a decision for the Foreign Office, and two, that they would advise that developed vetting is sought.”
She went on to say that
“the Prime Minister did not know about the UKSV conclusion, and he did not know which specific risks were identified at the time of appointment.”
Only this morning, former Foreign Office permanent secretary Sir Philip Barton told the Committee that he was confident that the appropriate process was carried out.
Those are not my comments, but those of senior civil servants—a former Cabinet Secretary, two former permanent under-secretaries of the FCDO and the current permanent under-secretary at the Cabinet Office—and they all stand in direct contract with the motion before the House. They are all of the view that proper process was followed. I know whose words I would rather believe. Their remarks chime with those of the Prime Minister, who said:
“for a direct ministerial appointment, it was usual for security vetting to happen after the appointment but before the individual starting in post.”—[Official Report, 20 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 24.]
Opposition Members might object to the process—they would be right to do so—but it was set out at the time of the appointment, and it was followed by the Cabinet Office, the FCDO, UKSV and, ultimately, the Prime Minister. As the Minister ultimately accountable for the decision, the Prime Minister has rightly changed the process so that appointments can be confirmed only once vetting has been completed. He has rightly appointed Sir Adrian Fulford to lead a review of security vetting to ensure consistency across Government in the way decision makers are informed of concerns ahead of appointments.
The Prime Minister has rightly set up the Ethics and Integrity Commission and tasked it with improving processes around lobbying, the revolving door between Government and the private sector, and financial transparency. I commend him for those steps and for his commitment to introducing as soon as possible legislation allowing for the removal of disgraced peers—that is the right thing to do. I trust that the legislation will obtain support from across this House.
Only yesterday, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister confirmed that
“the Cabinet Office will have passed to the ISC all the material it has processed as part of the Humble Address and judged to be prejudicial to national security or international relations. This has amounted to over 300 individual documents. It includes a number that are relevant to the processes of Peter Mandelson’s security vetting, too.”—[Official Report, 27 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 588.]
We expect the second tranche of documents under the ambit of the Humble Address to be published after Parliament returns following Prorogation.
As mentioned in yesterday’s ministerial statement on progress on the Humble Address, outstanding documents are either with the Government awaiting publication, with the ISC, or with the Metropolitan police, given the ongoing criminal investigation into Mandelson. The last time a Prime Minister’s conduct was referred to the Privileges Committee was during the covid pandemic. Boris Johnson was under investigation by the Metropolitan police for repeatedly partying in No. 10 during lockdown. He then misled the House by saying that rules had been followed when they had not. The police had issued fixed penalty notices for breaches of covid-19 regulations.
I have mentioned the Cabinet Office’s vital ongoing work to review the documents within the remit of the Humble Address, the Intelligence and Security Committee’s work to review proposed redactions, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s public evidence sessions, and the wholly separate police investigation. My question to the Leader of the Opposition is: why bring this motion now? Why bring this motion when we have not had the full disclosure of the documents within the ambit of the Humble Address, including the private messages, WhatsApps, and the additional minutes and file notes that were not published in volume one back in March. Why duplicate the work that is already being undertaken by the Cabinet Office and the ISC under the Humble Address? Why not wait until after Prorogation, when the full documentary evidence is available, to determine whether a Privileges Committee referral is warranted? Why not wait until all relevant witnesses have given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee? We are only just digesting the evidence given today.
The Leader of the Opposition makes much of due process in her motion. My retort is simple: due process ought also to be followed in getting to the truth. Let all the documents be released, and then let this House determine the facts of the matter. The cynic in me would say that today’s privileges motion is nothing but a bare-faced political stunt by the Conservative party, which, with just over a week to go until the local elections, is clutching at straws. It politicises the important review process that is under way across Government and Westminster. Hard-working and dedicated civil servants are working alongside Ministers to ensure that the Humble Address is fulfilled as quickly as possible. My first obligation is to this country above all else. I owe it to my constituents to outline my rationale and my way of thinking, as I have done. I will vote with the Government today.