(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy recollection is that the hon. Gentleman was a member of my circuit, but I will have a think about that. Cautioning has been utterly corrosive, and even when people have been prosecuted the sentencing procedures that have been put in place have been difficult for lawyers, and impossible for non-lawyers, to understand. The point has been well made that the idea of someone serving no more than half a sentence is difficult for people to take on board, but when somebody reappears after a few days or a few weeks the public simply cannot comprehend it. A good start is linking the release of serious offenders to the scrutiny of the Parole Board. It is an important link and I am glad that it is being reintroduced. I say “reintroduced” because it worked very well in the 1990s, but since then we have had indeterminate sentences for public protection, and judging by some of the comments today it is clear that the party that introduced them still does not understand the problems they caused.
The Bill has the advantage of introducing a system that imposes a period of imprisonment that will be served unless, after a substantial time, the Parole Board approves early release. The Bill retains the incentive for the prisoner and provides a valuable safeguard for the rest of us—that is a good piece of legislation. What a pity that we had to have those years of messing around with alternatives before going back to something that worked well in the 1990s.
When someone is released, is it wrong to use technology to monitor them? I understand that some people will be uncomfortable with the idea of tracking humans with a global positioning system, but is it any different from putting a tag on someone and using different technology to monitor whether or not they enter or leave a building? Surely when people are precluded by court order from going to certain locations, there is nothing wrong in monitoring that with technology. There is always a line with technology that we should not cross, but this Bill falls far short of it.
If someone on licence breaches the terms of that licence and will do so again, why should they not have to serve the remainder of their sentence? Most people probably assume that that is what happens anyway, and would be surprised to learn that the system provided for anything else. People have the licence terms explained to them: if they breach the licence and it looks as though they will do it again, they should serve their sentence, and there cannot be anything wrong with that.
One aspect of the Bill that has received media attention relates to proceedings for judicial review. Is it really controversial that those who wish to be involved in someone else’s case may have to pay towards the cost of those proceedings? Those who appear as interveners are free to provide their assistance, knowledge and experience to any party in any case, but if they want to appear themselves, why should it be assumed that one of the parties will automatically pick up their costs or that they will have no responsibility for the costs that they incur on behalf of others? They are free to pass on their expertise and knowledge, but if they want to take part in the litigation, some responsibility may come with that.
The hon. Gentleman’s point sounds reasonable, but the reality is that one of the parties is the state, with all the resources and the power that the state can bring to bear, and the other parties are simply not in the same position. They are trying to challenge an exercise of state power in a situation where there is a gross inequality of bargaining power. At times, that means that positions and points that are important for public policy will not otherwise be considered. That would be a price worth paying if it actually meant that public policy was improved.
I do not disagree, and that is why the Bill provides for circumstances in which that can happen. However, in a large number of cases, expertise can be provided without intervention and representation being needed. As an aside, organisations that oppose this measure and that frequently appear as interveners should make it clear in their lobbying that they stand to be affected by the changes that they oppose.
The leapfrogging provisions of judicial review are not controversial and are a good idea. Only last week, the Supreme Court exerted its authority. As confidence grows that it will be, as it should be, the final court in this jurisdiction and that that is where issues will ultimately be determined, why incur cost and delay calling in at the Court of Appeal if a matter will automatically be referred to the Supreme Court?
Is it really controversial to suggest that a case that offers the prospect of nothing more than a pyrrhic victory should not take up days of court time? I find the opposition to clause 50 surprising. It seems to come from the left, yet the argument that has been advanced recently in the High Court, especially in relation to ballots by trade unions on industrial activity, is that if we have thousands of members and we only have the addresses wrong for half a dozen or so, why should we rerun the ballot when it will not affect the outcome? Is that not precisely the sort of point that should be dealt with at a preliminary hearing? If it is quite clear that there was no mischief in the error and that changing the error would not affect the outcome, is there any need for full judicial review proceedings? Something that is argued on behalf of the trade unions as perfectly sensible in the High Court seems, when it appears in a Government Bill, to be worthy only of criticism from the Opposition Benches.
For all the focus on judicial review, I agree with the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and others that the clause on which people should reflect concerns the magistrates court, which deals with 95% of all criminal cases. Clause 50 creates a system for trial, not for guilty plea, so the idea of guilty plea by post is not what the clause is about. It creates a system for trial, the determination of proceedings that are not admitted. These proceedings could involve criminal damage, assault and public order. They are not matters that will attract sentences of custody, but they could have implications that affect people’s livelihoods. They could be determined behind closed doors, and in a process that involves nobody who has any legal qualification whatever. It could be a single lay magistrate in a private room with papers provided by a police officer. I hope the Government will reflect on that.
One solution is to have at least two if not three magistrates. Another is to say that if it is a single justice, they should be a district judge. The idea that a file can be submitted, that there is no intervention from a prosecutor and that a lay justice in private can decide whether someone has committed a criminal offence is quite a significant step. It may well be that some of these people have not bothered to reply or that some know they are guilty, but there is some significance to that step and it is something on which we should reflect.
The Bill also makes provision in relation to wasted cost. I will tease the Minister a little by reminding him that there is one party to criminal proceedings that often causes trials to be adjourned owing to lack of court time or lack of jurors, and there are no cost implications for them, and that is of course the Court Service.
It is impossible to speak in a debate on criminal justice and courts without making mention of the current problems over proposals regarding remuneration. My recollection is that it was the previous Labour Government who first saw industrial action by the Bar. It was in relation to remuneration for very high cost cases and proceeds of crime cases some six or seven years ago. My view now is the same as it was then. I know as well as anyone the talents and strengths of those who practise at the independent Bar, but there must be a balance between those who practise in the courts and those whom the courts are there to serve. Pursuit of remuneration should never tip the balance away from timely remedy for those seeking justice, whether it is because they are complainants or victims or because they are awaiting trial.
Finally, those who would never reverse these proposals if ever the opportunity arose should be slow in hinting that they might.