Sergeant Nightingale

Simon Reevell Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Simon Reevell (Dewsbury) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) for giving me the opportunity to speak.

Earlier this year, the court martial appeal court confirmed that the Attorney-General has a supervisory role as far as the Service Prosecuting Authority and the Director of Service Prosecutions are concerned. Ironically, it did so in a case when an unrelated search discovered trophy items and the SPA went out of its way to select charges that would protect the defendant from a draconian sentence at the end of his trial. The Attorney-General enjoys those powers because he has authority over anybody who prosecutes on behalf of the Crown. Forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker; I should have declared that I have practised in the military courts for 20 years.

In light of the significant public concern regarding the circumstances in which Sergeant Nightingale was prosecuted, and given recent questions of judgment at the very top of the Service Prosecuting Authority—the contract of the Director of Service Prosecutions is not to be renewed—it would provide reassurance for all concerned if the Attorney-General reconsiders his decision of this morning not to conduct a review of the application of the service interest test. The decision to prosecute Sergeant Nightingale in respect of the Glock pistol has led to the debate and the circumstances we are discussing. The concern of a great many people is that, although on a simple analysis an offence may have been committed, the service interest was not properly considered before a decision was taken to mount the prosecution. If the Attorney-General takes the view that that is not so, all matters raised in the debate are for the court martial appeal court, but if his view is that the service interest test was not met, he would doubtless ensure that a view is taken by the prosecution not to oppose the conviction appeal in respect of the Glock pistol. The ammunition is perhaps a different matter, but the sentencing powers for that are different.

There are wider concerns. There is suspicion among many that there has been a miscarriage of justice, but there is a wider undermining of the military justice system when there is public outrage, and when the public question whether an individual should ever have been prosecuted in the first place. The Attorney-General is entitled to deal with that as soon as he chooses.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor-General]

There is a protocol that decides where these cases are tried. The advantage from the serviceman’s point of view of being dealt with by court martial is that it often does not result in loss of rank or dismissal. In this case, the court martial said it hoped it would be possible, first, for the sergeant to keep his rank, and, secondly, that he would not be dismissed from the service. Had it wished, it could have recommended the loss of rank and service, but it did not. That was the decision.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell) made a point about the role of the Attorney-General. In the case he referred to, it is true that the court said that if a judge was unhappy with a prosecution and felt it was not necessarily in the public interest, the judge could refer it and say, “Look, you should discuss this with the Attorney-General.” But that is at the beginning of the case, before a conviction. In a case such as this, where there has been a conviction and the court has moved to sentence, the only way of challenging the decision is for the person concerned to appeal. Under this system, the sentence in the court martial is made not just by the judge advocate but by the five serving officers on the board. They all have an equal vote. It is worth making the point that there was Army representation and that two of the five were warrant officers.

[Simon Reevell]

I have the advantage of having been in the court at the time. On the court martial appeal, the court said, “The Attorney-General has a supervisory role, an example of which would be”—and it then gave that example. It was not a restrictive role in the way that might have been suggested.

[The Solicitor-General]

I have three minutes left, and superintendence is a complicated issue. There is statutory superintendence for the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Prosecution Service, and there is a common law form of superintendence that applies to all prosecutions, but the Attorney-General cannot just say, “I’m stopping this prosecution.” The House would not want a situation where politicians can stop proceedings and where we move away from an independent prosecution service and an independent court system.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury, I hold our armed forces in extremely high regard. They regularly put their lives at risk for our country, and we only recently remembered their sacrifice. Sergeant Nightingale has given great service over the years to the Army and the country, but the case was dealt with in accordance with the procedures and laws that Parliament has passed regarding the seriousness of weapons.

I am sure that my hon. Friend, in view of his own military service—this will apply to other hon. Friends here today—will understand instinctively the need to maintain the security of weapons and ammunition. In this case, possession of the weapon was prohibited by law because of the very nature of the weapon. It was being held insecurely, together with a large quantity of live ammunition, in an ordinary house, on an ordinary road. The way to challenge the conviction or sentence is to follow the correct procedure, which is to appeal.

Voting by Prisoners

Simon Reevell Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Simon Reevell (Dewsbury) (Con)]

I am pleased that this has not just been an in or out of the European Court of Human Rights debate, because many from all walks of life turn to that Court, whether they are concerned about the DNA database or hunting legislation. Who would criticise Gary McKinnon for taking his case there in the face of the Extradition Act 2003? Who, as a matter of principle, would not cast an eye to Strasbourg if a high-speed train route was being put through their constituency? But if it is not in or out, is it much better to talk about pick and choose? Is it really suggested that we can welcome rulings that we like, and simply ignore those that we do not?

Would we dream of taking that course if it were the House of Lords as was that had found in Hirst’s favour, and we were talking about a House of Lords judgment? Or in those circumstances, would the mood be that the Government should get themselves to Strasbourg and try to use the ECHR to overcome that ruling? Do we really suggest that some rights should be regulated by legislation in Parliament, over which there should be no prospect of review in the courts? If so, might we pause and wonder what would be on the list alongside prisoner votes? What if control orders, as were, came back and went on the list? What about challenges to the Extradition Act? I do not believe that prisoners should be allowed to vote, but I am more concerned about the rule of law, because we cannot be law-makers and law-breakers.

Cases such as the Hirst ruling catch the eye, but so do decisions of the UK courts, and there have been too many instances where the ECHR jurisdiction has been necessary. A trip to Sandhurst and the view of the officer cadets on the subject of prisoners’ votes was mentioned. We used to have a system of justice that basically followed the principle of military justice of “March in the guilty man.” We had that system until a man called Findlay, a member of the armed forces, having been turned down by every court in the United Kingdom, went to Strasbourg and won his case. As a result of that, the military justice system was completely overhauled and the previous Government brought in the Armed Forces Act 2006, which, just a few weeks ago, we all ratified so that it continues. Were it not for the ECHR, that system simply would not have changed.

I do not like the Hirst ruling, but I like less the fact that it was ignored for more than five years. On balance, I like even less the idea of picking and choosing when it comes to this nation’s legal obligations.

[Andrew Bridgen]

Is not the crux of the argument that by supporting the motion this afternoon, we are not seeking to extend the powers of this Parliament but resisting the extension of the powers of the Strasbourg court, an unelected European body that has little respect for or makes little acknowledgment of the great and enviable democratic history of this place?

[Simon Reevell]

I used the phrase “pick and choose”, but it comes to the same thing.

We are entitled to moderate and we should, but we should do that within the rule of law. It is clear that four years is not appropriate, because that would see people convicted of serious crimes of violence, serious sexual offences, perhaps even including the offence of rape, and offences of drug distribution being included. We should not allow judges discretion, not because we do not trust them, but because we must have a robust system that will stand a challenge, and doing it in court on guidelines on a case-by-case basis weakens our position.

We should look at the duration of detention, not just the length of sentence. In fact, Mr Hirst, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and whose plea was accepted because he had mental health problems, had served his tariff sentence and was being detained because he posed a risk as a result of his mental health when he brought his challenge. It is not a matter just of the length of the sentence, but of the time that someone is lawfully detained once the threshold sentence is passed. We should take the very simple step of amending the Limitation Act 1980, so that anybody who receives damages arising from litigation on this subject can have the damages taken away by the victims of their crime. What prevents that at the moment is the time limit that has usually been exceeded before the convicted person is in funds and so the victim is precluded from claiming. It would take half an hour to draft the amendments to the Limitation Act that would solve that problem.

There are too many examples to mention of necessary and welcome ECHR intervention, so we should not be tempted to walk away from that institution. We should make the best that we can of the situation in which we find ourselves—a situation that we on this side of the House inherited. We do not allow our citizens to pick and choose, so we should not seek to pick and choose ourselves.