NHS Risk Register

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lansley]

I entirely understand my right hon. Friend. My colleagues and I very much look forward to the conclusions of the Justice Committee’s post-legislative scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

rose—

[Mr Lansley]

Further advice from my right hon. Friend, not only to me but to the Prime Minister, is always welcome.

[Simon Hughes]

I defend the Government’s record on the openness of information, and I am a clear believer that the Freedom of Information Act, which I and many Liberal Democrats supported, is the right way forward. Will the Secretary of State therefore confirm that the Government are doing nothing other than following the policy provided for in the Act, which is that when there is a dispute, including when the Government and the Information Commissioner have a different view, the matter properly goes to the tribunal, and the Government respond positively to the tribunal’s decision?

[Mr Lansley]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, because I had not intended to quote the Information Commissioner, who wrote an article in The Observer in which he rightly states that he is not infallible. The Government have the right to appeal to the tribunal and we have exercised that right. The tribunal is a proper place in which the public interest test can be applied.

Let me return to the reasons why we do not publish high-level risk registers, the first of which is candour. To be effective, a risk register requires all involved—not necessarily the officials responsible for the policy, but others—to be frank and open about the potential risks involved. It is their job to think the unthinkable and to look at worst-case scenarios. It is vital that nothing is done to inhibit the process of identifying risk. If people are in doubt about the confidentiality of their views, they will inevitably think twice before committing themselves to such direct and candid language in future. Without full candour, risk registers across the Government would be bland and anodyne. In effect, they would cease to be of practical value. Inevitably as a consequence, that would lead to a reduction in the quality of advice given to Ministers.

The second reason is that disclosure can increase the likelihood of some risks happening—it is like a self-fulfilling prophesy. When some risks are made public, those potentially affected are likely to act in a way that could increase the likelihood of the risk actually happening. Let us imagine publishing the risk registers of banks—no doubt the shadow Secretary of State would tell us that the risk registers of banks owned by the Government should be published. The consequence of publishing such risks would be to precipitate financial events.

Lord Turnbull, former head of the civil service, and not under this Government, said in another place:

“Managers might be reluctant to be frank in public about operational difficulties if that would undermine their ability to make contingency plans or could trigger an event before their plans are ready.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 December 2011; Vol. 733, c. 729.]

The purpose of a risk register is to secure mitigation of those risks, not to precipitate them.