RSPCA (Prosecutions)

Debate between Simon Hart and Angela Smith

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Westminster Hall

[Simon Hart]

I now regret not accepting an earlier intervention from the hon. Gentleman, although it was worth the wait. I will press on, otherwise we will get bogged down. A number of other hon. Members want to make a contribution.

[Angela Smith (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Simon Hart]

I will take an intervention later, but I want to make a little progress if I can.

The debate asks why the RSPCA prosecutes when pretty much every other worthy charity, whether they deal with animal or human welfare, such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, relies entirely on the CPS and the police to deal with problem areas they come in contact with in the course of their professional duties. Why is animal cruelty in Scotland dealt with perfectly satisfactorily by the procurator fiscal, rather than by the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the sister organisation to the RSPCA, as private prosecutions are not permitted in the same form north of the border?

I draw the Attorney-General’s attention to the fact that all those activities have a cost to the taxpayer both through the beneficial tax regimes that all charities benefit from and through gift aid, which assists the RSPCA to the tune of several million pounds a year. Will he comment on what powers the society really has, and its relationship with the police? Even some police officers often assume that the RSPCA’s officers have powers of entry. They do not. Their rank and uniform, although often similar to those of the police, provide no authority whatever in the eyes of the law, yet they can and do liaise with the police to engage in covert surveillance, raids on property and interviewing or cautioning those whom they might suspect. Given the political and commercial activities of the society, is it right that it operates so closely with the police? Should the police exercise some care in the relationship, especially as it applies to the use of cautions?

I want to address how the decision-making process for prosecutions fits with CPS guidance, especially as it applies to the old, sick, infirm, vulnerable and young. Many fellow Members will have examples of constituents who feel that they have been the victims of heavy-handedness from the RSPCA. I will highlight just two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hart]

I regret that I disagree entirely with my hon. Friend’s comments. I will explain why in a minute. The debate is not about trying to pass yet more legislation to deal with what some people consider to be a problem. This is about how we can actually empower the CPS, and, indeed, for that matter, impose a degree of accountability on those who wish to prosecute privately. I am not here to try to stop people prosecuting privately; I am just trying to ensure that, if they prosecute, they do it in a way that does not conflict with their political or perhaps, commercial objectives.

I remind my hon. Friend that the police had the ability to prosecute in their own right removed in the 1980s, with the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service. The police must gather evidence, make arrests and submit a file to the CPS, which will then apply a stringent and objective test. That process is right, and exists to protect the public from police officers who might, through no fault of their own, be tempted to chase targets or satisfy neighbourhood or other pressures, which might distort their proper objectivity. I am attempting to argue that if any charity were to go about its private prosecutions—and, let us face it, the RSPCA is about the only one that does it—with that degree of objectivity and accountability, we should have achieved something, and my hon. Friend’s fears would not come to fruition.

[Angela Smith]

Does the hon. Gentleman at least accede to the point that the Charity Commission has agreed that the RSPCA’s approach to prosecutions follows the CPS code—a two-stage evidential and public interest test, which is applied in all RSPCA prosecution decisions and that it believes that the RSPCA’s work is consistent with the duties placed on trustees?

[Simon Hart]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, which I suspect she wrote before she read The Daily Telegraph this morning. I refer her to a letter written yesterday from the Charity Commission to the RSPCA:

“The charity should ensure that it has fully considered the reputational damage to the charity of adverse publicity; fully assessed the risk of such publicity; and taken steps to mitigate such risk where possible.”

The letter continues that

“although we understand the reasons for the ‘independence’ of the charity’s Prosecution Department…ultimately the trustees are responsible…and…the trustees should review the current arrangements to ensure that they are entirely satisfied with the criteria for prosecutions”.

The Charity Commission has therefore today issued a rebuke to the RSPCA on the manner in which it carries out prosecutions.

Dangerous Dogs

Debate between Simon Hart and Angela Smith

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Westminster Hall

[Simon Hart (Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire) (Con)]

I am grateful to you, Mr Bayley, for allowing me to speak now. I join in the congratulations for my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes).

I will deal with two issues, one of which is to add to the momentum about consolidation, and the other is to touch on the law of unintended consequences. I have been fascinated and to some extent enlightened by the rare outbreak of consensus among all parties—we seldom hear so many hon. Members making the same points for the right reasons in Westminster Hall or the main Chamber—but one issue does concern me. There has been much reference to evidence and statistics that suggest an increase in attacks by dangerous dogs or, indeed, by dogs. Is that a trend with evidence to which the Minister can refer us, or is there simply a greater awareness or reporting of such incidents? Is there perhaps greater enforcement of which we are not aware, because we might not be privy to the statistics, and can the Minister put us right?

Another important point was the reference to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 as amended. If ever there was an example of a piece of legislation that has clearly had no effect, the 1991 Act is surely it. Many of the speeches made today were made then as well, back in 1991, with just as much passion and feeling. Legislation was forthcoming, and those in Parliament at the time presumably felt that they had done the right thing by voting for the legislation; yet, a few years on, here we are, having the same debate and referring to statistics that appear to have got worse rather than better. So I ask the Minister to exercise some caution in thinking that the solution to the problem mentioned by so many Members is simply further legislation. Unless we deal with the problem of enforcement, such legislation will serve only to restrict legitimate dog owners, while not restricting illegitimate ones, which is contrary to what we are all attempting to do.

I want to touch on the six pieces of existing legislation, although I will not go into them all. There are provisions in the Dogs Act 1871, as amended in 1989, for some civil recourse for people such as postmen who might be the victims of vicious dog attacks. I note that no one has highlighted the plight of poor old parliamentary candidates—apart from my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North, who touched on the issue—who might also find themselves being attacked on private property.

[Angela Smith]

To satisfy the hon. Gentleman, I put on the record that I was attacked in the general election last year, in precisely the circumstances outlined earlier—the hand through the letter box and the dog on the other side—so I sympathise with the plight of parliamentary candidates in elections.

[Simon Hart]

I do not think that there would be much public sympathy for our plight, but it might be the only area in which we could generate some sympathy for ourselves. That is why I made the point. I accept that such an incident is a civil rather than a criminal matter, so that might need some attention as part of any consolidation process that follows. We must also not overlook the Animal Welfare Act 2006 or the Policing and Crime Act 2009, which do at least provide an opportunity for injunctions forbidding ownership.

As other Members have mentioned, there is therefore quite a lot of legislation, dealing with quite a lot of issues, varying from using dogs as a form of weapon to using dogs in a way that might cause them suffering, let alone the people that they might come into contact with—indeed, there is a power to prevent some people from owning dogs at all. Such provisions already exist, suggesting that instead of new legislation necessarily being the solution, the proper and cross-departmental consolidation of existing legislation might be the way to proceed.

I also want to touch on the law of unintended consequences. There are some grey areas in what constitutes a dangerous dog or activity that might cause alarm and distress to members of the public. Plenty of dog owners have fallen foul of concerned if not mischievous people who are worried that the activity of a dog might be dangerous, although it is not at all. We must protect those whose livelihoods depend on working dogs. There is a distinct line to be drawn between legitimate scrutiny by law enforcement agencies and individuals, and people who may simply be caught up as a consequence of owning a dog responsibly and thoughtfully, but which might seem to an outsider to pose a danger. There have been numerous examples of people who have fallen foul of that distinction.

This debate has shown, if nothing else, that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 did not have the desired effect, nor did the Dangerous Dogs (Amendment) Act 1997. Clearly, there is much work to be done on the activities of irresponsible dog owners, for which the dog usually gets the blame. One wonders whether some of the measures for dog control notices that have been suggested or are in place would be better applied to the owner instead of the dog. The point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North about attitude and education is crucial. I fiercely defend the Minister’s position that the Government are not bossy and that it is not their business to interfere with people’s daily lives, but there is line to be drawn.

With a little knowledge, a lot of progress can be made in persuading, educating and informing people about the difference between irresponsible dog ownership and responsible dog ownership, and that could be easily and cheaply achieved. Consolidation of existing legislation, coupled with other measures, would be a sensible and proportionate way forward.