Bus Services (No. 2) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right; there is no commercial case for large-scale, frequent bus services to every small rural community. I have certainly not come across such a case, even if one does exist. The solution—if there is a solution—will be one of a number of things. Under a franchising scheme, it would be open to a local transport authority to invest in and design a scheme that provides for frequent bus services to every rural community. It would be possible to do that, but it would be phenomenally expensive.

Already, one of the key criticisms of the Bill is that it has no money attached to it, so we are going to spend the next two and a half weeks virtue signalling about how wonderful franchising could be. It is not mandatory, and no one is actually going to do it—outside of the big mayoral authorities that are doing it anyway under the Bus Services Act 2017—because there is no money supporting the Bill. It would be incredibly expensive.

There is an alternative, hybrid solution: a combination of scheduled bus services on the key arterial routes from big villages into their major towns, such as from Norfolk going into Norwich, a rural hub-and-spoke system for the more remote villages, as suggested by the hon. Member for North Norfolk, and demand-responsive public provision.

On Tuesday, I described this as the “Uberfication” of public transport. It still is unlikely to make sense on a purely commercial basis, but it is the kind of focused provision of public sector transport that could work in a highly rural area where the aggregate cost would be less than the blind provision on frequent, full bus services to every community, which would be monumentally expensive.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Amendment 46 would remove the requirement for the service not to have an adverse effect on local services. Bearing in mind what the shadow Minister said about the impossibility of commercial viability for some rural services or non-radial routes in cities, is it correct that the amendment would allow commercial entities to come in and take away part of the market, even where a local transport authority had built up the potentially profitable part of a wider, well-planned public network? The requirement as it stands is intended to prevent commercial companies from parasitising on a market that has been built up with public money. The Minister is not proposing that it should be easier for commercial entities to come in and develop new markets where there is potentially pent-up demand in rural areas.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Lady is right that there is a risk of challenges in some areas, but in other areas there is the opportunity to increase provision for new markets. The difficulty is that the clause as drafted says that “any adverse effect” will be sufficient to prevent the application.

Amendment 47 would replace the word “may” with the word “must” in clause 7(2)—in reality, proposed new section 124Q(5A) of the Transport Act 2000—if a local transport authority is satisfied with the conditions of proposed new subsection (5A)(a) and (b). In such circumstances, why should the local transport authority be given discretion to refuse to grant a cross-boundary permit? It will have accepted that there are no adverse effects; nevertheless, it is given discretion. The clause says that it “may” grant the application, but why? If someone wants to provide an additional service and the local transport authority has satisfied itself that there is no adverse impact, why would it say no?

That is the purpose behind amendment 47. If the applicant—it could be the municipal bus company, given that there is nothing to prevent it from doing this—has satisfied the local transport authority that there is no adverse impact, as set out in the conditions of proposed new subsection (5A)(a) and (b), why should the provider not, as a right, be able to create the service?

[Siân Berry]

I just want to give an example in which “may” is more appropriate. Proposed new subsection (5A)(a) and (b) talk about a local service that is provided. If a local transport authority is building out a planned network and, in the very near future, a service will be introduced in an area, it may want to prevent disruption of the benefits of an integrated local service there by such an application. I believe it is very appropriate that “may” remains in the clause.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Lady is bending over backwards to think of hypothetical instances in which it is possible that something like that could exist. The fact remains that we must ask—this comes down to the philosophical difference between us, perhaps—whether we are looking after the passenger or the supplier. From my perspective, the Bill should have services for passengers squarely in its sights. If passengers will benefit from a new service, the local transport authority should allow it. After all, the aim of the Bill is to maximise general utility for the wider bus service. Amendment 47 would therefore prevent local authorities from sitting on their hands, as the hon. Lady suggests they might.

Amendment 48 goes one step further. If the previous two amendments were red meat to some members of this Committee, this one will send them over the top. It would scrap entirely the convoluted assessments about balancing benefits and adverse effects in proposed new subsections (5A)(a) and (b). The authority would simply take a view on the benefits for persons making journeys on the proposed service—what is wrong with that? If the service has benefits for customers, why should we not just go for it? It is a straightforward process where applicants are in the driving seat. The amendment would provide higher certainty for applicants and therefore encourage additional service providers.

I anticipate that hon. Members may say, “What about the web—the franchise service—that the local transport authority may be trying to design?” But I seek to remind them about the incentives of providers. Again, I speak as a former businessman. We sometimes forget something in this place. We make lots of rules and we deal with processes ad infinitum, and we think that everyone will be incredibly logical. We say, “Oh yes, they have to go through this process, then that process and the other one, and then the local authority may decide to help them or not.” That ignores the basic maxim of private enterprise, which is that time kills deals. If a process is convoluted by design, it is also, by design, time consuming, and therefore expensive and uncertain in its outcome.

Let us think of a potential service provider looking through these provisions. They would say, “I’ve jumped through the hoops of proposed new subsection (5A)(a) and (b), and I’ve demonstrated the evidential basis for this application,” but then there is the discretion at the end where the local authority may, for whatever reason, choose not to award the deal based on some plan for some date in the future that we have not even heard about. Is the provider even going to bother doing it in the first place? This is an important issue of practicality. Commercial organisations respond to incentives, and if we make something long-winded, expensive and complex, they are much less likely to bother doing it. They will employ their capital, their time and their creative energies elsewhere.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful for that thoughtful intervention. In principle, the answer is yes, which is why we legislated in 2017 to allow that in principle and why we supported Greater Manchester through the implementation of the Bee Network. That happened under not Labour, but the Conservatives. However, it comes with financial risk. There needs to be clarity on where the costs are and an absolute, laser focus on minimising them, just like in any other business.

The hon. Member did not say that the forecast in the Bee Network’s business case, which enabled it to get the go-ahead, was for it to make a profit. I accept that there will be periods where it makes a profit and periods where it makes a loss, but it should break even overall. Over the forecast period, however, the plan was for it to make a profit of £94 million—that was how it was sold. For it to make a planned loss in 2025-26 of £226.3 million and change, given the huge cost overruns that I hinted at in Tuesday’s sitting, is a disaster. It makes me wonder where that has come from.

I remember the hon. Member watching with interest on Tuesday as I talked about the more than £17 million overrun on agency bus drivers, because the transport authority had failed to provide enough qualified drivers having misunderstood the nature of the TUPE regulations regarding their transfer from the previous operators to the franchise process. There was also the massive cost overrun on the purchase of bus depots because it was the only buyer in the market. There was an explosion in costs for the purchase orders for new buses, with a surcharge of £40,000 on every bus that Andy Burnham’s Greater Manchester combined authority buys because of the design requirements that he has put in, including bits of leather on the seats—we will not go into the detail of that.

If we are not absolutely laser-focused on the costs, that is what happens. The biggest overrun, which perhaps I should have led with, was the increase in wages. There has been an increase in unionised power—which arguably could be a good or bad thing—and an increase in hourly rates for bus drivers to £16 an hour, which is above the market rate. There are not just bus drivers in a bus company; there are all sorts of other roles as well.

I should also mention the failure to be efficient with the application of capital. In a private organisation, having bus washers is important, because having clean buses is part of the service and it affects the customer experience. Since the Bee Network has been in place, and the local transport authority purchased the depots, there has been a rather unfortunate occurrence whereby the bus cleaning mechanism—the washers—have been out of action for over a year.

The processes and the efficiency within the new structure have to date proved inadequate to get the funding to repair the washers, because that is capex rather than opex. I am assuming that is what the problem is—that it is an unplanned expense, so the authority has to go through the rigmarole of a public sector procurement process. No doubt it will get there in the end, but the consequence is that the bus depot is sending out buses that have not been cleaned for a year. Is that an improvement in service? No, it is not.

I say that not to denigrate franchising. Franchising can be done well—it is not a necessary consequence of bus franchising that there are dirty buses—but the evidence that we have at the moment is that even a really sophisticated operator such as Greater Manchester, with a mayoral combined authority and the financial resources, but without the experience of running buses, suffers very significant bumps along the road. That needs to be addressed. If that is happening in a large local transport authority, what is the likelihood of it happening in a small one—for example, in Norfolk county council in my neck of the woods? That is one of our problems with the Bill.

Going back to amendment 49, proposed new section 123Q(5B) of the Transport Act 2000 deals with intra-boundary services. I am applying the same logic as I did to amendment 47. Why should local transport authorities have the power to refuse to grant a service permit if they are satisfied that there are benefits of the proposed service to the economy of the area, or to persons living in that area, and that those benefits will outweigh any adverse effect on any existing local service?

All the amendment requires is for local authorities to act in the wider interests of consumers—the passengers. The proposed service might have an impact, but if we are satisfied that overall the net benefit is in the positive column and not the negative, why would we not agree to it? Let us think of the passenger—the consumer—rather than the supplier.

The amendment would be a particularly important safeguard if the local transport authority was also the owner of a municipal bus company, which was the supplier of the local services contract. There would then be an added layer of opacity in the process, because the contractor and contracted would be the same organisation. A challenger brand could then come and say that it wanted to provide additional services, and it could be assessed to be net beneficial to the economy or the people living in that area, nevertheless the local authority could refuse to grant a permit, even though it is the operator that would be adversely affected—let us imagine how that would look.

The temptation, of course, would be to say that the award was refused for wholly improper reasons: a circling of the wagons to protect one’s own. I hope that the whole Committee would agree that that would be an improper reason to deny additional access to the people living in the area, and/or to deny a benefit to the economy, yet there would be a strong temptation. If the authority has built its bus service network, and a little so-and-so comes in and demonstrates that it can go one step better, but that would have a negative impact on the authority’s cosy plans, people in the authority are going to think, “I don’t want to be troubled by this.”

[Siân Berry]

The shadow Minister was looking at me while making those points, and I agree that our parties have very different philosophies on this issue. The circumstances that he has just described as “cosy” relationships that are improper, are ones that I characterised earlier as public money being invested in building up a market that should not be parasitised. Those are, very clearly, different points of view, and I want to make sure that is on the record at the right time.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Member is absolutely right that there is a fundamental difference of philosophy here. She appears to back what I described as the cosy relationship—but let us not use pejorative language; let us call it the mechanism of state supply. She thinks that that is more important than improving the experience of passengers in that location and/or improving the economy, because that is the hurdle that would have to be crossed for the change made by amendment 49 to take effect. I accept, acknowledge and celebrate that difference. As a Conservative, I stand up for the consumer—for the resident—in my constituency, not for the supplier of services, even if it is the state supplier. Those are the people who I represent, those are the services that I am trying to improve, and that is what amendment 49 would do.

The amendment would require the local authority to act in the wider interest of consumers, not that of its own suppliers. That is particularly important where the authority has skin in the game. If I am unsuccessful—as I have a sneaking suspicion that I might be—in persuading the majority of the members of the Committee to support amendment 49, we should at least expect transparency in any decision-making process where the decision taker, the local authority, is taking a decision that affects a municipal bus company owned by that authority. At the very least—as we will discuss in relation to other amendments—we should insist on absolute transparency in those commercial relationships, so that the disinfectant of sunlight can shine on the exact rationale for a commercial opportunity being refused.

Amendment 50, my final one in this group, goes one stage further. It would get rid of the complex “balance of benefits” argument entirely and replace it with a simple assessment of the application: will the proposed service have benefits for the economy of the area or persons living in the area? If yes, the licence would be granted. The impact would be similar to that of amendment 48: it would simplify the process and give agency to the applicant. If they could prove that their service would deliver benefit, the local authority would grant a service permit.