Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Thursday 24th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss]

I thank the Minister for his consideration of this proposal. I would be interested to know what has changed since the previous consideration was arrived at that such provisions were not necessary. He suggests he will weigh that up and perhaps bring forward some amendments on Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 26

Reporting requirement (objectives)

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report assessing whether the powers available to the Secretary of State and the registrar are sufficient to enable the registrar to achieve its objectives under section 1081A of the Companies Act 2006 (inserted by section 1 of this Act).

(2) Each report must make a recommendation as to whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to the report.

(3) Each report must provide a breakdown of the registrar’s annual expenditure.

(4) Each report must provide annual data on the number of companies that have been struck-off by the registrar, the number and amount of fines the registrar has issued, and the number of criminal convictions made as a result of the registrar’s powers as set out in this bill.

(5) Each report must provide annual data on the number of cases referred by the registrar to law enforcement bodies and anti-money laundering supervisors.

(6) Each report must provide annual data on the total number of company incorporations to the registrar, and the number of company incorporations by Authorised Company Service Providers to the registrar.

(7) The first report must be published within one year of this Act being passed.

(8) A further report must be published at least once a year.

(9) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of each report before Parliament.”—(Seema Malhotra.)

This new clause would add a requirement on the Secretary of State to report on the powers available to the Secretary of State, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and Companies House in relation to the registrar’s powers to achieve their objectives set out in clause 1.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. I have some brief comments to make about clauses 103 and 104 stand part. The Minister has outlined what the clauses do. Clause 103 inserts a new section into the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 that establishes on general partners of limited partnerships a duty to ensure that the firm’s registered office is at all times an appropriate address at which to receive correspondence. The clause introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to make regulations giving the registrar the power to change a limited partnership’s registered office address. The appropriate address is supposed to be within the original jurisdiction.

While new regulations on the addresses of limited partnerships are needed, Elspeth Berry, a legal expert on limited partnerships, set out in her written evidence to the Committee concerns about this element of the Bill. She said:

“The requirements for an “appropriate” registered office address or email are an improvement but do not guarantee a genuine economic link to the UK…The “appropriate” address for the registered office, and email address, ensure that the address is used with consent, and someone will answer. However, the provisions still lend themselves to maildrops, with no real economic presence. None of the options intended to link an LP to the UK demonstrate a real economic link. Option 1 is apparently already complied with by most rogue LPs already, because they have no real place of business in the UK, so anywhere can be the “principal” place. Option 2, the usual residential address of a partner, can be redacted, so redaction must not apply if it is also chosen as the registered office. Option 3 is the address of a corporate general partner, with all the lack of transparency that entails. Option 4 is an ACSP address, which can be a maildrop.”

Will the Minister respond to those concerns? What assurances have the Government received that the provisions in the clause will genuinely guarantee the economic link to the UK that is intended? If not, will he look again at this part of the Bill? It would be a shame to get to the point of the Bill becoming an Act without it being able to do what is intended.

Clause 104 provides for a six-month transitional period during which the general partners of existing firms must submit a statement specifying the firm’s registered office, per the regulations set out in clause 103. Will it really take six months to specify an address? Is that not something that the Minister can look at? Other provisions of the Bill refer to 28 days, so why this six-month period? Perhaps six months emerged from a consultation as the most effective option, or it has simply been passported into the Bill because that is in alignment with some other regulation. Was it just cut and paste? If, however, not much thought has gone into this transition period, and if there are no downsides to doing so, we have an opportunity to amend,. Again, I will be grateful for the Minister’s response.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

I very much agree with the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston. Without rehashing our previous arguments about addresses—checking whether they are real addresses and whether someone can pick up mail there, which requires people going to make such checks—I note the concerns of the Law Society of Scotland that “principal place of business” could still be a bit unclear. It points out in its briefing that a number of other concepts already exist in legislation, such as “head office”, “establishment” or “centres of main interest”. That makes things confusing and more easy to get around if people wish to do so.

The society believes that another issue has emerged, in part owing to covid: not everybody has a principal place of business as we used to understand it—a head office with a sign above the door. That is what we were used to seeing, but now that people work remotely, sourcing a principal place of business might become more difficult. Businesses have adapted, so it will be useful to understand from the Minister whether such things will be caught by the legislation. Someone might not have a traditional headquarters in the old way, and so might not be caught by the legislation. I seek his assurance about the intention of the Bill.

The Law Society of Scotland briefing also points out that members of a management team might not all be based in the same location; they might be working remotely or in different countries around the world. Again, sourcing that person who has responsibility at a principal place of business has become a little murkier as a result of changes in working practices. We need to ensure that legislation keeps pace with that and that there is not a workaround for those who want to avoid scrutiny.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause inserts the definition of limited partnership into the Bill and makes clear that the registrar is obliged to maintain only those limited partnerships registered under the 1907 Act within the registrar’s index of names.

Limited partnerships are a specific type of business structure in UK law that confer limited liability on some partners and therefore have to be registered with Companies House in line with the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 and the Partnership Act 1890, but numerous reports and consultations by the Government have identified the risk of economic crime through limited partnerships and Scottish limited partnerships. As I know the Minister will be well aware, the consultation in 2018 also emphasised the apparent attractiveness of such partnerships as vehicles for organised crime, and I am sure we will come back to that when we consider amendments to this part of the Bill. The consultation noted specifically that the National Crime Agency reported a high volume of suspected criminal activity involving Scottish limited partnerships. It also referred to claims made in an investigation that 113 SLPs were involved in a much larger money laundering scheme that transferred more than $20 billion out of Russia between 2010 and 2014.

Limited partnerships and Scottish limited partnerships have been identified by the Government for some time as high-risk corporate structures when it comes to facilitating and enabling economic crime. It is positive that we have reached this point, but it is disappointing how long it has taken. The clause is important, as it ensures that the registrar is obliged to maintain those limited partnerships that are registered as such, thereby ensuring that the registrar is not under any obligation to maintain names of defunct limited partnerships.

[Alison Thewliss]

My views on the abuse of Scottish limited partnerships are on the record, and the Minister is well aware of them. Anything that will help to tighten up protection against that abuse is welcome, but again, a lot of this goes to enforcement. It is not good enough just to legislate. There has to be enforcement, and the current enforcement has been absolutely woeful, with just one fine for failing to register a person with significant control. When the legislation started in January 2018, 7,078 people were not registered as they should have been as persons with significant control. That now stands at 201, but 201 is still too many, and the Government are still not issuing any fines for not complying with the obligations under that law. As with all the measures within this part of the Bill, my concern is about enforcement and making sure that everything is absolutely watertight, because if there is no consequence—at the moment, there is no consequence for non-compliance—people will continue to abuse the systems.

I caution the Minister also that when the rules around Scottish limited partnerships were tightened, people just moved to the next structure, and the next structure was limited partnerships in Ireland. Ireland has seen a huge surge in people abusing its corporate structures, which are similar to ours for historical reasons, but nobody warned the Irish that this was coming. I would be interested to know how the Government intend to monitor the tightening up of this legislation so that we are not just pushing down the bubble in the wallpaper for it to come up somewhere else.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

I exist three times.

[Seema Malhotra]

Right, her name is registered three times, rather than having one entry noting that she has three directorships. With identity verification and the issuance of unique identifiers, Companies House will know exactly how many directorships an individual has. Companies House may plan to update pages showing people’s total directorships once it issues unique identifiers, but that certainly is not clear.

An alternative is to have some form of proxy ID, which is becoming increasingly common. That is a unique ID linked to the director’s unique ID, which can keep the director’s ID itself private, but has a unique public identifier that is searchable and uniquely linked to the underlying identifier. That happens increasingly for email addresses, for example, when someone may not want their email address to be public, so a pseudo or proxy address is created so that the one that someone might publicly enter and others might publicly see is not the underlying email address, but is uniquely linked to it. There are ways in which technology can be used simply and easily. That is not a high-cost option and it can be built in to have what we need for public purposes—a unique identifier for a director that links all their directorships, if published, and is searchable.

I hope that those constructive suggestions and the way we laid out our reply when the Minister asked in a previous debate what we were not fully happy with in clause 66 mean that things are perhaps clearer. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister asks a fair question. He is not necessarily stating a cap. Given what has come out in the consultation, and what has been in the articles about whether there should be a cap and what would be right for British companies, it is certainly open to further conversation. It is interesting that in the Government’s consultation many were suggesting between 15 and 25, which is in the ballpark of what has been happening in other countries. The make-up of our economy could be slightly different. We have to understand it in the round, and in the context of our economy, but it is a question of a scale of 400 to 1,000.

If the Minister is saying that there might be a level at which there starts to be a red flag, and implicitly that Companies House may implement the legislation, perhaps Companies House and the registrar will say, “Maybe we’ll just do a procedural check if we have 25-plus directorships.” I do not know. That is where data and analytics help, rather than a ballpark figure. It must be within a considered understanding of how our economy works, and how and where legitimate business is carried out, with a view from directors as well. We might find that it is an easier answer to reach, because it does not have to be one that only we, as Members of Parliament, comment on; it has to be informed.

We are not arguing for a hard cap. We are saying that, as the logic of the SNP amendment outlines, rather than managing on a case-by-case basis, having a way to manage risk structurally and procedurally is an important response to the evidence, the nature of use that we have seen and the situation we find ourselves in today. There is room to learn from the experience of other countries.

Amendment 69 would insert a provision into schedule 2, requiring that:

“On receipt of notification of a person becoming a director, the registrar must allocate that director a unique identification number, unless such a number has already been allocated to that person.”

Amendment 70 follows from that, and would provide penalties for anyone failing to provide their unique identification number to the registrar. We support the spirit of the amendments, but I refer the Committee to our amendments 102 and 103, which we will be speaking to in later debates. Our amendments take a slightly different approach and place a duty on the registrar to give every director a unique identification number, which is published on the registrar’s website. I think that approach is tighter.

I hope in his response that the Minister will be clear about what the registrar is required to do versus what they can do, and what will be and will not be published on the unique identifiers for directors.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

I rise to speak to amendments 69, 68 and 70. These are connected amendments to schedule 2. I appreciate the point about clause 66, but we will get to that when we get to it, and we are here now.

The evidence from various witnesses last week, which I have heard over many years, is that the Companies House register is a mess. The amendments seek to tidy it up to some extent. A unique identifier that follows a person all the way through, from becoming a director of a company to perhaps resigning as a director of that company and going on to be a director of a different company at a later stage, would help to trace that person through the Companies House system.

I have mentioned in previous debates that there are three Alison Thewlisses on the Companies House register. They are all me, but they appear three times, and nobody would necessarily know that they are the same person. It would make sense to have a unique identifier attached to me as a person so that people can easily find and trace my history as a company director.

I looked up the Minister on the Companies House register. He is there five times. There are five Kevin Paul Hollinrakes out there in the world. It would be useful for companies doing due diligence or for people seeking to look at somebody’s directorship history if there was only one Kevin Paul Hollinrake on the register and we could see a complete picture of all those registrations over the course of his life and career.

That is the main purpose of the amendments—to make registrations traceable and to make the system easier for users and for me, if I want to be a company director, to provide the correct information. I could say, “I am already a director—here’s my number; just add it on to the previous things I have.”

Amendment 70 seeks to prevent people getting around that system and trying to register themselves perhaps by using their middle name or a different name, as if they were a different person. The unique identifier, once allocated to a person, should always follow that person through the system. If I try to register with my middle name or a married name rather than my maiden name, the system should pick it up. That is often an issue for women in the system. They might look very much like two separate people, with a married name and a maiden name, but they are in fact the same person. That unique identifier within the system would help trace people through, simplifying it for everyone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss]

Broadly, I support clause 66. The amendments are not to that clause, but to schedule 2, to tighten it up and to improve it in any way we can. I accept what the Minister says. Labour, too, has an amendment to tighten the provisions, and I dare say I will support that as well, when we get to that stage, because all such amendments are to press the Government to tighten things up and to improve the Bill.

On amendment 68 and the number of directorships held, in evidence we heard Bill Browder suggesting the scenario of a drunk Latvian having their passport taken and being registered as a director in hundreds and hundreds of companies. Bill Browder said rightly:

“Why is it okay to have a person be a director of 400 companies?” ––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 74, Q151.]

Clearly, that is ridiculous. There is no way that someone could fulfil their obligations as a director if they were the director of 400 companies at once. It would be impractical to suggest that anyone could.

Also, Thomas Mayne said:

“On the point about directors, there certainly should be”

a limit—

“it is crazy that you have these people with 1,000 companies.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October; c. 79, Q162.]

It really is.

I do not want to put a specific number in the Bill—that would be something for Companies House and regulations to decide—but we clearly all understand what an excessive number of companies is. Four hundred is excessive and 1,000 is ludicrous. Perhaps the cut-off could be at 20 or 30, although even at that I would struggle to say that someone could make a good job as a company director keeping an eye on all those companies. It is worthwhile looking at the issue, because it is a red flag in the system: if one person is registered to multiple companies, that is a red flag, and it should be something that triggers Companies House to look into them in more detail.

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful argument. The Minister asked her what she thought was not sufficient about clause 66. Does she agree that arguing for a unique identifier is about ensuring that it actually happens? The wording of proposed new paragraph (d) in clause 66(2)(c) is to

“confer power on the registrar…to give a person a new unique identifier”.

It is a power, rather than a duty. That seems to be at the heart of the disagreement—is it a power or is it a duty?

[Alison Thewliss]

I agree. I do not want to go too far on clause 66, as we have not reached it, but this is about ensuring that something is in the Bill, that it is hard and fast that it happens, rather than having a suggestion, something that the registrar might like to consider, or some kind of “have regard to”. It needs to be there and specified. That is what we are trying to achieve.

Proposed new subsection (3) in amendment 68, on what Companies House should take into account in making its determination under the clause, specifies the “experience, expertise and circumstances” of a director. If someone has long-term experience of running companies that actually existed and have filed accounts, there is something tangible there and then Companies House can say: “Oh yes, that person has 30 directorships, but they are active in all those directorships, and we know what they are.” However, if someone has no active activity that Companies House can fill in, that becomes a red flag under amendment 68. It would give Companies House a degree of discretion. Wherever it might want to put the number is also a factor.

The Minister is trying to suggest that having such a check would be an inhibition to business. I do not believe that, and I am interested to hear what evidence the Minister has to suggest that such a limit on directorships would inhibit businesses in any way. As the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, mentioned, other countries have such a rule. Those restrictions are in place elsewhere around the world, so the comparison would be interesting: do they feel that businesses, directorships and the involvement of people in companies are inhibited by having such a rule? We are proposing a change to the Bill to help Companies House do its job, to help it with the red flags and to give it an action to take once it has seen the red flags and identified them through something such as holding multiple directorships.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

On this occasion, having heard what the Minister has said, I think that this is an ongoing debate. We will want to have some further discussion and perhaps come back to the issue on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 71, in clause 1, page 2, line 10, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that the registrar has sufficient resources to fulfil the objectives set by subsection (3).”

This amendment would require Companies House to be properly resourced in line with its new responsibilities.

Much like with the previous amendment, it seemed sensible to bring things to the attention of the Government right at the very start of the Bill, because matters can get diluted over time. If we put this issue front and centre of the Bill, and say that the Secretary of State must ensure that the registrar has sufficient resources to fulfil the objectives set by subsection (3), that puts an obligation on the Government, and on future Governments, to follow through on the recommendations regarding the very worthy legislation in the Bill.

We heard a lot of evidence about earlier legislation. I served in Committee on some of it, such as in the evidence sessions for the Joint Committee on the Draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, and in Committee for the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. Over the years, there has been much legislation, but, as Bill Browder said in his evidence, without any enforcement of that legislation, and without the resources to ensure it is followed through, the Government can write as much law as they like but it does not actually matter.

We want to see resources put front and centre of the Bill, right up there at the start, and to hold future Governments to the important principle of funding this work. If the registrar is not funded to carry out the work it is being given to do, it just will not do that work. That has been the evidence of Companies House over many years. If it is not funded as well as empowered to do the work, it seems very unlikely that it will complete the tasks that the Government and all of us in this room expect of it. I therefore think the amendment is important and urge the Minister to accept it.

[Seema Malhotra]

The amendment tabled by our SNP colleagues would amend clause 1 to require the Secretary of State to ensure that Companies House is adequately resourced to achieve its objectives. I raised the matter on Second Reading, and I am sure we will come back to it.

On Second Reading, the Minister himself talked about legislation with implementation, and I am sure that he will have some sympathy for the sentiments of the amendment. As Jonathan Hall said in his evidence:

“The one thing that I think would make all the difference would be to resource Companies House.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 34, Q70.]

We support the principle of the amendment, but we are looking to address the same issue in our new clause 26, which we will discuss later. It is right to put the issue on the radar today and have it on there as we proceed through Committee. I look forward to coming back to further discussions on how we ensure that Companies House is adequately resourced.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 2 is important, and we have no concerns with it at all. It amends section 8 of the Companies Act 2006 to state that, for individuals, “name” means a forename and surname, and it goes into further detail. It is another example of an area where it is extremely surprising that our system has lasted for so long while being so feeble in the extent of the information it requires of company subscribers. Subscribers are initial shareholders in the company when it was set up: those who sign the important memorandum of association in forming the company.

Currently, information about subscribers is extremely limited, and there is no verification or definition of what constitutes a subscriber’s name. That relates to the deeper issue, to which we will continue to refer in Committee, around the transparency of shareholders. Alongside our discussions of directors and officials, we must ensure that we keep shareholder transparency very much centre stage. Not having clear names affects the reliability of the subscriber information held by Companies House.

We welcome the clarity provided by clause 2, but we believe that the Bill could go further in requiring information from company subscribers. That is why we tabled amendment 85, which would insert a new provision that would require the memorandum on company subscribers to include the nationality of each company subscriber and the country in which the subscriber is ordinarily resident. Without that information, which should be verifiable, the formation of a company that registers with Companies House could be questioned by the registrar.

Transparency International has remarked that the UK has a terrible reputation as a hub for dirty money. That is something we do not even need to keep saying, because we are so used to hearing it. That is exacerbated and enabled by a lack of transparency about those who own and control UK-registered companies. If the Bill is to fulfil its ambition of clamping down on dirty money flowing through our economy, the Minister should support the amendment, which would provide that greater transparency and scrutiny of who owns companies registered with Companies House. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Alison Thewliss]

I rise to support this useful amendment. It is fundamentally about enhancing the transparency of the register and what we know about the people on the register. It is also about tracing control: who owns what and where they happen to be. That is useful. Those are things that the Bill should look to fix. The Bill is about putting right things that are not quite right. The amendment adds to the richness of the information that is available to people. It seems perfectly logical that the Minister should support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

We support clause 9. We recognise that it amends the Companies Act to give the Secretary of State the ability to prevent registration of a company if they think the name of that company is intended to facilitate dishonesty or deception. Companies House deals with up to 100 cases of corporate identity theft every month, and given that this form of fraud and others are starting to become more prevalent, it is right that there be these new powers to prevent registration, stemming—we hope—the flow of new fraudulent registrations. An incredible amount of distress arises from the impact of that dishonesty and deception.

Clause 10 inserts into the Companies Act a new section prohibiting company names falsely connected to foreign Governments and international organisations, and the Minister has spoken about why that section is important. It gives the Secretary of State the ability to prevent the registration of a company with a proposed name that, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, suggests a connection with a foreign Government, its offshoots or international bodies where none actually exists. As has been mentioned, that could be the UN or NATO, or any other body. Of course, we support the principle behind that measure, but in the interests of transparency about the use of that power, could the Minister clarify whether, when the Secretary of State is asked to make a judgment in such a situation, he expects that the judgment will be publicly shared—that, for example, Companies House might report on the uses of that power as part of its reporting?

I also want to clarify how the power will be used. When a company is formed that the Companies House registrar suspects is not actually connected with a foreign Government or other international body, but looks like it might be, will the registrar have a duty to flag such instances with the Secretary of State? That is important, because it comes back to the question of the proactiveness of the registrar’s duties, so it would be helpful to clarify it. What about the scenario where an attempt is made to register a company with a proposed name that, were it to be raised, would go through that process and very correctly be stopped by the Secretary of State, but it is not picked up by Companies House? If that situation arose for any reason—it could be new staff, or it could be the pressure of time because of insufficient resources; mistakes can be made in those circumstances—could a third party then apply for the name of that company to be changed? How would that work if it were an international organisation?

If uses of the power were reported by Companies House, would we be able to search and see that a number of people had sought to set up a company called United Nations Associates, or something like that? Would we be able to have a sense of how Companies House is perhaps being used in that way?

Should a company that has had its name changed by direction of the Secretary of State continue to seek to trade under that company name—perhaps in an overseas jurisdiction, if the name is falsely connected with foreign Governments—it would be helpful to clarify what measures could be taken, and by whom, to seek to put an end to that. There may be an obvious answer.

[Alison Thewliss]

I want to highlight again to the Minister the issues in these clauses that Graham Barrow raised in the excellent evidence that he gave to the Committee last week. He said:

“The Bill does include the ability for Companies House to reject similar names, but if you have 3,000 companies a day—and that extends to companies across the world that may have similarities—I do not see how you are going to enforce that reasonably. There is just too much volume and too many potential comparative data points to compare them to.”

His suggestion was that the system needs to have

“a little bit of friction”.–––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 27 October 2022; c. 109, Q204.]

Instead of Companies House turning around an application in less than 24 hours, a little bit of time should be taken to assess and analyse it.

The human element of this process is also important. Some of it may be possible to achieve with clever computer algorithms to sift out any companies whose names are too similar to existing ones, but there needs to be human judgment as well. This goes to the point of Companies House resourcing and staff being able to understand what they see in front of them. That will take expertise and long-term knowledge, not only of the company in front of them but of the existing companies on the register—and they are there in their millions.

I will address a point that has not really been raised before about clause 11 and names containing computer code. When these kinds of things come up, I reach for the expertise that I have pretty much at hand. I went to my husband and asked him about this, because it is his profession—he is a computer coder by trade—so I thank Mr Joe Wright for his assistance. I said, “Is this really a problem, and what does it actually mean?” My understanding is that the clause is to guard against SQL injection into the Companies House register, because anyone pulling that out of the register can have their systems corrupted by companies that register with computer code.

My husband directed me to a very useful article, which people should have a wee look at, by Neil Brown on decoded.legal that looks into this in some detail. A company has been registered using computer code. It was registered under the name ; DROP TABLE "COMPANIES";-- LTD, which has some computer code around it. Dr Michael Tandy registered that company name, but Companies House did not publish the name on its register; it said that the name was available on request. Can the Minister clarify whether the clause will deal with that specific case, or whether it is broader than that?

The article by Neil Brown raises some questions. What exactly would be prohibited? The Bill does not define computer code; it prohibits the use of names that

“in the opinion of the Secretary of State”

are computer code. I do not know whether the Minister knows his SQL from his JavaScript, but that seems like a big judgment and responsibility to put on Government Ministers. In its very essence, computer code is just an instruction to a computer, and that instruction can be in plain English text as well. Can the Minister tell us exactly how this will be assessed and what systems will be put in place at Companies House to define what computer code is, in practice? That, again, comes down to the human element—someone understanding exactly what is in front of them.

I urge the Minister to give a wee bit more clarity about what is code, what is not code and what exactly the clause is intended to catch. There are such companies on the Companies House register, and because code can be in text that we would understand—rather than a series of numbers, letters and symbols—it might be more difficult to enforce this. I would be grateful if the Minister could help us understand a wee bit better how the Secretary of State’s complete discretion to define what is and what is not computer code will be used in practice.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

Q To be a bit more specific, what more do you suggest should be in the Bill?

Peter Swabey: For me, it should reference the role of the company secretary. I have a slightly wider issue than that. The Companies Act 2006 got rid of the requirement for a company secretary in all companies. That was deregulatory—that was fine—but we now rely much more on the reporting that companies do and the filings that companies make, so I believe there should be a requirement for a company secretary, not just in public companies, as there is now, but in larger private companies that also have to meet some of these requirements.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q We heard earlier about some of the deficiencies in the way that documents are delivered and uploaded to the Companies House website, and how they can be used thereafter. Are there practical improvements that could be made to improve that situation, both at your end of the process, in the filing, and for the use of those documents at the other end of the process?

Peter Swabey: Yes, I think there are. We have regular engagement with Companies House and that is one of the things that it is seeking to tackle already, but will also seek to tackle through the powers and resources that it will hopefully get as a result of the Bill. It would great if everything that has to be filed at Companies House can be filed electronically. There are still a number of things that cannot be. Again, that may be changed as a result of the changes that Companies House are making to their system but, as we stand at the moment, there are things that cannot be filed electronically.

In terms of use, there is a question that companies sometimes get feedback on from shareholders, which is on the availability of information, particularly about retail shareholders, and particularly for those companies that have large registers of members. Individuals on this Committee, or me, or whoever—their name and address might be at Companies House in respect of a holding of 100 shares in a company. If it is a big public company with millions and millions of shares, that is probably not that helpful. There are people who buy copies of the register for commercial purposes. It would be quite useful to tighten that up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you very much, Ms Belton, for joining us to give evidence today, and thank you for all you do as well. In terms of the scale of economic crime and how much needs to happen nationally and internationally, what gaps do you see in the legislation as it currently stands that stop the UK from being able to tackle economic crime on the scale that we need to?

Catherine Belton: There is a very simple answer to this, though I should basically preface all my answers by saying that I am not an expert on the Bill like some of my colleagues, such as Oliver Bullough. I have not studied it deeply, but what I can speak to is the urgency of these reforms, because of the threat posed to our national security. There is also a dire need to push through the anti-SLAPP legislation.

All these deep-pocketed oligarchs are essentially taking advantage of our system and are able to outspend not just journalists but financial watchdogs acting in the public interest. They are outspent and intimidated out of pursuing any real investigation into financial misconduct. They know from the outset that they may lose.

You only have to look at the example of the Serious Fraud Office and its battle against ENRC, which was once listed on the London stock exchange, then delisted and owned by a trio of Kazakh fraudsters essentially. The amount they spent annually on legal cases in the UK was £89 million, which is over the annual budget of the Serious Fraud Office. Though the Bill is of dire importance, without greater spending and funding for our public watchdogs—the National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office and other entities—we are going to be stymied from the get-go.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you very much, Catherine. Could you tell us a bit more about why the UK has become the destination of choice for people wishing to use corporate structures for money laundering and other purposes? Could you tell us about the impact that has internationally?

Catherine Belton: The UK, like many other countries, has welcomed capital from places such as Russia with open arms for the past 20 years. It is certainly a place that Russian oligarchs have flocked to, not only because they want to be part of the UK establishment but because they have clearly taken advantage of our lax legislation and regulation compared with the US, for instance. If you are listing a company in the US you face the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, and you have committed a crime if you are found to have lied on your financial disclosures. Here, there seem to be so many loopholes; people can get away with everything.

We only have to look at our Companies House institution to see that there is very little scrutiny of filings that people are making. We have all heard the obvious examples of people not disclosing anything. I think you are a great expert in the use of limited liability partnerships by Russian money launderers. UK LLPs have seen tens of billions of dollars’ worth of illicit Russian cash move through them over the last decade or so.

Most of those money laundering schemes have been overseen by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. It has a money laundering department called Department K, which has overseen all those schemes and has had an involvement in each and every one of them. I am told by security officials in Moldova—where one scheme used LLPs to move tens of billions of dollars of cash into the UK—that essentially the schemes are used not just by Russians seeking to move money to evade customs and tax, but by the Russian Federal Security Service itself, because it sees the greater flows of cash as cover for it to move its strategic cash into our jurisdiction.

I must again point to the need for SLAPP legislation and ask whether that could, or should, be attached to the economic crime Bill as it stands. If we do not enable journalists and financial watchdogs to look at those entities without fear of getting crushed by enormous lawsuits that will cost more than anyone’s budget allows, then we are going to be open to this type of abuse of our system forever. It was only July when Dominic Raab, the Justice Secretary, finally and wonderfully—it seemed like a miracle at the time—forwarded that anti-SLAPP legislation. It was going to allow for an early dismissal mechanism for cases that were clearly an abuse of the law, and aimed at intimidating journalists and financial watchdogs out of reporting matters of public interest—whether financial misconduct or something else. There has been a great deal of turmoil in Government since then, but we are seeing that SLAPP cases have very much not gone away.

The esteemed Chatham House think-tank recently had to remove the mere mention of a Tory donor, who had previously been convicted of money laundering, from a report on the abuses of the UK system by kleptocrats. The past of our Tory donors is something that we should know about, yet Chatham House had to erase its mention of that donor from its report. Staff looked into how much it was going to cost to defend, even though it was clearly public interest reporting. There was not really much to dispute about it, but they found it was going to cost them £500,000 before the case even got to trial, which means there is something so deeply wrong with our system, and we cannot even begin to combat any of these issues without having these anti-SLAPP measures in place. That is not just for journalists but for the Serious Fraud Office and for other public interest watchdogs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q On the attractiveness of the UK, you have mentioned enforcement, but from your research in this area, what would you highlight as being the weakest points in enforcement?

Professor Jason Sharman: The UK has a combination of a good reputation and lax enforcement. From the point of view of a launderer, that is a bonus: you get double. You get the appearance of probity—other people have mentioned the use of UK companies to open foreign bank accounts—with not much scrutiny and even less enforcement. Transparency is all good and well, but more information by itself does not lead to stronger action against money launderers or corrupt officials.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q There has been a lot of discussion about anti-money laundering supervision, and the effectiveness of the agencies that the Government expect to carry out those duties. Are they the weakest link in the chain, and could more be done to tighten up that anti-money laundering supervision, to shut the door, and to stop these companies from beginning their business here?

Professor Jason Sharman: There is certainly more that could be done. Some of it has been mentioned by other people; more money is the obvious one, but that may be necessary but not sufficient. In some ways, the career structure and career incentives for people who work in these agencies needs reviewing: if they start an investigation and it goes well, they get a small bonus to their career. If they start an investigation and it goes badly, they get a very big, indelible black mark, so in terms of career progression, it is safer for them not to investigate things.

One of the main sources of support has not been fully used: there are a lot of people outside the formal enforcement agencies who are very keen to help in this cause, including journalists and those in non-governmental organisations, as well as in the for-profit sector. That potential has not been tapped, so there are certainly things that the Government and the state could and should do, particularly in terms of regulatory agencies; but the area where I think it is possible to make most progress is probably beyond that.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

Q To be a bit more specific, what more do you suggest should be in the Bill?

Peter Swabey: For me, it should reference the role of the company secretary. I have a slightly wider issue than that. The Companies Act 2006 got rid of the requirement for a company secretary in all companies. That was deregulatory—that was fine—but we now rely much more on the reporting that companies do and the filings that companies make, so I believe there should be a requirement for a company secretary, not just in public companies, as there is now, but in larger private companies that also have to meet some of these requirements.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q We heard earlier about some of the deficiencies in the way that documents are delivered and uploaded to the Companies House website, and how they can be used thereafter. Are there practical improvements that could be made to improve that situation, both at your end of the process, in the filing, and for the use of those documents at the other end of the process?

Peter Swabey: Yes, I think there are. We have regular engagement with Companies House and that is one of the things that it is seeking to tackle already, but will also seek to tackle through the powers and resources that it will hopefully get as a result of the Bill. It would great if everything that has to be filed at Companies House can be filed electronically. There are still a number of things that cannot be. Again, that may be changed as a result of the changes that Companies House are making to their system but, as we stand at the moment, there are things that cannot be filed electronically.

In terms of use, there is a question that companies sometimes get feedback on from shareholders, which is on the availability of information, particularly about retail shareholders, and particularly for those companies that have large registers of members. Individuals on this Committee, or me, or whoever—their name and address might be at Companies House in respect of a holding of 100 shares in a company. If it is a big public company with millions and millions of shares, that is probably not that helpful. There are people who buy copies of the register for commercial purposes. It would be quite useful to tighten that up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you very much, Ms Belton, for joining us to give evidence today, and thank you for all you do as well. In terms of the scale of economic crime and how much needs to happen nationally and internationally, what gaps do you see in the legislation as it currently stands that stop the UK from being able to tackle economic crime on the scale that we need to?

Catherine Belton: There is a very simple answer to this, though I should basically preface all my answers by saying that I am not an expert on the Bill like some of my colleagues, such as Oliver Bullough. I have not studied it deeply, but what I can speak to is the urgency of these reforms, because of the threat posed to our national security. There is also a dire need to push through the anti-SLAPP legislation.

All these deep-pocketed oligarchs are essentially taking advantage of our system and are able to outspend not just journalists but financial watchdogs acting in the public interest. They are outspent and intimidated out of pursuing any real investigation into financial misconduct. They know from the outset that they may lose.

You only have to look at the example of the Serious Fraud Office and its battle against ENRC, which was once listed on the London stock exchange, then delisted and owned by a trio of Kazakh fraudsters essentially. The amount they spent annually on legal cases in the UK was £89 million, which is over the annual budget of the Serious Fraud Office. Though the Bill is of dire importance, without greater spending and funding for our public watchdogs—the National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office and other entities—we are going to be stymied from the get-go.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you very much, Catherine. Could you tell us a bit more about why the UK has become the destination of choice for people wishing to use corporate structures for money laundering and other purposes? Could you tell us about the impact that has internationally?

Catherine Belton: The UK, like many other countries, has welcomed capital from places such as Russia with open arms for the past 20 years. It is certainly a place that Russian oligarchs have flocked to, not only because they want to be part of the UK establishment but because they have clearly taken advantage of our lax legislation and regulation compared with the US, for instance. If you are listing a company in the US you face the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, and you have committed a crime if you are found to have lied on your financial disclosures. Here, there seem to be so many loopholes; people can get away with everything.

We only have to look at our Companies House institution to see that there is very little scrutiny of filings that people are making. We have all heard the obvious examples of people not disclosing anything. I think you are a great expert in the use of limited liability partnerships by Russian money launderers. UK LLPs have seen tens of billions of dollars’ worth of illicit Russian cash move through them over the last decade or so.

Most of those money laundering schemes have been overseen by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. It has a money laundering department called Department K, which has overseen all those schemes and has had an involvement in each and every one of them. I am told by security officials in Moldova—where one scheme used LLPs to move tens of billions of dollars of cash into the UK—that essentially the schemes are used not just by Russians seeking to move money to evade customs and tax, but by the Russian Federal Security Service itself, because it sees the greater flows of cash as cover for it to move its strategic cash into our jurisdiction.

I must again point to the need for SLAPP legislation and ask whether that could, or should, be attached to the economic crime Bill as it stands. If we do not enable journalists and financial watchdogs to look at those entities without fear of getting crushed by enormous lawsuits that will cost more than anyone’s budget allows, then we are going to be open to this type of abuse of our system forever. It was only July when Dominic Raab, the Justice Secretary, finally and wonderfully—it seemed like a miracle at the time—forwarded that anti-SLAPP legislation. It was going to allow for an early dismissal mechanism for cases that were clearly an abuse of the law, and aimed at intimidating journalists and financial watchdogs out of reporting matters of public interest—whether financial misconduct or something else. There has been a great deal of turmoil in Government since then, but we are seeing that SLAPP cases have very much not gone away.

The esteemed Chatham House think-tank recently had to remove the mere mention of a Tory donor, who had previously been convicted of money laundering, from a report on the abuses of the UK system by kleptocrats. The past of our Tory donors is something that we should know about, yet Chatham House had to erase its mention of that donor from its report. Staff looked into how much it was going to cost to defend, even though it was clearly public interest reporting. There was not really much to dispute about it, but they found it was going to cost them £500,000 before the case even got to trial, which means there is something so deeply wrong with our system, and we cannot even begin to combat any of these issues without having these anti-SLAPP measures in place. That is not just for journalists but for the Serious Fraud Office and for other public interest watchdogs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q On the attractiveness of the UK, you have mentioned enforcement, but from your research in this area, what would you highlight as being the weakest points in enforcement?

Professor Jason Sharman: The UK has a combination of a good reputation and lax enforcement. From the point of view of a launderer, that is a bonus: you get double. You get the appearance of probity—other people have mentioned the use of UK companies to open foreign bank accounts—with not much scrutiny and even less enforcement. Transparency is all good and well, but more information by itself does not lead to stronger action against money launderers or corrupt officials.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q There has been a lot of discussion about anti-money laundering supervision, and the effectiveness of the agencies that the Government expect to carry out those duties. Are they the weakest link in the chain, and could more be done to tighten up that anti-money laundering supervision, to shut the door, and to stop these companies from beginning their business here?

Professor Jason Sharman: There is certainly more that could be done. Some of it has been mentioned by other people; more money is the obvious one, but that may be necessary but not sufficient. In some ways, the career structure and career incentives for people who work in these agencies needs reviewing: if they start an investigation and it goes well, they get a small bonus to their career. If they start an investigation and it goes badly, they get a very big, indelible black mark, so in terms of career progression, it is safer for them not to investigate things.

One of the main sources of support has not been fully used: there are a lot of people outside the formal enforcement agencies who are very keen to help in this cause, including journalists and those in non-governmental organisations, as well as in the for-profit sector. That potential has not been tapped, so there are certainly things that the Government and the state could and should do, particularly in terms of regulatory agencies; but the area where I think it is possible to make most progress is probably beyond that.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

Q This is just a quick follow-up for clarification. The Bill arguably makes shareholder information less transparent, because it takes away the opportunity to put information relating to shareholders on the central register.

Duncan Hames: A lot of information was collected on shareholders when this register was developed six years ago, and in many cases companies have been able to say, “There have been no changes.” That means there is a risk that information on shareholders has become quite dated, and finding what information there is involves tracking down PDF format documents that were uploaded a long time ago. There is an opportunity, whether in legislation or in practice at Companies House, to make sure that shareholder information does not become much less usable for investigation and due diligence.

On the third thing you asked me about, we think it is very important that Companies House has the powers and uses them to check the information, where it thinks necessary, that has been used to verify information by trust and company service providers, and not simply take that on trust where it has concerns or suspicions.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

Q I want to ask Duncan about Scottish limited partnerships and limited partnerships more generally. The Bill does not really crack down on the opaqueness of ownership. Could you explain a wee bit more to the Committee why that is a particular issue?

Duncan Hames: Limited liability partnerships have been a company entity available for the last 20 years or so, and 200,000 have been formed. We noticed that they kept appearing in revelations about major money laundering scandals. In the Danske Bank scandal, for example, the investigations found that UK limited liability partnerships were the vehicle of choice for the non-resident clients of its Estonian branch basically to hide their identity from those conducting compliance checks.

There are 1,600 LLPs that have appeared in these various scandals, but there are thousands upon thousands of UK limited liability partnerships that share the same offshore corporate partners. A pair of corporate partners registered in Belize are the controlling corporate partners of over 2,000 UK limited liability partnerships.

What is bizarre is that MPs have thankfully legislated to end secretive ownership of UK property, but we do not have the same requirements for overseas entities that control UK limited partnerships. As a result, we still have a veneer of UK respectability presented over what is essentially a secretive corporate network.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q First, thank you for coming to give evidence today; it is much appreciated. We have had some discussion on information-sharing; I think you overheard that. If there is anything that you wanted to add, rather than repeating what we may have heard, that would be useful.

I want to ask you a bit more about the lack of transparency when it comes to shareholders. How much do you see that as an issue? Can you suggest any specific measures to increase shareholder transparency?

Chris Taggart: I will maybe talk about the information sharing after. First, shareholding data is not even data. It is just a name; it is just some letters put together. We have opened the gates by allowing it to be just a transient historical record—you know, somebody owns shares in a company. They make a report. They put down a name; we assume that they put down their own name, but of course they can put down any name. But the shares are transferred the next day—maybe into a trust, maybe to somebody else—and there is no record.

At the moment, I think we have that with shareholding, particularly given the international context of cross-jurisdictional context networks and so on. Shareholding actually matters. If someone who runs a chip shop in south Wales or is a mechanic in Estonia, or wherever, owns the shares, they own the shares. That matters. We are not recognising this.

I absolutely welcome the Bill and think it is a huge improvement on where we are, but I think the shareholding is a particularly strong example of how there is essentially still the same problem, which is that Companies House is a historical record of information submitted by people, and the bad actors will always lie. We need to change things, so that it is much more difficult and risky for the bad actors to lie. I think that is the fundamental criticism of the Bill, which, by the way, I think is entirely welcome. It is an incredibly thoughtful and well-drafted Bill, but it is fundamentally coming from a different era. The Bill is a better horse and cart, and the criminals are driving around in fast cars.

Elspeth Berry: On the shareholder transparency point, I noticed that the identity verification is not being applied to shareholders and I think it could be, possibly subject to some de minimis requirements. If they come in as PSCs, which is possible, that also brings us to the problems with the PSC legislation, because the thresholds are, depending on which view you take, either woeful in terms of not catching enough people or should just not be there at all.

The third thing is that, for reasons I do not fully understand, I see that the central register of members is going. Some things now have to be central and some things cannot be central, and shareholders will not be central. I would also point out that the unique identifiers are not being applied to shareholders, although, in any event, they are apparently they not going to be made public. I am not a journalist, but I rely on the work of some fantastic investigative journalists and organisations to dig through that stuff and find out, “Well, that shareholder is appearing here as a partner, there as a director and there as another shareholder,” but that cannot be done.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q First, I want to follow up on that point about unique identifiers and how those would help. I have looked myself up in the Companies House register, and I appear as three separate people. Can you tell us what the benefits of having a unique identifier would be?

Elspeth Berry: The idea is that the John Smiths, the J. Smiths and the Mr Smiths can be linked. Where it is a common name—or an overseas name, where a person like me who was looking at this would not know it was a common name and might assume, “Well, that must be the same person,” when actually it is not, because it is such a common name—it is important to find links. I can see that it is important for Companies House as one of their red flags, and they are going to be able to operate this system, but only partly, because it will not apply to shareholders or partners. But outsiders—people who do fantastic work that Companies House can’t, doesn’t or won’t—are going to find it difficult, or at least as difficult as it is now, to do the work of trawling though everything.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you, Mr Barrow, for giving evidence today. To pick up on your point about becoming obsessed, I think that is an understatement of the contribution you are now making, which seems to be identifying so much more than Companies House is doing itself and documenting the flaws in the current system. Why do you think that is the case? You have played a very important role in documenting some of the most blatant abuses of the Companies House registration systems. How concerned should we be about the large number of companies you have identified that are incorporated in offshore jurisdictions with weaker money laundering laws than we have?

Graham Barrow: Thank you. Let me pick up on both of those questions. I think the reason why I have been successful is because I have a mandate to go wherever I want to and do whatever I want to. I also ought to congratulate Companies House because a lot of what I now know is through the release of its advanced search function, which has transformed our ability to understand networks of suspicious companies.

I really want to emphasise this idea of the network. No criminal ever set up one company. It is just not how it works. They work in networks of companies. At £12 a go, it is probably the cheapest way of organising a criminal network. Of necessity, they leave company DNA behind them. I guess I have a capacity for identifying that DNA and extracting it from the background noise at Companies House.

Your question about offshore entities is really interesting. I came into this five years ago very much thinking about what you have just been talking about—limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. They feature prominently in a lot of the reporting. I think part of the reason for that is that they are, by and large, a very small subsection of the entirety of what is incorporated in Companies House. Therefore, the focus has been on some of that DNA that is exhibited by LLPs and LPs.

Before now, we have had very few tools that could establish the role of limited companies. To give that some context, since 1 January 2000, about 10 million companies have been incorporated at Companies House, of which about 5 million are still active. The loss rate is very high; it is consistently 50%. Nine and a half million of those companies are limited companies. That is an exceptionally difficult body of data to trawl through to establish suspicious activity.

I think one of the reasons why perhaps some of the stories I now re-tell on social media are novel is simply because we have never been able to extract those signals from the Companies House data before. For whatever reason, I appear to have a brain wired in a particular way that allows me to do that, and I have a very good relationship with Companies House. We share information quite regularly.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you, Graham, for coming to give evidence and for all the work you have been doing on the Companies House register. You have exposed quite a lot of companies that are essentially fake. They do not really exist—they are not real companies. Some of them are set up to imitate existing companies. Can you tell us a bit more about the extent of that and the scale of the work that the Companies House register will have to undergo to have a register that has integrity?

Graham Barrow: Where do I start? The scale is enormous. Even today, I have been looking—I have a company that tracks new company registrations. I can tell you that 20 or 30 companies have been set up in Leeds and in Birmingham today that have used real peoples’ names and addresses, some of them for the fifth, sixth or seventh time. One gentleman is 92 years old and has just had his name used for a second time. It is an absolute scandal what is going on. I would say that at least 1,000 people every week have their names used as directors on companies without their knowledge or permission. You are talking about potentially 50,000 people a year. It is on an unimaginable and wholly unreported scale.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss]

Q I want to ask about Scottish limited partnerships, the implication being that they are used in sanctions-busting and various other things to do with the war in Ukraine and Russia’s activities around the world. Does that misuse cause a reputational damage to the UK and to Scotland?

Bill Browder: Well, Scotland is so dwarfed by London that you do not have to worry about your reputation, because the reputation is so bad here that no one will even be paying attention.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Coming back to law enforcement, the Bar Council has suggested that the new regulatory objective that the Bill will add to the Legal Services Act 2007, focused on promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime, is incompatible with barristers’ duties and may confuse the role of lawyers. What is your view on that?

Bill Browder: I have written a whole book about this. The bad guys in Russia are a big part of the problem, but you cannot export this type of corruption and money laundering unless you have somebody doing the importing. And who is involved in the importing? It is the western enablers—the lawyers.

I have had shocking experiences with western law firms that are benefiting from this. If there were some kind of duty whereby they had to actually look into the source of their funding or the legitimacy of the business, I think that would be an extremely powerful thing, if it was actually enforced. There is a whole other long discussion of law that one could have about the role of western enablers, and particularly the lawyers.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Sorry, what is the omission?

Nigel Kirby: The omission was referred to by Nick Van Benschoten: the civil liability protection. In the UK, we have real trust and confidence built up in voluntary information sharing with the National Crime Agency under section 7 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. That has been the basis of our voluntary sharing, and we have built confidence in it over seven years.

The legislation has two limbs to civil liability protection—I will have to read my notes to make sure I do not make a mistake. The first limb is

“an obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure”—

that limb is also included in this Bill. The second limb that we rely on is

“any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed)”—

that limb is not included in the Bill.

Our position is that the Bill should align with the existing legislation that we are comfortable with. We would have more comfort in sharing and be more incentivised to share if we had the same protections as we have when we share with the National Crime Agency. The further observation is that there is not just one precedent; another piece of legislation, the Criminal Finances Act 2017—under section 11, I think—had sharing provisions with the purpose, in effect, of bringing better disclosures to the NCA. It had exactly the same two civil liability limbs, written in the same way. We believe that the second limb would be hugely helpful in doing things.

You might want to come back, but the other dependency that is key for us is that the Bill is drafted as an interlink with the GDPR, as you well know. That is wise, and one of the protections—that it has that link with the GDPR—but because the Bill has that interlink, the provisions in the GDPR are really important. I am aware that there is a draft Bill that has not yet been laid before Parliament and, again, we—my colleagues in UK Finance—have worked on that Bill. Absolutely key for us in the draft Bill is a legitimate interest for sharing, because that Bill sets out legitimate interests.

At the moment, the GDPR cites only fraud as a legitimate interest, and no other crimes. To be able to make the measure in this Bill work, we need the revised GDPR to have the “prevention, investigation” and “detection” of crime—what the GDPR says at the moment—to be for all crime as a key part, so we can make the interlink. Otherwise, we are restricted only to fraud, but do not include wider economic crime.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That is really interesting. I want to pick up a little on what you said earlier about receiving banks and where fraud has been against some of your customers. The Treasury Committee, in our report into economic crime, discussed fraud on online platforms, and the level of it. I understand from speaking to some of your colleagues in the past that that has been increasing. If someone tries to buy something on Facebook but is defrauded, the bank of that person will refund them. There is no obligation on the platform to take any action, and the receiving bank of the person who has done the fraud will take no action either. Could more be done in the Bill to break those types of transactions, with fraud being perpetrated on online platforms? What is the wider impact on the banking system?

Nigel Kirby: Your question is specifically about fraud and what we can do in that space. I suggest that tackling fraud is a shared responsibility. When you look at a typical fraud, you have the payment platform, as you mention; you have a sending bank and a receiving bank, and you have the victim. To tackle it, we need to look at the whole ecosystem, as Nick said, and have an approach that works. I am not convinced that there are things that one can put into the Bill for that—it is the wider point of the whole ecosystem coming together for any fraud strategy moving forward, how we tackle that and how we incentivise the right behaviours for tackling fraud in future.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Seema Malhotra and Alison Thewliss

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss]

Q I want to ask about Scottish limited partnerships, the implication being that they are used in sanctions-busting and various other things to do with the war in Ukraine and Russia’s activities around the world. Does that misuse cause a reputational damage to the UK and to Scotland?

Bill Browder: Well, Scotland is so dwarfed by London that you do not have to worry about your reputation, because the reputation is so bad here that no one will even be paying attention.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Coming back to law enforcement, the Bar Council has suggested that the new regulatory objective that the Bill will add to the Legal Services Act 2007, focused on promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime, is incompatible with barristers’ duties and may confuse the role of lawyers. What is your view on that?

Bill Browder: I have written a whole book about this. The bad guys in Russia are a big part of the problem, but you cannot export this type of corruption and money laundering unless you have somebody doing the importing. And who is involved in the importing? It is the western enablers—the lawyers.

I have had shocking experiences with western law firms that are benefiting from this. If there were some kind of duty whereby they had to actually look into the source of their funding or the legitimacy of the business, I think that would be an extremely powerful thing, if it was actually enforced. There is a whole other long discussion of law that one could have about the role of western enablers, and particularly the lawyers.