Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNo, I do not think so; we do not have time for that. I call Seema Malhotra to ask the first question.
Q
My second question is to both of you. Do you believe the Bill should go further and reform the strike-off procedure for companies? There is a recognised issue where companies are building up debts, not filing a return and then being struck off as one of the routes through which money laundering may be taking place, with limited room for manoeuvre after that. Would there be any benefits to reforming that process? Is there any consideration, for example, of companies being placed in a compulsory liquidation procedure? I would be interested in your thoughts on that.
Martin Swain: As you say, we have £63 million through the spending review for transformation. We are two thirds of the way through our transformation programme at the moment. It is fair to say that we have been clear with the Department and Treasury that we are taking on significant new functions and responsibilities. Some of that will require more people and people with different skills from those that we have now. Companies House is a register of information, so a lot of our people do processing work. We will need to move those people off that. We will need to employ skills that we do not currently have, so we are actively talking to the Department and the Treasury about our funding model.
To your point on fees, yes, we could increase fees to pay for additional resources. I know there is some challenge around the fee being too low. Again, we have taken provision in the Bill to charge fees for different things that we currently cannot charge fees for. For example, we cannot currently recover costs for investigation and enforcement activity, as it is centrally funded. We are taking powers to do things differently. I do not think I am at a stage to be able to say we have a definitive figure that we have agreed with the Department or Treasury that would give us our funding model for the future.
Mr Searle?
Adrian Searle: I think the question that was probably targeted towards me is not about the resources in Companies House, but the second, follow-up question relating to striking companies—
It was about how to tackle economic crime and whether the reform of the strike-off process is important to that.
Adrian Searle: The strike-off process is not something I have a detailed understanding of. I suspect Martin might be better placed to answer that question.
Martin Swain: Again, it is something we are very aware of. Companies take advantage of the strike-off route to discharge themselves of debts and so on, and for other purposes. My sense is probably that the Bill as drafted gives us what we need. It is about how we take forward the policy in that area regarding where companies are moved to strike off. For example, we get lots of representation with regard to lots of companies being registered at one address—a registered office being used and abused. The route for that would be to default them to our address at Companies House, for not having a registered office address that is valid. The next step on that would be strike-off, but clearly if we do that we may be having an adverse impact on the system and giving companies a route to use it for criminal activity or to fold without paying their debts. We are very aware of the issue.
Q
Adrian Searle: I think we have. There is, as you say, a real challenge to get the balance right between a prosperity and a security agenda. As we know, the Companies House reform elements of the Bill are a long time coming, so there has been lots of analysis and consideration of how you get the balance right. What I know from a law enforcement investigative perspective is that the changes being introduced under the Bill will certainly make the job of law enforcement far more straightforward in terms of our ability to investigate criminals and corrupt elites who are exploiting the complexity of the corporate structures to hide their assets, launder their wealth, and so on. I am confident that it gives Companies House and, by extension, the investigative agencies the powers we need. The indications that I have from exchanges with Martin and others in the industry are that the changes do not go so far that they inhibit transparent business practices in a way that undermines our economy. It feels to me that the balance is right.
Martin Swain: It is a very good point. It is a challenge for us as an organisation, because we have very clear direction from our Ministers that we should not create a burden for business, or make it difficult for companies to incorporate or for people to invest in the UK. The concept of balance is always there for us. We will bring in things such as ID verification, but we need to make that really efficient, and make it easy for people to understand the process, so that we do not create a burden for the vast majority of companies on our register that are legitimate businesses. That is quite a tension sometimes, because there is a significant spotlight on Companies House to become more than the passive register that we are at the moment, and to become—I hear this term—an “active gatekeeper” of the register. There is a potential that we move too far into that territory and make it harder for the vast majority of companies to deal with us.
I mentioned our transformation programme. There are two elements to our transformation. One is the legislative reform and all that is involved with that. The second part is digitising our services. That is what we have been focusing on in the last few years: making our systems really quick and easy to use, and to drive data, rather than receiving information on paper. You cannot work effectively with law enforcement from paper transactions; you have to have data.
Q
Michelle Crotty: The SFO would like to see those. We understand the concerns that other parts of the system have in terms of how you ringfence a cost regime just for economic crime. In terms of what the SFO can recover in any one year, we can retain £900,000 of legal costs if we win. Clearly, it is the other way if we lose, and there are ongoing discussions with the Treasury. I gave evidence to another Committee last week that, where we do not have a fund available to us for that that sits within our budget, we have to go and negotiate one with the Treasury if we lose. We would certainly welcome some protections, but we understand the challenges around fitting them into the broader scheme.
Q
Simon Welch: Obviously, we are putting more resource into this area. If we are to go after them proactively, we are building up our intelligence around this. Historically, fraud has not been given the same emphasis as other types of criminality, so I think we lack in some areas. If we start to build that up, to get more intelligence that is actionable for us to work on, and to go after some of these people proactively as opposed to reactively, we will be getting ahead of the game, and then we will be able to arrest these people and prevent other people from becoming victims. It is important to invest in this area. It is a difficult time for us, because recruitment and retention of staff are challenging. We are looking to build, and are getting investment streams coming into us. We are looking to develop that all across the piece. We are looking at the intelligence and at the proactive capability and the investigative capability to take this on.
Q
Simon Welch: Resources are a big part of it, but there is experience as well. If we bring in new people, they are unlikely to be the most experienced investigators. Unfortunately, in recent times, we have lost a lot of our middle-ranking, experienced investigators, so we are having to bring people through quite quickly. There is quite a quick turnover now, especially in things like crypto investigations, because those skills are very desirable in the private sector. It is really difficult for us to hang on to those people, so we are going through a bit of a treadmill trying to recruit and hang on to them. Mr Adams is looking at things like structures and strategies within the force to try to hold on to people and to look at different ways of retaining those skills and experience to make us that much better at investigating these things.
Q
Michelle Crotty: It is fail to prevent for us, and it is capacity, capability and retention. As my colleague said, we can train people up with fantastic training, but the real challenge is that they are then very valuable recruits—not just to the private sector, but within the law enforcement community and in how we operate jointly to ensure that we build a pathway for people within law enforcement, as well as out into the private sector.
Commander Adams: The final thing to add to all of that is technology. The licences for the tools that we are able to use at the moment, particularly some of the tools for tracking crypto assets, are expensive. When you start to build up those layers of individual costs that Simon described on the tools and technology, to be really effective we have to bring those together with highly skilled and highly competent individuals. All that is a challenge for us at the moment, in the recruitment environment that we face.
Q
Commander Adams: I am not sure that my impression is the thing to take as gospel here. We see from the crime survey, our annual reporting and the growth in trends around victimisation that fraud is growing year on year. We predict that there could be anywhere from 25% to 65% growth in fraud over the next four to five years. If we were to go around the room and ask for a show of hands on who has received a smishing or phishing message, versus those who have been burgled in the past 12 months, I think we would be staggered at the volume.
We now have evidence from Dr Susan Hawley from Spotlight on Corruption, John Cusack—via Zoom—from the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, and Thom Townsend, representing the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Can I ask Dr Hawley and Thom Townsend to introduce themselves first?
Dr Hawley: Hello. I am Dr Susan Hawley, executive director of Spotlight on Corruption. We are a UK anti-corruption charity that monitors how the UK enforces its anti-corruption laws and keeps its international anti-corruption commitments.
Thom Townsend: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Thom Townsend. I am the executive director of Open Ownership and the incoming chair of the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Open Ownership supports more than 40 Governments around the world to implement exactly these types of reforms.
John Cusack: Hello everyone. My name is John Cusack. I am the chair of the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, which is an NGO. It is a 20-member organisation, both public and private, with large members such as Interpol and Europol, as well as Open Ownership—Thom’s organisation—and RUSI, which you may well know in the UK too.
Q
Secondly, does the Bill provide enough mechanisms to help with transparency around the new responsibilities of Companies House, and should there be reporting—to Parliament, or certainly publicly available—on new powers? What would you want to see in order to have confidence that measures are having impact?
Who wants to go first?
Thom Townsend: I think that there are significant areas of improvement for the piece of legislation that we see before us. Primarily, from our perspective, we focus on reform of company registrars around the world, so my focus is very much on how Companies House can better operate. The key area we would identify is around the verification mechanism, as you would expect, and that splits out into two points.
One is around how we verify someone’s identity versus how we identify and verify the statement of control and ownership that they are giving about their involvement with the company. That second part—their status—is not covered here. We are not putting in place mechanisms to understand whether the disclosure of beneficial ownership is accurate, and that is a significant problem. A colleague talked previously about having a gold standard, but we are far off that. We see company registrars in countries around the world taking meaningful steps to attempt to use their data and powers to begin to understand whether those statements are true. That needs to be significantly beefed up in this legislation.
On the second part—the ID of individuals—there are grave misgivings about that being outsourced to the trust or company supervisor profession. There are other ways of identifying people: in an ideal world, Companies House should be doing that. That is a big change for this piece of legislation, but frankly, that is where most of the world is going.
Q
Thom Townsend: It is worth saying that countries that are doing very well on this typically have a national identity card system that is the foundation of their ID process. There are other ways of doing it. I think about Estonia, France, Germany—the list could go on, but it is based around their national ID card system. Clearly, we do not have that. The Government have done significant work on their own identity verification programme, which has had mixed results. We know we can do this. It does not necessarily need to be outsourced to that profession, which of course is supervised, but we collectively have severe misgivings about it.
On the second point around the accountability mechanism, we would like to see a very strong mechanism for Companies House to be coming to Parliament on a regular basis to talk about how this is looking and how it is performing. It is a much broader conversation about the kinds of indicators we would like to see reported on. That is a much longer conversation, but I will pass over to colleagues at this point.
John Cusack: I share Thom’s views, principally, on this. I spent 30 years working in banking as an MLRO—that is the previous history to my current role—and I spent many, many occasions trying to establish beneficial ownership. It is not easy, but it is the key to understanding risk and understanding who owns and controls a bank account, real estate or a company. That is absolutely key. I would like to see an obligation on the companies register that is essentially equivalent to that which a bank has in relation to knowing its customer, to the extent that that is possible. That is where we need to get to. Thom was explaining that some of the better countries are trying to get to that kind of standard.
Secondly, I believe that the registrar of companies needs to have a much stronger obligation than is currently set out in the proposed legislation—it needs, again, to be slightly similar to my old obligations as an MLRO. There needs to be an obligation to operate an AML programme that is worthy of the name, and to have strong and meaningful controls in order to be able to demonstrate that Companies House and the companies register are doing a similar job to what other people do in the private sector.
Dr Hawley: I would like to strongly back that up. It is essential that the “know your customer” rules that the private sector has to use are used by Companies House as well. There is no point having a registry that SMEs cannot rely on because it is not as accurate as it needs to be. That has been a problem now that the big companies simply do not use the corporate register because it is so inaccurate. There is a long way to go on that.
We also have real concerns, as Thom mentioned, about the authorised corporate service provider provision in the Bill. In essence, it relies on another part of the system—the anti-money laundering supervision system—and the danger is that we are just playing whack-a-mole. We are just pushing the problem down the road. We know that HMRC, in its supervision of TCSPs, has had lots of very serious questions about whether it is up to the job, and it just recently revised its average fine level down from £250,000 to £8,000. There are real questions about whether that is a serious deterrent. In its recent report, it found that nearly 50% of its cases that went up to the governance panel had to be returned to the case officer for serious work to be done again. Either the Bill needs to address the AML supervision regime—I can tell you some of our suggestions, because it would not be that difficult to come up with a transition—or there are real questions over whether that clause should be in it at all.
A final point, which was picked up earlier by colleagues from law enforcement, is about how this will be funded. The registry will be meaningful only if there are proper resources. It can be completely cost-neutral to the Treasury. We are heading into a difficult fiscal time, so it needs to be cost-neutral. As the gentleman from the National Police Chiefs’ Council said earlier, we have almost the lowest registry fee. We are the 6th lowest, in company with Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and South Africa. Most other countries charge an average of £150 to £300, compared with £12. That could go an enormous way to getting the right IT infrastructure. We know a lot of this will have to be done with technology and AI. Making sure that the fees for Companies House are set at a realistic level to make this properly verified is essential.
Q
Dr Hawley: Absolutely. The key thing is what John alluded to—clause 88. What is the requirement in the Bill for how far the registrar has to go? If it is the minimum amount, the fees will be minimal. If we are going for the gold standard, the fees will need to be higher to reflect the greater verification work.
Thom Townsend: Just a quick thought: what strikes me, reading the Bill, is that it is not quite clear what Government want Companies House to be, when you delve into the detail. Is it around minimising criminal activity, as in the fourth objective? Is it about preventing, which comes up in clause 88? That needs to be resolved to give a very clear idea in primary legislation of what we want Companies House to be. It should be the first line of defence in the UK economy from the perspective of integrity and preventing crime.
We have registries of beneficial ownership for assets and property. We have to try to make it possible for law enforcement to connect companies, individuals and assets. Do you think we have the framework for connecting those three dots effectively?
Thom Townsend: As it stands, no. Some form of this legislation will go a lot further. We need to look at how we are uniquely identifying people. In that case, there is an argument for bringing that ID process in-house so you have clarity around it. You can assign that identifier, which then gets used across the panoply of datasets that law enforcement have in their possession to do that interconnectivity. We run the risk a little bit, as the legislation is currently framed, of creating another island that is a bit better connected but probably will not sit at the heart of the process and be that effective first line of defence that the UK economy should have.
Q
Dr Hawley: Ensuring that companies cannot just liquidate has been incredibly important to law enforcement in the past. I am very sorry, but we might have to get back to you on that because I have not looked specifically at that clause.
Q
Thom Townsend: I think there is a balance between speed and effectiveness. Companies House is fantastic at what it does now—it provides a really good service to register a business quickly, and it is really easy to use—but it has never had to do the kinds of things that we are now proposing it does. It will be a long journey to get from where it is today to the sort of high-functioning all-singing, all-dancing machine that we are proposing.
There is a balance between achieving the objectives of the Bill, and the wider goals of dealing with corruption and countering kleptocracy in the UK. We will probably have to look at some sort of transitional arrangement but, ultimately, we should have a much more aspirational and ambitious vision for what we want Companies House to be in five to 10 years’ time, put the resourcing in place, and ensure oversight and accountability to drive that forward and make it happen.
Would anybody else like to answer that question? No? In that case, I thank all three members of the panel for their help in giving evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Oliver Bullough and Bill Browder gave evidence.
We will come to the questions in a minute. Oliver Bullough, would you introduce yourself, please?
Oliver Bullough: It is great to be here. I am sorry that I am not there in person. It is half-term and I have the children in the other room, with instructions to be quiet. It is an honour to appear alongside Bill, who I have known for a long time and whose work I have been following since even before he was an activist outside Russia—when he was still fighting corruption inside Russia.
I am a Russia enthusiast—a Russophile. I worked in Russia as a journalist for a long time. I inevitably came across corruption, because it is difficult to spend any time in Russia without coming across corruption, but the more that I investigated corruption and the more time I spent looking into it, the more I realised that it cannot be understood as simply a Russian phenomenon. The money does not stay in Russia; it moves out of Russia and too often it ends up in the UK, where it buys real estate, football clubs and many other things. I have been spending, I suppose, most of the last decade attempting to map how money moves from kleptocratic countries via tax havens and ends up in cities such as London, in order to work out how corruption really works and cut through some of the simplifications that are often used.
Q
Bill Browder: Thank you. This is the crux of the whole issue. By the way, it was not just Magnitsky money that was not investigated. We have this problem; since Vladimir Putin has come to power, he and 1,000 people around him have stolen $1 trillion from the Russian people. This has been the largest destination of Russian money laundering. In 22 years since he has come to power, not a single money laundering prosecution has come out of Russia—not one—and we are talking about $1 trillion.
What is going on here? What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side. Why are they so risk averse in opening cases? It comes down to simple risk-reward for them. Their budgets are very thin, as law enforcement does not have a lot of money, and when they go to court here on any type of civil case—it is not true in a murder case, but it is true in a civil case—if they lose at any point, not just at the end of the case, but at any point procedurally during the case, the loser has to pay the winner’s court fees, and there is no budget for that. Therefore, the UK law enforcement agencies will not take that risk.
I have seen it done differently. We presented the United States Department of Justice with the same information. They do not have that problem; they can open a case, conduct an investigation and build their case as they are doing their investigation, and if they lose, nobody loses their job, nobody is bankrupted, and no departments have to go back and beg for more money from the Government. Whatever money they have spent on their lawyers is the money they have spent.
What has to happen here—this is plain as day—is that you have to get rid of this adverse costs issue in a civil case brought by the Government. You could easily write an amendment to the law as it is written, because it is not here right now, to say that if the Crown Prosecution Service brings a money laundering case or an economic crime case, there are no adverse costs. If you make that point, it will change the whole dynamic—the whole risk-reward—for these people.
Q
Bill Browder: The same thing.
Q
Bill Browder: Well, Scotland is so dwarfed by London that you do not have to worry about your reputation, because the reputation is so bad here that no one will even be paying attention.
Q
Bill Browder: I have written a whole book about this. The bad guys in Russia are a big part of the problem, but you cannot export this type of corruption and money laundering unless you have somebody doing the importing. And who is involved in the importing? It is the western enablers—the lawyers.
I have had shocking experiences with western law firms that are benefiting from this. If there were some kind of duty whereby they had to actually look into the source of their funding or the legitimacy of the business, I think that would be an extremely powerful thing, if it was actually enforced. There is a whole other long discussion of law that one could have about the role of western enablers, and particularly the lawyers.
I am afraid that under the rules that we operate on, I have no discretion to allow this very interesting sitting to continue, so we have to finish. I thank both our witnesses for a really fascinating sitting. Their great insight and knowledge on this subject has been of immense value. Thank you very much indeed.
We now come to the ninth panel. We have Professor John Heathershaw from the University of Exeter appearing via Zoom and Thomas Mayne from Chatham House. Good afternoon. I am going to ask Professor Heathershaw, first, to introduce himself briefly.
Professor Heathershaw: My name is John Heathershaw. I am professor of international relations at the University of Exeter. I work on aspects of money laundering related to post-Soviet political elites.
Thomas Mayne: I am Thomas Mayne. I am a research fellow at the University of Oxford and a former visiting fellow at Chatham House. I am one of the authors of “The UK’s kleptocracy problem”, a report we released at Chatham House in December.
First, by way of very quick introductory remarks, on the day we launched the report, the then Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss—how time flies—was also speaking. That was a nice coincidence. She was asked about our report and her response was that the UK has the strongest money laundering regulations and laws in the world. As we have heard today, we could debate whether that is true or not; there is some evidence to suggest that it is. However, as we have heard a lot today, without enforcement, laws are useless.
Secondly, I am an expert in kleptocracy and anti-corruption measures. Kleptocracy and money laundering are two slightly different things, and I hope we will get into some of the differences today.
Q
Secondly, would you expect kleptocrats, in the light of this regulation, just to move their assets to unregulated sectors? Are we going to have the protections we would want for Britain, or are we in danger of seeing some of the behaviour simply displaced?
Thomas Mayne: First, on supervision, I do not think there is enough in the Bill. The findings of OPBAS—that the risk-based approach we have put in place really is not working—are quite shocking. What is the solution to that? I know that Dr Hawley was here earlier; Spotlight on Corruption has just released a report on the supervision of the legal sector. There is a debate in that on whether there should just be a single sector supervisor, which is something we should look at.
Generally, I think supervision is lacking and it is very uneven. Across sectors, we are seeing very different layers of enforcement actions. For example, I think the Council for Licensed Conveyancers—obviously, it deals with real estate, which, as we know, poses some of the highest risks for money laundering—produced zero enforcement actions in a three-year period. There are varying levels of not only supervision but enforcement activity. That is definitely something that we should look at that is not really in the Bill. John, do you want to say anything on that question, before we move on to the second one?
Professor Heathershaw: I think the accountability question pertains to parliamentary supervision of those regulatory agencies. As I understand it, there is nothing in the Bill to enhance that. There would be scope for a specific cross-departmental parliamentary Committee in this area, I think. As we know, money laundering crosses different Departments, so greater accountability for poor performance by the supervisors could be tackled through that kind of oversight.
Thomas Mayne: Was the second question whether we are worried about capital flight from the UK?
Q
Thomas Mayne: That is certainly a risk. We are way ahead of the game, in some respects, in terms of which businesses we regulate. I know that there is an ongoing discussion about whether PR agencies should have regulation. I am not an expert on crypto, but I think we should look at bringing it into the existing regime where, if there is a suspicion of money laundering, you have to report it by law.
Professor Heathershaw: To add to that, it is not simply a matter of liquidating assets to move them into other denominations or unregulated sectors. The nature of money laundering is that it is a social and political phenomenon as well. It is about achieving a place to stay where you can protect your assets through the rule of law, and maybe gain some social influence, get your kids into school, and use your residency to garner a wider profile and clean up your reputation. That means that the property and bank accounts are hugely important; they will not just be liquidated overnight.
When we are talking about the kind of money laundering that Tom and I look at by political elites and those from kleptocracies, they are seeking to gain a whole set of goods that you cannot simply get through putting all your assets into crypto, or into a more loosely regulated jurisdiction such as Dubai. There are certain things that the UK, and London in particular, offer that will not simply fall out of the way in a beggar thy neighbour, “Well, we’ll just move ourselves into a sector or jurisdiction that is loosely regulated,” way. I do not think that that should cause us to worry about losing market share, or the problem shifting into another sector, because the problem will always remain in the legal and regulated sectors that are our principal concerns. They will always be there, too.
Thomas Mayne: I have one thing to add on real estate. We now have the registration of overseas entities as part of the previous Act. It will be fascinating to see what happens in January, when the deadline comes in, with the existing properties that we know are owned by oligarchs or kleptocrats, and what kind of information they put on record. It is not a magic bullet. One problem with the ownership of property is that we will not, and should not, have a searchable database where we put in somebody’s name and see whether they own a property in the UK. It does not work like that, so there may be other properties that are perhaps owned by proxies. Those proxies will have their name on record as the so-called beneficial owner, but they will not be discoverable because we do not know about them, and we do not know that proxies are being used. What will be interesting is, as I say, what information will be revealed about the properties that we do know by January.