(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.
As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.
In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.
New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.
New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.
New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.
Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.
I seek clarification. As drafted, in clause 12(1)(c), the High Court would give
“a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met”,
but in new clause 21(6)(a), the panel is required to issue a certificate of eligibility, to which the Minister just referred. I seek the Minister’s guidance on whether it is the Government’s view that the High Court declaration has equal weight in law to the certificate of eligibility set out in new clause 21. I ask particularly because that certificate will be relied on for the purposes of suspending the Suicide Act 1961, under which a criminal offence would otherwise have been committed. The certificate of eligibility will need to be relied on to demonstrate that no criminal offence has been committed under that law. Is it the view of the Minister and the Government that a High Court direction, as originally required, can now be fully replaced by, and have equal weight with, a certificate of eligibility?
As I understand it, everything has to be internally coherent in whatever the final draft of the Bill is. Within this structure, because in this case it is a panel that issues the certificate, it is its own sui generis certificate appropriate to this process. The declaration that was referred to in the earlier draft is one that the High Court would normally do. Given that this is on the face of the Bill, and will be in primary legislation, it would have legal force and would, if it were internally coherent with the rest of the legislation, have the legal effect of operating coherently with the criminal offences and, indeed, with the suspension of the Suicide Act, as the hon. Lady just asked. That is my understanding.
My original question was more about whether it has the same legal force as a High Court direction.
I drew the comparison for the purpose of showing where judges and legal experts are deployed in a multidisciplinary forum that is not a court or tribunal. I was not suggesting that there is a straight-line analogy. After all, a Parole Board panel is performing a different function to make a global assessment of risk. That is what it is ultimately doing; it is not strictly speaking an adversarial process in that sense.
The situation that the Bill addresses is that of an individual seeking to establish their eligibility for a right that—if the Act is passed—Parliament will have conferred on those who meet the criteria. It is not an adjudication. It is the panel’s function to assess, through the various conversations and provisions and by interrogating the information that has been provided, whether it is properly satisfied that the eligibility of the person’s election to avail themselves of that right is sound.
I am trying to clarify this for my own benefit, because I am not familiar with some of these procedures. Is there a difference between a High Court judge leading an inquiry or sitting on a panel, using their legal experience to provide advice or recommendations or give an opinion, and having a judge sitting in the High Court, who, under the original wording of clause 12, would be giving a direction? If there is a difference, have we not crossed from one role to the other by introducing a panel rather than a High Court direction? Does that matter for the purposes of the legislation?
To be absolutely clear, what we are discussing reflects the intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. It is important to break it down. We have a judge in the role of the commissioner, and the commissioner will set up the framework and guidance for how the panels will operate and will lend their expertise. Our judges often sit on the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, developing the appropriate practice to govern the process in question. In this case, it would be the process of providing the third layer and the assessment whether the eligibility criteria have been met.
The commissioner would also—and this is where the role is distinct from that of a court or tribunal—provide a monitoring and reporting function to Parliament on the operation of the Act. That is a fundamental distinction from the model that we will have if we pursue clause 12, because in that case each application for an assisted death would go to whichever High Court judge happened to be sitting on that day. There would be no requirement for particular expertise on the part of the High Court judge, and that judge would not have to report on the operation of the Act. It is a different model that my hon. Friend has elected.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
You have highlighted in particular the distinctions between health law, which is a devolved matter, and the law on suicide, which currently is not devolved. On the first page of your written evidence, you draw out clauses 32, 31, 33 and 34 in particular as issues that we should focus on in ironing out those legalities. Is there anything else you want to add to that that you think that we as a Government should focus on in our work consulting with the Senedd?
Professor Lewis: I think it is important that both Governments understand how the implementation of what will be a pretty radical change in the law will happen on the ground within the health service and among those who are responsible for delivering social services. I am thinking of issues such as adult safeguarding, which in Wales has its own specific law and is slightly different from the arrangements in England. There are those kinds of nuances between the two territories, and I think it would be prudent to focus on them.
I also think it is wise to bear in mind that Wales has certain statutory bodies whose interests might extend to the Bill. For example, there is the Older People’s Commissioner for Wales, in particular; there is the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales as well. I think it is important that there is some forum, some scope, for those people also to be involved in how this is shaped.
Q
“is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”
Could you expand a little on that and, if you feel able, make some recommendations as to what you think could be sufficient?
Dr Price: Thank you. In answering this, I will also refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.
We also need to think about how that would work in practice. When we are thinking about capacity assessments, it is usually related to a treatment or a choice about a treatment or about somebody’s life—for example, changing residence. Psychiatrists and doctors and actually lots of professionals are very used to those sorts of decisions and have gathered a lot of knowledge, expertise and experience around it. This particular decision is something that in this country we do not have knowledge, expertise and experience in, and we therefore need to think about how that would look in practice.
As for advice to the Committee about what that might look like, I think that we need to gather what evidence we have—it is actually very thin—from other jurisdictions that think about capacity as part of this process. I am thinking about my PhD: I visited Oregon and talked to practitioners who were directly involved in these sorts of assessments. They described the process, but they are not using the Mental Capacity Act as their framework. They described a very interpersonal process, which relied on a relationship with the patient, and the better a patient was known, the more a gut feeling-type assessment was used. We need to think here about whether that would be a sufficient conversation to have.
One of the things that I have thought quite a lot about is how we can really understand the workings of a mental capacity assessment, and one of the best ways we can do that is to see who is not permitted to access assisted suicide because of a lack of capacity and what that assessment showed. We do not have data because the assessments for people who were not permitted to do it are not published; we cannot read them, so if this becomes legislation, one of the suggestions that I would have—it is supported by the Royal College of Psychiatrists—is to, with patients’ consent, record capacity assessments to see whether they meet the standard that is necessary. I think it is important to set out the standard necessary and the components needed to be confident about a mental capacity assessment. That will help with standards, but will also help with training, because this is new territory for psychiatry, for medicine, and to be able to think about consistency and reliability, training needs to actually see a transparency in capacity assessments.