(1 week, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIf I may, Ms McVey, I will speak to the issue of the judicial oversight of the panel and the whole of new clause 21. I would like to understand something, and perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley could help me. We have been talking a lot about judicial oversight. My concern is that even if we had judicial oversight, there is no liability if something goes wrong. We would have had judicial oversight, but now we have panel oversight—non-judicial oversight—of the decision. Even then, what if somebody went down the assisted dying route and an issue was raised afterwards? What recourse would anybody—family members and so on—have to hold anybody liable if they did something wrong, including, potentially, the commissioner?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.
As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.
In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.
New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.
New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.
Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.
New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.
Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.
I believe it is in there. Let me find the relevant provision so that I can refer my hon. Friend to it.
It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:
“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.
Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:
“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”
That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the Bill as drafted, a panel and the commission are not invested with powers of summons, and the evidence that is heard and requested is not conveyed under oath. It is not a court or a tribunal. Those provisions do not apply, so she is absolutely right. They can make the request, but they cannot compel someone to attend.
Amendment (e) to new clause 21 would make it explicit that, when considered appropriate for medical reasons, the panel would be able to use pre-recorded audio or video material when considering evidence for the purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance. Panel procedure would be set out in guidance issued by the commissioner, which would detail the processes governing the panel process in general, but also for the use of that form of evidence.
New schedule 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the. Member for Spen Valley, builds on the new clause 21. The new schedule further details the composition and the intended proceedings of the assisted dying review panels. As we have heard, panels would be formed of three members, including a legal member sitting as chair, a psychiatrist and a social worker.
Thanks to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, we have dealt with the provision on decisions to grant the certificate of eligibility and how they will be determined by members of the panel. We heard from the promoter herself, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that the intention is that such decisions are unanimous.
The commissioner would be responsible for making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of the multidisciplinary panels, and for establishing those panels. Under the schedule, the legal member as chair of the panel must hold or have held high judicial office, be one of His Majesty’s counsel—that is a KC—or have been authorised as a temporary judge in the High Court. The psychiatrist member must be a registered medical practitioner and a practising registered psychiatrist, and the social worker member must appear on the register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales.
I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.
The Minister mentions impartiality. As things stand, the doctors who take part in the process will have made the choice to do so. Would the same yardstick be applied to the panel, or would its members just be appointed? Could they choose not to participate in the process?
I anticipate that members of the professions will apply to be members of the panel. There will have to be a recruitment process, which is something that the commissioner, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, will undertake. I emphasise the point that all the professions, in their different ways—I am obviously most familiar with the legal profession, particularly the Bar—are governed by professional standards that specify the need for and place a high value on not just integrity, but impartiality.
There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.
One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to understand something. She says that the Official Solicitor is there to help with adults who lack capacity, but in the cases before the Court of Protection of the girls who had anorexia, the judges took a decision that they should not continue to be force-fed. The judges concluded in nine of 10 cases that they lacked capacity, and yet accepted that these girls were inevitably going to die. In that case, would the role of the Official Solicitor not be helpful as a further safeguard?
It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill.
All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.
I appreciate the Minister’s position and am grateful for her explanation, but it does not address the central point, which is that nine girls were deemed not to have capacity. Despite all the amendments that have been tabled and the letter from all the charities about anorexia, that has not been addressed. In absence of any impact assessment on one of the issues that most frustrates me, how do the Government conclude that the workability of the Bill is sufficient? Will it work, given that we do not have the protection for those girls who may have anorexia? There is precedent for such girls who did not have capacity. How will the Government safeguard those girls in particular?