Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Samantha Dixon and Lewis Cocking

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Samantha Dixon)]

I will speak first to clause 48 and associated schedule 3, before addressing Government amendments 14 to 17 and new clause 40, tabled by the Opposition.

The current legislative framework for absent voting was designed for a very different electoral landscape. Today, far more people vote by post; supply chains and administrator resources are under greater pressure; and expectations around reliability and timely delivery have changed. Developed in consultation with the electoral sector, clause 48 modernises and strengthens the absent voting system to reflect those realities. It streamlines administration, gives electors greater flexibility and ensures that safeguards around the integrity of absent vote applications remain robust.

These measures will enable postal voters to take part in elections with confidence, by helping to ensure their ballot is issued and delivered in good time, while allowing a switch to voting in person or by emergency proxy if their ballot is delayed. They will not apply to Northern Ireland because of the different absent voting regime there and the stricter security requirements around absent voting, which are a result of the history of electoral fraud in Northern Ireland.

Setting clearer rules and deadlines will give electoral administrators the confidence and certainty needed to manage their workload effectively and keep the absent voting system running smoothly at the most demanding points in the electoral timetable. The integrity of our elections is of paramount importance. The clause also strengthens safeguards in the absent voting system by clarifying identity verification requirements, and introduces a clear statutory determination deadline for identity verification. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Government amendments 14, 15 and 16 remove a regulation-making power that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has advised is unnecessary. The Bill already provides that a proxy with a long-term proxy postal voting arrangement can make temporary arrangements for a particular poll without affecting that long-term arrangement. Where a proxy instead applies for a proxy postal voting arrangement for a particular election, the correct outcome is that the long-term arrangement is cancelled. That is the policy intention, and the Bill already delivers that without the need for regulation-making powers. The amendments therefore simplify the legislation, remove redundant provisions and ensure the law operates clearly and consistently for electoral administrators.

Government amendment 17 ensures consistency between the absent voting regime and the proxy voting offences in section 61(1A) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. The Bill already allows someone who has applied to be registered, and is only awaiting the end of the objections period, to be treated as a person who “will be registered” for absent voting purposes. Without the amendment, that same person could be granted a proxy vote but might not be legally capable of committing the offence of acting as a proxy for too many electors if they knowingly breached the proxy limits. The amendment closes that gap, reflects the advice of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and ensures that the law operates clearly, consistently and as intended. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

New clause 40 seeks to require electoral registration officers to share information with political parties about electors whose postal voting arrangements have expired. While supporting voter participation is important, the Government do not consider the new clause to be workable, proportionate or necessary. As drafted, it does not provide access to postal vote expiry data itself; instead, it links disclosure to details supplied in proxy vote applications for parliamentary elections, which is not how postal voting arrangements are recorded or renewed in practice.

Most postal voters will never have applied for a proxy vote. As a result, for many electors whose postal vote has expired, there would simply be no proxy application data to disclose, meaning that the new clause would not achieve its apparent policy aim. There is also a clear mismatch in scope. The new clause refers to postal vote expiry for

“elections of the kind in question”

but limits disclosure to proxy applications made for parliamentary elections, significantly narrowing and distorting the dataset that would be available.

A question of principle is also at stake. Electoral registration officers already have a legal duty to notify electors directly about when their postal voting arrangements are due to expire and to provide them with information about how to make a fresh application to vote by post. That ensures that voters are informed at the right time without reliance on third parties.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

When postal voters are notified by their local authority that they are about to drop off the roll, does the Minister agree that they should not always be encouraged to do that online? Some people who have postal votes do not want to make online applications. Does she also agree that they should be sent a fresh application from the council, with a freepost envelope for its return, so that they can keep their postal votes?

[Samantha Dixon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. It is appropriate for electoral registration officers to use their discretion in the circumstances that he describes. They can do that already, and should continue to do so, rather than the Government prescribing the route that they should follow.

Finally, requiring electoral registration officers to respond to ad hoc requests from political parties, alongside their existing statutory write-out duties, would impose a substantial and unnecessary administrative burden. For those reasons, the Government cannot support new clause 40.

Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Samantha Dixon and Lewis Cocking

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Samantha Dixon]

The fourth circumstance allows the registration information of 14 and 15-year-olds to be disclosed to MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. That is the extension of a standard provision allowing our intelligence agencies to use electoral registration data, if necessary.

The final circumstance allows the registration information of an under-16 to be shared with an individual who has been appointed to act as that young person’s proxy voter. I am sure it is obvious that such information sharing is naturally helpful to allow the proxy voter to carry out their role.

It is important to note that three of the five circumstances in which clause 8 permits disclosure of information have further restrictions placed on them by clause 12, which I will discuss in detail shortly. Furthermore, the relevant supply enactments—the fourth circumstance—already contain restrictions on use and further disclosure. Overall, the Government consider these exceptions to the prohibition to be appropriate and proportionate in allowing young people’s registration information to be shared when, and only when, absolutely necessary.

Clause 9 provides for the way in which the data of 14 and 15-year-olds should be handled in Scotland and Wales, where the UK Government have responsibility for UK parliamentary elections, but the Scottish and Welsh Governments have devolved responsibility for local elections and elections to the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru. Where individuals in Scotland and Wales are eligible to take part in both reserved and devolved polls, their electoral records are held by electoral registration officers on a combined register.

That is a very sensible and efficient approach to managing electoral registers, but in the context of the data protection provisions put in place by clauses 8 to 16, that approach presents a challenge—namely, what should happen if devolved legislation prohibits an entry from being disclosed, but reserved legislation allows it? The Government are committed to upholding and respecting our devolution settlements, and the clause is designed to do exactly that. Devolved electoral registers and reserved electoral registers should be considered to be separate in principle. It is only a matter of practice that they happen to be held in one place.

Clause 9 provides that, where electoral registration information is held in a combined register, if clause 7 of the Bill prohibits the disclosure of information, but devolved legislation allows it, disclosure of that information is permitted. The clause also provides that if both devolved and reserved legislation permit disclosure, but only devolved legislation places restrictions on the use of that data—for example, a restriction on its onward disclosure—those restrictions do apply. The clause strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the information of those who have not yet reached voting age, and respecting the rightful responsibility that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have over their devolved elections.

I turn now to clause 10, which is a mirror image of clause 9. Whereas clause 9 ensures that the Bill works with and does not conflict with devolved legislation, clause 10 is designed to ensure that devolved legislation does not conflict with this legislation. Specifically, clause 10 provides that, where electoral registration information is held in a combined register, if relevant parts of devolved legislation prohibit disclosure of information, but clause 7 of the Bill allows it, disclosure of that information is permitted. The clause also provides that, if both devolved and reserved legislation permit disclosure, but only reserved legislation places restrictions on the use of that data—for example, a restriction on its onward disclosure—those restrictions do apply.

Taken together, clauses 9 and 10 accommodate and respect the importance of devolved responsibility, while equally ensuring that the UK Government are not constrained by the policy decisions made by the devolved Governments when legislating for our own elections.

I turn now to clause 11, which is a further part of the package of measures in the Bill designed to protect the information of 14 and 15-year-olds who register to vote ahead of reaching voting age. Specifically, clause 11 builds on clause 8, which sets out five circumstances in which the prohibition put in place by clause 7 on sharing the registration information of those under the age of 16 does not apply. Members will recall that the second circumstance listed in clause 8 provided that the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared to comply with one of a limited number of supply enactments. Clause 11 lists four supply enactments, which I will list shortly.

Before I do, it is important to note that there are already restrictions on what individuals who receive information via a supply enactment may do with that information. I also remind hon. Members of the two strict limitations that clause 8 puts on disclosure under these supply enactments. First, disclosure under a supply enactment listed in clause 11 may be made only for purposes relating to an election, referendum or recall petition at which a given person will be entitled to vote or sign. That will allow information of individuals under the age of 16 to be protected, while also allowing individuals who will be old enough to vote in specific polls to be included in campaigning activities related to that poll. Secondly, disclosure under a supply enactment listed in the clause must not contain information that would allow the date of birth of the young person in question to be learned.

Noting those key restrictions, I will now talk through the four types of supply enactment under which the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared. The first allows records of postal and proxy voters under 16 to be shared on request with a candidate. The second allows information of individuals under 16 to be shared with the Electoral Commission. The third allows information of individuals under 16 to be shared with the Boundary Commission.

The fourth allows information of individuals under 16 to be shared with candidates upon request or, in respect of the recall of an MP, that MP, political parties and official campaigners. Noting again the important restrictions placed on disclosure in these circumstances by clause 8, these provisions make it possible for individuals who are not yet of voting age, but who will be on the actual day of a specific poll, to be appropriately involved in the electoral process in the run-up to that election.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

Is the Minister confident that when we collect all this data, and the Boundary Commission and Electoral Commission get it, they will be able to analyse it to make sure that all constituencies at the next general election fall within their parameters for how many electors each MP needs to represent, to make sure that none is too far outside that boundary?

--- Later in debate ---

[Samantha Dixon]

Clause 20 enables the Secretary of State to make pilot regulations that test new and innovative methods of electoral registration. As part of our work to strengthen the registration system, the Government are exploring new and innovative ways of electoral registration.

By harnessing existing Government data and embracing new technology, we aim to modernise the process, making registration simpler and more accessible for citizens. However, before any new methods of registration are introduced in full, it is right that they are tested in real-world conditions with real people, not merely in enclosed, controlled environments. By testing new registration methods in the real world, we will be able to ensure—to the best of our ability—that any new approaches to registration are both effective and secure. The Government are committed to strengthening our democracy and encouraging full participation by legitimate voters in our elections, and the clause forms a critical part of that work.

With the Committee’s indulgence, I will address amendment 28, notwithstanding the fact that it has not yet been spoken to. It aims to ensure that the voter registration pilots, which are provided for in the Bill, cannot be used to amend the franchise. I reassure members of the Committee that the new piloting powers, as drafted, could not be used to amend the franchise.

Clause 20 creates a new power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to pilot changes to the voter registration process, which the Bill describes as “voter registration provision”. Clause 21 defines “voter registration provision”, making clear that it is limited to registering individuals entitled, under existing franchise eligibility criteria, to be registered. It also allows for existing register entries to be amended or removed. Our intention is to make registration easier and simpler for those already eligible to register to vote; it is not to amend the eligibility criteria for entitlement to register to vote. I ask the hon. Member for Hamble Valley to withdraw his amendment, as it is unnecessary.

Clause 21 seeks to clarify what is meant in clause 20 by “voter registration provision”, in relation to pilot regulations, by providing examples of what such regulations could entail. As I have just said, before any new methods of registration are introduced in full, it is right that they are tested in real-world conditions with real people, not solely in enclosed, controlled environments. In July last year, the Government published our strategy for modern and secure elections, in which we noted that technology presents ever-expanding opportunities to improve the way in which the Government deliver for the public. Our ambition is to modernise our registration practices, harnessing data and moving towards an increasingly automated system, so that voters can be easily and simply registered to vote.

[Lewis Cocking]

The Minister probably knows the point I am about to make. I fully appreciate what she has just said about having to do these demos in real-world scenarios, but can she ensure that they will be conducted during elections where everybody is treated in the same way—that is, council elections—rather than at a general election, where she will create two types of elector? Can we have that reassurance?

[Samantha Dixon]

I note the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, and I hope to address them as we go forward.

Clause 21 makes clear that piloting regulations may be used to explore this ambition further, including by testing new and innovative ways of using Government data to identify individuals and support them to register, as well as testing potential improvements to administrative processes. Our ambition is to support a modern, efficient registration system that makes participation straightforward for citizens and strengthens the foundations of our democracy. The clause plays an important role in providing the framework through which that ambition can be pursued.

Clause 22 builds on clause 21 by providing further clarity on the scope of the piloting powers set out in clause 20. It makes clear that pilots will take place in one or more areas, and that they may assess the impact of new registration methods on specific demographic groups. The clause also confirms that, in most circumstances, pilots will proceed only with the consent of the relevant electoral registration officer. It is right that those directly responsible for administering the pilot are engaged, informed and supportive of the approach being taken.

Furthermore, clause 22 allows pilot regulations, on a temporary basis, to create, suspend or disapply an offence or financial penalty where that is necessary for the effective conduct of a pilot. However, they cannot increase penalties beyond existing legal limits, nor introduce penalties or offences for individuals who fail to register or update their details. That ensures that the legal framework operates sensibly during the testing period while maintaining appropriate protections and proportionality.

Clause 22 provides breadth, flexibility and practicality to the proposed piloting framework, giving clarity to officials without imposing an overly rigid or exhaustive set of rules. In doing so, the provisions ensure that pilot schemes can be designed in a measured, proportionate and genuinely useful way, supporting the Government to realise their ambition to modernise electoral registration and make it simpler for citizens to engage with the democratic process.

I now turn to clause 23, which provides that any pilot regulations made under the new power conferred on the Secretary of State in clause 20 must be made by statutory instrument. Parliament is the proper forum for the scrutiny and oversight of such powers. Electoral registration is a matter of significant importance and sensitivity, and it is therefore right that parliamentarians have the opportunity to examine in full any proposed regulations establishing a new pilot.

Clause 23 provides that all regulations made under this piloting power will be subject to the affirmative procedure, except where the regulations do no more than extend an existing pilot for no longer than 12 months, or amend the deadline by which the Electoral Commission must publish its evaluation report—in which case the SI will be subject to the negative procedure. Requiring the affirmative procedure for the vast majority of cases reflects the long-standing convention that changes to electoral law should receive the highest level of parliamentary scrutiny. Safeguarding the security and inclusivity of our electoral registration system must remain paramount.

Clause 24 provides that the Electoral Commission will evaluate any pilots and produce a report. The Electoral Commission serves as an essential independent guardian of the integrity and transparency of our democratic processes. By upholding rigorous standards and providing impartial oversight, it helps ensure that electoral matters across the United Kingdom are conducted properly, securely and with public confidence.

By placing the Electoral Commission’s independent assessment at the heart of the evaluation of any electoral registration pilot, we ensure that Parliament, stakeholders and the public receive a clear, objective and authoritative appraisal of any pilot’s effectiveness. The clause reinforces our commitment to rigorous independent scrutiny by requiring the report to address specific issues. That includes an assessment of the extent to which a pilot has met its objectives and an evaluation of whether the changes made by the regulations represent a cost-effective means of achieving them.

Although we are ambitious about delivering a modern, more automated electoral registration system fit for the 21st century, we are equally mindful that robust processes and independent evaluation must remain integral to the testing of any new registration method. Clause 25 provides definitions for the four key terms used throughout clauses 20 to 24. This is an interpretive provision that defines key terms and is necessary for the operation of those clauses. I commend the clauses to the Committee.