(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAlthough I understand the intention behind the new clause, some of the wording concerns me. I supported new clause 1 because it was quite clearly permissive and expansive. This new clause is quite clearly prescriptive. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the Secretary of State will be guided day to day, which is much more regularly than multi-agency reviews can happen? The Secretary of State will be guided day to day by advice from the security services and others, not as to the theoretical characteristics of an acquirer that might make them a threat, but as to the actual identity and track record of the acquirer and concern.
In particular, is the hon. Gentleman not concerned about requiring the production of a list of high-risk and low-risk characteristics, or that subsection (3) of the new clause in particular would create the possibility that, at some point, somebody who ticked all the boxes for low risk, but was still a high-risk acquirer, could prevent the Secretary of State from undertaking the scrutiny that was required? Can he even explain, for example, what he means by “greater” and “lesser” scrutiny? How would I interpret whether the Secretary of State’s scrutiny had been greater or lesser?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Those are valid points, and part of what we are driving at here is to be more prescriptive. The feeling is that we essentially need to allow the loops in the net to be closed enough such that we catch some of these companies. We do not want a situation where a number of companies have portions of them being owned by, for example, China or another country, and do not fall foul of any of the provisions currently in the Bill. In time, that could mean that countries and entities that were hostile to Britain’s strategic goals ended up having quick and strategic access to things around nanotechnology, agriculture and a range of other areas where they had essentially got their hands into something that I think should be protected far more closely by the UK.
To give an example, in the US—this is already under way—a Palo Alto-based venture capital firm backed by the Chinese Government had dozens of US start-ups in its portfolio. On 15 November 2020, the Office of the US Trade Representative said that 151 venture capital investments in US start-ups had featured at least one Chinese investor—up from 20 in 2010. We are not saying we do not want Chinese investment, but what we do not want is a situation where we are unable to have a grip when we find that loads of our technology companies —our most cutting-edge firms—are essentially all part-owned by the Chinese Communist party or one of its subsidiaries. That is why we have been more prescriptive in many parts of the new clause.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which goes back to what the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs said. That is why this needs to be looked at regularly enough to be on top of the process. Obviously, threats change. Countries rise and fall and their agendas and Governments change, but we know that in some instances countries are actively making moves to invest in technology companies in such a way that might not be caught by some of the provisions in the Bill. We feel that being more stringent here would allow the Secretary of State more powers to keep, in some ways, a better eye on exactly what is going on.
Perhaps I should explain a little what I mean by that. One of the things that we are trying to uncover and drive at with the new clause is the importance of some of the ways in which venture capital firms are being used, particularly by the Chinese and by some companies. For example, in Cambridge and Oxford—two important tech hubs for our country—start-ups are regularly invited to pitch ideas to the Chinese state investment company. Nothing particularly untoward is happening there, but it is quite interesting that Chinese investors are particularly interested in talking to emerging biotech, internet of things, artificial intelligence and agri-tech companies.
Why is China particularly interested in those areas? The publicly available “Made in China 2025” strategy to become an economic superpower says that the first three things that the Chinese are interested in are biotechnology, the internet of things, and artificial intelligence. It is quite clear that there is a specific move by the Chinese—this could be replicated by other countries, whether it be Russia or others—but it is not as obvious as, “This is a state company that is going to come in and invest.” They will be taking part in buy-ins of some of the companies. This is something that has already happened.
Although I understand the intention behind the new clause, some of the wording concerns me. I supported new clause 1 because it was quite clearly permissive and expansive. This new clause is quite clearly prescriptive. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the Secretary of State will be guided day to day, which is much more regularly than multi-agency reviews can happen? The Secretary of State will be guided day to day by advice from the security services and others, not as to the theoretical characteristics of an acquirer that might make them a threat, but as to the actual identity and track record of the acquirer and concern.
In particular, is the hon. Gentleman not concerned about requiring the production of a list of high-risk and low-risk characteristics, or that subsection (3) of the new clause in particular would create the possibility that, at some point, somebody who ticked all the boxes for low risk, but was still a high-risk acquirer, could prevent the Secretary of State from undertaking the scrutiny that was required? Can he even explain, for example, what he means by “greater” and “lesser” scrutiny? How would I interpret whether the Secretary of State’s scrutiny had been greater or lesser?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Those are valid points, and part of what we are driving at here is to be more prescriptive. The feeling is that we essentially need to allow the loops in the net to be closed enough such that we catch some of these companies. We do not want a situation where a number of companies have portions of them being owned by, for example, China or another country, and do not fall foul of any of the provisions currently in the Bill. In time, that could mean that countries and entities that were hostile to Britain’s strategic goals ended up having quick and strategic access to things around nanotechnology, agriculture and a range of other areas where they had essentially got their hands into something that I think should be protected far more closely by the UK.
To give an example, in the US—this is already under way—a Palo Alto-based venture capital firm backed by the Chinese Government had dozens of US start-ups in its portfolio. On 15 November 2020, the Office of the US Trade Representative said that 151 venture capital investments in US start-ups had featured at least one Chinese investor—up from 20 in 2010. We are not saying we do not want Chinese investment, but what we do not want is a situation where we are unable to have a grip when we find that loads of our technology companies —our most cutting-edge firms—are essentially all part-owned by the Chinese Communist party or one of its subsidiaries. That is why we have been more prescriptive in many parts of the new clause.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore turning to the amendment, it occurs to me that the Minister, in his new role as vaccinations tsar, could consider this Committee Room as somewhere to store some of the vaccine.
Amendment 31 would simply require the Secretary of State to report on the time taken to process notices, on the resource allocated to the new unit, and on the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises are called in under the new regime. It is about requiring greater accountability from BEIS in the investment security unit’s service standards. That sounds anodyne, but it does something very important.
Throughout our discussions, there has been one point of agreement across the Committee: hon. Members, across party lines, have raised concerns about the capacity and capability that a new investment security unit will have to deliver on the Bill’s ambition. A number of the expert witnesses added to that concern, describing the shift as “seismic”—totally transformational—and said that changes will need to be thoroughly resourced in that unit, which should be especially prepared to work closely and efficiently with our innovative start-ups.
Indeed, some of the experts were pretty clear on that point. David Petrie of the ICAEW said:
“The first point I make about that is that this new investment security unit will need to be very well resourced. A thousand notifications a year is four a day; I am just testing it for reasonableness, as accountants are inclined to do. That is quite a lot of inquiries.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 53, Q60.]
I certainly sympathise with the hon. Gentleman’s desire for that information to be published. Can he explain why the Bill should require that it be published, rather than leaving it to ongoing scrutiny by the relevant Select Committee? Does he think that the wording of paragraph (o) of the amendment needs to be more precise to be part of an Act of Parliament? If scrutiny were left to the discretion of a Select Committee, it would not need to be quite so clear about what “average” means, for example, because five or six different words mean “average” to statisticians.
The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. I think that the wording is precise enough. The accompanying guidance to the Bill could perhaps clarify some of those points. The key reason that we want that in the Bill, rather than for it to be overseen in the way that he has suggested, is that—
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOne of the things that we have probed a number of times, when taking evidence from witnesses and in our debates in Committee, is the idea that we need to give businesses clarity, because many are feeling uncertain. If they cannot make decisions about forward planning, clearly that will be detrimental as we move through the crisis.
Perhaps I should refer to some of the expert evidence we heard last week. Michael Leiter, who represents a very large, global limited liability partnership, told us:
“I think this is a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment… having some opportunity to make sure that both the private sector and the public sector are ready for that and understand the rules…is particularly important”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 46, Q52.]
That was in our discussion about resourcing, and one of the questions that I and colleagues on both sides of the Committee raised was on the resourcing of BEIS. As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central suggested, rather than the burden falling on small and medium-sized enterprises, there should be a fully resourced and expanding new unit within BEIS. Given that the number of call-ins could rise from 12 to 1,800, as we have heard, we need a huge scaling up of BEIS’s ability to look at these, and obviously it does not have the same experience that the Competition and Markets Authority had previously.
I humbly point out that the Minister assured the House on Second Reading that:
“The investment security unit will ensure that clear guidance is available to support all businesses engaging with investment screening”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 277.]
The amendment is intended to secure that assurance in substance; not to tie the hands of the Secretary of State, but to give clarity to businesses by shifting from something that may happen to something that shall happen.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I know that there was quite a bit of discussion in an earlier sitting, which I was unable to attend, about the different between “may” and “must”. In relation to clause 14—my comments apply also to clause 18—if we try to imagine the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would choose not to make those regulations, we realise that there are none. If no regulations have been made, most of subsection (6), which clearly is the meat of the clause, just does not make sense.
Subsection (6) states that the Secretary of State may reject the mandatory notice if
“it does not meet the requirements of this section”.
But the clause does not place any requirements on the notice. A letter that says, “Dear Secretary of State, this is a notice under section 14” would meet all the requirements of that subsection, so it cannot be rejected on those grounds. Clearly, it cannot be rejected on the grounds that
“it does not meet the requirements prescribed by the regulations”,
unless the Secretary of State has made the regulations. It can be rejected if
“it does not contain sufficient information to allow the Secretary of State to”
make a decision. How can it possibly be fair for a business to have a notice rejected on the grounds that it does not contain sufficient information to allow a decision to be made by somebody who has chosen not to state what information needs to be provided?
Therefore, two of the grounds on which the Secretary of State can reject the notice are meaningless. The third one has meaning, but it is surely not a reasonable way to treat any business. If there is information that the Secretary of State feels will be necessary to allow her or him to come to a decision on the notice, surely that information should be set out in regulations so that there can be no doubt.
It is perfectly in order for the statutory form of notice to require additional information that cannot be specified in advance. Clearly, the Bill will cover a wide range of transactions, and there will always be information that is needed for one transaction but maybe not for others, but surely we will need to know the name of the acquirer, the identity of the asset and the timing of the intent to acquire. It will be impossible to process any notice without those kinds of things, so surely the Secretary of State will at the very least make regulations requiring that information to be provided. If the Minister can persuade me that there are realistic circumstances in which the Secretary of State can choose not to make any regulations at all, perhaps I would not support the amendment, but the clause will simply not work if the regulations have not been made. For that reason, it should require the Secretary of State to make those regulations.
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
David Petrie: I suspect that would be the corollary of that, yes. We are probably dealing with a relatively unusual set of circumstances here. It rather assumes that the shareholders of the British company are absolutely determined to sell or take investment from an entity where its ultimate ownership is quite difficult to identify. We are dealing with quite an unusual situation—not unprecedented, certainly, but relatively unusual. I do not know what resources the new unit will have at its disposal, but given that this is relatively rare and is a question of national security, I would expect that the Secretary of State would ask it to use whatever resources are necessary to gain the information it needs.
I hope—again, we will see—that the closed doors process for the judicial review, should it come to that, would enable national security to be protected, so that if there were some other breaches as a result of the investigation, or if explaining how we found out what we know caused a breach in national security elsewhere, that problem could be resolved. I am comfortable—I think that would be the right expression—that those difficulties can be dealt with in circumstances in which the absolute preferred option for the company is to take investment, but I have to say that I think those circumstances would be relatively rare.
Q
David Petrie: Yes, I have. The Government have been very clear about the need to bring this legislation on to the statute book, and they have done so through the Green and White Papers. When consulting on the White Paper, they sought opinion from a very broad spectrum, including business groups, businesses, the investment community and so on. They have set that out in the response to the consultation.
The next consultation is the one on the sectors within the scope of the mandatory regime, and the next month or so is going to be a very important stage in this process. Defining those sectors in a way that market participants understand and that does not trigger manifestly unnecessary notifications is going to be very important, and we look forward to engaging in that process, as does the legal and investment profession and British business.