Prisons and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Sam Gyimah and Holly Lynch

Committee Debate: 1st Sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 28th March 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

Q Can I press you on that point? Do you think this is something that you should be looking at in that case? It sounds as if you are collecting the statistical data about frequency, but not doing the follow-up about how violence is investigated to see whether there is evidence about how deterrents should be in place, for example.

Martin Lomas: We look at outcomes. The process of investigation and whether the investigation was competent, whether the police should be more engaged and certainly whether the CPS should have charged—we would not look at that.

[Mr Gyimah]

Q I would like to ask a question and get the panel’s views about accountability in the new prison system and how that works. Starting with Mr Lomas, what difference do you think the Bill will make to the effectiveness of the prisons inspectorate? Could you also comment particularly on how you see the notification trigger being used?

Martin Lomas: We think this is an important step forward. We think the Bill is helpful and useful. We have already talked about what it says to those who run institutions, with regard to their purpose and what they are meant to be doing. As far as the inspectorate is concerned, we believe it strengthens our institutional framework. It recognises us formally as an entity and clarifies our powers. At one level, those powers have not changed, but the Bill clarifies them, which is important in terms of asserting our independence and reflecting the public’s understanding of what we are about. We believe that the reference to OPCAT—the optional protocol to the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—is absolutely critical in emphasising the independence of the inspectorate and consequentially its authority and ability to speak to issues and to all stakeholders, including the Government and others.

We believe the specifics around the requirement to respond on recommendations—reflecting current practice, but raising the importance of the process, formalising it, and making it more accountable—is a very big step forward in terms of our impact. Added to that, the notification arrangement and the significant concerns that are referred to again reflect practice. We would not walk away from a disastrous prison and not do something. We do act, and in fairness to the National Offender Management Service as it is now—Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service—it does respond in those circumstances. This is about making that process more transparent and accountable and putting names to the responsibilities. It is most definitely a step forward.

Rachel O'Brien: I agree with all of that. We recommended that stronger role for the inspectorate. There is a question about what happens in between inspections; that is sometimes a bit strange. There are top-level things that drive change for the three or four years in between. That is a question that we did not answer. We looked at the possible role of the independent monitoring boards, for example, to look at the more institutional day-by-day changes in the shorter term, but also new issues that might come up. The danger is that sometimes we say, “Those are the three priorities” and meanwhile something changes over here, in the local drugs market or whatever it is, so there is a question about what happens in between.

My overall accountability freedom issue would be that I worry about the balance. There are a lot of new accountabilities, still from the top-down league tables. Are those governors and new group directors going to have sufficient freedoms to make local decisions? That is the key question. That cannot be defined in primary legislation; it is much more about the narrative coming out from Government and so on.

Joe Simpson: The POA welcomes the changes, but do not think they go far enough, both for the chief inspector and for the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman. We would like to see the same legislative powers given to them as the Health and Safety Executive. If someone is going to inspect prisons, then inspect prisons and everything that goes on. If there are recommendations, someone should turn round and say to the governor “You are not doing something right.” If we are giving governors autonomy, it is not the Secretary of State who is running the prison—it is the governor. He is the employer and the person who is in charge of that prison, so they should get the 28-day notice. What is the point in putting that all the way back up for the Secretary of State, so that she can say, “Yes, we have an action plan”? We would rather see something coming from the chief inspector of prisons go to the governor to improve things, and if they do not improve them, the legislative powers akin to the Health and Safety Executive given to the chief inspector and the PPO. If we are going to have independence—the independent scrutiny of prisons and the independence over deaths in prisons—they should have that legislative power to turn round and make things change, rather than wishing for it.