Rupa Huq
Main Page: Rupa Huq (Labour - Ealing Central and Acton)Department Debates - View all Rupa Huq's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Finances Bill (Third sitting)
Rupa Huq ExcerptsThursday 17th November 2016
(8 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Finances Act 2017 View all Criminal Finances Act 2017 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 November 2016 - (17 Nov 2016)
The Chair
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Before we begin, would everybody who has a mobile phone switch it off so we can get on with the business of the day? Although it is a bit cold at the moment, hon. Members may remove their jackets if they wish to.
The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, and shows how selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally about the same or similar issues. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments in that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate, and I will work on the assumption that the Minister wishes the Committee to reach a decision on all Government amendments. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, debate occurs according to the selection and grouping list, and decisions are taken when we come to the clause that that amendment affects. I hope that explanation is helpful.
The Bill contains 51 clauses, which is a substantial number considering that we only have today and two days next week to discuss it. I would appreciate it if Members could be concise and full in their presentation as possible, so the examination can be as full as possible. After all, it is Members’ time and the House’s time. I will use my discretion on whether to allow separate stand part debates on individual clauses and schedules following the debate on relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Unexplained wealth orders: England and Wales and Northern Ireland
Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, after “sought” insert—
“(and the property specified may include property located outside the United Kingdom)”
This amendment would ensure that unexplained wealth ordered may be issued for property located outside the UK.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alan.
In summary, we welcome the Bill. The unexplained wealth orders are a good thing, but amendment 1 is an example of where we think the measures could go a little bit further and be further improved. The amendment would provide that property located outside the UK could be utilised in an unexplained wealth order brought before an individual. It is meant to be a technical rather than political amendment. We are happy to work with the Government, but I think we can all drink to this amendment regardless of political affiliation.
The amendment would facilitate information sharing across different jurisdictions and would provide the United Kingdom with vital information regarding illicit financial activity that has taken place elsewhere across the globe. Reports by both the Select Committee on Home Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee hinted at this, and there is even a line in the Government’s action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism finance from April that says we should increase
“the international reach of law enforcement agencies and international information sharing to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing threats.”
Therefore, if an individual provides false and/or misleading information in relation to an unexplained wealth order, they can be prosecuted, but we would widen the scope of the property that comes under such an order so that we can question those who might be resident in the UK regarding their suspected illicit activities regardless of where their wealth is. As we know, people travel and cross borders, so we might not be able to recover wealth from that person. That throws up issues around cross-jurisdictional co-operation, and it is one area where confiscation orders kept hitting a brick wall and coming to grief.
We can glean intelligence on behaviour abroad and share it with other states, which would act as a disincentive to come to the UK to corrupt politically exposed persons who may contaminate our economy with their illicit wealth. If criminals know that on entering the UK, there is a process and our enforcement agencies can compel them to talk about their suspect wealth or property regardless of where they have placed it, they will think twice about coming here. We want to restrict their ability to move. That would send out a powerful message that the UK is not a soft touch when it comes to dodgy financial dealings, which I think we can all agree would be a good thing.
The current threshold at which a UWO can be served under the Bill is £100,000, but what if a criminal or suspected criminal has property of £50,000 here in the UK and has moved £50,000 of property elsewhere? Our enforcement agencies have concluded that, on the balance of probability, both combined are beyond the means of the person in question. I would like to think that the Bill already covers that, but we have tabled this probing amendment to confirm it. We are talking about portable wealth, which extends to jewellery and paintings, which have ultimate portability, because someone could leg it to a foreign country with them. My conclusion is that we would be unable to issue an unexplained wealth order if property is split between two places. I suspect I am right but am happy to be proved wrong.
The scenario I mentioned raises another question. If an individual acquires property of a value that reaches the unexplained wealth order threshold of £100,000 and manages to transfer it out of the UK, it is only after they have done so that our enforcement agencies become aware of it. Does that mean that an unexplained wealth order cannot be issued to that person because the property is now outside the UK? I want some clarification from the Minister on those things. I imagine that the answer is “Yes, we cannot do that”, but if the answer is, “No, we can do it”, it would be even better, because Opposition Members want unexplained wealth orders to be a success.
Finally, the amendment would introduce an element of operational efficacy. If all our enforcement agencies were aware that they were able to factor in stuff that is located outside the UK properly from the beginning of their investigations, it could contribute to our agencies being quicker off the mark. They could sound a warning alarm bell. They would be oriented from the get-go to cast their net as widely as they can to hold criminals to account. That is largely what we seek to do through the amendment.
The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alan. As we begin the line-by-line scrutiny, it might be useful if I give the Committee a brief outline of how unexplained wealth orders will work.
In short, an unexplained wealth order is a civil investigatory tool. It is a court order that requires a person to provide information that shows they obtained identified property legitimately. If the person provides information and responds to an unexplained wealth order, the enforcement authority can then decide whether to investigate further, take recovery action under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or take no further action. If the person does not comply with an unexplained wealth order, either by not responding or not responding fully to the terms of the order, the property identified in the order is presumed to be recoverable under any subsequent civil recovery proceedings. It is important to note that the unexplained wealth order does not in itself lead directly to recovery action. It is designed to be an investigatory power and a precursor to civil recovery action.
An unexplained wealth order is an order made against a person, requiring them to provide information to explain how they obtained the property. It is important for all of us to understand this crucial factor: the unexplained wealth order is made against a person, not against property, and does not itself result in the recovery of that property. That is the vital point in relation to amendment 1.
In the Proceeds of Crime Act, it is clear that, if an order is to be made against a person or a property overseas, it must be explicitly stated on the face of the legislation. For example, section 282A of POCA provides that a civil recovery order can be made against property overseas if there is a connection with the UK. Section 375A of POCA also provides that an evidential request can be made overseas in constructing a case for civil recovery.
The same is already the case with unexplained wealth orders. New section 262A(2)(b) in clause 1 of the Bill provides that the person on whom the order will be served must be named, and it expressly provides that
“the person specified may include a person outside the United Kingdom”.
The unexplained wealth order therefore has global effect. The definition of “property” in the POCA already encompasses all property, whether it is situated at home or abroad. An unexplained wealth order can therefore list any property, wherever it is in the world. The court has an associated power to make an interim freezing order in respect of that property.
Clause 3 inserts a provision into POCA that an enforcement authority can request assistance from an overseas state concerning the freezing of property overseas that is subject to an unexplained wealth order. I therefore assure the hon. Lady that unexplained wealth orders will be effective against property anywhere in the world. Accordingly, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Dr Huq
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 1, page 2, line 31, at end insert—
“(8) Persons who are members of an enforcement authority must co-operate with other persons who are members of other enforcement authorities for the purposes of making application to the High Court for an unexplained wealth order.
(9) In particular, the duty imposed on a person by subsection (8) requires a person—
(a) to engage constructively, actively and on an ongoing basis in any process leading to an application being made for an unexplained wealth order, and
(b) to have regard to activities of a person within subsection (8) so far as they are relevant to the making of an application for an unexplained wealth order.”
This amendment would require enforcement authorities to co-operate when making applications for unexplained wealth orders.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 12—Unexplained wealth orders: duty to prevent corruption—
“In Chapter 1 of Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (investigations: introduction), after section 342, insert the following—
‘342A Unexplained wealth orders: duty to prevent corruption
(1) A relevant authority must exercise its functions in relation to unexplained wealth orders in the way which it considers is best calculated to contribute to the prevention of corruption.
(2) For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether corruption is being prevented in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
(3) In considering under subsection (1) the way which is best calculated to contribute to the prevention of corruption a relevant authority must have regard to any guidance given to it by—
(a) in the case of the National Crime Agency, the Secretary of State,
(b) in the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Attorney General,
(c) in the case of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the Financial Conduct Authority, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
(d) in the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.’”
Dr Huq
We heard in the evidence session on Tuesday from many different bodies, including Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Serious Fraud Office, and the National Crime Agency. One problem with the existing confiscation orders is that the buck seems to be passed between many of them, and there is confusion about who the lead investigator is. The amendment would introduce a duty on all those agencies to co-operate, even before it got as far as the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. Those people feel stymied, and they cannot investigate—it does not get that far because of squabbling over where the buck stops. The amendment seeks to address the lack of co-operation among UK law enforcement agencies that devolve responsibility for investigating cases.
There is an example that people may know about. It is the quite famous case of Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian who was murdered, and who uncovered what had been going on at Hermitage Capital Management. Bill Browder, an American, has spoken to an all-party parliamentary group here and is quite vocal on these issues. The murdered chap blew the whistle on $230 million in Russian Government frauds. Hermitage Capital Management discovered that, and there is a timeline on which it sought every possible avenue to open a money laundering investigation in the UK. Every single UK enforcement agency refused to open an investigation, stating that it was not its responsibility to investigate.
In 2010, Hermitage filed a complaint with the Metropolitan Police Service, highlighting the UK nexus of criminal activity. The MPS replied that the responsibility for investigating the fraud did not lie with the MPS. Hermitage then attempted to take legal action through the Serious Organised Crime Agency, requesting that an investigation begin in connection with the $230 million in fraud. SOCA replied that it was not the appropriate body for the job. In 2012, Hermitage filed another complaint with the Serious Fraud Office, which gave evidence to us on Tuesday, to highlight those financial crimes, which occurred in a UK jurisdiction. The SFO refused to do anything. In its words,
“matters do not fall within the offences that the SFO is permitted to investigate.”
In 2013, Hermitage filed a complaint with HMRC seeking a review of the company formation agent that facilitated the money laundering in the UK. HMRC answered that confidentiality precluded an investigation. In 2015, Hermitage filed a complaint with the NCA, which also gave evidence to us on Tuesday, outlining the flow of money—the fraudulent $230 million—to the UK. The NCA replied that it was a domestic criminal investigation relating to money laundering in the UK and therefore that the NCA was not the most effective way forward.
The amendment would create a duty for UK authorities to co-operate and take constructive action. We used to talk about joined-up thinking. That is essentially what the amendment is with regard to unexplained wealth orders. It would strengthen the Bill and ensure that provisions are not rendered ineffective because everyone says, “It is not my responsibility.”
Tristram Hunt
I am happy for the amendment to be withdrawn, but it would be nice to hear something more on Report. I take the point about the precision of focusing on corruption when other serious criminal activities are involved, but some language on a duty to prevent corruption would be good. The important element is the duty; I hope that the wording on corruption and other serious criminal activity might be added to that.
Dr Huq
If I understood correctly, the Minister said that no primary legislation is required to do what the amendment would do, and that there are already flags and a joined-up process. Are we confident that something like the Magnitsky case, with all the stuff that happened—everyone closing the door to Bill Browder, year upon year—would not happen again with unexplained wealth orders?
Mr Wallace
On the Magnitsky case, it would be inappropriate to comment on a case that could be under continuing investigation. The main point is that our law enforcement agencies have operational independence. It is for them to decide the priorities for how they spend their resource and work together. We do an awful lot, without primary legislation, to ensure that they work together. They liaise through regional bodies such as the regional organised crime units, and through the national co-ordinators and everything else.
Our view is that primary legislation is unnecessary because, whether it is through the code of practice, which will be published alongside the Bill, or in the operational day-to-day running of the organisations, joint working is part of their remit and, effectively, their duty. We do not think it is necessary to put anything in the Bill because we fear that that could pervert their priorities and interfere with their operational independence.
Tristram Hunt
I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 1, page 3, leave out line 28.
This amendment would allow unexplained wealth orders to be issued to politically exposed persons in the United Kingdom and EEA States.
Mr Wallace
Clause 2 acts in tandem with clause 1 in appropriate cases. It provides that the court can also issue an interim freezing order in relation to property that is subject to an unexplained wealth order. The interim freezing order provides that the property cannot be dealt with in any way while subject to that order. There is no point in putting an unexplained wealth order on something if it can immediately be sold, as we might lose the asset. The freezing order can be used to keep it in place.
It is important to split the obtaining of an unexplained wealth order and the freezing of property into two different matters. Although they will be done at the same hearing, they are different decisions with separate considerations. Some colleagues have asked why we are not providing that property must be frozen in every case. Freezing someone’s property is a very invasive measure and may not be necessary in every case. For example, there may be no suspicion that the property will be dissipated—perhaps it is a house that has been owned and occupied by the same person for many years—or that a civil recovery order will be frustrated in some other way.
We would not want unexplained wealth order applications to be rejected solely on the grounds of a technicality related to the freezing decision. It is also important to note that if property is frozen, the court may quite reasonably expect the case to progress at a far quicker pace than if no freezing order was in place. On that last point, I should flag up the fact that, under clause 1, if property is subject to an interim freezing order, the enforcement authority is given a deadline of 60 days to decide the next steps. The freezing order would then be discharged after a further 48 hours.
The expectation is that if an enforcement authority is to go forward with civil recovery action, it will obtain a property freezing order, with many of same provisions and safeguards, to apply immediately to the same property once the interim freezing order is lifted. The property would remain frozen.
An application can be made for the variation or discharge of the freezing order. The court can also provide that property can be released to meet affected persons’ reasonable living expenses, their need to carry on their business and their legal expenses. I hope that what I have said reassures hon. Members that the freezing order provisions are properly circumscribed.
Dr Huq
The Minister has given a full and cogent account of why interim freezing orders are being introduced. As a London MP, I know how dirty money in the property market has skewed the entire London property market, meaning that genuine people cannot get a foot on the ladder. It sounds as if sufficient safeguards are being put in place, so we will not stand in the way of the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
External assistance
Mr Wallace
Clause 3 supplements clause 1, on unexplained wealth orders, and clause 2. It provides for a request to be sent to another country to freeze property there that is subject to an unexplained wealth order, which addresses the point that the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton made in the debate on her amendment 1 about going after property abroad.
I will make two points for the benefit of the Committee. First, an unexplained wealth order can apply to property outside of the UK. That reflects the operation of existing civil recovery powers, which can include property overseas if a sufficient connection can be shown with the United Kingdom—for example, where the suspected criminal is British, the criminality is thought to have taken place in this country or there are victims in the UK.
Secondly, there is no international law that expressly provides for the freezing of property in relation to unexplained wealth order-type powers. We will need to liaise closely with other countries in relation what existing international law may underpin such a request, as well as working on obtaining wider recognition of unexplained wealth orders. The clause primarily creates legal certainty that such a request can be made. We also encourage recognition of such requests as part of the wider fight against international crime and corruption.
Dr Huq
Once again, we have no problems with any of that, particularly as it allays some of those concerns about overseas property that were anticipated by amendment 1.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Unexplained wealth orders: Scotland
Richard Arkless (Dumfries and Galloway) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 4, page 14, line 35, leave out “£100,000” and insert “£50,000”.
This amendment reduces the threshold for the value of property that UWO may be issued for in Scotland to £50,000.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Alan. Essentially, we are asking for the threshold or limit for which an unexplained wealth order can be granted to be reduced, in Scotland only, from £100,000 to £50,000. I cite three main arguments for making that suggestion. We state in the explanatory notes that that would bring the threshold in line with international standards. The level in Ireland is €5,000, while the level in Australia is 100,000 Australian dollars, which equates to around £60,000.
I also refer the Minister to the drastic difference in asset valuations north and south of the border, particularly in property prices. Property prices in London average at £487,000. The unexplained wealth order threshold in England and Wales is set at £100,000, which is just less than a quarter of the average property price. Property prices in Scotland are significantly lower. In my constituency the average is £120,000, while in North Ayrshire they are less than £100,000. Applying the same rationale of a percentage of the overall property price, our threshold should be substantially lower. We suggest that a reasonable level would be £50,000.
I also draw the Minister’s attention to the point that reducing the threshold in Scotland, where there are lower asset valuations, is a no-lose situation for the Government. The threshold in itself is not the main benchmark to trigger these unexplained wealth orders; it is the test. The test for Scotland, which we agree with, is set out in proposed new subsection 396B(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That test must be met in every single circumstance, whether the threshold is £5, £10 or £100,000. Even if the limit was set at £500,000, that test must be met. Given the lower asset valuations in Scotland, it is a no-lose situation to bring the threshold down.
I envisage criminals perhaps acquiring properties in a lower-asset valuation jurisdiction and creeping below the £100,000 threshold. We do not want to end up with some criminals getting off the hook and us having to come back to Parliament to try to lower the threshold. We are not suggesting that the threshold is lowered in England and Wales—that is a matter for the Minister and Members for England and Wales. Clearly there are arguments, given the higher property prices, but I suggest, for the reasons I have set out, that it would be sensible to lower the threshold for Scotland. It would be a no-lose situation for the Government to agree to the amendment.
Mr Wallace
The clause brings us for the first time to devolution and separate court systems in the United Kingdom. Clauses 4 to 6 provide for unexplained wealth orders in Scotland on effectively the same terms as clauses 1 to 3 do for England, Wales and Northern Ireland. As such, much of what we have discussed relating to the substance of unexplained wealth orders applies equally here.
The reason for separate provisions for Scotland is the different court structure and the separate existing practice and procedure that relates to civil recovery. I assure the Committee that there will be a consistent approach to unexplained wealth orders across the United Kingdom. All the safeguards and other measures will apply in Scotland as they do elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
As we are adding to the criminal law, I will specifically mention the creation of a parallel offence of knowingly or recklessly making a statement that is false or misleading, but I do not think there is anything more to concern the Committee relating to unexplained wealth orders that we have not already discussed.
Richard Arkless
I rise to reiterate our support that the clause stands part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Interim freezing orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Richard Arkless
I reiterate that we will not stand in the way of clause 6 standing part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Disclosure orders: England and Wales and Northern Ireland
Mr Wallace
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which was introduced by the last Labour Government, provides a suite of powers to be used in connection with a range of investigations, including confiscation and civil recovery. A disclosure order is one of those powerful tools and requires any person having relevant information to answer questions, provide information or produce any document that is relevant to the investigation. Disclosure orders are flexible, practical and efficient. Their use avoids the need to seek multiple orders over the course of an investigation. The changes we are making extend the power to seek disclosure orders in money laundering investigations that were previously explicitly excluded. This exclusion was primarily because of concerns over self-incrimination. However, that protection is maintained in the new provisions, ensuring that individuals who are subject to a money laundering investigation cannot be compelled to provide information that might incriminate them.
Clause 7 also changes the definition of who can apply for a disclosure order, removing the need for a prosecuting body to be responsible for its application. Significantly, this change does not lead to a reduction in the level of seniority of the person who can apply. An appropriate officer can apply for a disclosure order only on the approval of the senior appropriate officer, ensuring that the application process is safeguarded. These changes will be reflected in the statutory code of practice on the investigation tools in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
Clause 8 replicates in Scotland the provisions contained in clause 7 for England and Wales that enable an application for disclosure orders in money laundering investigations, providing an essential UK-wide response.
Dr Huq
I am convinced by the Minister’s persuasive words that red tape will be removed. We can apply for disclosure orders and yet maintain vital safeguards, so we will support clause 7 and clause 8, which extends the power to Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Power to extend moratorium period
Mr Wallace
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 9, page 28, line 34, at end insert “(subject to the restriction mentioned in section 336A(6))”
This amendment clarifies that the 186 day maximum period for extending the moratorium period also applies to a decision of the appeal court in Scotland.
Mr Wallace
Clause 9 inserts in part 7 of POCA a scheme for the extension of the suspicious activity report moratorium period beyond 31 days. As the action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance sets out, the Government see a more robust law enforcement response as central to tackling money laundering. It might help if I briefly explain how the suspicious activity report regime works.
Where a company in the regulated sector—a bank, an accountancy firm or a legal firm—suspects that they may commit a money laundering offence, they are obliged to submit a suspicious activity report to the National Crime Agency seeking consent to proceed. The National Crime Agency then has a seven-day period to determine whether it is necessary to refuse consent to the company to proceed with the transaction. If consent is refused, the 31-day moratorium period begins. During the moratorium period, law enforcement agencies need to gather the necessary evidence to instigate civil recovery proceedings or a criminal investigation in relation to the money laundering activity. However, money laundering investigations can be multi-layered and complex. Money launderers obfuscate the financial trail to distance proceeds from their criminal source; funds are often moved overseas.
New section 336A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 states that the court may not grant a further extension of the moratorium period if the effect would be to extend the period of more than 186 days in total, beginning with the day after the end of the initial 31-day moratorium period. The amendment makes that clear. Amendment 15 replicates in Scotland what clause 28(2) already does for England and Wales. Amendments 52, 53, and 56 are consequential to that.
The criminal’s property, referred to in POCA as “free property”, which may be in the form of cash, is available for consideration in confiscation unless it is already subject to a forfeiture or deprivation order. When a court considers making a confiscation order under POCA, it must not take into account certain types of property when calculating the amount of the order. This is to ensure fairness to the defendant and prevent the double counting of assets.
Clause 28 amends POCA to clarify the situation in relation to cash that has been seized and is being detained pending the decision of a forfeiture application. Cash that is detained in anticipation of the forfeiture application being made is already excluded, so this is an extension of the existing principle in section 82 of POCA. The amendment extends that to Scotland. We hope to be making an equivalent amendment in respect of Northern Ireland in due course—we are awaiting their formal agreement.
Amendments 50 and 51 will correct an error in clauses 37 and 38, which incorrectly refer to England when they should refer to England and Wales. That is merely to ensure that the text of the Bill reflects the intent of the policy, which is for the measure to extend to England and Wales. Amendment 55 will correct another typographical error.
Dr Huq
It sounds as if the amendments are tidying up some sloppy mistakes. On the whole, however, I know that the SARs extension to the moratorium period was very much welcomed by the witnesses we heard from. I have seen that some law firms do not like the policy, but I think it is a good idea. The previous period of 31 days was not long enough. Does the Minister have an inkling of how many times the maximum would be used—I think it is 200 days?
Mr Wallace
The timescale is really just a reflection of what the investigatory agencies have said to us: that some of these cases are very complex. Some of the ways in which people hide their wealth—they sometimes freeze it themselves—and who they are mean that the process will take time. We want to ensure that our agencies have time to investigate, rather than being under the sort of pressure where effectively they run out of time. Those people exploit that. That is the reason for the longer period. Hopefully it will not be used, but the very fact that it is there will give power to the elbow of the agencies trying to do the job.
Dr Huq
I thank the Minister for his response. We support the proposal, but we have a concern, which will come up in a new clause at the end, about the architecture of crime fighting. There could be better resource for all the different agencies that will be looking at these issues and particularly for the ELMER IT system. It was envisaged that that system would deal with 20,000 SARs a year, but the figure is 380,000 at the moment and will probably rise even higher after the Bill is passed. That does not relate to the clause, but I wanted to sound a word of caution.
Richard Arkless
The Minister’s explanation was comprehensive and persuasive and accords with my understanding of the Government’s position. We will not stand in the way of the clause.
Mr Wallace
Clause 9 inserts in part 7 of POCA a scheme for extending the suspicious activity report moratorium period beyond 31 days. As the action plan for anti-money laundering set out, the Government see a more robust law enforcement response as central to tackling money laundering. I have already explained the SARs regime, so we do not need to hear about that again.
As the national risk assessment set out, the UK is vulnerable to abuse by professional enablers from the legal, accountancy and finance sectors. The level of expertise involved can make it difficult to progress a money laundering investigation substantially in only 31 days. That is particularly the case when the law enforcement agency needs to obtain evidence from overseas authorities, which is another reason for an extension for a further length of time—the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton asked why it needed to be so long—or to undertake complex asset-tracing inquiries. Accordingly, the moratorium period may be lifted and funds dissipated before the investigation has progressed sufficiently to determine whether civil or criminal proceedings should be undertaken.
We need to provide law enforcement agencies with an appropriate amount of time to undertake investigations. This clause provides for the extension of the moratorium period by a court for periods of up to 31 days. That can be repeated up to a total of 186 days from the end of the initial 31-day moratorium period. The hon. Lady is better at adding up than me, so she produced the right figure. Providing an extension of the moratorium period enables law enforcement officers to continue investigating particularly complex transactions, such as those involving overseas grand corruption or other serious crime. The clause ensures that proceeds of crime are not dissipated when there is a suspicion that money laundering activity has taken place and when the law enforcement agency has not had the opportunity to complete its inquiries.
The Government recognise that there may be concerns about the length of time for which an individual’s property could be withheld from them. The clause does not allow unlimited extension of the moratorium period. The court must approve the application to extend the moratorium period each time an extension is sought. Law enforcement agencies must demonstrate to the court that it is reasonable in all circumstances for the moratorium period to be extended. They must satisfy the court that the investigation is being carried out diligently and expeditiously and that further time is required to progress the investigation.
An application to extend the moratorium period will be made to the Crown court, which provides a senior level of judicial authorisation. The owner of the property will be able to make representations in person before the court and is provided with the opportunity to appeal the decision to extend the moratorium period. An application may be made only by a senior officer who has a remit to undertake financial investigation. A senior officer is at the police rank of inspector or equivalent.
Money laundering is an enabler of serious and organised crime. The clause will help to stop criminals profiting from their criminal behaviour. It gives our law enforcement agencies the time to progress critical investigations into money laundering where they have genuine reasons for being unable to progress their investigation substantially in 31 days.
Dr Huq
The Minister has put it very well. All the witnesses stated that 31 days was not enough. Here we have appropriate checks and balances. A legal procedure is gone through to extend the period; it cannot be open-ended; and appeals procedures are built in. The Minister also praised my maths, which never happens normally—I am a qualitative person usually—so for that reason as well as all the other reasons, we will not stand in the way of the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Sharing of information within the regulated sector
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Wallace
The clause introduces a new provision into the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. As the action plan for anti-money laundering also set out—it seems to make a regular appearance—the Government see public-private partnership as central to tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. A major part of that approach is to provide support for the effective exchange of information, both within the private sector and between the public and the private sectors, to increase our collective knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities, to help the regulated sector to protect itself and to improve the quality of the UK’s financial intelligence.
Both the private sector and law enforcement agencies hold significant amounts of information that can be of great use to each other. The private sector holds data on financial transactions and related personal data; law enforcement agencies hold intelligence on money laundering and terrorist financing. When those data have been shared, there have been benefits to both sectors.
Dr Huq
I described joined-up thinking in my remarks on amendment 2. The Minister has reassured us. I have seen that some people have civil liberties concerns, but he has told us that the sharing of information will be a last resort in extreme cases, and that it will happen largely on a voluntary basis anyway.
The Government action plan on money laundering said that what is needed is a
“collaborative approach to preventing individuals becoming involved in money laundering.”
It discussed different agencies, supervisors and the public and private sectors working together. The clause does all those things, and we support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Further information notices and orders
Amendment made: 10, in clause 11, page 38, leave out line 2.—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment removes a reference to the Scottish Ministers from the list of persons who may make an application to the sheriff for a further information order under new section 339ZJ of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Mr Wallace
Clause 11 creates a new power to issue further information orders. In the anti-money laundering action plan the Government set out our commitment to improving the financial intelligence that would be available to both the law enforcement agencies and the private sector. Improving our financial intelligence is essential to allow the identification of the major risks from money laundering, and to identify where resources from both the public and private sectors should be focused.
The action plan also contained a commitment to do more to tackle money laundering internationally, through sharing information and intelligence, and working through international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force. The suspicious activity reports regime, run by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit at the National Crime Agency, is central to the UK anti-money laundering regime, and to the development of financial intelligence. The regime took more than 380,000 reports in 2014-15 from the regulated sector, including banks, lawyers and accountants.
Clause 11 will allow the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, following the receipt of a suspicious activity report, to request further information from any member of the regulated sector, irrespective of whether that entity raised the SAR.
There are a number of reasons why the UKFIU needs such a power. First, there are occasions where the SAR does not contain all the information necessary to allow the UKFIU to determine whether action, including an investigation, should be undertaken. That is particularly important when determining how scarce resources should be allocated. The intention is to drive up the quality of SARs and to enable improved intelligence analysis for the better identification of risk and threat.
Secondly, the UKFIU can use the power when it needs information in order to develop effective intelligence to identify the major threats from money launderers. That intelligence will be used to inform the work of law enforcement agencies and can be shared with the private sector to help them put in place effective counter-measures to the threats they face from money laundering.
Thirdly, it will allow the UKFIU to seek further information on behalf of a foreign financial intelligence unit to support investigations or intelligence development in that country. That will be subject to the appropriate safeguards, and the UK will benefit from the ability to request equivalent information from foreign financial intelligence units. The provision will also ensure that the UK is compliant with the relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations ahead of the its evaluation of the UK anti-money laundering regime in 2018.
The clause will allow the National Crime Agency to direct that further information is provided and, if it is not provided, to apply to a court for a further information order to require the person to provide the information requested. We are keen to support appropriate information sharing between financial intelligence units, and we know that FATF and its members want to do more in that area. Incidents such as the attacks in Paris, where financial intelligence was needed to support the investigation, illustrate the need to be able to share such information. However, I would like to be clear that there should be safeguards in place for international information sharing. As with a request driven by the NCA itself, a court order will be required where a regulated entity does not provide information if requested to do so by the NCA. That in itself is an important safeguard. I am, as ever, open to discussing this issue with hon. Members if it is felt that additional safeguards may be appropriate.
On a separate point, I know that the issue of privileged information is of concern to Members, and I want to be clear that the UK Financial Intelligence Unit will not be able to request the provision of privileged information as part of this measure. This is an important safeguard for those who hold such information, and we do not believe that it should be requested under this power.
Dr Huq
It appears that the clause enacts some of the recommendations of the action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance that the Government issued in April 2016. We will support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Andrew Griffiths.)