Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the inquiry into the horrendous attack on Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017.
I work closely with MI5. While its activity is necessarily discreet, the whole country should be profoundly grateful for the patriotism and courage of its staff. They work indefatigably every day to keep the British people safe. Since the start of 2017, MI5 and the police have disrupted 37 late-stage attack plots.
An Islamist suicide bomber murdered 22 people and injured more than 1,000, as well as inflicting incalculable psychological damage and misery. I know that the whole House will join me in expressing our profound sorrow and extending our heartfelt condolences to everyone affected by this barbaric act. They were supposed to have a brilliant time and come home safely. What should have been a simple pleasure turned into a hellish nightmare. It is vital that we understand what happened and what lessons we need to learn, because we must do everything possible to prevent a repeat of this outrage.
Volume 3 of the inquiry was published last Thursday. I would like to thank Sir John Saunders and his team, who have spent more than three years on it. Sir John finds that there was a failure by the Security Service to act swiftly enough, and that there were
“problems with the sharing of information between the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing”.
Following the publication of the report, the director general of MI5 and the head of counter-terrorism policing offered their profound apologies for not preventing the attack.
Sir John does not blame any of the educational establishments that the bomber attended for failing to identify that he was a risk, but he does find:
“More needs to be done to ensure that education providers share relevant information about students”.
Sir John concludes that the bomber
“should have been subject to a Prevent referral at some point in 2015 or 2016. However, it is very hard to say what would have happened if”
the bomber
“had been approached under Prevent or the Channel programme.”
The police investigation into the attack, Operation Manteline, is praised.
Although Sir John cannot conclude whether the attack would have been prevented, he finds that there was a significant missed opportunity to take further investigative action that he judges might have led to information that could have prevented it. While this is welcome, and the Home Office will work at pace with both organisations to act on the chairman’s recommendations, we must not lose sight of the fact that responsibility for the attack lies with the bomber and his brother. These conclusions require careful consideration.
Since 2017, the Government have made a number of changes to how we deal with and seek to prevent terrorist attacks. We have given law enforcement and intelligence agencies improved powers. We have strengthened the controls around access to explosives precursors. We have strengthened the management of terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders in prison and on licence. We have ended the automatic early release of terrorist offenders in England, Wales and Scotland, and we have ensured that the sentences served by terrorists reflect the severity of their offending. We have strengthened the tools for monitoring dangerous people in the community.
We have invested heavily in counter-terrorism. We unveiled a new counter-terrorism operations centre in 2021 that brings together partners from counter-terrorism policing, the intelligence agencies, the criminal justice system and other Government agencies. This will allow minute-by-minute collaboration between teams in the police and MI5. Last year’s integration of special branch into the national CT policing network will improve our response to the full range of national security threats, boost skills and ensure better communication between agencies and a more consistent and effective national response.
Work is under way to develop a new faith security training scheme to raise security awareness among faith communities and help them to mitigate threats. We continue to engage with faith organisations and security experts to develop the scheme. In April, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) announced the continuation of the Jewish community protective security grant for 2022. In May, new funding was allocated to provide protective security at mosques and Muslim faith schools.
In response to any terrorist attack affecting British nationals, in the UK or overseas, the Home Office’s victims of terrorism unit works to ensure that the right support is available to them. The unit is conducting an internal review to strengthen its work. I am overseeing a comprehensive review of the CONTEST strategy to combat terrorism. It follows on from the independent review of Prevent, led by William Shawcross, which assessed the programme’s effectiveness in preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. As the review made clear, Prevent requires major reform, and I have accepted all its recommendations.
Prevent has underestimated the threat of Islamist extremism, which remains far the biggest threat that we face, and too often it has minimised the role of ideology in terrorism. It will focus on security, not on political correctness, and its first objective will be to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. The Government have also developed a comprehensive system of support for the owners and operators of public places across the UK. It includes access to research-driven expertise through products delivered by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure.
However, we must go further. Martyn’s law, formerly known as the Protect Duty, will introduce proportionate new security requirements for certain public premises throughout the UK. They will be better prepared and ready to respond, and their staff will know what to do in the event of a terrorist attack. Martyn’s law will clarify who is responsible for security activity at the premises in scope, increasing accountability. We are also considering how an inspection function will oversee compliance, to provide appropriate advice, and, where necessary, to sanction.
Martyn Hett was one of those killed in Manchester. I am enormously grateful to his mother, Figen Murray, and the Martyn’s Law Campaign Team, as well as to Survivors Against Terror and all the security partners, businesses, charities, local authorities and victims’ groups that have informed our work. I have always been humbled when I have met them and heard about their experiences.
The doctrines that underpin the way in which the emergency services respond to incidents have improved since the attack. Let me end by once again recognising the anguish, and the courage, of the loved ones of those who were killed or hurt on that dreadful night. It united the country in sorrow and in disgust. We will continue to work non-stop to prevent further such tragedies from being visited on others, and I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the right hon. Lady for her questions, which I will address in due course. I agree entirely with her assessment that we must now all come together—the Government, the security services and the emergency services—to learn the lessons of this awful tragedy and work to reduce the likelihood of future attacks. It was a truly sad and terrible incident, but I want to reassure the public that our priority is to keep them safe. We must root out extremism wherever we find it, and we must give no quarter to political correctness as we do so. We must respond quickly to all criticisms, but we must also recognise the serious work that has taken place since the attack.
On Martyn’s law, the Government will publish draft legislation for scrutiny in the spring. After that, we will introduce a Bill as soon as parliamentary time allows. Its progress will depend on Parliament passing it and agreeing a date for commencement. There will be a lead-in time to allow for those captured by the Bill to prepare.
Martyn’s law is one part of our extensive efforts across Government, including by the police and security services, to combat the threat of terrorism. There remains an intensive programme of guidance, developed by security experts, counter-terrorism policing and other partners, to provide high-quality advice to stakeholders and others with responsibility for public places. I look forward to moving forward with the solution and to presenting the Bill on Martyn’s law.
We have published a new policy framework allowing for greater scrutiny of the contact between terrorist prisoners and the public. Our new approved contacts scheme, to be implemented this year, will allow greater checks on the visitors and phone contacts of those convicted of terrorism and terrorism-connected offences, regardless of the category of prison in which they are held.
A large amount of work has been done since 2017 to support and improve the consistency of local authority Prevent delivery, and to manage the risk posed by subjects of interest. This includes additional funding and support for the highest-priority areas, the publication of the Prevent duty toolkit and the development of the multi-agency centre programme. We are working across Government to mitigate the risk posed by those about whom we have concerns.
Finally, the right hon. Lady asked about support for families who are going through this unimaginable process, which is why I welcome the Deputy Prime Minister’s announcement last week on the Government’s commitment to legislating, as soon as possible, to establish an independent public advocate to support victims following a major incident. The IPA will help victims to navigate the systems and processes that may follow a major incident, such as the police investigation, the inquests and inquiries. I hope it does not have to be used, but in the event of a tragedy, we will have the resources, expertise and structures in place to support families in this unimaginable situation.
I know the whole House will agree that we must now move forward with a solution to ensure our frameworks and processes are as robust as possible so that we never again see anything like this.
I call the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
On behalf of the ISC, I extend our deepest sympathy to the families and individuals so dreadfully affected by this terrorist act.
I welcome the publication of the third volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry report, and I express my strong appreciation for the work of the inquiry team. Of course, the Committee will carefully consider the report and Sir John Saunders’s request that we should monitor the implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. In the meantime, do the Government acknowledge and accept that the ISC is the only Committee of Parliament equipped with both the facilities and the clearances fully to undertake this type of classified scrutiny?
Sir John Saunders has made it clear that he is determined that the recommendations are monitored, and he has made arrangements with the ISC to that effect. The open part of volume 3 has only just been published, and the closed recommendations have not yet been shared with the Government. We will carefully consider the report’s findings and recommendations in full. We will also consider any recommendations that Sir John makes about the role the ISC can play in the light of the memorandum of understanding that exists between the Committee and the Government. That MOU is available on the Committee’s website.
Yes, the ISC is a very effective and secure forum in which, as has happened in the past, the delivery on the back of such inquiries can be properly scrutinised.
I call the Scottish National party spokesperson.
The awful events on 22 May 2017 led to the deaths of 22 innocent people and to hundreds more being injured and affected for the rest of their lives. Of course, the ultimate responsibility lies with the bomber who detonated his homemade device in the foyer of Manchester Arena as the crowds left an Ariana Grande concert. I welcome the fact that MI5 has reflected and apologised for its role in failing to prevent this heinous attack. For example, the report finds that intelligence could have led to the bomber being followed to a car where he stored his explosives. The inquiry also found that two pieces of information about the bomber were assessed by the Security Service as not being terrorism-related. An officer also admitted that they considered a possible national security concern on one of those pieces of information, but did not immediately discuss it with colleagues and did not write up a report on the same day.
May I first ask the Home Secretary what steps she is taking to ensure that the security services improve in their communications and information sharing, guaranteeing that professional standards do not fall short, as they have done in this case? Secondly, the inquiry has found that the bomber was probably assisted by someone in Libya, but because of gaps in available evidence, that line of inquiry has not been addressed sufficiently. Can the Home Secretary provide further information on whether the investigation will continue to search for those who assisted the bomber? Given how much frustration the victims’ families are experiencing, understandably, as a result of information being withheld due to national security implications, will the Home Secretary at least provide reassurance to those families that the UK Government will leave no stone unturned in finding justice for their relatives?