Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill

Baroness Winterton of Doncaster Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 8th June 2021 Commons Chamber

Second Reading

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Before I ask the Minister to move Second Reading, I will introduce a three-minute time limit on Back-Bench speeches. As colleagues will know, this is a very short debate, but I will try to get in as many Members as I can.

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[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

Talking about the cost to the taxpayer, I wonder if my right hon. Friend continues to be shocked by the fact that a Member of this House, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), received over £85,000 from subsidiaries that were mis-selling, like a company in my constituency that defrauded my constituents. That money has never been paid back, but that Member received money from the taxpayer, and actually we should be looking at ourselves—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order.

[Mr McFadden]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I do think it ill behoves any Member, given the scale of the losses and given the necessity of the Government to bring in this Bill to compensate people for their losses, to profit from this either directly or indirectly. I think that should be clear to all of us.

The Government are legislating on this because of the litany of regulatory failures set out in the report on this issue carried out by Dame Elizabeth Gloster. These failures included failures to respond to repeated warnings from investors and potential investors, LCF repeatedly running promotions implying its products were regulated by the FCA, and failures of communication between different parts of the FCA, all in the end leading to this collapse and financial loss. Had the FCA acted earlier, far fewer people would have invested through this firm, losses would have been lower and the taxpayer would not be faced with the £120 million we are talking about today.

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[Mr McFadden]

Many investors did invest because they thought that these mini-bonds were authorised by the FCA, and they were not. A big part of the problem here is having a regulated firm marketing unregulated products. If I am right, the hon. Member’s constituents may be eligible for the compensation authorised by the Bill.

Dame Elizabeth’s report makes it clear how badly the investors were let down by the regulator, and both the Government and the FCA have said that they accept the findings. I have a number of questions that I want to put to the Minister for his wind-up at the end of the debate. First, why is the level of compensation he has chosen 80% of the FSCS level? On what basis was that decision made? Secondly, how will this work practically? I understand that the Government want to avoid the involvement of claims management companies, and that is something I think we would all endorse. How will the Government do that and avoid repeated rounds of claims?

The Bill also gives rise to some important broader questions about policy. The failings identified were serious and substantial, and have to be addressed. The first of those broader questions is: when should compensation paid for by the taxpayer be paid and when not? The Minister quite rightly said that the taxpayer cannot stand behind every investment policy. It would be unfair on taxpayers to expect them to do so, and it would produce perverse incentives. After all, we all know that the value of investments can go down as well as up.

In the case of LCF, it was bonds that were being sold, and the advertising implied a guaranteed pay-out when such pay-outs could not, in practice, be guaranteed. Regulation is not aimed at enabling people to make reasonably informed choices and to understand the risks they are taking. Having made the decision to offer taxpayer-funded compensation in this case, when does the Minister believe it justifiable that the taxpayer should be asked to do that, and when does he not? What was the discussion in the Treasury about how to ring-fence this failure and this company from broader claims for financial compensation? There are calls for compensation quite regularly when investment failures happen. How confident is the Minister that the Treasury will not be subject to legal action from victims of other investment failings?

How confident is the Minister that the FCA can actually make the changes necessary to avoid a repeat of the findings set out in Dame Elizabeth’s report? Callers were phoning the FCA for three years before the company’s collapse. Appendix 6 of Dame Elizabeth’s report states that the FCA received 611 queries from consumers regarding LCF. That is not a random phone call at five o’clock on a Friday that can be missed; it is a pattern of people trying repeatedly to raise red flags and getting nowhere

Individual A said on 15 July 2016:

“This company is doing exactly what the pyramid scams are doing. What they’re doing is they’re paying the money out, the interest out from money which people are paying on the bond… In other words, it’s just a pyramid scam… they’re saying they’ve got charges on their property, security on them, assets on their property, of course they don’t have any assets. It’s all horrendous really, the whole thing”.

There was call after call like that, and they were not acted on. They were not passed up the line, partly because the mini bonds were not regulated. In fact, one caller was told by the FCA call handler that it was not a scam.

There was also the letter from individual financial adviser Neil Liversidge in 2015, three full years before the collapse of the company. He warned that LCF had one customer who was worth—bear with me on the language, Madam Deputy Speaker; I am quoting—

“the square root of bugger all”

and he tried to raise warnings about the practices and health of the company. It appears that that letter was lost.

One of the more damning findings in Dame Elizabeth’s report is that, even if the letter had not been lost,

“It is unlikely that it would have resulted in any, or any substantive, action or re-action by the FCA.”

So little faith did she have in the processes that she appears to have argued that it did not matter that that warning letter had been lost because it would not have been acted on. Imagine if the FCA had acted, in 2015 or 2016, when those reports were received, rather than only at the end of 2018. Another question for the Minister is this: what will the FCA do to improve its handling of reports like this?

Then, there is the so-called halo effect of regulated companies selling unregulated products. Being regulated by the FCA featured heavily in LCF promotions. The financial promotions team at the FCA did warn LCF to dial back on the advertising, but the pattern went on and on, and no one drew the conclusion that this was not just an advertising problem, but a problem with the content of what it was actually selling. Dame Elizabeth states in her report:

“A substantial proportion of the Bondholders said that they would not have invested in LCF had it not been for the fact that it was regulated by the FCA.”

How will the FCA avoid the difference between unregulated activity and regulated companies from being exploited in the future?

The Gloster report was also the subject of a well-publicised disagreement between Andrew Bailey, the Governor of the Bank of England, and Dame Elizabeth, about the nature of responsibility and accountability. Where do the Government stand on this issue? It was all played out before the Treasury Committee in several hearings. Is it the Treasury’s view that senior officials in leading regulatory bodies are responsible for the failing that happen on their watch, or should responsibility apply only to the organisation collectively?

Does the Minister agree with the statement in the report that

“It is difficult to see why an individuals’ willingness to take on challenging tasks in public bodies should absolve them from accountability”?

Or does the Treasury accept the statement from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards quoted in the report that

“A buck that does not stop with an individual...stops nowhere”?

These broader questions matter, because with ever more complex financial markets, the regulators have to be equipped to do the job—equipped through their leadership and their systems, but also through the resources at their disposal. Part of the backdrop to this is the FCA taking on responsibility for tens of thousands more firms after it took on the responsibilities of the Office of Fair Trading back in 2014. Is the Minister confident that it has the resources after the LCF collapse?

Let me turn to clause 2 and the fraud compensation fund. The Bill authorises a loan to be made as a consequence of greater than expected claims on that fund arising from the Dalriada case. It is estimated that the judgment in that case could result in claims of over £300 million. The loan will be funded by a levy on the pensions industry, to be paid back over the next 10 to 15 years. That comes on top of the levy to pay for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme rising sharply since the introduction of the Government’s pension freedom legislation in 2015. Back then, the levy was £300 million; this year, it will be over £1 billion pounds. That is a 48% increase on the previous year and more than triple the level of five years ago. Why does the Minister think the FSCS levy has had to increase so much since the pension freedoms legislation was introduced in 2015? Now we have a new fraud levy to boot.

Surely the right way to tackle this issue is to ask why more and more pensioners are being exposed to fraud and scams in the first place. Why does the Minister think that is happening? Why are more pensioners losing their money? When the previous Chancellor introduced the pension freedoms changes, he said that

“there will be free impartial guidance available to all.”

Six years on, the take-up of that advice is just 3%. Even when the Department for Work and Pensions made a targeted push to increase it, it only got up to 11%, so the vast majority of people using these freedoms are not using that service. Of the small number who take up the option, 72% say they do something different from their first inclination after receiving advice, so it is clear that such advice can help people to make a better decision, yet take-up is nowhere near the promise made at the time.

The promise of pension freedoms being matched with good, trustworthy financial advice has not been kept, and these levies, which will have to be paid by the pension schemes that have been nowhere near fraud and are trying to offer a good service to their members, are being put in place at least in part as a result of the Government’s own pension reforms, which have left more pensioners exposed to fraud and scams. That conclusion was endorsed by the Work and Pensions Committee in its recent report.

What unites both these clauses is people being subject to fraud, often through online advertising. There is a clear need for greater action on this. People are being bombarded on a daily basis with adverts for investments, some of which are scams and attempts at fraud. Financial innovation can be a great thing, but consumers need help in navigating this world, and they are currently being failed by a regulatory system that is lagging behind what is actually happening in the financial markets. There is an online harms Bill coming that, as things stand, does not include plans to crack down on financial crime. I urge the Government to think again on that. To proceed with that Bill without tackling online financial harm would be an enormous lost opportunity to protect consumers against this type of crime.

The answer is not just compensation when people lose money; it is to protect people against financial scams happening before they lose their money, to crack down on the fraudsters while they are peddling their scams and to stop these adverts reaching people in the first place. Not all thieves wear masks. It is possible to rob people of their money through misleading websites and illusory promises of financial gain. It is critical that the laws that we pass in this place keep pace with the innovations in fraud and financial crime that are taking place. For that to happen, it will take a lot more than the two clauses on compensation in this Bill.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We now go to the Chair of the Treasury Committee, who has four minutes.

[Mel Stride (Central Devon) (Con) [V]]

This is a very important Bill. It seeks to compensate for some significant wrongs. As part of our ongoing inquiry into London Capital & Finance and the FCA’s response to it, the Treasury Committee has heard many harrowing stories of those who, in many cases, lost life-changing amounts of money as a consequence of what happened.

The Treasury Committee has been involved in the LCF situation for some time. My predecessor, Baroness Morgan, initiated the inquiry by Dame Elizabeth Gloster through approaches by the Committee to the Treasury and the FCA. I take this opportunity to offer my thanks, on behalf of the Committee and of the LCF bond holders, for the very thorough report that she and her team produced, for the witness session she attended as part of our inquiry and for the courtesy and information that she provided to me outside that witness session by way of correspondence and discussions over the telephone.

Dame Elizabeth Gloster carried out some excellent work. As a consequence of her report, the level of the failings on the part of the FCA is very clear. Indeed, the answers to the key questions put by the Government to Dame Elizabeth as part of the directions for her inquiry were clear: the permissions granted to LCF were not appropriate to the business it carried on; the FCA did not adequately supervise LCF’s compliance with the FCA rules and policies; and the FCA’s handling of information from third parties regarding LCF was wholly deficient. The FCA had appropriate rules to regulate the communication of financial promotions by LCF. However, the FCA did not have in place appropriate policies. Numerous red flags were examined by the Committee, but they had been missed over a long period.

There were wider failings within the regulatory system, and we have heard some of those from the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). The FCA’s approach to the perimeter was limited. It did not take a holistic view of the perimeter and therefore there was inadequate supervision of unregulated activities. The halo effect, which the shadow Minister also raised, was without doubt a wider systemic problem within the FCA.

Our inquiry is ongoing. We have taken evidence from Dame Elizabeth, from senior personnel at the FCA, including Andrew Bailey, who was the chief executive officer of the FCA during the appropriate period, and my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. We will have much to say in our report, which will be published no later than the end of this month.

Looking ahead, the speakers so far have rightly asked how we make sure that this does not happen again. That lies within the transformation programme that the FCA is now undertaking. The Committee will be showing a close and careful interest in the progress of that transformation programme.

By way of intervention, I note the observation of my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) about the importance of those responsible for shortcomings being held accountable. We will no doubt have something to say about that in the report.

The whole issue of compensation leads on to the issue of the general view that there should be personal responsibility for investments, as well as Government backing, and we will need to look at that. I am terribly short of time, so I will leave it there. I welcome the Bill.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We now go to the SNP spokesperson, Peter Grant, who I am sure will be acutely aware of the very limited amount of time that we have left for the debate.

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[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, as ever, for his representations. He has been a determined campaigner for that sector during my tenure. I have regular conversations, at least every six weeks, with the chief executive of the FCA, and we discuss a whole range of matters. I would be very happy to discuss that matter with him when I next speak to him in the next few weeks.

As Members from across the House have recognised today, the measure concerning a loan to the board of the Pension Protection Fund, set out in clause 2, is vital to ensure that those defrauded of their pensions by scam pension liberation schemes are able to access the compensation that they deserve. The Bill will ensure that those whose pensions have been unjustly targeted by fraudsters receive their pensions. We must continue to provide a safety net for people across the UK, who deserve to have confidence that they will have a pension pot for their retirement. I note that a number of observations were made about the ongoing challenge of dealing with the evolving nature of financial services firms and the sophistication of scams. The Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham, and I are working across Whitehall to bring an effective resolution to this matter.

I acknowledge that Members from across the House have supported the principles of the Bill, and I welcome the support that it has received. It will offer some relief to the enormous distress and hardship suffered by LCF bondholders and victims of fraudulent pension liberation schemes. It is an important Bill, and I want to move as quickly as possible from Royal Assent to enact it and deliver that compensation. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will support it this evening.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill:

Committal

The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 17 June.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Alan Mak.)

Question agreed to.

Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill (money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:

(a) expenditure incurred by the Treasury for, or in connection with, the payment of compensation to customers of London Capital & Finance plc; and

(b) loans by the Secretary of State to the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.—(Alan Mak.)

Question agreed to.

Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill (ways and means)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Compensation (London Capital & Finance plc and Fraud Compensation Fund) Bill, it is expedient to authorise such levying of charges under section 189 of the Pensions Act 2004 and Article 171 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 as may arise by virtue of that Act.—(Alan Mak.)

Question agreed to.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I will now suspend the House for two minutes to make the necessary arrangements for the next business.