(5 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe shadow Secretary of State has touched on a number of issues, stretching from the Kurdish community to Daesh online. I shall try to deal with them in turn.
What I think is at the heart of the answers to all these questions is that the only way in which we will be able to resolve the problems is through a proper political settlement. Many of the issues raised by the shadow Secretary of State—whether the issue is the minority rights of Yazidis and Christians, or the relationship between Kurds in Syria or Iraq and their national Governments—will have to be resolved in that way. It is very easy to stand at the Dispatch Box and try to talk about an inclusive political settlement, but that is unbelievably difficult to achieve, particularly after eight years of war, deep resentments and a massive militarisation of societies. We see the challenges all the way from Somalia to Yemen, and it will be just as difficult on the Syria-Iraq border, but ultimately that is the only way to resolve these issues, and the more support we can provide for mediators to try to come up with those political solutions, the better off we will all be.
The hon. Gentleman raised a technical and important question about the purpose of British forces. The reason for our forces on the ground was the Iraqi Government’s request for self-defence against Daesh and Syria, and the justification for their continuing presence is to do with the continuing threat posed by Daesh as a terrorist organisation, but not as a territory-holding organisation. I can, however, reassure the House that the nature of our presence is relatively limited. We are talking about airstrikes many of which are not conducted, the planes not being based in the middle east itself, and we are talking about British troops who are predominantly involved in training operations such as counter-IED and first-aid training. Some are based in the Kurdish regions, others in Iraqi bases. We are talking about a few hundred people. This is not the type of operation that we were talking about in relation to Iraq or Afghanistan, and I therefore do not think that a whole new mandate is necessary.
I share the hon. Gentleman’s frustration that a debate on an issue as important as this should be so poorly attended in the House of Commons. I hope that our sense of seriousness as a nation means that the next time such a statement is made, people will engage more in the debate.
Idlib is a source of huge concern. DFID has put £80 million into humanitarian support in Idlib, but it remains true that the populations in Idlib are under a ferocious and brutal attack from the Syrian Government. It remains very difficult to access people within Idlib, and we continue through every mechanism to call on both the Syrian Government and their supporters, including their supporters from Russia, to exercise restraint, but our options have been very limited and we need to do so in a way that does not repeat the mistakes made in the past of laying down red lines that we cannot maintain or raising the hopes of communities in ways that we cannot vindicate or justify.
This brings me to the question of resettlement in Iraq and the 55,000 suspected Daesh fighters and their families and social media. All that is leading up to a much bigger issue: there are clearly some legal issues raised, and there are consular and human rights issues raised, but at the heart of all this has to be the question of Daesh mark 2, or in other words, how we prevent all the same conditions—all the same resentments, all the same abuses, all the same lack of public services and all the same corruption—that led to the emergence of Daesh in its first form back in 2004-5 and its new form of 2011-12 from re-emerging again. We have to work with the Iraqi Government and with those areas of Syria controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces to ensure that people’s rights are respected, that reconstruction money is going in and above all that Sunni Arabs feel they have a stake in a political settlement, whereas at the moment they often feel deeply excluded by the regimes, by the ethnicity of the regimes and by the sectarian allegiances of the regimes.
On that last point, recognising the considerable caution my right hon. Friend has expressed about the future of Iraq, what more can be done to help promote political reconciliation in the provinces of Anbar and Nineveh and to encourage economic reforms that will enable all the provinces of Iraq to benefit from the stability that our forces have done so much to secure?
This is of course an issue that my right hon. Friend knows very well indeed. In essence, the only way that we can begin to bring some kind of life and some kind of hope back to areas such as Anbar and Nineveh is by making sure that we have the right combination of economic development, governance and security, which is a pompous way of saying we need to start fixing houses in Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul. That means clearing mines out of the way, and that means actually physically getting buildings up. This has to be led by the Iraqi Government. There is more we can do in terms of tax incentives, training, support and infrastructure, but that all points to the next consideration, which is of course security. They still remain dangerous areas; there is still a continuing rural insurgency. The way in which that security is addressed—the identity of the Iraqi forces we bring in and their sectarian allegiances—will be very important in regaining the trust of the population. Finally, we must have the right kind of devolution down to the local level so that people feel that the leadership in Mosul, Ramadi or Fallujah genuinely reflects them—reflects them democratically, reflects their identities, reflects their sense of hope—so that those three elements of security, governance and economic development can begin to produce a sense of hope.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the shadow Secretary of State for his comments and for his broad welcome for the review’s conclusions. I agree with him about the importance of the referendum and its verification and the overwhelming result showing that the islanders want to remain British.
The hon. Gentleman asked a number of specific questions, including about how often we conduct such a review. The last review was conducted in 2008 and this review was set in train in 2013, which is about right as an interval: we should look at the issue every four or five years.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the potential involvement of Russia and press speculation. I am not responsible for speculation in the newspapers about either Russia or, indeed, troop numbers. So far as the threat is concerned, I re-emphasise that the principal threat to the islands remains the unjustified claim of Argentina to ownership of them.
On the budget, I made it clear that the expenditure is a 10-year programme: there will be expenditure of £180 million over the next 10 years. On Rapier, we expect it to go out of service in about 2019 or 2020, and there will be no gap before we introduce its replacement.
The hon. Gentleman asked about diplomatic discussions with Argentina. He will have noticed the presence on the Front Bench of my colleagues from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who are always ready to talk to Argentina. However, if the discussions are to be about the future of the Falkland Islands, it is very important that representatives of the Falklands Islands Government are present in the room when they take place.
On behalf of the Defence Committee, I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement on the Falkland Islands. May I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), who led the Committee’s trip to the Falkland Islands, and thank the Secretary of State for taking on board their recommendations?
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and I am particularly grateful to those two members of his Committee for undertaking that particular journey. It is not especially easy to visit the Falkland Islands at any time and it obviously involves a commitment of a number of days. We have, of course, reflected on the recommendations my hon. Friend set out in his letter to me.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe are already co-operating closely with France in particular, and we have reinforced our offer of assistance to France over the last few days. If ISIL is to be defeated and the threat to our own country and other European countries reduced, we will of course depend on the co-operation of the entire international community, but especially on the co-operation of partners in the region. The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the role that Turkey and other regional partners can play.
We have been training Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and are doing so at the moment. Training courses in Kurdistan are being managed and led by British troops, and I hope that they will help the peshmerga, in particular, in their fight against ISIL.
Setting aside the fact that there will be no foreign combat troops on the ground, will the Secretary of State tell us what is the difference between the 2007 strategy in Iraq and the strategy today? In particular, have we a new counter-insurgency doctrine, is there a new Sunni outreach strategy, and have we adopted a new approach to building the capacity of the Iraqi Government and army, or are we fighting the same target with the same strategy and fewer resources?
I can tell my hon. Friend—who, I know, brings a great deal of experience from Iraq to the House—that the biggest difference between now and 2007 is that we now have a genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq, who represent both Shia and Sunni, and, indeed, Kurdish elements in Iraq. The new Defence Minister, Minister Obeidi, is himself a Sunni. It is important for that Government to concentrate on precisely the kind of Sunni outreach that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, so that their forces can enjoy the support of the tribes in the Anbar region, where ground must be recaptured from ISIS.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the shadow Defence Secretary for what he has said and for the tone in which he said it. I agree with his comment about the baseless untruths. He started by saying that our armed forces must be accountable to the law, and it is important to emphasise that—that they are accountable under both domestic law and the law of armed conflict, and that where there are allegations they will always be investigated. We should be open and frank about that. Where instances of some ill treatment or harsh treatment occur, they should be fully and honestly investigated. I do think that there are very few countries and judicial systems that would put themselves through this kind of inquiry to get to the truth.
The hon. Gentleman asked me some specific questions. On the recommendations, I am studying the report in detail and I will respond, as is customary, within the next few weeks on the detail of the recommendations. I hope it is clear that I accept the spirit of them all and the principle behind them all. I just have to look at some of the practicalities of implementing at least one or two of them.
I do not have any up-to-date information about where the personnel are currently serving. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would allow me to write to him on that specific point.
On the procedural changes, these were the procedures that applied 10 years ago, in 2004. Sir Thayne himself acknowledges that many of the procedural changes have already been introduced. On the public inquiry, it might have been easy for the incoming Government—the inquiry was set up under the previous Government—simply to halt the public inquiry, but I believe that it was the right decision to allow it to run its course. However, we now have the Iraq historic allegations team, which will be able to get at the truth of these allegations probably in a different format and a little more quickly than a public inquiry, inevitably. That is not a criticism of Sir Thayne—far from it.
I join the Secretary of State in absolutely commending the report for reinforcing the honour and respect of the British soldiers. Having been based in Abu Naji and Maysan at the time, I encourage the Secretary of State to focus on the broader political context. It was completely tragic that not just a few Iraqis, but most of the Iraqi leadership in the province were convinced of these unimaginable atrocities. I encourage the Secretary of State to ensure that in future we have the right role for political officers on the ground to ensure that bodies are treated in the correct fashion, that the survivors’ families are reached out to in the correct fashion and that trust is built between the British military and the local political leaders to ensure that our soldiers are protected from these baseless allegations.
My hon. Friend makes the very important point that we need to reflect on the extent to which these lies and untruths were believed by the local community in the area. He makes the point all the more powerfully because of his personal experience and knowledge—not simply of Iraq, but of that particular province of Iraq. I will certainly reflect further on the point he makes about the role of political officers.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
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I will certainly look at that suggestion. We gained expertise in countering IEDs and vehicle-borne explosive devices in Afghanistan and, as the hon. Lady says, we also accumulated considerable expertise in dealing with the injuries that they cause.
I urge the Secretary of State please to ensure that, along with the trainers, we deploy people who have expertise in Iraq, both military and civilian, to look specifically at the role of the Shi’a militia and the Sunni tribes so that we can credibly sit at the table with the Iraqi Government and the United States to challenge and debate the overall strategy, and drive a Sunni reconciliation.
I absolutely endorse what my hon. Friend, the Chairman of the Defence Committee, said. It is vital that the new Iraqi Government not only consider themselves to be inclusive, but demonstrate that they are inclusive. They must command the support of the Sunni tribes and show that the Shi’a militia that are associated with the effort to halt ISIL are part of an overall inclusive effort that cuts across political, religious and tribal divisions. I have emphasised that throughout. There are encouraging signs in the Iraqi Government, in the reform of the Iraqi military and in Defence Minister Obeidi’s proposals for a national guard that can help to secure ground that has been won back from ISIL. However, there is a long way to go in ensuring that that effort is genuinely inclusive.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberNo. The 2010 review rightly identified the need for agile and flexible forces, and set out the numbers. It is too early to prejudge the review that will be conducted next year, but I am sure that the House will want to salute the achievement of our armed forces in so many difficult parts of the world.
Will the Secretary of State ensure that the new SDSR acknowledges that Russia has radically changed the situation, first by creating a war in Europe and secondly by ensuring that NATO is undermined, and will it plan for what appear to be Russian planning assumptions for a major war in 2018-19?
My hon. Friend the Chairman of the Select Committee is right. The 2010 review did not predict the scale of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the recent NATO summit at Newport reinforced the need for NATO members to maintain the level of their spending and to ensure a properly rapid reaction force that can be an effective deterrent to Russian aggression in future.