Iraq War (10th Anniversary)

Debate between Rory Stewart and Martin Horwood

Thursday 13th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart]

I am sure that much of that is true. I am not here to defend that decision—it was a terrible, catastrophic decision—but I think it is dangerous to put the whole blame simply on Blair and Bush, because the implication is that if we do not have Blair and Bush around, we will never get in these messes again. We will get in these messes again because we have not created the proper Government policy structures required to think these things through—not just to avoid the decision to invade, but above all to get out more rapidly once we have made a bad decision.

Military reforms—you have very kindly given me some time, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I do not have enough to talk about this today—involve accepting that the military have too much power in the policy debate. That is not the military’s fault: they are filling a vacuum. The military feel that the Foreign Office is not taking the lead and that somebody needs to do something. I saw that all the time on the ground in Iraq. I remember a major-general saying to me, “The diplomats and aid workers aren’t doing anything, so we”—the military—“need to take those things over,” but that is not the military’s job. It is extremely dangerous, because its puts generals in positions where they make optimistic predictions about their capacity to sort things out, albeit without a detailed understanding of the politics or the reality of those aspects of governance or diplomacy.

We in Parliament need to look at ourselves—it is on this that we need to conclude. The hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) was exactly right to ask us to look hard at how the Select Committee on Defence, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence and Security Committee got this wrong. What reforms have we introduced to those Committees to ensure that we do not get it wrong again? How do we as Members of Parliament operate in a very complicated world? It is not realistic for any of us in this Chamber to understand exactly what the difference is between Harakat-Dawa, Hizb-e-Dawa and Hizb-e-Dawa Islamiya. Everybody is learning desperately from briefs, trying to sound plausible, but there are 200 nations in the world. Ministers are busy. Politicians are busy; they are worrying about their constituents. They are not deep experts on these issues. We therefore need to create a system that we can rely on in the Foreign Office, the military and the intelligence services. We in Parliament need to know how to question those people, how to listen to them and how to promote people who disagree with us. We need in Parliament to learn how to look at which civil servants got it wrong and hold them accountable, rather than promoting, as we did, almost everybody who was implicated in the Iraq decisions.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

rose—

[Rory Stewart]

I am coming to the end.

Finally, we need above all to learn—I feel, as a new Member of Parliament, and with all deference to this House—a lesson of humility.

Piracy (Somalia)

Debate between Rory Stewart and Martin Horwood

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) and his Committee on securing this timely and important debate and the whole Committee on the report, which is an authoritative and important contribution to British policy making in the context.

The problems associated with piracy are well understood by everyone here. It is conducted on a staggering scale in the Indian ocean, and I think that the report suggests that between 1,500 and 3,000 pirates are operating there. It affects trade through the Gulf of Aden worth hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars to the global economy. Any disruption of that trade certainly affects not just British companies, but companies all over the world, and the insurance and other markets that support it. There are disturbing trends, which the Select Committee drew attention to, including—and probably most worryingly—increasing violence against hostages, which was not a particular characteristic of Somali piracy a few years ago. On top of that, there is the fact that such piracy has been going on for decades. The international community despite, I think, nine United Nations Security Council resolutions and three multinational naval operations, has not remotely cracked the problem. As we have heard, the amount of ransom that is being paid is on the increase.

That is not to say, however, that there are not some positive signals. In Somalia, the situation on the ground seems more promising than for many years. That is partly due to the courage of African Union and other international forces, which have secured more territory than for many years. There is some evidence that progress is being made against forces such as al-Shabaab, although it continues to control huge swathes of the country.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on how serious or sustainable the progress in Somalia is? Is he confident that in three years’ time Somalia will be significantly better than it is today?

[Martin Horwood]

I cannot predict the future, but the fact that Mogadishu is now an overwhelmingly secure city, which was far from true only a few years ago, and that the Foreign Secretary and International Development Secretary can visit cities such as Mogadishu with a degree of confidence about their personal security is a quite dramatic shift, as I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would acknowledge. I do not say that securing a military solution is the only path forward, but the fact that African Union troops and others have made enormous sacrifices, displayed great courage and secured a large amount of territory should not go unnoticed.

There is also progress in the sense that areas of the internationally recognised territory of Somalia—mainly, in practice, self-governing areas such as Somaliland and Puntland—have achieved a reasonable degree of peace and security. The Government have shown wisdom in promoting a flexible attitude to territories such as Somaliland. The creation of the Somaliland Development Corporation, which the Government supported earlier this year, is a positive development. Trying to exploit the economic potential of the relative peace of areas such as Somaliland is a practical contribution to the provision of an alternative economic model to the chaos and piracy prevalent in other parts of the Somali territory. It is exactly right that the Department for International Development is prioritising development on the ground and the provision of economic alternatives to people in Somalia.

The convening of the London conference earlier this year was an important step, not just in relation to tackling war and conflict in Somalia and getting a co-ordinated regional approach, which the Select Committee asked for, but in making concrete contributions to progress on anti-piracy initiatives, including some things that have been mentioned: the taskforces on ransoms and the wonderfully named—let me get it right—Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre. I am sure that Hansard will report that I got that fluently right. The substantial financial commitment that the Government have made to RAPPICC is welcome, and we have provided its first director, Garry Crone. That support is welcome and exactly the kind of lead in international co-ordination that the Select Committee asked for.

On ransoms, Her Majesty’s Government’s instinct is exactly right. Briefings from non-governmental organisations such as Saferworld, which has talked to civil society in Somalia, make it clear that the economic model of piracy brings, in some cases, the most effective wealth provision into the local economy. If we can disrupt that business model and suggest that a peaceful, normal economy and society would be a more profitable way to develop—as we would obviously hope—we will have some chance of defeating the root causes of piracy. If we continue to fuel the ransom economy and pay money, that will be a massive incentive for Somalis to continue with piracy and to allow it to spread. If, as the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) said, risk and reward are so imbalanced, why would piracy not spread down the coast of Africa? Why would not that model be emulated in other parts of the world?

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

The whole debate is a tribute to the astonishing attention currently being paid to Somalia. In fact, the increase in African Union troops from 12,000 to 17,730, and indeed this whole discussion, show how important Somali piracy is. I would like to sound a note of caution, however. The most important thing in the debate is not to get dragged in too deeply, or to be too ambitious in what we feel we can achieve on the ground in Somalia.

There are very grand theories going around about the importance of Somali piracy and linking it to theories of state building, economic development, regional stability and terrorism. The hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) made a number of those arguments. They are powerful, partly because a powerful industry supports them, trying to draw us ever deeper into Somalia. The components of that industry are various, but there are four.

The first is what I call the “forward school”, represented by people like my father, who quite like the idea of grand naval operations and keep talking about sending out Q-boats and remembering Julius Caesar attacking the shoreline. That is the naval “use it or lose it” approach, where a military complex likes to expand its area of operations to justify its existence.

The second is, of course, the Somali Government themselves, who find it very convenient to use Somali piracy to attract international attention and resources. They are increasingly adept at manipulating international sentiment on human rights and terrorism to attract more resources into their Government.

The third component is think-tanks. There is now a major industry, particularly focused on Islamic radicalisation and counter-terrorism, that is keen to connect Somali piracy with the obsessions of Washington think-tanks with the proliferation of al-Qaeda.

Finally, as the previous speaker pointed out, there are the aid agencies, which find it extremely convenient to use Somali piracy to argue for more investment in development operations in Somalia. Connections are perpetually made, and were made by the hon. Gentleman, with governance, failed states, economic development and alternative livelihoods, as they are in Yemen, Congo, Chad, Afghanistan and Sudan.

[Martin Horwood]

I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s long and genuine experience in the field, but having worked for a development NGO I think the suggestion that the NGOs are in some way fostering an image of Somalia in particular for the benefit of their business model and to encourage spending on development is rather extraordinary and, indeed, really offensive.

[Rory Stewart]

I am very happy to share endless statements from almost every major NGO and development agency that has attempted to draw links between their programmes on the ground in all the areas the hon. Gentleman and I mentioned and state instability, and indeed piracy itself. It is entirely normal. We have seen it all the way from Congo to Afghanistan. Somalia is absolutely no exception.

The problem with that kind of argument is twofold. First, there is a theoretical problem: the strong link between state instability, governance and developmental poverty and piracy is yet to be proven at any theoretical level. Secondly, the actual links, as Anja Shortland argued in a recent academic paper, are very fragile indeed. No link has so far been effectively established between the piracy and al-Qaeda, and very few substantial links have been established between piracy and the al-Shabaab movement itself. As for statements about development and state building, Anja Shortland argued that it is very doubtful whether the contribution of piracy to the Somali economy is anything other than marginally positive at the moment.

I am not saying that Somali piracy is not an evil in itself, or that poverty in Somalia is anything other evil. Both those things are true and important. Attempting to connect the two, however, draws us into a dangerous policy position. The solution is humility and context. Instead of endlessly inflating the problem of Somali piracy in order to draw in more resources, we need to acknowledge the reality of our situation.

We need to acknowledge first that, as many hon. Members have pointed out, we have made little progress on Somali piracy over the past five years. We have invested surprisingly little in the issue, despite an enormous amount of rhetoric. Despite nine UN resolutions and three multinational task forces, the reality on the ground is that there has been an increase in both the number of attacks and the amount of ransom money being paid. Moreover, despite an enormous amount of rhetoric and the idea that people read in The Daily Telegraph that this is the No. 1 priority of the British Navy, we have often only one ship or perhaps none at all in the region; in fact the matter does not actually classify at the highest priority level for our naval operations. Part of that may be due to mixed signals, influenced by the fact that the majority of the crews, unfortunately, are not citizens of OECD countries, and the majority of the ships involved have nothing to do with Britain itself.

However, there are much more fundamental limits constraining us and, unless we acknowledge those limits, we are going to get ourselves in trouble. Those limits are threefold. First, there is a limit of abstraction. Statements about governance, rule of law and economic development in Somalia are extremely vague and ill-focused. We have a poor understanding of governance and rule of law structures on the ground in Somalia, very little idea of what kind of country the international community could turn Somalia into, and few models to put forward. The isolated lives of our diplomats and other international officials, because of security issues and short tour lengths, and lack of linguistic expertise means that their understanding of what is happening at rural level in Somalia is extremely limited. All of that is disguised within a very optimistic language, which talks about a land-based solution, without any evidence that we have the knowledge, the power or the legitimacy to achieve that kind of solution.

[Martin Horwood]

I will resist the temptation to debate Anja Shortland’s conclusions, which I think demonstrate exactly the opposite of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but on the specific point about the lack of a positive model, what about the example of Somaliland—he may regard it as a different territory, I suppose—and the British Government’s support of the Somaliland Development Corporation? Does not that look like a positive alternative model of development?

[Rory Stewart]

The problems in the al-Shabaab-controlled areas and in Puntland are completely different from those in Somaliland, and attempting to read from one across the other is highly misleading.

To conclude, the context needs to be put in place. The limited obligation that we have needs to be asserted: in other words, we do indeed have an obligation to the Somali people, as we have an obligation to the people of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan and our own people, but the threat posed by Somali piracy and by Somali state instability to UK national interests is limited. It is a threat but it is one threat among many. Somalia is one of perhaps 40 countries in the world with which the United Kingdom and the international community needs to be concerned. We should not be raising the expectations of the Somali people through talk of our ability to deliver solutions that we cannot deliver.

This is not a recipe for pessimism. It is instead to suggest that we can make developmental progress, but we will not be able to achieve governance, rule of law, or state stability. We may be able to contain Somali piracy, but we are extremely unlikely to be able to eliminate it. Our objectives should be limited to ongoing counter-piracy operations, some development operations and an attempt to increase the likelihood of a political settlement and decrease the likelihood of civil war. Any attempt to claim that we can do more is likely to mislead the British people, disappoint the Somali people and draw us into a situation into which we should not be drawn.