Criminal Finances Bill (Sixth sitting)

Roger Mullin Excerpts

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 22nd November 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Tristram Hunt]

I will not detain the Committee with an inquiry into the difference between “weighty” and “obscure”; these things can often be lost in the mists of time. As we did not quite generate the success that we needed to on new clause 11, I will not put the measure to a Division. However, I urge the Minister to ensure that, having created this interesting Bill and having delivered these interesting reforms, if the reforms are going to be put to proper effect and have the political momentum—a terrifying word—behind them, then a degree of political transparency and support connected to Parliament is important. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 19

Whistleblowing in relation to failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion

‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector, including the protection of anonymity, in relation to the disclosure of suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion, and report to Parliament within six months of the passing of this Act.’—(Roger Mullin.)

This new clause would conduct a review into the facilitation and protection of whistleblowers with a focus on the protection of anonymity for those who suspect corporate failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Roger Mullin]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22—The culture of the banking industry and prevention of the facilitation of tax evasion—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into the extent to which the banking culture contributes to the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the financial sector, and lay a copy of the review before the House of Commons within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.

(2) The review must set out what steps the UK Government intends to take to ensure that banking culture is not facilitating tax evasion.’

[Roger Mullin]

I rise to speak to new clauses 19 and 22, which are on today’s amendment paper for the Committee to scrutinise thanks to the complacent and worrying attitudes of both the FCA and the BBA at last week’s evidence session, when I specifically raised the issues of banking culture and whistleblowing.

During the previous exchanges, the Minister indicated the importance of culture, for which I am grateful. I have been concerned with culture for a long time. In one of my previous lives, I undertook more than 30 cultural studies of large, complex organisations. As many Members will be aware because I have related this fact more than once, large-scale international studies have shown that around 70% of major corporate failures are primarily as a result of a failure of culture—they are not about detailed regulation or detailed law, but about culture. In that regard, this issue must be taken very seriously indeed.

A very important part of culture for the related new clause on whistleblowing is to assess internal trust within organisations. Unless there is sufficient cultural trust, whistleblowers will not feel secure or safe. Despite advances in recent years in the protection of whistleblowers, I am sure that I am not alone in having had people come to me, an MP for barely over a year, saying that they wish to raise issues in organisations but fear the consequences.

I will highlight that by picking just one example—the case of Paul Moore, with whom some Members will be familiar—from the financial sector to show the importance of culture and whistleblowing. He is best known as the HBOS whistleblower, following his dismissal from Halifax Bank of Scotland in 2004. He was appointed to the role of head of group regulatory risk at the end of 2003 and had formal responsibilities for the bank’s policy and oversight of executive management’s compliance with Financial Services Authority regulation. During 2004, while conducting reviews of the bank’s sales culture, Moore and his team uncovered mis-selling and unethical practice. He reported those findings to the HBOS board as his job demanded, and was fired on 8 November 2004 by the HBOS group chief executive officer, James Crosby. Since then, Mr Moore has been shunned by the financial community for doing his job and doing it well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Roger Mullin]

I thank the Minister for his remarks, particularly his conclusion, when he indicated an open mind, as is only to be expected from him. However, we remain concerned about culture. He mentioned the role of the FCA. After the comments made last week by the FCA representative, I would have thought that the FCA itself needs a bit of a culture review to see whether it is fit for purpose.

[Mr Wallace]

When the Bill was being rolled out, I specifically asked for a meeting with the FCA to demand that when it comes into force—hopefully it will do so—they will up their game. The overall intention of the Bill is not just the criminal prosecution of individuals, but to bring about cultural change. As a regulator, I would like steps to be taken. One of the things that I welcome in the English part of the Bill is that the perpetrators are faced with unlimited fines for some of the offences—there is no cap on fines. With large fines, we change not only employees’ habits, but shareholders’ behaviour, which is important.

[Roger Mullin]

I think the Minister for those remarks and I particularly welcome his remarks about his meeting with the FCA. He is to be commended for that, and we would fully support him. Given his remarks, we will not at this stage push either of the new clauses to a Division, but we will reserve our position and perhaps return to it on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 20

Recovery orders: repatriation

‘(1) The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended, after section 266, by inserting—

“266A Recovery orders: repatriation

(1) Where a court—

(a) issues a recovery order under section 266; and

(b) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that property subject to the recovery order was obtained through unlawful conduct in a foreign country,

the court must issue a repatriation order in relation to that property.

(2) A repatriation order shall provide that within a year of the property’s having been recovered the property must be repatriated back to its country of origin.

(3) When a repatriation order has been issued, the Secretary of State shall send a request for cooperation and assistance to a representative of the government of the country of origin, in consultation with relevant third parties, and must, upon a court having issued a recovery order, endeavour to agree with that representative—

(a) as to how such property or the value of such property will be used upon its being repatriated to ensure that wherever possible the property repatriated will be used in a manner that will contribute to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 16, that benefits victims of the unlawful conduct, or that ensures the repatriated property is used for the original purpose from which it was diverted;

(b) a mechanism for accounting for the disbursement of the property and for making public a report on the use to which the property has been put.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

“relevant third parties” will include civil society actors and non-governmental organisations; independent audit bodies; the Department for International Development and multilateral development banks; and

“victims” will include communities affected by the unlawful conduct as well as the State.

(5) A repatriation order shall not be issued where—

(a) the court is satisfied that on the balance of probabilities that successful repatriation would lead to the property or the value of the property being subject to conduct that, were it within its jurisdiction, would violate the Human Rights Act 1998;

(b) the court is satisfied that on, the balance of probabilities, that successful repatriation would most likely result in such property being subject to illicit financial activity by a Politically Exposed Person in its country of origin; or

(c) the court is satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the property would not reach and/or be used for the purposes as agreed to by the Secretary of State and the representative of the country of origin.

(6) The UK may retain the total value of the recovered property where the Secretary of State and the relevant enforcement agency take all appropriate steps as set out in section (3) subsections (a) and (b) to assist the State in question in repatriating such property and yet receive no cooperation from the other State within a year of having taken such appropriate steps.

(7) For the purposes of subsection (6) “cooperation” is defined as the foreign State’s conclusively demonstrating to the Secretary of State and enforcement agency of its having done or being in the process of implementing the necessary steps required to ensure that the property or value of such property will be used for the ends laid down in section (3) (a) and the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the property or value of such property will be used in accordance with those activities and probabilities as laid down in subsection (5)(a), (b) and (c).

(8) The court may order that a repatriation order may grant that the property could be given, subject to an agreement between the Secretary of State and a representative of the government of the country of origin, to a non-state actor who may distribute the property in accordance with subsection (3)(a) and (b) above.

(9) Upon application by the relevant enforcement agency the court may increase the time period within which repatriation must happen up to a maximum of five years if the court is satisfied that operational circumstances preclude the possibility of repatriation within the period previously required.

(10) The relevant enforcement agency may apply to the court for further extensions to the time period, where there is less than a year before the date of repatriation.

(11) Where the court grants an extension the enforcement agency in conjunction with the Secretary of State must publish a public report detailing the reasons why it sought an extension to the deadline for repatriation.

(12) Where the Secretary of State in conjunction with the enforcement agency publishes such a report as set out the Secretary of State may omit sensitive operational information which would preclude the possibility of repatriation being successful should such details be published.

(13) Such a report without redacted information will be passed to the Secretary of State upon each application made to the court for an extension.

(14) No later than one year after such property is repatriated all such reports will be made public in an uncensored form.””—(Dr Huq.)

This new clause would require property that was subject to a recovery order to be repatriated to its country of origin where the money was options through unlawful conduct in that country.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dr Huq]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State—and the enforcement agencies vested with the power to do so—to receive recovered property under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to repatriate recovered property where a court is satisfied that the property or the value of the property was begotten by illicit means. I hinted at the issue this morning. The clause builds on former Prime Minister David Cameron’s global forum for asset recovery, which came about after the anti-corruption summit of May 2016. We Opposition Members commend him for that. How he is missed. We have seen the forum begin to bear fruit, with the Government having signed a memorandum of understanding with Nigeria last September. There has clearly been limited progress on repatriation, but the Crown Prosecution Service’s most recent asset recovery strategy laments the low take-up of mutual legal assistance requests:

“Since London is a global centre for finance, there are a large number of criminal proceeds deposited in its financial institutions. Despite this, historically the CPS has not received a high volume of incoming MLA requests for the restraint and recovery of assets.”

Many of the people from the charitable sector who gave evidence worry that, at the end of the process, little will go back to those communities and third-world economies.

The Minister said on Second Reading, in relation to repatriating illicit wealth, that

“It is important to note that we are already doing this. In November 2015, the UK returned £28 million to Macau, which were the proceeds of corruption laundered in the UK. That is a concrete example of our giving back money to those countries that have been robbed by crooks who have used Britain to launder the money or to make the money in its jurisdiction. I want to see more of that and to see it go further.”—[Official Report, 25 October 2016; Vol. 616, c. 198.]

Through this new clause, we seek to help him with that process. He has made a clear commitment to seeing repatriation go further, and to ensuring that there is more of it. The CPS has also stated that mutual legal assistance is seriously underused, and that massive sums of illicit wealth are simply not subject to such requests and are therefore not being repatriated.

The new clause would not obstruct the Minister or the Government in their desire to see greater repatriation of illicit wealth. In fact, it would aid the Government in realising their aims. The new clause seeks to provide a different avenue from mutual legal assistance for repatriating illicit wealth, and it has a number of in-built safeguards to ensure that the UK repatriates such wealth to deserving countries, as well as safeguarding against the UK’s time being wasted.

Although the new clause is substantial in scope and takes up a number of pages in the amendment paper, we are not trying to cause an argument for argument’s sake. A precedent for repatriating wealth has been set, and the Committee has heard an example. The new clause would streamline the process, and I hope that the Government will take that in good faith; the new clause is technical, rather than political.

This is how we envisage the new clause working: where a court is satisfied that property is recoverable and issues a recovery order, and where it is also satisfied that the property was acquired with wealth illicitly obtained abroad, it may instruct a receiving enforcement agency to take steps towards repatriating that wealth upon the property being initially recovered. We term that a “repatriation order”—that is snappy.

Once such an order has been made, the Secretary of State would request co-operation and assistance in the repatriation process from a representative of the Government of the country of origin. The Secretary of State would then be free to enter into consultation with any other relevant third party. After that initial contact, an agreement would be reached with the aforementioned actors on how the value of the property would be used on repatriation.

The purpose of the measure is international development. In the new clause, proposed new section 266A(3)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 states that

“wherever possible the property repatriated will be used in a manner that will contribute to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 16”,

or the repatriated property will benefit the victims of the crime, or it will be used for its original purpose. The Government have some flexibility and room for discretion in the phrase “wherever possible”. Proposed subsection (4) contains a list of definitions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Arkless]

The SNP generally supports that proposition—we would prefer that Crown dependencies and overseas territories held publicly available registers of beneficial ownership—but to further a point that I made earlier, as the Scottish National party, we are obviously reluctant to compel this place in primary legislation to legislate for jurisdictions where it perhaps does not have locus. Proposed new section 2AA(5) in new clause 5 highlights the constitutional quagmire that that would put this place in. It states that this place would

“take all reasonable steps to support the Crown Dependencies to consent”.

Are we going to try to persuade them to consent? I do not quite understand what that subsection is getting at. If we have jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction; if we do not have jurisdiction, we simply do not have jurisdiction.

In conversations that I have had with the Jersey authorities—I have forthcoming conversations with the Isle of Man authorities, which sent me a similar letter, although I perhaps would not describe it in such terms—they have been at pains to stress that this place does not have competency to make such legislative provisions. I am minded to agree, even though I think it would be a good idea if they did, under their own steam, make those public registers available. Our position is that we support the proposition in principle, but we do not see that this new clause is competent, given the jurisdictional capabilities of this place over the Crown dependencies.

[Roger Mullin]

The SNP has been very supportive of everything today, but I have to say that for the past year and a half I have been having discussions with the Isle of Man authorities, including with the First Minister there, and I have found them genuinely willing to engage in discussions. I think that the language used about the Isle of Man was unfortunate.

[Mr Wallace]

As the hon. Lady rightly says, this subject has been raised significantly, both on Second Reading and elsewhere. New clause 21 would set a legislative timetable for the UK Government to ensure that overseas territories have a public register of beneficial ownership, and to work with Crown dependencies to achieve the same outcome. There is considerable interest in this specific issue and I am pleased that this amendment allows us to debate it. I understand where the Opposition are coming from and appreciate the desire for these jurisdictions to have publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership information—David Cameron made this an ambition in 2015. I would be grateful if the hon. Lady clarified why she chooses to treat Crown dependencies differently from overseas territories when it comes to some of the measures; that would be helpful to all Members.

While the overseas territories and Crown dependencies are separate jurisdictions with their own democratically elected Governments, and are responsible for their own economic diversification and fiscal matters, we have been working with them on their role on company transparency. If public registers emerge as a new global standard, the UK Government would expect all relevant jurisdictions to meet that standard. However, it would be wrong to say that, in the absence of public registers, no efforts have been made to increase corporate transparency and tackle tax evasion and corruption. The Crown dependencies and those overseas territories with financial centres are already taking a number of important steps on beneficial ownership and tax transparency, which will put them well ahead of most jurisdictions. This includes some of our G20 partners and other major corporate and financial centres, including some states in the United States. These measures will prevent criminals from hiding behind anonymous shell companies and mark a significant increase in the ability of UK law enforcement authorities to investigate bribery and corruption, money laundering and tax evasion.

I asked officials whether there has ever been an example of our imposing legislation on the Crown dependencies. As far as we can find out, in recent history there has never been an example of our imposing legislation on Crown dependencies without their consent. That is important—we have not gone around imposing our will on Crown dependencies as we see fit. Where we have done so on overseas territories, it has been on very strong moral issues such as capital punishment. Both in Crown dependencies and overseas territories, people have moved quite significantly and, I have to say to the hon. Lady, far more significantly than in 13 years of a Labour Government. We cannot sit here and ignore the elephant in the room.

Under our Government, we now have a position where the debate in this room is about the word “public” and whether registers are going to be public. It is not about whether these islands and other places will have a central register of beneficial ownership. By next year, they will either have a direct central register or linked registers and that is 90% of the way. By the way, our law enforcement agencies will have automatic access to that information.

The best thing, in my view, would be to say, “Yes, we know what David Cameron’s intention was in 2015 when he made that statement; yes, the United Kingdom pretty much leads the world in making our register public for the whole of the United Kingdom”, but also to say, “Let us revisit this once we get the Bill through, once we see whether our law enforcement agencies can use that access to prosecute, deter, change culture and show the way forward.” If that is not happening, of course we can have these debates again, but we should recognise that a lot of those countries have moved without our imposing our will on them, and we are hopefully giving access to our National Crime Agency and HMRC—all the things that we struggled to get for very many years. Let us see where that journey takes us. Our intention is clear. We pretty much lead the world in this. I urge hon. Members to recognise that we are going a long way.