(1 year, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThank you for selecting the amendments to Lords amendment 5, Madam Deputy Speaker. I would first like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South (Andrew Lewer) for bringing his amendments forward. He has put his finger on a couple of important principles about how we do law in this country and how we legislate in this House.
I should start by saying that this debate is absolutely not about abortion. My hon. Friend’s amendments also do not change the legislation regarding buffer zones. As has been said, that debate has happened in this House; they are in place. In fact, the powers providing for buffer zones around abortion clinics already exist. That point was made very well, I may say, by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq). She is not in her place, but she highlighted how, where buffer zones have been challenged, their presence has been upheld and people protesting within them have been moved on. They are both legal and, it would appear from her description, effective for their purpose.
We therefore have not only laws that provide for buffer zones around abortion clinics but some evidence of what those mean in practice. We have the evidence that there are laws that allow for people to be moved on. However, we also have something rather more disturbing: evidence of the way that law is being interpreted.
I would like to make two points about the law and how we approach it. As a Member coming to this House tasked with understanding the issues that we debate—a wide range of issues on all sorts of things—one of the first questions I ask myself, and often one of the first questions asked of me, is, “What evidence is there of the need for this?” I think that that question of necessity and proportionality is an important one, particularly in relation to amendment (b) to Lords amendment 5 tabled by my hon. Friend, which seeks a pause in the legislation until we have established such a need.
Certainly, before any kind of national provision is introduced, it is reasonable to ask, “What is the necessity, and is this proportional?” In 2018, it was established that that necessity was not there, so I have to ask myself how that has changed and why the measure is felt to be necessary now. Is there a material difference? I must confess that I am struggling to understand the objection to providing or securing that evidence to have the confidence that we are acting proportionally and out of necessity.
My second point on my hon. Friend’s amendments is about, effectively, the carve-out or provision for silent prayer. There is no support in this place, nor has there been throughout the passage of the Bill, for any intimidation or harassment of women seeking the services of an abortion clinic. That is an important point, because that is not what the amendments seek to achieve and we already have laws to deal with that.
We have evidence of an arrest that took place for the act of silent prayer. Amendment (a) seeks to make it clear that that is an inappropriate interpretation of our laws.
That seems to be the nub of the challenge. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, although he does not feel that silent prayer would intimidate him, plenty of users of the service feel that it is intimidating, so it is right that it is in scope?
The hon. Member has clearly read my notes, because I am coming to that exact point. In response to her earlier comments, I also say that I do not seek to put myself in the place of a woman who is seeking the services of an abortion clinic. I respect the fact that that is an incredibly difficult moment—a sensitive and vital moment—and I cannot seek to understand that from my lived experience, as she said.
Equally, however, as the hon. Member said, it is the presence of the person in that place that is objectionable, because we cannot know what silent prayer is. Hon. Members may well be silently praying that I wrap up my remarks so that we can move to the votes; I have no way of knowing. Prayer is not necessarily marked by a folding of hands, a closing of eyes, a bowing of the head or a thumbing of a rosary, and it is not necessarily marked by kneeling.
Indeed, the evidence from the abortion clinic with a buffer zone around it where the arrest took place is that the person was standing. When challenged, she was arrested on the basis that she was praying silently. There were no placards or graphic images, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton, and there was no shouting—there was nothing. That is the point of concern, because what is the basis for the arrest if it is just the presence of someone who is perhaps in the habit of praying silently?
The importance of the issue comes down to three things: thoughts, words and deeds. If our freedom to think, our freedom to speak and our freedom to act exist on a continuum, where we put the marker of where a freedom ends is a statement about our society. Do we place that marker just beyond the freedom to speak, effectively saying that we must watch our speech and what we say? I think we have already established through the laws of the land that we do that, because we do not allow people to speak freely without consideration.
What we have seen, however, through the implementation of existing local laws that the Bill seeks to make national, is an interpretation that says that we do not have freedom of thought. That is the point of my contribution and of the amendments of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South. Specifically, I support them because first, they are a helpful and sadly necessary clarification that we in this country enjoy freedom of thought and the freedom to practise silent prayer; and secondly, when we make laws, it is incumbent on us to pause to test the need for further legislation before introducing unnecessary legislation.